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Introduction 
The Historian as Detective 
This book is a history of criminal homicide, or murder, in America. 
Murder is one of the two most common forms of intentional homicide, 
defined simply as the killing of one human being by another; the other 
is war. The third, capital punishment, is linked to both; death may be 
decreed either for failing to kill when a society demands it or for killing 
when a society forbids it. All three forms are linked in other, sometimes 
surprising ways. But while war has been a main—perhaps the main— 
subject of traditional history, historians have only newly turned their 
attention to criminal homicide. 
As fact of life and death, object of horror and curiosity, subject of 
epic and myth, murder of course goes back as far as we can dig; Cain's 
slaying of his brother, Abel, is central to the biblical account of human 
genesis, and the bones of prehistoric men and women show clear evi­
dence of homicide, even cannibalism. But while the subject is older 
than history itself, what is new is serious historical investigation of mur­
der, and the legal response to it, as a means of understanding social 
behavior. 
In fact historians have simply added a new layer of questions to those 
that have long been asked by ordinary citizens, theologians, and schol­
arly experts of all kinds. Many of the old questions endure simply be­
cause they are always fresh, or cannot be answered with certainty; and 
some of the old answers endure simply because they work. But histori­
cal detective work has provided some surprises, as careful analysis of the 
who, what, how, and when of homicide in earlier times has often chal­
lenged the conventional wisdom, clearing some of the usual suspects 
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and pointing to others. At the same time, the nature of the clues left by 
past events has left much unanswered, often unanswerable, confirming 
what every reader knows: that much about murder remains a mystery. 
One of the ways in which the study of murder fits into the study of 
history is that writing history is really a form of detective work. The 
object for both detectives and historians is to reconstruct a version of 
some past event or events as accurately as possible, to make a convinc­
ing story out of whatever clues have been left behind. A good historian, 
or detective, needs imagination, logic, and experience to make the case, 
but ultimately it must be based on the evidence—whether interviews, 
fingerprints, official documents, private papers, or physical remains. 
And while good clues make a tight case, some can be read in more than 
one way, and scattered, ambiguous, or absent clues leave us with mys­
teries difficult or impossible to crack. 
But while professional historians are often mystery fans, there are 
differences between writing the social history of homicide and solving 
a crime, some of which may be seen through a look at two of the best-
known murder cases in American history. The killings of Abby and 
Andrew Borden in Fall River, Massachusetts, on the Thursday morning 
of August 4, 1892, held the title "Most Famous Murder Case in Ameri­
can History" for a little over a hundred years, until the Los Angeles 
knifing deaths of Nicole Brown Simpson and Ronald Goldman on the 
Sunday evening of June 12, 1994. Despite differences in these cases 
almost as great as the century and continent that divide them, there 
is no secret to why they seized our imaginations. Both involved two 
victims; both were exceptionally bloody events, the Bordens savagely 
chopped up, apparently by an ax, Simpson and Goldman by a knife. 
The accused killers in both cases were close relatives, the Bordens' 
daughter, Simpson's ex-husband; both defendants were seen as objects 
of sympathy, unlikely villains universally and semiaifectionately known 
not by their full names but as "Lizzie" and "O.J." 
But above all, both cases presented strong elements of mystery: the 
timing was tight, no weapons or bloody clothes were found, the prose-
cution's expert witnesses were tripped up by the defense. And while 
millions believed that the accused were guilty, millions more, and more 
important all of the jurors, could not believe that two middle-aged 
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people with spotless public reputations could commit such acts of ap­
parently senseless brutality. 
The central question in both cases, as in most brought to trial, was 
simply who, with other questions—how, why, and where—treated as 
secondary and the answers, such as "he was jealous" or "in the bed­
room, with an edged instrument, around 8 A.M.," used simply as part 
of the evidence pointing to the specific identity of the killer. But for the 
historian, who in this sense—answerable in terms of individual iden-
tity—is rarely the central issue. Sometimes it is possible to reinvestigate 
ancient murder mysteries, to stretch the "true crime" genre back de­
cades or even centuries, to suggest who might have killed the Bordens 
or even the "little princes in the tower," two young heirs to the British 
throne who disappeared sometime in 1483. But for a social history of 
homicide in general, it is not the exceptional cases but the typical ones 
that are most interesting, those that reveal the most about the times and 
places in which they occurred. And in most cases there is rarely any doubt 
about who committed the crimes. The more important question is rather 
why, as applied to both the accused and the legal outcome of the case. 
For a time, during the nineteenth century and part of the twentieth, 
there was an attempt to answer the more general why about the act itself 
in terms of the individual who. As part of an attempt to establish a new 
science of criminology, to explain the causes of crime in general and 
homicide in particular, researchers turned to the more established sci­
ence of biology, later to psychology. Criminal behavior was "deviant," 
or different, by definition—which suggested that criminals were, too; 
that is, the shape of their heads, or their intelligence quotients, or their 
genetic makeup was different from that of ordinary law-abiding people. 
But this has proved an investigative dead end; while biology has some 
bearing on the subject of violence—most obviously, males, especially 
young males, behave more violently than women, for example—it has 
so far proved almost impossible to distinguish killers or other criminals 
from others of the same age and sex in terms of their internal chemistry 
or the wiring of their brains, and absolutely impossible to predict that 
any given individual will or will not commit a given crime. 
That is in fact perhaps the one conclusion shared by those who have 
investigated the subject not through science but through religion, phi­
losophy, and the arts. The issue that has always made murder a major 
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theme of the world s great literature—not only the Bible and our own 
Western Oedipus, Hamlet, and Macbeth but also the great epics of many 
peoples across the globe—is again not who but why. The simple iden­
tity of a killer is rarely a question, and never as important as the reasons 
underlying the act; the exploration of homicide is at this level part of 
the ongoing effort to understand and explain the nature of our com­
mon humanity. The key word is "common": it is assumed that to un­
derstand murder is to understand ourselves, in that we all share at least 
the capacity to destroy ourselves and each other. 
This book shares that basic assumption. But beyond that no history 
is able, as history, to explore the deeper questions of responsibility and 
morality any more than it can those of individual identity. 
The historical record, then, with its often incomplete or absent clues, 
does not allow us to search everywhere the imagination reaches. But it 
suggests its own versions of the questions who? and why? Sometimes 
historians can unearth much about an individual act and probe its sig­
nificance; certainly we can add up and speculate about the meaning of 
many thousands of acts spread over centuries, and the social and legal 
reactions to them. One key question, as among contemporary sociolo­
gists and criminologists, is thus, how many? This and the other ques­
tions that grow out of it are not then individual but collective and 
social—to ask who means "what kinds of people" commit homicide, 
to ask why means "what kinds of conditions" or "motives" have driven 
them. Given the uniquely historical dimension, the next obvious set of 
questions is comparative: in terms of who does what to whom, how 
often and why, and what then is likely to follow, how does the modern 
United States compare to seventeenth-century Massachusetts, the slave 
South, or the western frontier? How have homicide and the reactions 
to it changed over time, and why? 
The ultimate purpose of all these questions about murder is to find 
out more about the societies in which it has occurred. And to compare 
different times and places is to suggest the kinds of conditions that drive 
murder rates up and down among different groups. 
The answers are not always fully satisfactory. The most obvious of 
historical questions, to begin with, is, how much higher (or lower) are 
today's murder rates than those of one or two or three hundred years 
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ago? But despite its simplicity, this is a question that the historical rec­
ord cannot answer with any precision. 
It is never easy to measure the extent of any illegal activity. Even in the 
most vigilant of modern jurisdictions there is a "dark figure" represent­
ing the unknown and unknowable number of acts that are never discov­
ered, or reported. The job of measuring gets harder when the search is 
extended back into times and places in which assault, for example, or 
prostitution were so common, or so fully tolerated, that no records were 
kept of how much or how many. Things get even more complicated 
when some acts are declared criminal at one time but not another: cock­
fighting, selling horse meat, carrying a weapon without a license. 
Murder is in fact the easiest of crimes to trace through time: always 
taken seriously, almost always subject to law, never common enough to 
be completely tolerated or overlooked. The legal disposition of murder 
cases is—usually—a matter of record, wherever records have survived. 
And while there is a dark figure for wholly undiscovered homicide, as 
for all crimes, the number is rarely large: exotic or hard-to-detect ways 
of murdering people are not often found in the real world, in which 
dead victims are usually identified and so are the majority of killers. But 
even murder presents problems of comparison across time. 
In the United States today the procedure for counting the "murder 
rate" for any jurisdiction is a standard one. A coroner s inquest or medi­
cal examiner determines that a given death is a homicide; the number 
of such homicides is tallied for a full year; the total number of people 
in the population, calculated from the census, is then divided into 
the number of homicides, and the result is expressed as a rate per 
100,000. In Louisiana, for example, the rate for 1993 was 20.3 kill­
ings per 100,000 residents, in Maine 1.6, across the United States as a 
whole 9.5. But it is usually impossible to make the same calculations 
for times past. 
First, there are sometimes no official or trustworthy figures at all, or 
figures that are not easily comparable to others. The best available may 
not count deaths directly. More usual are court records of several kinds, 
each representing a different stage in the legal process: homicide indict­
ments, trials, convictions, finally executions, with the numbers shrink­
ing each time the process moves farther away from the original act of 
homicide. 
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Problems of legal or social definition also cloud the count. Abor­
tions, in the past, have sometimes been classified as homicide; so have 
fatal automobile accidents. And not all people were always counted, or 
counted in the same way, in all jurisdictions; it is sometimes unclear 
whether official records were kept of the murders of slaves, say, whether 
by other slaves or by whites, or the victims of formal duels at one end of 
the social scale or lynchings at the other. And as another kind of com­
plication, since calculating a murder "rate" involves division, its relative 
accuracy depends not only on the numerator—number of homicides— 
but also on the denominator—size of the population. And while in the 
modern United States the denominator is based on a reasonably reliable 
census, that kind of count is not always available, and for some times 
and places the size of the population is no more than an educated guess. 
In the end,finally, any kind of numerical statement about the history 
of homicide must be cast as a statistical generalization, meaning that it 
is "mostly" or "typically" true, but not always. If, for example, it is 
statistically accurate to say that most homicides have been committed 
by males, especially young males, most especially poor young males, it 
should be noted that O. J. Simpson belongs in only one of these three 
categories, Lizzie Borden in none. 
And yet despite all of these problems, it is still possible to make at 
least rough numerical comparisons across time. Given the numbers, the 
wider purpose of the investigation is to find out more about the soci­
eties that produced them. And the numbers are only one set of histori­
cal clues, always used together with others. It is not only the rate and 
nature of criminal homicide but the way it is treated in law and in 
custom that helps reveal what a given society fears and what it does not, 
its economic or psychological tensions, the value it places on human 
life, perhaps the different kinds of values it places on different kinds of 
human life. 
The historical evidence is not always tidy; it does not fit easily into 
any kind of box—such as those currently labeled politically "right" or 
"left"—and sometimes the attempt to solve the mystery of what hap­
pened in the past generates new mysteries of its own. But the potential 
results are worth the effort. The richest, strongest nation in the world, 
we have scandalously high rates of murder, higher than those of any 
other country in the West, or among the prospering free societies of the 
Pacific Rim. Fear of criminal violence plagues the United States today, 
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driving much of our politics, our patterns of settlement, the relations 
among our races and social classes. But these rates have varied greatly 
over the centuries, generations, even shorter spans of time. We have not 
always been so fearful, nor have our citizens always led the Western 
world in homicides. One purpose here is to trace the origins of both 
developments. 
Two sets of questions, then, run throughout this book; both of them 
require that the story of homicide be set firmly inside the wider history 
of America, with all its different regions and peoples. The first examines 
how, and how well, the justice system has worked in dealing with homi­
cide and other capital crimes. Who has run the system, historically, and 
for what ends? How efficiently has it detected murder, and how fairly 
has it dealt with murder suspects? How does legal theory compare with 
actual practice? What kinds of killings have been most harshly pun­
ished, what kinds tolerated, even applauded? 
The other set of questions concerns the social or historical conditions 
that drive the number of homicides up or down. These questions in 
turn include a number of others that will be treated, as fully as possible, 
in the context of the specific time and place covered in each of the 
chapters that follow. Many (not all) of them are the familiar ones of 
contemporary debate. Does the historical record suggest that murder 
rates rise as the result of geographic change, of migration from country 
to city? How much results from changes in the family or the justice 
system, from obsession in the media? What are the respective roles of 
economic change, of widespread gun ownership, of the frontier expe­
rience, Indian fighting, slavery, and social class, of regional or racial 
differences and conflicts? 
But if these questions are (mostly) familiar, the evidence from his­
tory suggests some unfamiliar answers, beginning with the experience 
of the preimperial England that shaped our basic legal procedures and 
sent our first permanent white settlers. 

The British Background 
The story of murder by and among the Europeans who peopled what 
is now the United States begins centuries before thefirst settlers arrived 
from England. Packed with the rest of the history that these men and 
women carried with them in their heads was their experience with 
criminal homicide, not only laws and legal procedures but moral atti­
tudes and social expectations as well. All of these had been developing 
over several centuries, and form the background and baseline for the 
history of murder in America. This chapter, and our story, begins in 
the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, then jumps to the seventeenth 
century, to the England from which the first colonists came. There are 
holes in the story: some of the evidence is indirect; some elements re­
main mysterious. But the outline is clear, and it is at least possible to 
sketch some of the legal, political, and social conditions that helped to 
shape it. 
I 
The sketch begins in the late Middle Ages because before then there is 
almost no evidence at all. While assassinations and murder among royal 
and aristocratic families had long rivaled warfare as subjects of song and 
story, the criminal behavior of ordinary people did not attract much 
The major sources used in this and later chapters, together with citations for quo­
tations, can be found in the Select Bibliography at the end of the book. 
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notice from the tiny literate elite who wrote narrative chronicles for 
posterity. The records of the Kingdom of England are the earliest to 
allow any systematic attempt to describe specific rates and routine cases, 
but even there the trail cannot be traced beyond the thirteenth century. 
What makes it possible at all is that England, although not yet of first 
rank in power, was in comparison with its contemporaries remarkably 
well governed. An important part of that government was the machin­
ery of criminal justice. And it is the records of the legal system that have 
allowed two ingenious historians, Barbara Hanawalt and James Givens, 
to supply at least rough answers to several questions: What was the 
medieval murder rate? Who, typically, were the killers and their victims, 
and why? What were the kinds of homicide that most concerned law 
and society, and why? 
What makes the English legal records important, and nearly unique, 
is that by the High Middle Ages ordinary crime had become official 
business. In much of the Western world, as earlier in England itself, 
routine offenses were not then the business of the state. Among the 
Germanic tribes who once overran Europe, assault and even murder 
were considered matters for the injured individuals or families to settle 
among themselves, either by killings in revenge or through the payment 
of wergild, or blood money, as compensation for lives taken. Criminal 
justice was later taken over by feudal overlords or other local authorities. 
But in England keeping domestic order and providing the rule of law 
more broadly had in England become a royal responsibility. 
In an age of generally decentralized authority, minor crimes were still 
left to local lords, or the church, to handle according to their own rules. 
But while most medieval men and women worked the land and rarely 
journeyed far, the exceptions were important. Three kinds of travelers 
crisscrossed the king's highways: those on church business, those on 
political business, and those simply on business, all moving often be­
tween London, the one great city of perhaps 35,000 or 50,000 inhabi­
tants, and a number of smaller market towns. All of these people 
wanted security while on the road. They looked not to the local barons 
whose land they crossed—and who sometimes threatened rather than 
protected them—but to the central government. For these travelers 
there were obvious advantages to having a standard set of rules and legal 
procedures, a "common law," for the kingdom as a whole. And even 
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for those who did not travel much, the king's courts were generally 
thought more fair and rational than those run by local oligarchs. 
From the royal perspective, too, there was an advantage in defining 
crimes not as simply the business of perpetrator and victim, or perhaps 
their families, allies, and friends, but as acts that concerned or injured 
the whole society. Since the society was personified by the monarch, a 
criminal act was then officially a kind of personal insult to him, or 
"breach of the king's peace," to be punished as such. In the continual 
medieval battle between local and central authority, it was a major vic­
tory for the king over the local aristocrats to establish that all major 
crimes, or felonies, the common law offenses such as larceny, burglary, 
robbery, rape, and murder, must be tried in royal courts. Prestige and 
power flowed to anyone who could effectively deliver justice. So did 
money; the court system was a rich source offines, fees, and forfeitures. 
But the system of criminal justice was not wholly dominated by the 
king. The Roman Catholic church had established the principle that its 
own officials, if tried in royal courts, could only be punished by the 
church itself. This exemption, "benefit of clergy," applied to thousands 
of people in the Middle Ages, not just parish priests, bishops, monks, 
and nuns but a host of minor clergymen, wandering friars, and univer­
sity students, who were not punished physically but made to do pen­
ance, at worst losing their positions in the church. Church and barons, 
too, shared in the business of lawmaking by dominating the parliament. 
The Magna Carta, or Great Charter, of 1215 not only confirmed the 
parliamentary right to consent to new laws but also established that the 
king, too, was subject to them. Above all he could not, acting alone, 
punish any powerful parliamentary nobleman; such noblemen were 
subject only to the "judgment of their peers," meaning that they could 
be tried only before the whole House of Lords. 
Those lower in the social scale also shared both rights and duties 
under the evolving system of criminal justice. While several layers of 
royal officials were concerned, every free male inhabitant was a poten­
tial agent of law enforcement, responsible for reporting and investigat­
ing criminal behavior, and catching and passing judgment on suspected 
criminals. It was a system that probably worked best in dealing with 
homicide, which ranked in official importance second only to trea-
son—and in fact was in some cases classified as a form of treason. 
12 Chapter I 
The key unit in local government was the county, whose main officer 
was the sheriff, chosen by the king from among local landed families. 
The sheriff in turn chose deputies, bailiffs, and constables to help him 
administer the smaller units into which each county was subdivided, 
including towns or vills. In addition, at the county level, those local 
aristocrats who qualified as "knights" elected from their own ranks four 
coroners who served as royal agents to investigate all violent or suspi­
cious deaths for evidence of murder or suicide. Three times a year trav­
eling royal judges held court at the county jail, disposing of those felons 
who had been identified since their last visit. 
None of these officials except the judges were paid regular salaries, 
and all of them had a number of duties not directly related to the inves­
tigation and punishment of crime. There was no real equivalent of po­
lice, detectives, or regular patrol, the closest thing being the night watch 
that was ordered, in walled towns, to look out for fire or other kinds of 
trouble. Real responsibility for law enforcement did not rest, then, with 
what were at most a few dozen part-time officials in the counties, but 
rather with the ordinary free men of the realm, whose active coopera­
tion was required at every level. 
A suspected murderer was always accused through a formal legal 
document, usually an indictment. The two most common procedures 
began with the men of the neighborhood in which the victim was 
found. If a murderous robbery, for example, was actually witnessed in 
progress by a man plowing nearby, responsibility began right there; any­
one unable personally to stop the killing was supposed to raise a "hue 
and cry," calling on all other members of the town or vill to form a 
posse and chase the killer. If successful, they then turned their catch 
over to the sheriff, who called on a local grand jury to review what they 
knew of the case and swear out an indictment. 
A mystery, in contrast, such as a strangers remains found in the 
marsh or a bloodied widow in her hut, brought on the coroner. He 
then called a jury of inquest, consisting of free men from the nearby 
vills. In their presence he measured the wounds, noted the condition of 
the corpse, and called on them to declare a cause of death: suicide, 
accident, or murder. If it was officially declared a homicide, the same 
inquest jury was then asked to name, or indict, a suspect or suspects on 
the basis of their local knowledge. In about 20 percent of cases no sus­
pect could be identified and the case remained officially a mystery. In 
 13 The British Background
the remaining 80 percent, bailiff or sheriff was ordered to make an ar­
rest, if the killer named had not already been caught by the posse raised 
through the hue and cry. 
There were two other legal routes to court. In one, a criminal already 
in custody might become a "king's approver," confessing to the crime 
and naming accomplices, perhaps persuaded by an earnest clergyman 
but more often, it seems, by a sheriff applying some of the ugly arsenal 
of torture routinely used in the Middle Ages. With luck the accom­
plices named were then arrested. In a second procedure, already rare by 
the thirteenth century, a private person, perhaps the wife or other rela­
tive of the victim, might bypass the procedure of indictment by a jury 
and bring an "appeal," or suit, directly to court, naming an alleged 
killer. 
Both approvers and appealers put themselves at some risk. In theory, 
and if they were male and healthy, any other male they named as mur­
derer might challenge them to a duel, usually to the death. This brutal 
legal shortcut was not based on the simpleminded premise that might 
makes right. In an age when religious belief governed much behavior, 
the idea was rather that a duel was an indirect appeal to the judgment 
of heaven, which would grant victory to whoever was telling the truth. 
But the Catholic church had never fully endorsed the notion that God 
was, in effect, on the side of the bigger and uglier party to a fight, and 
by the thirteenth century the secular authorities were also committed 
to more rational procedures. Judicial duels were then rarely allowed. 
But even without a duel the tables might turn; if the accused was even­
tually declared not guilty, the accuser might be fined or even hanged. 
Apart from the duel, there were two other ways for an indicted killer 
to escape trial. One of these was legal, although rare. If a shrewd felon, 
perhaps a minor clergyman, managed to escape into a church, he might 
claim sanctuary; armed pursuers were not allowed into this consecrated 
ground to lay violent hands on anyone. If, further, the fugitive was able 
to hole up and hold out for forty days and nights, living on bad bread 
and tainted water, he might claim the right to escape trial if he swore 
after that time to "abjure the realm," that is, to leave England entirely, 
an echo of the ancient punishment of banishment. Given the minimal 
machinery of enforcement, it is not clear how many of the handful who 
took advantage of this loophole actually sailed off and stayed away for 
life; some simply used the abjure device as a thin cover for escape. And 
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escape, pure and simple, was very common indeed; it was hard in an 
era of poor roads and communications to track down anyone who fled 
the county. And although it was also hard for an escaped killer to make 
a new life, given a society in which land and jobs were usually inherited 
or entered only through tightly guarded trade associations, it was not 
wholly impossible. The penalty for failure to show up for trial was to be 
declared an "out-law"—a man who, being outside the law, could be 
killed by anyone, at any time, with full legal blessing. But in fact a very 
large proportion, perhaps 40 percent, of indicted murderers skipped 
trial; and many of these joined roving bands of outlaws. 
Whatever the outcome of trials, the records of inquests and indictments 
have provided historians with their first glimpse of how many murders 
were committed. The rate cannot be determined as nearly as modern 
rates, not only for the usual reasons involving the undetected and un­
detectable darkfigure for murder itself but also because of uncertainties 
about population sizes. While it is possible with some confidence to 
count the number of homicide indictments for a given county over a 
series of years, to calculate these per 100,000 population requires that 
we have a figure for the number of people in the county. And with no 
real census available since the late eleventh century, any population es­
timate for the thirteenth or fourteenth century is no better than an 
educated guess. But whatever the precise rate, it is clear at least that it 
was surprisingly, even astonishingly, high. 
The current rate of homicide in the United States, calculated on the 
basis of a "body count" of victims, is officially somewhere between 9 
and 10 per 100,000 people each year. In modern England it is only a 
tiny fraction of that—often less than 1 per 100,000. But estimates for 
the medieval counties, calculated on the basis of indictments (which are 
considerably lower, on average, than actual body counts), give an aver­
age of well over 20 per 100,000. Even far more conservative estimates 
are high in comparative terms, with rates in the more peaceful places, 
in quiet years, comparable to those of the modern United States, or ten 
times those of Great Britain. 
The reason these figures are surprising is that most of the popular 
theories used to explain violent behavior in the modern United States 
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simply do not apply to medieval England. The English population was 
then overwhelmingly rural, most of it living in small communities. Ut­
ter dependence on local agriculture and the weather and the continual 
threat of famine helped shape a fearfully conservative outlook in matters 
social and economic. The medieval English, like virtually all peoples 
before the modern era, struggled to follow the wisdom of their elders as 
best they could recall it. Insistently they condemned innovation in all 
things and tried to live by what we would call tradition. Their ethnic 
mix was relatively simple and by that date cause of little serious tension. 
Only perhaps 15 percent of the people lived in towns. The great ma­
jority were peasants, serfs, or free tenants of feudal landlords or of Ro­
man Catholic monasteries or bishops. The church itself enjoyed an 
essentially unchallenged monopoly. 
High rates of homicide then cannot be explained in terms of the 
availability offirearms, which had not yet been invented. Nor did they 
typically result from the dangers and tensions of life in the big city; 
there were no big cities, as London was then no larger than, say, modern 
Kokomo, Indiana, and it seems in fact that rates in London were lower 
than in most rural areas. The medieval English did not suffer from 
rootlessness or from failure to respect religion or other traditional val­
ues. Neither did they experience the shock of cultural conflict. They 
were surely capable, like virtually all peoples, of hostility based on racial, 
religious, and ethnic difference. But by our standards, at least, they were 
a remarkably homogeneous people who rarely encountered others 
much different from themselves. The Crusades against Arab Muslims 
having sputtered out, for practical purposes, a century or so earlier, even 
the king's warriors—and these were relatively peaceful times—mostly 
fought long-familiar foes, the French and Scots, in equally familiar fash­
ion. And yet there were clearly sources of tension and conflict in that 
society which led a large number of people to violate the most solemn 
laws of church, state, and community by committing murder. 
The official documents provide clues not only to the rate of murderous 
violence, but also through the who, where, and when, to its causes. 
Here again the record is not always clear; an indictment is in form a 
short story, with only the barest information. "On the 3d day before 
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Michaelmas, in the 2d Year of the Reign of King Edward," it might 
read, "John Smith quarreled with Henry Brown about a penny, outside 
of Smith's shop, and Smith and William Jones then beat Henry about 
the head with staves until his skull cracked and he died forthwith." But 
on analysis even these minimal accounts provide significant informa­
tion about the people accused, those they killed, and the nature of their 
fatal encounters. Hanawalt and Givens have studied different counties, 
at somewhat different times, asking somewhat different questions. And 
although it gives a false sense of precision to provide detailed rather than 
approximate percentages, the patterns they find are roughly compatible. 
In some ways these patterns resemble those found in most other 
times and places. Homicide was a matter of the warm months, typi­
cally, of the twilight and evening hours of the traditional Sunday or day 
of leisure. It was an overwhelmingly male phenomenon; more than 
90 percent of accused killers were men, and although ages were not 
specified, the majority seem to Jiave been young and vigorous. Most 
victims, too, more than 80 percent, were male. They were more likely 
to be poor men, peasants or laborers, than knighted landlords or mer­
chants. The evidence for social class is part of another familiar pattern: 
the medieval English tended to murder people much like themselves. 
At least three-fourths of these killings involved men or women who 
were probably at least acquainted with each other, often neighbors or 
people from the same or nearby villages. 
But in other ways the patterns of reported medieval homicides are 
different from those of later times. The three most striking are (1) the 
low percentage of killings among family members (even apart from in­
fanticides, to be considered below); (2) the high proportion committed 
by two or more killers acting together; and (3) the high proportion of 
murders committed in the course of robbery. 
Thefirstfinding is truly extraordinary. In samples of some thousands 
of reported thirteenth- and fourteenth-century homicides, only be­
tween perhaps 2 and 8 percent occurred within nuclear families. This 
is a range radically lower than that in the modern West: in the United 
States today, despite a sharp drop-off over the past generation in the 
number of annual murder cases involving family as both killers and 
accused, the proportion is about 12 percent; and in Great Britain, 
about 50 percent. 
Two possible explanations point in different directions. On the one 
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hand, it may be simply that the emotional temperature within medieval 
families was low. Marriage, only recently made a sacrament by the 
church, was primarily a property arrangement. Both romantic love and 
its all-too-frequent complement sexual jealousy were then relatively un­
important; the ties that bound were still loose and informal, easily cut 
or shifted if the parties, or at least the husbands, felt confined. On the 
other hand, men and women in an agricultural society needed each 
other for survival. The household was the basic economic unit of the 
society, and to work as a unit it needed spouses and children to do 
complementary specialized tasks, traditionally done by one gender and 
not the other, from plowing the fields to making clothes. This need, 
coupled with an emphasis on heredity in both property and status, 
might create a kind of practical bond that in time became emotional 
and stressed the interests of family against the world in ways that made 
internal violence unthinkable. 
But it may be that both explanations miss the real point. The figures 
for domestic violence, expressed as rates per 100,000, are not really low 
as compared with those for modern Britain. The fact that they repre­
sent a small percentage of all reported cases just reinforces the most 
basic conclusion: homicide in general was then rampant, with the sheer 
number of other kinds of cases dwarfing those that occurred within 
families. Medieval England was simply a violent society, for a number 
of different reasons, political, social, and cultural. 
The king, first, legally required that every healthy man in the realm, 
excluding clergy, must be ready to fight. Males of the aristocratic or 
landlord class, all over Europe, were distinguished from commoners by 
being made knights. The elaborate exercises in armored horsemanship 
required to qualify for knighthood had long reinforced the reality that 
to be a member of the governing class was to be a member of the fight­
ing class. In England the kings had extended the requirement that all 
men should bear arms downward into the villages, where competitions 
in archery and other martial arts were held to assure that the inhabitants 
would be ready to serve their sovereign if called. 
And if few were called in this cause, many were ready to fight in 
others. Royal government and the rule of law, if relatively stronger than 
earlier, were still resented and resisted. If thirteenth- and fourteenth-
century England seems peaceful in comparison, or from a distance, at 
the time and on the ground its high politics was riddled with violence 
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and assassination. In 1265, King Edward I had to fight to win back his 
father's crown from a group of barons who were holding it in a kind of 
trust, and a long generation later, in 1320, his own son Edward II was 
deposed by the Parliament; accused formally of breaches of law and 
informally of sodomy, the former king's captivity was soon cut short in 
gruesome fashion, by a poker thrust up his rectum. 
In this atmosphere tradition and training combined to exalt the di­
rect settlement of disputes; to appeal to the king's courts was dangerous 
for his political opponents, and perhaps branded as cowardice even 
among his friends. Great nobles kept crews of bullying retainers to over­
awe the countryside they considered their rightful turf, sometimes in­
timidating royal judges and sheriffs, as when Sir William Bradshaw 
brought sixty armed men to court to keep Cecilia le Boteler from ap­
pealing against him. The use of arms was a way of life at the highest 
levels, central to virtually all masculine recreation, from hunting deer 
and boar to war games that pitted knights against each other in violent 
jousting that proved for some losers as fatal as the real thing. 
At lower social levels, too, weapons were always at hand. In addition 
to the bows and arrows kept stashed by royal edict, medieval men and 
indeed women routinely carried knives—forks were not yet used—to 
cut their bread and meat. In an agricultural society the most common 
of tools, hoes and axes, scythes and threshing hooks, could easily be 
turned to lethal work. And for ordinary villagers or townsmen, as for 
aristocratic warriors, the settlement of quarrels by peaceful legal means 
often failed to work, although for different reasons. 
The formal ways of resolving conflict in the Middle Ages were either 
through politics, broadly defined, or through the courts. Differences 
might be heard before a town or village council, or the meeting of an 
occupational guild; those with unsettled grievances could appeal for 
help to some superior, a landlord for example. People might also go to 
a court run by a local magnate, since only the major felonies were re­
served for royal justice. There is evidence that this system worked fairly 
well for those with local influence and prestige: few indictments ac­
cused members of the village elite of going outside the law by murder­
ing those further down the social scale, simply because they did not 
have to, since they had ways of bending law to their will. But it cost 
money to go to court, where poorer men had little influence, and they 
had reason to fear that the whole system was run by men who had little 
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sympathy for them—a set of reasons that help explain why the poor are 
often more prone to violent behavior than the rich. Murder was typi­
cally an affair among neighbors, and although there was surely a history 
of bad blood behind it, in many cases the actual event, as in other times 
and places, tended to result spontaneously from simple arguments 
rather than from well-thought-out motives of revenge, greed, or do­
mestic jealousy. It is hard, from the brief stories on the record, to tell 
just what the fights were about, but it is clear that the parties were 
people with short tempers and often long histories of petty friction over 
boundary lines, uneven tasks, strayed animals, or refusals to go along 
with guild or village decisions. There were, in theory, deliberate ways of 
dealing with these sore issues. But the quickest one was the one too 
often chosen. And if John raised his hoe against William, brothers or 
friends, always nearby, were likely to join in, and the result was often a 
fracas that ended with a single victim and several killers. 
The fact that a fight tended so often to pull in others ready to pile 
on reflects the second striking characteristic of medieval homicide: the 
high proportion of multiple indictments. One study of the thirteenth 
century shows that in roughly two cases out of three accused killers 
acted in company with one or more accomplices. What this character­
istically collective aggression reflects is the characteristically collective 
nature of medieval economic and social life. 
One hallmark of village agriculture was the blurred and sometimes 
contested line between public and private. Much of the acreage used by 
villagers belonged, by custom, to the entire community—woodlands 
for gathering fuel and hunting rabbits, wells and streams as sources of 
water. Small plots were wholly owned by individual families, who raised 
beans and chickens just back of the cottage. But the biggerfields, given 
over to the great grasses, wheat or rye, barley or oats, although divided 
into privately owned strips, were plowed by communal teams, with the 
major decisions as to what and when to seed and harvest made collec­
tively. In town, too, economic life was tightly regulated. Small enter­
prise was the rule, but individual artisans, skilled shoemakers or tailors, 
had to belong to shops run by a master according to collective rules set 
by guild or association, rules that limited the number of employees, set 
maximum wages and hours, and dictated standards of workmanship. 
At every social level, too, medieval men and women lived not only 
their economic but their personal lives in the company of, and under 
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the eye of, other people. Individualism was not prized in the abstract, 
and privacy was rare in practice. Peasants lived in crowded one-room 
cottages, working, eating, and making love elbow to elbow with family 
and, on really cold nights, livestock. Even the greatest houses lacked 
truly private rooms, with doors and locks; owners, spouses, children, 
servants, visitors, retainers, and dogs continually jostled each other 
through the arches. Very little was done alone—including, it seems, 
murder. 
If the medieval British were used to living and working in company 
and making decisions collectively, continual closeness was then a source 
of tension as well as cooperation. It is hard to find just what accounted 
for fluctuations, over time, in the annual rates. Such usual suspects as 
war and political turmoil do not seem to have had much direct impact. 
But it does seem that economic conditions were important, as mea­
sured at bedrock by the price of bread. Bread was by far the leading 
source of calories, and hunger has always been at best a source of hair-
trigger irritation and at worst a source of desperation. Besides hunger at 
the poorest levels, crop failure affected everyone on up through the 
medieval hierarchy. Barons and bishops with shrinking rent rolls were 
frustrated by shrinking ambitions and lifestyles, while their retainers 
who lost lands or jobs might take to the woods and highways as robbers. 
The third noteworthy pattern among medieval homicides is in fact 
the high proportion that occurred as the result of robbery. Since rob­
bery, unlike impulsive fights, typically occurred in lonely places or in 
the dark and since roving robbers were less likely to be known locally 
than quarrelsome villagers or townsmen, a large part of the 20 percent 
of known killings that wholly mystified coroners' juries was surely the 
work of robbers. The indictments that specify robbery as motive range 
from perhaps 10 up to 25 percent. Some of these were the work of 
desperate loners, but more, in keeping with the finding about accom­
plices in general, were committed by confederate bands, some of them 
casual, some clearly organized as professional thieves and killers. 
Ballads sang (although rarely) of gallant outlaws such as Robin 
Hood, but there is no evidence that these men gave anything to the 
poor. And in fact, although they sometimes robbed and killed mer­
chants on the highways, they had no wish to tangle with the rich and 
well protected. They tended to operate from poor rural areas, where 
population was thin, law enforcement weak, and deep woods offered 
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places to hide. Their victims, overwhelmingly, were ordinary people, 
often attacked in their own homes, with little to offer but food, perhaps 
some cloth or a few pence. Otherwise outlaws were distinguished 
mostly by their savagery, by their willingness to kill women and chil­
dren or any possible witnesses to their crimes. 
The third major set of clues about medieval homicide comes from the 
courts, and suggests something of social attitudes toward it. Evidence, 
as above, about rates and patterns is mostly from indictments, the first 
stage of the legal process. It is the next two stages, trials and sentences, 
that tell what medieval Englishmen thought about these rates and pat­
terns and what they did or hoped to do about them. 
The trial was held before a royal judge in the course of one of his 
several yearly visits. The accused was brought out from jail—no bail 
was allowed in cases of homicide—to face a jury. The trial jury was 
made up of twelve to twenty-four free men who lived in the vicinity 
where the crime had been committed. It might in fact include some of 
those who had sat in on the same case in its earlier stages, as members 
of the inquest or indictment juries; it might even include men who had 
answered a hue and cry and helped catch the accused. Above all, in 
direct contrast to modern legal practice, they were not supposed to be 
wholly open-minded or ignorant of the case. Their job in practice com­
bined those of a modern jury and of witnesses. The trial itself featured 
little or no new testimony but rather consisted of mutual consultation 
among men who usually knew both victim and accused, their local 
reputations, perhaps their families, and had already done their inves­
tigating. They were then supposed to arrive at a unanimous verdict, 
achieved quickly at that stage, often in a matter of minutes, and tell it 
to the judge. 
But there are strong clues to the attitudes of ordinary Englishmen in 
the gap between the black letter law and what happened in actual op­
eration. The law in some ways represented the ideal of absolute justice, 
the hope for certainty reflected, for example, in prayers that God would 
indicate the truth through the judicial duel, or oaths, or other direct 
appeals to His judgment. But in practice criminal justice was a political 
system in which a number of different opinions, constituencies, and 
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pressures were represented. The results were then often a compromise 
among the formal demands of the state, the interests of the officials who 
administered the law, and the attitudes of the ordinary free male in­
habitants of the realm who made up the juries. 
The king's interest in criminal matters was driven in large part by 
simple greed; all convicted felons were hanged, usually within hours of 
sentencing, at most a couple of days, and all their goods were as quickly 
forfeited to the Crown. As a result state officials, paid in fees and shares, 
had on the one hand an interest not only in detecting but also in con­
victing as many killers as possible. But in some cases, on the other hand, 
they were afraid of powerful local landlords or outlaws protected by 
them, or open to bribery; throughout the Middle Ages, clerical ser­
mons, parliamentary petitions, and popular songs all complained of 
favoritism and corruption among those charged with administering the 
law. Since, too, all but the judges were county residents, they were also 
subject to local pressures and attitudes that sometimes conflicted with 
the king's interest. Fear and bribery might affect jurors in the same way. 
They, too, were local folks, normally closer in social rank to the ordi­
nary villagers or townsmen who were brought to trial than to knightly 
sheriffs or coroners. And after their participation in a given case was 
over, they had to go back and live among, perhaps answer to, the people 
in their neighborhoods. 
One striking illustration of the way in which all of thesefilters shaped 
the law in practice was the treatment of infanticide. The killing of in­
fants was a crime in medieval England, which in defining homicide 
made no distinctions about the age or sex of victims, or indeed the 
motives of killers. But it had not always been a crime; in the Roman 
Empire a head of household had the absolute right to dispose of any 
newborn child unwanted because of its physical defects, its sex, or 
simply the burden of its care and feeding. In early medieval villages, 
too, skewed sex ratios—as many as three males to every two females— 
strongly suggest that at least in famine times, as in much of the modern 
non-Western world, female infants were often strangled or left to die. 
It was one of the long slow campaigns of the Catholic church to curb 
this practice through insistence on the equality of all souls. It was very 
long and slow in reaching conservative countrymen, in Latin pagani, or 
pagans, who resisted for centuries. Only by the High Middle Ages, in 
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England, had it largely succeeded, as evidenced less by the law than by 
the fact that the rural ratio of males to females was not unusual. 
But success was not total; there are reports that fourteenth-century 
parents did sacrifice newborns when crop failure pushed them to this 
last resort. Most significant is that these and similar deaths simply did 
not reach the courts. Among some five thousand fourteenth-century 
homicide cases culled from courts and coroners, the leading historian, 
Barbara Hanawalt, has found just three involving newborns. In terms 
of actual acts of homicide, by the standards of an earlier time (or, as will 
be shown, a later one), this is an extremely low figure. The records in 
all three cases are murky; at least two of the babies were drowned, it 
seems, one by a person unknown. It is suggestive that no parent was 
directly accused and no one was convicted in any of the incidents. 
It is hard not to conclude that these escapes from hanging were no 
accident. On the presumption that infanticide is almost always an act 
of desperation, committed by the poorest and most distraught parents, 
no one had any interest in pursuing them. The king had nothing to 
gain from confiscating their miserable belongings. More important, a 
jury of neighbors perhaps recalled a distant time when their actions did 
not violate village custom, and surely had some sympathy for their 
plight. In an age of high infant mortality it was hard to tell homicide 
from accident in any case. The men of the village, then, exercised their 
discretion at the very first stage of the criminal process by simply failing 
to indict. 
Nothing in law, tradition, or experience suggests that hanging was in 
principle abhorrent to these medieval Englishmen. There was no re­
corded objection to the death penalty as such. Execution had been a 
traditional punishment in both the Roman Empire and among the 
Germanic tribes of pre-Christian Europe, although among the Ger­
mans it was reserved for cowards or traitors rather than for ordinary 
murderers. By the thirteenth century the formal purpose of the death 
penalty was twofold. One was revenge; clerical legal scholars cited the 
Book of Noah: "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood 
be shed." The other was the protection of society, or deterrence. 
But the legal code of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries went 
well beyond revenge, or "an eye for an eye," in calling for death in all 
felony cases, of which homicide accounted for only about one in five. 
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Royal greed, as suggested above, was one reason for this. And it was the 
king and the parliamentary elite who defined the social interests that 
got most support from the written law. The most serious crime in the 
code was treason; the punishment involved dragging a convict behind 
a cart to the gallows. The offense included not only spying for an enemy 
but counterfeiting, the right to stamp coins being a royal monopoly. 
The protection of the social hierarchy more broadly is suggested by the 
fact that the killing of one s lord or master was defined, with the obvious 
support of those who ran the Parliament, as "petit treason," subject to 
the same penalty. And so,finally, was the killing by a wife of her hus­
band, the difference being that the penalty for a woman convicted of 
treason was, uniquely, death by fire. 
The law itself allowed for'mitigating circumstances. Death was the 
penalty for all convicted of committing a common law felony of any 
kind, "with felonious intent," whether the specific offense was steal­
ing clothes or butchering widows. Purely accidental homicides, done 
"without felonious intent"—those in later centuries classed as "excus-
able"—were not subject to legal penalty. And it was recognized that 
those under the age of twelve, the "age of reason" as defined by the 
Catholic church, were not fully capable of forming intent. Neither were 
the insane. Young or clearly crazy defendants, then, although declared 
guilty, were pardoned immediately. Otherwise the judge had little dis­
cretion; guilty or not guilty were the only possible verdicts, and these 
were in the hands of the jury. 
Those at the top of the social hierarchy expressed their attitudes to­
ward crime directly, in part through the legal code, in part through 
well-recorded actions, in part through written chronicles, petitions, and 
complaints to king and Parliament. The king himself was willing, in his 
own interest, sometimes to excuse criminal behavior: strong, aggressive 
felons might be saved from the noose if they agreed to serve for a term 
in the royal army, a practice not always popular with his other subjects. 
Powerful magnates, for similar reasons, might provide protection for 
outlaw bands that did some of their political dirty work; their own re­
tainers did their share of bullying as well. Rival magnates, traveling mer­
chants, and clergymen all complained loudly about these bands, who 
threatened them directly. But the attitudes of ordinary people about 
ordinary crimes were not usually recorded so conveniently, and must 
be inferred from the decisions of trial jurors. 
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Thirteenth-century jurors were used to death in all its forms. 
Roughly half their children died as infants, on average, and in the ab­
sence of any useful treatment for trauma and little for infection fatal 
accident was a routine event. The death penalty was advertised pur­
posefully, with executions as public events held on busy crossroads, the 
bodies of victims left to swing and rot as reminders of what it meant to 
defy the king's law. 
But if these medieval men were used to death, they do not seem to 
have been brutalized into indifference to it. The threat of hanging hung 
heavily in the minds of all those involved in executing the law. And 
even apart from the special case of infanticide, jurors were not eager to 
inflict death; in practice they registered their opinions about crimes in 
general and the various kinds of homicide in particular through the rate 
at which they convicted or acquitted those accused of them. 
Routine violence, even fatal violence, did not shock jurors into de­
manding retribution. Those actually tried for homicide, as opposed to 
those who escaped detection entirely or fled into outlawry, were over­
whelmingly men, sometimes women, who lived nearby; the whole sys­
tem was arranged so that their reputations were already known to the 
jurors. So, importantly, were the accuseds' families or friends, if any, 
who would remain neighbors, possibly angry or vengeful if verdicts 
went against a son or brother. The conviction rate for all kinds of crime 
was quite low: during nearly half a century, in a study of eight counties, 
more than two-thirds of those indicted were acquitted. Most striking, 
the rate for homicide conviction was the lowest for any offense that 
accounted for a significant number of cases—a little over 12 percent. 
Property crimes were clearly more worrisome than violent ones, by this 
measure, with a little over 30 percent of accused burglars and robbers 
convicted, 22 percent of simply larcenous thieves. It is especially signifi­
cant that nearly two-thirds of all indicted clergymen were convicted, a 
rate many times that for laity. The explanation is simply that jurors 
knew that as a result of benefit of clergy these men would be, at worst, 
defrocked and made to do penance, and so felt free to call them guilty 
as they saw it. 
If the law made no distinctions either about the degree of the offense 
or among persons, the jurors clearly did. Ordinaryfights were common 
events; most men had seen or done their share. In many cases of what 
in modern law would be manslaughter, only a lucky blow, given or 
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taken, separated winners and losers; in others, victims were notoriously 
quarrelsome or aggressive people, or killers had acted in self-defense. 
Jurors were tolerant in such cases. With no alternative to hanging but a 
not guilty verdict, not guilty it was. 
This was a clear evasion of the law. Beginning in the thirteenth cen­
tury (and continuing ever after), the common law doctrine of self-
defense was defined quite narrowly. It was in the interest of the king's 
power and purse that conflict should be resolved by his courts, not by 
the parties involved. Homicides were justifiable on grounds of self-
defense only if the killer had exhausted all other options. He was sup­
posed to give ground; indeed it was in a later formulation "his duty to 
retreat" in the face of a persistent aggressor. Only with his back to the 
wall, quite literally, was a man legally justified in standing his ground 
and killing to save his life. But here again, the law said one thing and 
jurors another. 
However tolerant of their peers, jurors, like merchants and clergy­
men, feared and certainly hated robbers and outlaws, strangers to the 
village. In contrast, they almost never convicted sisters or uncles or 
other family members who abetted or sheltered relatives after the fact; 
although in law these were accessories to murder, the ties of blood were 
honored through acquitting them of all guilt. 
Not only as accomplices in family cases but as principals as well, 
women were treated differently from men. Medieval attitudes toward 
women and women's behavior were complex. Females under indict­
ment for murder were often active agents, who wielded knives and even 
swords. But they were acquitted more often than men for these and 
indeed all other kinds of crime, whatever the sex of their victims. And 
if most killings resulted from fights and fighting in general was widely 
tolerated, men who killed women were not. Medieval males had rela­
tively little reason to fear domestic violence, but the rate of conviction 
for this and other homicidal attacks on females was significantly higher 
than that for men who killed men. 
Three hundred years later, in dealing with homicide as with other 
crime, seventeenth-century England still kept most of its medieval 
forms and institutions. One major legal change had occurred since the 
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fourteenth century: homicide was graded into degrees of guilt, not 
simply in terms of the fatal act itself but also in terms of the intent, the 
mens rea, of the killer. "Murder" itself by then required premeditation, 
or "malice aforethought," and a murderer was denied the right either 
to receive a royal pardon or to plead benefit of clergy. To kill an officer 
of justice, such as a sheriff, while carrying out his duties was also ruled 
unpardonable. Other kinds of culpable homicide, typically the result of 
"a sudden occasion," such as a fight, were downgraded to "manslaugh­
ter. " Otherwise legal procedures remained much as before, from hue 
and cry or inquest on through indictment and trial, with, normally, 
hanging following conviction. But the political, economic, and social 
context of homicidal behavior had changed radically, and so had its 
level. 
What separates England of the early modern era from its medieval 
predecessor were two great movements that were transforming the 
whole of Europe, and with it the world. One was the narrowing of the 
globe symbolized by Columbus s voyage to the New World in 1492, 
the other the Protestant Reformation inspired by Martin Luther's chal­
lenge to the Roman Catholic church beginning in 1517. 
Both of these events greatly multiplied the potential for homicide in 
the form of war. It was in this era that Europeans not only circled the 
planet but also began to conquer it, greatly expanding the international 
market economy, establishing military outposts in Southeast Asia, help­
ing to transform western Africa into a great slave market, subjugating 
and exterminating much of the population of the South American con­
tinent and beginning to probe north. At the same time the religious 
revolution created wholly new reasons for Europeans to hate each other. 
The rival dynastic and economic ambitions of the great states were now 
greatly complicated by a wholly different and uniquelyfierce set of mo­
tives: the clash of Catholics and a variety of mutually hostile new Pro­
testants, sometimes within states, sometimes between them. 
England, still a relatively small nation on the fringes of this troubled 
world, experienced all of this turmoil on its own scale. While it is at 
least possible to imagine the island in the Middle Ages as tranquil and 
tradition-bound, the early modern era was obviously unsettled. As for­
eign trade grew more important, the sixteenth century witnessed a 
sharp disruption in traditional village agriculture as more goods and 
animals were made and raised for export. A long-term and massive shift 
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from growing grain for food to raising sheep for wool threw former 
peasants off their land, creating a major crisis of unemployment, swell­
ing the population of London especially, and reviving, for the first time 
since the Roman Empire, the sense that a whole society might suffer 
from overpopulation. 
As foreign trade moved all around the world, English seamen and 
merchants challenged the larger Atlantic powers, France and especially 
Spain. Economic rivalry was aggravated by religious difference, with 
England by the middle of the sixteenth century a Protestant state, de­
fying the imperial Spanish crusade for a reunited Catholic Europe. And 
to a degree never known before, foreign and religious issues were re­
flected in domestic politics. 
England's Tudor monarchs had come to power through civil war, 
their claim to the throne shaky at its base. And when Henry VIII in 
1534 declared that he, not the pope, was now head of the English 
church he opened a whole new era of mutual suspicion between sover­
eign and subject. As Henry was succeeded by his son Edward and 
daughters Mary and Elizabeth, the official state religion shifted from 
Protestant to Catholic and back again. With church and state closely 
entwined, savage warfare engulfing the European continent, and Spain 
thought to be plotting on behalf of Catholic pretenders to the throne, 
to be of the wrong religion was something close to treason. 
The Tudor fear of assassination and religious difference verged at 
times on paranoia. Heretics, in the sixteenth century, were burned at 
the stake. Treason, brought to secret Star Chamber courts without the 
protections offered by jury trials or public proceedings, was punished 
with an official savagery unknown in the late Middle Ages. The ancient 
instruction that women traitors were to be burned seems merciful in 
the new context, as men, while still alive, were to have their genitals cut 
off and bowels burned, then their heads severed and bodies cut in quar­
ters to be spiked and displayed in public places. The number of these 
vicious public spectacles as well as ordinary hangings reached an all-
time high in the century following Henrys breach with Rome. 
Yet somehow in the midst of all this official brutality the rate of or­
dinary private homicide fell off dramatically, as compared with the rates 
of the late Middle Ages. The extent of this decline is impossible to 
measure closely. The survival of official documents depends on the un­
predictable whims of man and nature, changing bureaucratic rules and 
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storage systems, fire and rot. In England, as it happens, it is far harder 
to gather evidence about ordinary crime for the sixteenth century and 
most of the seventeenth than for the fourteenth; only three counties 
have criminal records for any significant number of years, the cases 
available for survey numbering only in the hundreds, rather than thou­
sands. For these counties, too, as for the Middle Ages, population fig­
ures are only guesses. But the most informed estimates for the homicide 
rates in Essex, Sussex, and Hertfordshire, measured by indictments, are 
7, 14, and 16 per 100,000, respectively, during 1559 and 1603, rates 
so far below those of two and three centuries earlier that there can be 
no mistaking the trend. 
The patterns of homicide, too, while hard to see at this distance, 
confirm the differences in rates. In early modern as in medieval En­
gland, not surprisingly, most killings resulted from impulsive male 
quarrels, probably among acquaintances. But proportionally far more 
occurred within families—something between 13 and 18 percent at a 
minimum, which indirectly suggests proportionally fewer robbery mur­
ders, or killings by strangers. The dark figure for undetected or unin­
dicted murders was probably lower for the later period than the earlier. 
A greater zeal for prosecuting is shown above all in the number of cases 
brought for infanticide, which, largely ignored in the Middle Ages, now 
amounted to about 20 percent of all homicide indictments. Many of 
those accused were unwed mothers; to make the case against them 
easier to prove to jurors, who often found it hard to decide whether a 
given infant was born dead or killed afterward, it was specifically made 
a capital offense, in 1624, to "conceal the death of a bastard child," 
whatever the cause, by attempting to hide its body. 
This apparent concern for the fate of newborns might be used as 
evidence for one possible explanation for falling murder rates. It has 
been argued that there was a slow trend, stretching all across Europe 
over many centuries, toward more civil, humane behavior, reflected in 
everything from improved table manners to less aggressive personal be­
havior. Fewer homicides and a lower threshold of tolerance for them 
would both result from this emotional shift. But such a humanitarian 
trend, if it existed, is impossible to see in the gruesome reign of 
Henry VIII and his successors. The statute making it a crime to conceal 
the death of an illegitimate newborn was designed after all to make it 
easier to hang young women, and reflects not greater humanity but the 
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zealous prosecution of sexual sin. And if Englishmen were not murder­
ing each other as often as earlier, they were finding other ways of killing 
off those they feared and hated. One of the by-products of religious 
zealotry and radical insecurity in early modern Europe was the perse­
cution of people, usually but not always lone women, accused of prac­
ticing witchcraft; literally hundreds of thousands were burned to death 
for this alleged crime. And while England was spared the worst of this 
misogynist hysteria, witchcraft was defined as a capital crime beginning 
in 1542, and in some times and places more people were accused of 
this than ordinary homicide, their bodies added to the grim totals piled 
up by official executioners in this era. 
A better explanation, then, for the falling murder rate is simply that 
the Tudor-Stuart state, however troubled, was far stronger and better 
able to impose the rule of law than its medieval predecessors. The 
growth of state power was then felt both high and low, at both levels 
cutting into the kind of disorder and desperation that led to homicide. 
At the higher level, early modern England was no longer troubled by 
private war among great nobles, or by their potential defiance of royal 
law. The great and powerful were more likely to be found, with Sir 
Walter Raleigh, dancing, writing sonnets, and currying favor in the 
court of Queen Elizabeth than supporting small armies of retainers, 
sheltering outlaws, or bullying the countryside. And the state had much 
for ambitious and warlike men to do, both on land and on sea, and in 
effect exploited aggression by exporting it outside of the kingdom. Ra­
leigh himself participated in the conquest of Catholic Ireland, a notably 
ugly war involving the slaughter of women and children, as well as the 
exploration of North America. English seamen were beginning to de­
velop a reputation as the world's most daring. Not only Russia and 
India but the New World offered whole new theaters of adventure. Na­
val officers and pirates, often hard to tell apart, terrorized much of the 
Spanish Caribbean. 
Back home, in the countryside, the rule of law and the habit of turn­
ing to the courts rather than to personal confrontation to settle disputes 
had strengthened over the centuries. One clue pointing to the declining 
murder rate and to the fuller use of the law is that homicide indict­
ments, once 1 in 5 of all brought to royal justice in the counties, had 
dropped to 1 in 20, 40, even 50, as less serious crimes were prosecuted 
more often. Lower courts were busy as well. One historian has even 
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argued that the number of witchcraft prosecutions may be interpreted 
as evidence that early modern villagers were using the official system, 
however cruelly, as an alternative to homicide as a means of dealing with 
the tensions and hostilities that plagued their communities. 
In dealing with felonies of all kinds, Tudor and Stuart juries were 
more willing to convict than their ancestors, acquitting only about half 
of all those brought before them. But ordinary crime, including mur­
der, was still not a major concern among those who made or adminis­
tered the law. In many cases, as earlier, jurors committed "pious 
perjury" by knowingly freeing people who, while guilty, did not in their 
opinion deserve to die. Only a small proportion even of those con­
victed, perhaps 1 in 5 or even 1 in 10, were actually sent to the gallows, 
as the old loopholes, pleas and pardons, were widened even further, 
notably the plea of benefit of clergy. While this had originally been an 
escape limited to those who had taken holy orders, by the early modern 
era, in a Protestant state, it was extended to all who could prove that 
they could read and write. Proof of literacy could be used, one time 
only, to escape the gallows; offenders were simply branded on the 
thumb. In a highly class-conscious society such people were thought 
more socially useful than illiterates. But while still a minority, they were 
a growing proportion of the male population, and that they were in 
effect given one free ticket to commit a serious crime suggests that pun­
ishing such crime was not a high social priority. 
There was some concern, among the literate class, about the "rogues 
and beggars" who infested the highways, a recognition that former sol­
diers and peasants driven off the land in hard times might turn to vio­
lence. Firearms became a concern for the first time; a few murders, still 
less than 10 percent, were being committed with guns, and a series of 
laws beginning in 1541 forbade their use by ordinary nonaristocratic 
civilians. But there was no real equivalent of the medieval fear of orga­
nized robber bands or gangs. The church, in an era of religious tension, 
was worried not about violence but about heresy and sin; the new law 
about illegitimacy and infanticide was one product. The state worried 
about invasion from abroad and treason at home. 
High rates of homicide in medieval England had resulted in part from 
social tolerance, in part from official weakness. The violent settlement 
of disputes was accepted among men at every social level, and among 
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the knightly class it was encouraged, even honored. And the state pro­
vided neither workable methods of settling chronic disputes among 
neighbors nor effective protection against murderous robbers. 
Early modern England, too, was a sometimes fearfully cruel society, 
full of mutual hostilities and suspicions, and many of its people had 
good reason to leave it for a new world. But the state had grown strong 
enough to curb most aristocratic violence and outlawry, and by provid­
ing more effective courts and law enforcement had driven down the 
number of ordinary homicides from the peaks reached in earlier cen­
turies. If the fear of violence played an important role in the decisions 
of those emigres who sailed west across the Atlantic, it was not murder 
that concerned them but rather the very real possibility of foreign, civil, 
or religious warfare. 
The Colonial Era, 1607-1776 
The first permanent English settlements in North America were the 
Virginia and Massachusetts Bay colonies, founded early in the seven­
teenth century. Over the following generations the dominant white in­
habitants of these and later colonies began to establish a distinctively 
American identity. But history does not move in straight or simple 
lines; the "American" experience was complicated, differing radically 
across time, among settlements, and above all among the different 
peoples whose lives shaped and were shaped by it. And while the colo­
nists cut their formal political ties with the British Empire in 1776, they 
could not so easily abandon the British experience that had formed 
them. From beginning to end, the history of the American colonies was 
framed by the concerns that had founded them: finding their place in 
the international market economy at a time of severe religious and po­
litical differences in Europe and within England itself. 
Both developments had several lasting results. British North America 
was from very early on a place where three races from three continents 
were entangled in ways that ensured the continual threat of murderous 
violence. Settlement required displacing and periodically fighting the 
original Indian inhabitants. The fact that all the territory from Maine 
to Georgia was in effect a string of imperial outposts, challenged by 
Catholic French rivals to the north and Spanish to the south, meant 
that these native warriors often found powerful European allies, making 
wars frequent and peace unstable. Meanwhile many of the American 
goods most valuable in international trade were increasingly produced 
by slaves, originally kidnapped from Africa. The use of reluctant slave 
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labor, complicated by racial tension, generated fears and threats inside 
many of the colonies at least as great as and more continuous than those 
from the outside. 
Amid all this menace, maintaining civil order was a matter of the 
highest importance to those who ran the American colonies. Violence 
of many kinds was inevitable, but homicidal conflict among white set­
tlers could not be tolerated as it was in medieval or even early modern 
England. Being English, the governing class codified its authority in 
rules of law and established systems of criminal justice. Being Ameri­
can, facing wholly new conditions and challenges, they did things dif­
ferently. Within each colony and certainly across each of the three 
regions—the South, New England, and the Middle Colonies—the 
activities thought to threaten the social order, the workings of the jus­
tice system, and the use of capital punishment varied distinctively with 
the local mixture of race, religion, and economic structure. So did the 
murder rate. But across the whole of the English New World, the ulti­
mate and paradoxical result was a society both more and less violent 
than the mother country's. 
I 
Virginia, the first English colony, was the first to encounter several 
wholly New World problems. Its early leaders took for granted a world 
in which the system of justice, among other things, was based on town 
or village community, acceptance of hierarchy and tradition, and the 
rule of a landed aristocracy drawing rents from a dependent peasantry. 
But those expectations were severely eroded by the cultural clashes, 
economic geography, and labor problems of actual settlement, specifi­
cally the relations with Native Americans, the loss of village or com­
munity tradition, and the wholly novel institution of chattel slavery 
based on race. 
The merchants of the Virginia Company who financed the pioneer­
ing voyage to Jamestown in 1607 and the captains who commanded it 
hoped first to strike it rich like earlier European adventurers in South 
America and Asia. The Spanish had found gold in Hispaniola, and rich 
but vulnerable empires to conquer in Mexico and the Andes. Their own 
fellow countrymen, traveling to Russia, the Near East, and India, had 
landed their ships, asked the nearest inhabitants to "take us to your 
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leader," won an audience with representatives of the local state and the 
merchant community, displayed their arms and wares, and begun to 
trade. But none of this worked in English North America. 
There was no gold to be mined, or rich civilization to exploit. The 
leaders of the Virginia settlement were experienced men of affairs, but 
they were not cultural anthropologists, and it took them many years to 
fully understand that the woodland Indians had no territorial state, as 
they understood the concept, no merchants, and made nothing worth 
money in the international market. If the Virginia Company was to 
make a profit for its sponsoring investors, then, the English settlers 
would have to dig in, literally, and make or grow their own products of 
value. This in turn meant that instead of a trading post, Virginia must 
become, and be governed as, a territorial state. 
The Spanish in Latin America had made this transition easily 
enough, not only claiming but actually ruling virtually all of the terri­
tory they found useful. The natives they encountered had been easily 
dominated, some of them already used to centuries of imperial rule, 
all of them demoralized and decimated by disease and culture shock. 
Many were worked as slaves, the rest allowed to live in and run their 
own dependent states, all of them treated as actual or potential converts 
to Roman Catholic Christianity. This was the only example known 
when the English landed in "Virginia," which, on parchment signed by 
the distant king of England, stretched all the way from its Atlantic 
coastline to the Pacific. To convert this into a territorial state would 
require that the peoples already living there be subjected to English 
government, including the English systems of criminal law and justice, 
which in turn depended on established Christian belief. 
King James decreed at the outset that these natives should be treated 
kindly, as his co-subjects, and the Church of England hoped to bring 
them into the Anglican fold. But the possibility of making this Virginia 
a state on the Spanish model was thwarted by the resistance of the na­
tive inhabitants, who did not easily bend to English law and govern­
ment. What happened in practice is neatly summarized in the story of 
the Chesapeake "princess" Pocahontas. 
Whatever distant sachems decreed in theory, the hungry, ignorant 
Englishmen who landed at Jamestown soon clashed with the Chesa­
peake tribesmen loosely governed by the chieftain Powhatan. There was 
enough mutual dependence—the invaders needing food, the curious 
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Indians intrigued by cloth and metal goods and hoping to use the in­
vaders against other tribes—so that hostilities stopped short of mutual 
annihilation. The famous encounter between Captain John Smith and 
one of the chieftains many daughters ("princess" was the English ver­
sion) seems to have been part of a diplomatic show of strength. And in 
the first decade of settlement there were some signs that the two groups 
might fit together, as individual Chesapeakes came to live and work in 
the English encampment at Jamestown and some English fled hunger 
and misery into the surrounding native villages. 
But sporadic warfare continued—in part inspired by episodic acts 
of murder between Indians and whites, who shared no common law. 
Among the eastern Indians, as among the Germanic ancestors of the 
settlers, murder was treated as an offense against the victim s family, 
rather than the society as a whole, to be settled with the killer and his 
family, ideally by a payment, next by surrender or execution of the of­
fender, or failing these, through blood feud. When the people involved 
were of different cultures, in an atmosphere full of often tragic misun­
derstanding, it was hard to draw the line between the sanctioned homi­
cides, or wars, that followed from policy decisions on either side and 
the unsanctioned homicides that followed from impulsive individual 
acts of anger or fear. Both groups, in either case, took revenge, or hos­
tages. And it was as part of an attempt to free English hostages that 
Pocahontas, long familiar to the English as a playful visitor cartwheeling 
through the Jamestown market, was kidnapped in 1613. 
The princess, then a teenager, was treated well, and while in loose 
captivity herself captivated the leading settler, Sir John Rolphe. Sir 
John's intentions were honorable but illegal, not because of the differ­
ence in race but religion; as a pagan Pocahontas was not eligible for the 
Anglican sacrament of marriage. Rolphe, however, saw this problem as 
opportunity. His lovelorn obsession with a maiden "to whom my best 
thoughts are, and have a long time bin so intangled, and inthralled in 
so intricate a laborinth, that I was even awearied to unwinde myself 
thereout" was in fact God's way of "pulling me by the eare, and crying, 
why dost thou not indevor to make her a Christian?" Pocahontas was 
in fact duly converted, baptized, and married. Her father and the En­
glish governor saw this alliance as a device common to both cultures, a 
signal for peace between their nations, perhaps eventual union. Lady 
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Rolphe, a bright and gifted linguist, went on to entrance the royal court 
on a visit to London in 1616. 
But events took a tragic turn when Pocahontas died on the return 
voyage. Her father followed shortly, and within a few years, in 1622, 
her uncle broke the uneasy biracial peace with a surprise attack against 
the Virginia settlement that killed nearly 350 people, roughly a third of 
the white population. 
Of the several crucial elements in this story, the Christian baptism 
on which it turns is one of the most unusual. While the Roman Catho­
lic church had many centuries of experience in converting preliterate 
peoples, including the Saxon ancestors of the English themselves, the 
official British Anglican church had none. No Protestants could match 
either the inherent drama and color of Catholic liturgy or the zealous 
missionary devotion of monastic orders like the Jesuits. For Protestants, 
conversion required the need to understand the Bible, ideally to read it, 
and to accept such difficult theological doctrines as predestination. As 
a result, few North American natives, then or later, followed the ex­
ample of Pocahontas in adopting English religion. And given the offi­
cial connection between state and church, to remain stubbornly pagan 
was in white eyes to remain something like "outlaws," beyond the nor­
mal protections of law and government. 
Far more typical than Pocahontas s life was her death. American na­
tives had no acquired immunities to many common European diseases; 
Lady Rolphe died of a lung ailment, hundreds of thousands of others 
of smallpox, measles, and pneumonia. There are many reasons why the 
English invaders were able to drive back the original inhabitants of Vir­
ginia and other colonies. But sheer military superiority was not one of 
them; if the musket was more powerful than the bow, the margin was 
not great, and native warriors had many other advantages. More im­
portant was native disunity, the way in which united white forces were 
able to exploit ancient enmities, always to find allies against whatever 
tribe was slated next for conquest. But the most important English allies 
may have been the invisible microbes that moved inland ahead of them, 
destroying whole villages, leaving empty spaces, fatally weakening the 
ability to resist. 
The great massacre of 1622 was no more than a defiant gesture. The 
Virginians regrouped and retaliated, crushing serious opposition. Any 
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hope of achieving the kind of biracial society and government symbol­
ized by the Pocahontas story was then lost. In Virginia, as in other later 
colonies, the Indians acquired a reputation as incurably treacherous, 
potentially murderous outsiders. And because they remained outsiders, 
the official boundaries of Virginia did not define a single territorial 
state, like England itself. Instead, there were several systems of law and 
government, one dominant, the others subordinate. 
In this Virginia set an example for the rest of British North America. 
A few native servants, slaves, or Christian converts lived inside the white 
world, clearly subject to colonial law, and seem to have been treated, in 
normal times, much like others of the same status. But differences of 
language and culture made their positions tense, and in wartime they 
might be subject to hostility up to and including massacre. The rest of 
the native population, living in tribes or settlements in varying states of 
dependence, was left to do justice to each other as they saw fit. But 
when there was conflict with whites, certainly when encounters on 
lonely farms, trails, or taverns erupted into bloody violence, the domi­
nant colonial law took precedence. 
Three early murder cases may be taken as typical. In 1638 four white 
men, indentured servants escaping from their masters in Plymouth 
Colony, fled along the trail to Providence. Along the way they encoun­
tered a Narragansett; poor and desperate, fully aware that natives were 
often used to track white fugitives, they robbed and murdered him. For 
this they were condemned to death, and three of them were hanged. 
The next year, in New Haven, the leader of the Quillipieck accused one 
of his tribe of murdering Abraham Finch and turned him over to the 
white authorities; Nepaupuck first denied the accusation but was con­
victed on the testimony of his cousin, finally confessed, asked to die, 
and was beheaded. Three years after that, in Maryland, when John 
Elkin confessed to killing an Indian "commonly called the king of Yo­
wocomco," the jury refused to convict, on the ground that a pagan was 
"outside the king's peace"; the governor rejected the verdict and impan­
eled two more juries, both of which found self-defense, until at last a 
fourth trial, more to his liking, found Elkin guilty of manslaughter. 
These incidents were relatively rare in the early years, when most 
interracial killings occurred during wars. But all parties knew that the 
two forms of homicide were related, and all the above cases illustrate 
the politics that often dominated the treatment of white-Indian mur­
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der. The two New England cases occurred within a year of the 1637 
Pequot War, in which Connecticut and Massachusetts forces combined 
to quash a rebellious tribe. Both white and Indian authorities, then and 
later, were acutely aware that individual acts of murder, if not treated 
in ways seen as just on both sides, could lead to escalating hostilities. 
In Maryland, as elsewhere, ordinary settlers tended to be hostile to 
"strange" and potentially dangerous people who held desirable land. 
Higher authorities, however, had geopolitical and economic interests 
not well shared by the average colonist; the Indians were potential allies 
against the French, for example, and trapped beaver and marten for 
favored politicians to forward for trade in Europe. 
As the colonies grew and settlement moved west, the early patterns 
were duplicated. Ordinary settlers and Indians had, literally, little use 
for each other, and expansion created friction, sometimes bloodshed, 
especially over claims to land. But both sides were policed by their lead­
ership, whose needs were more complicated. The result was complex: 
several systems of criminal law and procedure, in practice run by the 
needs of politics more than ideals of justice. But there was no question, 
after the very earliest years, either about merging all into one or about 
which was supreme. Indians accused of murdering whites were usually 
turned over to be tried in white courts; when whites were accused of 
murdering tribal Indians, the authorities sometimes arranged for mone­
tary compensation, as a de facto admission of guilt, or at least respon­
sibility, but whites were never surrendered to Indian justice. 
And if the native people created unanticipated problems in Virginia, so 
did the local soil and climate. The economic geography and human 
ecology of the Chesapeake region made important changes in the bal­
ance between individual and state power, changes reflected in the sys­
tem of criminal justice. Above all, the problem of labor supply was met 
by adding a third race, the African, to the two already in place. That 
this addition was based on naked force, and attended with continual 
fear of violence, had results of enormous importance to the future of 
criminal justice in America. 
While white Virginians were soon forced to trade their dreams of 
quick exploitation for the harder job of growing or making their own 
products to sell abroad, they still thought in terms of making a killing. 
That is, they might grow exotic things, flax, for example, silkworms, or 
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wine grapes. Only after many failed experiments did they reluctantly 
conclude that, among those that would actually flourish in the soil 
along the Chesapeake, only the stinking weed tobacco had any com­
mercial value. And once the bitter native leaf smoked by Pocahontas 
and her people was replaced by a better variety introduced by her hus­
band, John Rolphe, Virginians were able at last to establish an agricul­
tural economy. 
But tobacco was a crop unlike any the English had known, and it 
helped create a society unlike any they had known. The plant itself 
notoriously exhausted the soil, so that planters continually had to move 
on to new fields. Luckily for them the Chesapeake region, across the 
bay in Maryland as well as in Virginia itself, was honeycombed with 
tidal creeks and rivers. This, and the virtual extinction of the local In­
dians, made it easy to pole upstream a mile or two every few years, carve 
out a new plot, and still float hogsheads of packed leaves down to the 
bay for shipment to addicts back in England. But what was fortunate 
for individual colonists was a nightmare for colonial administrators. 
The settlement was governed at first by the private Virginia Com­
pany, under a charter granted by King James. In the earliest years, the 
settlers, disoriented and often hungry, faced a great green jungle, full of 
strange creatures and equally strange people. Their appointed captains, 
as dazed as they, had none of the authority that came with centuries of 
settled rule, symbolized by all the pomp and majesty of the state back 
in England. To win obedience they had few weapons but fear, and in­
voked all the authority of the death penalty not only against the starving 
madman who boiled and ate his wife but also against political oppo­
nents and a variety of petty violations of social order. This policy, ex­
tremely unpopular and hard to enforce, gave way as the colony moved 
toward establishing English institutions under the kind of constitu­
tional government familiar at home, a mixture of hereditary right, ap­
pointment, and election. 
When in 1624, after the Indian massacre, the king canceled the com­
pany charter and took over direct responsibility, the change made little 
difference on this side of the Atlantic. Chief executive of the central 
government was still a governor, now chosen by the king. He in turn 
appointed an advisory council, roughly equivalent to the House of 
Lords back home, which acted as one branch of the colonial lawmaking 
body. The other branch, created in 1619, was the House of Burgesses, 
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elected, like the House of Commons, by the "planters" or landholders 
in the local counties, or towns. Governor, councillors, and burgesses 
would then make the laws; appointed judges, county sheriffs, and local 
juries would administer them. 
But there were in fact no "towns" outside of Jamestown. More im­
portant, there were no real villages. In Virginia, like most later colonies, 
land was not worked in common or shared by peasants, usually renters, 
living close together in the traditional English fashion. Instead, given 
the immense amounts of unsettled land available on the North Ameri­
can continent, it was typically owned outright, in what by European 
standards were huge amounts; in Virginia the usual unit wasfifty acres, 
and many planters held thousands. And since planters continually 
moved out and away from each other as tobacco land wore out, there 
were no real communities. This in turn had profound implications for 
criminal justice. 
In England the whole system of criminal justice had rested on the 
men of the neighborhood, who formed posses, captured felons through 
the hue and cry, investigated violent deaths through the inquest system, 
served on grand and trial juries, and made decisions on the basis of 
long-standing custom and tradition. But there was no long-standing 
custom and tradition in this new world. The authority of all colonial 
governments was almost continually challenged, as they had to con­
front new situations and invent novel solutions just when the govern­
ment back in England, through much of the middle seventeenth 
century, was in crisis, even civil war. It was hard for governors, sheriffs, 
and judges to win obedience. It was hard, to begin with, to find neigh­
bors. And once found, the independent planters of this turbulent early 
society were not easy to deal with. 
One key reason for their sense of independence, and for the turbu­
lence of the society, was that so many of them owned guns. In England, 
and in Europe generally, the ownership of firearms, often the right to 
hunt game, was legally restricted to an elite. But from very early in 
British North America the official need for an armed militia to deal 
with natives or Frenchmen made owning a musket a civic duty. On 
isolated farms, too, the presence of meaty big game combined with fears 
of bears, wolves, and lurking Indians to assure that planters knew how 
to shoot. And this new and characteristically American phenomenon, a 
man on a lonely farm with a gun, made law enforcement hard. Courts 
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and governors sometimes challenged the land titles of men like these, 
and sent sheriffs out with legal papers; the warrants came back from 
the frontier with notations such as "not executed by reason of a gun" 
or "defendant swore that he would shoot me if I touched any of his 
estates." 
But the most important effect of weakened law enforcement on the 
early Chesapeake frontier was that it opened the door to African slavery. 
The story of slavery begins with the fact that tobacco is a demanding 
crop, each plant requiring painstaking attention throughout the grow­
ing season. To make a profit took hard work; to get rich took extra 
labor. No free whites in Virginia would do this for mere wages, given 
the opportunities to farm their own land. Neither would the Indians. 
While English law allowed for war captives, especially pagans, to do 
forced labor, the natives of North America, unlike those to the south, 
were not used to regular agricultural work, and most resisted coercion 
to the point of death. The search for tobacco hands then led back to 
the British Isles, where economic developments had created a big po­
tential labor pool. 
To deal with all those "rogues and beggars" on the highways to Lon­
don, men thrown out of work by the disruption of village agriculture 
in response to the new international market, the authorities in the six­
teenth century had created a new class, "indentured servants." Under 
new Poor Laws these men could sell themselves, or be forced to do so, 
for a term of four or seven years. While they were supposed to be 
treated much like a master s children, allowed to go to church, perhaps 
taught to write, they got no pay but their keep. Thousands of them 
came to Virginia in the first generation alone, whether as volunteers or 
as alternative to jail or poorhouse. From the landowner's point of view 
their labor was critical and the pay ideal. But there were two problems: 
their death rate and their behavior. 
Especially in the brutal early years, the death rate among these poor 
and exploited young men was appalling; around 1620 it approached 
80 percent annually, a truly shocking figure, higher even than in Lon­
don during the plague, the result of malaria and typhoid combined 
with overwork, malnutrition, and general ill-treatment. Planters, how­
ever, continued to import new ones, who arrived fresh and ignorant off 
the boat. From their point of view, again, the problem was less those 
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who died—replaceable free of charge—than those who survived to fill 
out their terms. Virginia law required that these servants, overwhelm­
ingly young men of the poorest classes, be givenfifty acres of land when 
their terms of indenture ended. These often swampy plots were rarely 
enough to make them into substantial farmers, certainly not family 
men (there were very few white women about). But they were free now, 
away from their masters' control, and in this new world this whole class 
of not-very-responsible young bachelors often had guns and played im­
portant roles in local power struggles. 
The first Africans imported to Virginia seem to have arrived as in­
dentures like these, rather than slaves. English law did not then allow 
for hereditary or even lifelong slavery. But in the Chesapeake colonies, 
where outlying planters tended to be a law unto themselves, it was easy 
to cheat these black pagans, who spoke no English, knew no law, and 
had no idea of when, if ever, their terms were up. Some of them, in 
these early years, were relatively well treated, freed, and became part of 
the society. But more, in practice, were kept in bondage for long years, 
even for life. Over the years practice became custom, and custom, law. 
In 1664 the legislature of Maryland took the final step, decreeing not 
only that all "negroes" were to be slaves for life but that the children of 
all female slaves were also to be slaves, ensuring that those with known 
African ancestry were doomed to serve forever. 
In earlier years it did not pay planters to buy servants at high prices, 
because the death rate was so high. But by the late seventeenth century 
it made economic sense to buy slaves for life, and their children for 
eternity, instead of white indentures for a few years. And this economic 
logic was bolstered by a major social and political development. In 
1676-77 Virginia was wracked by the civil war known as Bacon's Re­
bellion, which had begun, like many colonial wars, with murder: an 
Indian raid on Nathaniel Bacons isolated plantation which killed his 
overseer. Accusing the governor of coddling the "darling Indians," Ba­
con led a revolt against the authorities in which poor and angry young 
indentures and former indentures, some of them black men with guns, 
played an important part. Once they were put down, the advantages of 
slavery over indenture were clear to the colony's governing class. Poor 
free men were a menace to the established political order; lifetime slaves 
could be shut out of politics entirely. 
But the fatal step into racial slavery, followed with enthusiasm in the 
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new Carolina colonies and spreading north as well, had enormous con­
sequences for both black and white southerners. 
The West Africans imported into the colonial South came mostly 
from societies of considerable sophistication, with some similarities to 
the English. They were used to patriarchal authority and to village gov­
ernment, run by male elders, with more direct power to punish murder, 
for example, than among the Native Americans. They were also used to 
war and to relatively benign forms of enslavement for the losers. But 
daily life in the west of Africa seems to have been generally peaceful, 
with little physical aggression among members of the same community; 
nothing had prepared these men and women for the new kind of bond­
age they encountered when kidnapped for sale to Europeans, certainly 
not for the routine brutalities they encountered during the voyage 
across the Atlantic or on arrival in Virginia. They did not take to it 
easily, or without resistance. 
The English themselves had to feel their way into the new situation. 
Since hereditary slavery was without precedent in common law, its fea­
tures had to be invented on the spot. And if the labor system was to be 
based on the involuntary service of imported Africans, sullen if not 
violent, the whole society must rest on the constant use or threat of 
force. 
In this context the low incidence of murder along the Chesapeake 
through most of the seventeenth century is in many ways surprising. 
Given political, social, and racial tension, the enormous death rate of 
the early years, and the callous exploitation of servants and then slaves, 
the population must have been hardened to illegal violence. But the 
ruling authorities never tolerated it officially, and were serious about 
their responsibility to protect the lives of whites of every status, as well 
as others who fell under their jurisdiction. 
Doubtless on the fringes there were cases of undetected murder, 
their actual number a mystery, but it does not seem large. North Caro­
lina made it a crime to bury a servant without notice, much like con­
cealing the death of a bastard child, to protect the most helpless victims 
of mistreatment. There is just a single recorded case, in Virginia, of the 
opposite kind of killing, or petit treason, in which one Matthews, a 
servant, turned on and murdered his master. In Maryland, to match 
that, John Dandy in 1657 killed a servant boy, Henry Gouge, and 
threw the body in a creek to hide it, a crime for which his peers con­
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demned him to hang. In all of the others brought to trial, the parties 
were social equals, generally of low status: family members, fellow ser­
vants, blacks, or Indians. 
Most important, there were very few such trials at all. Although the 
records for Virginia are not fully complete, just ten cases are known 
before 1660 in all the Chesapeake region. As compared with the En­
glish rate, late in the previous century, this seems very low. The convic­
tion rate, in contrast, was comparatively high—eight of the ten were 
found guilty—and so was the rate of execution, as at least three, possi­
bly four, of these killers were hanged. Taking the two colonies together, 
there were comparatively far fewer legal executions than in the mother 
country, a total of eight, with homicide accounting for less than half, 
the others being for buggery, rape, larceny, and piracy. 
Two patterns, then, emerged in the early South. Within the clearly 
settled areas, murder was not a major threat to social order. But given 
the insecurities of a new society, when it occurred it was taken seriously, 
certainly among white colonists. Conviction rates for homicide were far 
higher than in the old country, whoever did it and to whom. It is hard 
to know what was happening on the wilder fringes. Meanwhile, tribal 
Indians remained a genuine if decreasing threat outside of the society 
and enslaved blacks a growing threat within it, both groups regarded 
with resentment and fear and dealt with according to laws that applied 
to them alone. 
Massachusetts, during these early years the model for New England as 
Virginia was for the South, faced many of the same New World prob­
lems and dealt with some of them in similar ways. But some issues of 
law and social order were treated very differently. Whereas Virginia 
owed its settlement to the first of the European changes of the era, the 
development of an international market economy, Massachusetts was 
founded as a result of the second, the Protestant religious revolution. 
While the social and labor systems of the New England colonies were 
less radically different from the Old World model than those to the 
south, the New England authorities, unlike those in Virginia, had ideo­
logical objections to the English state and church. As extreme Protes­
tants, or Puritans, they were convinced that their settlements were a 
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kind of Godly experiment in right living, that "the eyes of the world" 
were upon them. And so they insisted on establishing their communi­
ties, and law codes, on a different and stricter biblical foundation. 
Relations with the Indians, first, ran roughly parallel to the experience 
along the Chesapeake. The natives of New England, even before white 
settlement, were hit even harder by smallpox and other Old World mi­
crobes than those to the south, and so offered less armed resistance. 
The Puritans, too, put more energy into attempts at education and con­
version than their Anglican brethren, earnestly sending a number of 
souls to Harvard College with sometimes bizarre results; the only one 
to graduate died of illness within a year. Some Puritans, too, like Roger 
Williams of Rhode Island, attempted to treat the natives with Chris­
tian justice. But the number of "praying Indians" remained small, and 
relations were marked with mutual suspicion punctuated with savage 
warfare. 
As in the South, then, two systems of justice developed within the 
New England colonies, one for the whites and those who lived in white 
settlements, one for tribal Indians. Again in cases of homicide across 
this line, the fate of accused killers was a matter for political negotiation, 
with Indians sometimes handed over to white justice, but whites never 
to Indian justice. The New Englanders insisted, in fact, that any killing 
of a white was murder and should be tried in their courts, in their 
language; refusing to recognize legitimate resistance against Christians 
by pagans, they made no exception even in wartime. And it was a mur­
der, specifically native hostility to the dominance of white law in a 
homicide case, that sparked the biggest war in New England history. 
During the early 1670s Metacom, chief of the Wampanoags (known 
to whites as King Philip), deeply resentful of the slow invasion of Indian 
lands, joined with several other tribes in an effort to resist the whites. 
An elderly praying Indian, Sassamonn, once an interpreter and ally of 
the Plymouth colonists, renounced his baptism to join these disaffected 
natives as a respected adviser to Metacom. Then, in 1674, the old man 
again changed his mind, was accepted back into the Christian fold, and 
informed the white governor that his people were secretly plotting 
armed rebellion. In January 1675 his body was found under the ice of 
Assawompsett Pond, victim of an execution as traitor to his people. A 
native eyewitness accused three Wampanoags; the three were captured, 
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tried in a white court that June, and hanged within days. Days later 
guerrilla war broke out all over New England, led in the west by the 
Nipmuc chieftain Matoonas, whose own son, too, had been hanged for 
the murder of an Englishman. 
King Philip's War raged for over a year, with the Indians, as was their 
custom, both fighting white troops and slaughtering men, women, and 
children found in isolated settlements, dismembering and mutilating 
their bodies and displaying the pieces on poles. The colonists retaliated 
with almost equal savagery, until in August 1676 "Philip," exhausted 
and hiding in a Rhode Island swamp, was betrayed by a follower and 
shot dead by an Indian ally of the New Englanders. Pieces of him were 
hung from four trees, as warning; the bounty paid for his head, with an 
irony that seems to have escaped the Bible-reading Puritans, was thirty 
pieces of coin. 
But while Metacom's death effectively ended the war, more than half 
the colonial settlements had been attacked, with over one-tenth of the 
white males killed. And if the coastal natives were effectively wiped out, 
white New England was more than ever convinced of the need to guard 
against murderous Indians on their northern and western frontiers. 
Although the threat of outside warfare never faded, the New England 
colonies were plagued far less by internal weakness than were those 
to the south. The Puritan leadership of Massachusetts and the several 
smaller colonies that bordered or split off from it were resolved above 
all to maintain Godly communities. Without a single staple crop like 
tobacco to pull them apart geographically, they were able for genera­
tions to defy the fact that they were surrounded by fertile lands un­
claimed by any Christian and hold the population together in villages. 
They engaged in communal agriculture much like an ideal version of 
that practiced by their medieval ancestors, dividing some of the land, 
sharing the rest, making key decisions in council, governed by leaders 
elected by householders and viewed as well as "Elected," or destined to 
salvation, by the Lord Himself. 
While the New Englanders used indentured English servants and, 
later, African slaves, neither group played as large a role as in the South. 
With no one labor-intensive crop to sell abroad, they had less need to 
exploit large numbers of unskilled workers. They were reluctant, too, 
to admit either rowdy bachelors or pagan Africans into their largely 
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closed societies, unless employed by and under the care of watchfully 
paternal householders. After a brief "starving time," as in Virginia, 
their new lands, too, carefully tended, helped make them as physically 
healthy and long-lived as any people on the planet, far less liable to 
cycles of want and violent desperation than the peasants of Europe. At 
the same time, with little movable wealth and few allowed to live out­
side communal boundaries, they offered virtually no opportunities for 
bandits or outlaws. 
Murder, then, as ordinarily defined, was even less a threat to social 
order in seventeenth-century New England than along the Chesapeake. 
Tight neighborly vigilance assured that even fewer cases went unde­
tected, and the New England justice system, even more than those to 
the south, took seriously its responsibility for the lives of social inferiors. 
Again, as in medieval England, Maryland, and Virginia, most of the 
seventeen homicide cases tried before 1660 involved social equals: 
neighbors, family, companions in a tavern, fellow Indians. Only two 
involved a wife killing a husband, none an Indian, black, or servant 
killing an authority figure. In 1644, in Massachusetts, one "Cornish's 
wife" was hanged—not burned, as under English law—for stabbing 
her husband to death and, with the help of an adulterous accomplice, 
sinking the body in a canoe; while in 1658, in Connecticut, Goodwife 
Boston was acquitted of poisoning. On the other side, five masters were 
tried for murdering servants; three whites, in the single Plymouth case 
described earlier, for killing an Indian. 
A related feature of New England justice was its severity. There was 
no tolerance for impulsive homicide, or fatal fighting. The majority of 
cases—as in the contemporary South, but unlike earlier in England— 
resulted in guilty verdicts, and when the legal charge was specifically 
"murder"—with no room for the possibility of accident or manslaugh-
ter—every one of the accused was hanged. A total, then, in the first two 
generations, of seven men and four women were sent to the gallows, 
and one Indian was beheaded. 
Ordinary homicide, then, was both rare and quickly quashed in 
these colonies. The real threat to social peace, as viewed by the Puritan 
authorities, was very different. During the first two generations, when 
the English state back home was wracked by political turmoil and civil 
war, the little New England colonies were effectively free of super­
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vision from across the sea. Basing their legal code in many cases explic­
itly on the Bible, rather than the inherited common law, they essen­
tially followed the Old Testament by eliminating capital punishment 
for theft—property crime was no real threat in any case. Murder and 
treason were still hanging offenses, although as noted in the case of 
Cornish's wife, above, the more barbarous forms of execution were 
eliminated. But what most concerned both the law codes and the justice 
systems in practice was sin and its sometime wellspring in religious 
dissent. 
Massachusetts, by far the biggest of these colonies, hanged three 
murderers before 1660. In a mild echo of the hysteria in contemporary 
Europe, the authorities also hanged two witches, both of them, as usual 
in such cases, highly unpopular women, tried as the result of accusa­
tions by neighboring villagers. The contemporary English, by midcen­
tury, were painfully learning to outgrow extreme penalties for religious 
dissent, but Massachusetts decreed banishment for several religious of­
fenders and then the hanging of four Quakers in 1658—including a 
woman, Mary Dyer—who refused to go away when ordered and re­
turned persistently to preach their heretical doctrines. But what really 
distinguished local justice was the 1644 trial and execution of Mary 
Latham and James Britton for the biblical sin of adultery. Three years 
earlier, in an even more striking case, an "ignorant and blockish lad," 
William Hackett, "was found in buggery with a cow, upon the Lord's 
day." Just before he, too, was led to the gallows, his sexual partner, the 
heifer, was slaughtered in front of his eyes, as prescribed in Leviticus 
20:15. 
The conflation of sin with crime also accounted for the severity with 
which the authorities pursued infanticide. This is a crime that histori­
cally was mostly ignored, and the justice systems of truly violent times 
and places have rarely wasted time and resources on it. But seventeenth-
century America, in part as a result of its self-appointed contest with 
the Catholic world, inherited the late Tudor and Stuart preoccupation 
with morality of all kinds, from swearing on the Lord's Day to acting 
badly in church. Pregnancy outside of wedlock was clear evidence of 
sexual sin, fornication, and perhaps adultery. And to murder a bas­
tard child was to violate at least two and perhaps more of the Ten 
Commandments. 
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Those accused of this crime were almost always poor unmarried 
women, often servants, wretched souls who posed no physical threat 
to the social order and scarcely inspired imitators. But fully four of 
the seventeen early homicide cases in New England (and some in the 
South) involved infanticide; every one was found guilty, and all but the 
one who died in jail were hanged. What inspired this unique record 
was, in Puritan eyes, the opportunity it opened to educate the com­
munity in morality, indeed theology. Every one of the women accused 
confessed her guilt, admitted the sin, and gave the presiding clergyman 
at the gallows the occasion to deliver and later print an "execution ser­
mon," a form of address not confined to New England but carried there 
to its most solemn heights. 
Death in any form was an opportunity to teach moral lessons, and 
even little children were thrust into its face, held up kicking and 
screaming in front of open coffins, so that they could smell it and be 
reminded that the world was not long with them. And if ordinary death 
was an opportunity, an execution was especially prized. 
Capital punishment in New England as in Old was a form of theater, 
a set of rituals, guaranteed to draw a crowd, performed on a platform 
high enough for many to see. Convicted sinner and hangman shared 
the stage with a clergyman, there to symbolize that human justice had 
divine sanction, in some places to perform last rites or hear a confession 
and say something to the crowd. For the devout, hanging a penitent 
was a very different matter from exhibiting the gibbeted pieces of a 
traitor, pirate, or other murderous disturber of the king's peace. The 
message was not the simple one that defiance of authority carries a ter­
rible penalty but that we are all potential sinners. In detailing the story 
of the crime, the life that led to sin, the minister reminded the crowd 
that God had so far spared them through His "restraining grace," but 
this was surely a time to examine one s soul. At the same time it is never 
too late; the one in the noose, if truly contrite, may yet have been saved: 
no one knows how and why He shows His mercy. 
All legal hangings in New England were accompanied by the execu­
tion sermon, and most by public confession: there were many sinners 
but not many atheists in that age, and few were defiant to the end. But 
those convicted of infanticide were the ideal subjects for this ultimate 
drama, reminders to all New England that however threatened by war­
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fare from without, the real threat to Godly community came from in­
side the society, indeed inside the soul. 
That was precisely the issue in the most famous series of capital cases in 
American colonial history, which began in the Salem, Massachusetts, 
kitchen of the Reverend Samuel Parris, in the spring of 1692, where a 
group of teenage girls were excited by some experiments with the occult 
led by a West Indian slave, Tituba. Some of them began to act hysteri­
cally; their elders suspected witchcraft, the Devil's work, and Tituba, 
under questioning by village magistrates, confessed and pointed to five 
other agents of Satan. The girls themselves named still more, and the 
governor appointed a special court that proceeded under English rules 
specific to such cases. With the normal rules of evidence greatly relaxed, 
the teenagers' nightmarish visions of Sarah Goode and others appearing 
to torture them—sometimes in the open court, although invisible to 
the adult spectators—were accepted as valid evidence. So was much 
neighborhood gossip about dire events and coincidences. As some be­
wildered villagers confessed, under great legal and emotional pressure, 
they were welcomed back into God's fold, purged of Satanic possession 
usually at the price of accusing still others. As the net widened, none 
who refused to plead guilty were spared, and over the course of the 
summer and fall nineteen men and women were hanged, while one 
stubborn old man, Giles Corey, elected to be pressed to death under 
heavy weights, taking advantage of the English law that allowed such 
brave or mad souls to save their goods from confiscation by the state. 
With over one hundred suspects awaiting trial that winter, many all 
across the province were growing queasy about the whole proceeding, 
and the clergy took the lead, after searching their own souls, in calling 
a halt. The Reverend Increase Mather declared that "spectral evidence" 
was suspect, possibly even a devilish device to convict the innocent, and 
the governor disbanded the court and freed all prisoners. 
Historically the Salem episode was triply unique for America, given 
the great numbers involved, the special court, above all the social stand­
ing of accused and accusers. There are many layers of explanation for 
what happened in Salem Village. Some villagers may have been playing 
with the occult; many and perhaps all of the girls were surely seized 
with a form of hysteria. As usual, too, in witchcraft cases, there was a 
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history of community gossip and feuding behind it. What is most un­
usual is that in this criminal case the accusers were typically from the 
wrong side of town, the losers in earlier arguments about the choice of 
ministers, for example, above all those left behind by the movement 
toward a more modern commercial economy; the victims were typically 
from what had been the winning side, those who were prospering with 
change until blindsided by the accusations and hanged in infamy. 
The governor's order to halt the proceedings in any case marked a 
turning point in several ways. North American prosecutions for witch­
craft had always been few, by European standards; after 1693 they 
nearly stopped entirely. And as the heat of religious tension was already 
giving way, all over the Western world, to the cool rationality of the 
eighteenth-century Enlightenment, the nature and concerns of crimi­
nal justice shifted all across the British colonies. 
As they moved into the later seventeenth century and then the eigh­
teenth, the number of New England and southern colonies grew and 
were joined by the Middle Colonies, New York, Pennsylvania, New 
Jersey, and Delaware. All were connected through the imperial govern­
ment at home, a growing power on the world scene, and some common 
American features. Over time their systems of justice, too, in dealing 
with settlers of European descent, developed along roughly parallel 
lines. The dominant movement was toward more rational and in some 
ways more humane ways of treating offenses of all kinds, notably capital 
crimes, although neither reason nor humanity was clearly triumphant. 
But persistent differences remained, as no two colonies were quite alike. 
Above all, the special status of Africans, slave and even free, set them 
apart from each other and from the home country. 
The royal charters that established each of the North American colonies 
generally provided that the governor had the power to enact law, with 
the approval of an elected assembly, so long as the results were "not 
contrary to the laws of England." Until about 1660 turmoil at home 
prevented any real oversight. After that king and ministers tightened 
the reins some, notably over the New England settlements, which had 
been for practical purposes independent states. But as England became 
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a leading player in world trade, the British interest was almost exclu­
sively confined to economic matters. With a few exceptions—Massa-
chusetts was no longer allowed to hang Quakers once a royal governor 
was appointed—each colony was free to make criminal law and de­
fine capital offenses as it chose. What pulled their justice systems to­
gether was, then, less a common authority than common origins and 
experience. 
The American experience made colonial government and justice 
more democratic than the English. Ideology was partly responsible for 
this; Puritans and other Protestants were theologically opposed to the 
notion of hereditary wisdom or virtue, used to electing church officers 
of many kinds. Geography was even more important: the king was far 
away, almost no titled nobles crossed the Atlantic, and above all land 
was abundant. In England the privilege of political participation, the 
right to sit on juries as well as to vote, was reserved for men who owned 
land of some worth, about one man in five. Across the colonies, the 
same landowning qualification was usually met by a majority of adult 
white males. But this democratic potential was rarely exercised in prac­
tice. The majority was still steeped in ideas of class and hierarchy and 
almost always chose leaders from among the richest and most respect­
able. As at home, then, colonial justice systems rested on local male 
landholders and amateur officials under the direction of a confident 
elite. 
The men who first made and administered colonial justice, whether 
along the Chesapeake or in New England, were typically landholding 
gentlemen who had served back home as justices of the peace in their 
counties. English justices, or magistrates, by the seventeenth century, 
had become the key officials in enforcing criminal law. Across the 
county officials responsible to them replaced grand juries in officially 
reporting that crimes had occurred, grand jurors serving now only to 
issue indictments. Justices decided minor cases in their own neighbor­
hoods, and when gathered all together as a county court of sessions, 
they in turn replaced the medieval traveling royal judges in hearing 
felony cases. Roughly the same system was adopted in all of the North 
American colonies, with appropriate variations. 
Except in New England, unique in having real towns or villages, the 
key unit of government was still the county. County magistrates, in­
creasingly elected, directed the activities of coroners, jurors, constables, 
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or sheriffs, and in towns the nightly patrols of watchmen. Except for 
the sheriff, all of these men were amateurs, typically reluctant to serve, 
paid at best by fees; constables and watch usually had to be drafted. 
Outside of New England the enforcement of most law was typically 
careless and weak, easily evaded at least by determined felons willing to 
desert their communities and run. But in part for this very reason, co­
lonial authorities were serious about reinforcing the lessons of social 
order whenever possible. 
Especially in the earliest years, magistrates were in charge of the co­
lonial trial process as judges just as firmly as they were in charge of the 
society as planters or merchants. Court day, especially in thinly settled 
southern or mid-Atlantic counties, was a major event: court time was 
theater, full of small tragedies, paybacks, sparks for gossip. With so 
many people gathered together it was a time for politicking, hawking 
goods, and racing horses. A good time, too, to remind all those gathered 
what justice was about: to impose order, from the top down, on a natu­
rally disorderly society. And about murder and other capital cases they 
were truly vigilant, as in the seventeenth century: Bradley Chapin, a 
leading historian, has insisted that "it is safe to say that no suspicious 
death went unexamined," with special attention paid to the corpses of 
infants and servants. 
Virtually all homicide cases began when someone reported an odd 
or violent death to a magistrate, who then called the coroner to hold a 
jury of inquest. The coroner, often a teamster, reported back to the 
magistrate and then hauled the body off for burial. As in England, if 
the inquest jury named a suspect not already captured through the hue 
and cry, a magistrate issued a warrant for arrest by sheriff or constable, 
followed by jail where available, grand jury indictment, and jury trial. 
But there were significant differences in colonial practice. 
The reasons for this were many. The early settlers could not duplicate 
the Byzantine complexities of the English court system, the tangled 
inheritance of centuries, and had no wish to: they were not lawyers and 
in some colonies passed laws forbidding lawyers. At the same time they 
lived in an age when the exercise of arbitrary authority was under at­
tack all over the English-speaking world: one issue settled in the civil 
wars at home was elimination of secret or Star Chamber proceedings 
run by servants of the Crown. And so, while by modern standards 
criminal proceedings in America as well as in England were heavily 
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stacked against defendants in capital cases, the trend was toward easing 
the odds. 
The trend was apparent in small ways and large. Legal forms such as 
the grand jury indictment were greatly simplified at every stage, written 
in plain English rather than Latin. Felons were often allowed to learn 
the nature of the charges against them in time to prepare for trial, and 
in some cases bail was allowed even in capital cases. More striking was 
the elimination of torture—at least on the books—as a legal tactic by 
the state. While for theological as well as legal reasons the ideal case 
resulted in confession, the pressures were religious and social rather 
than physical, as torture was specifically made illegal in New England 
and soon abandoned everywhere in dealing with ordinary white felons. 
The more cruel and unusual punishments, too, were largely elimi­
nated. The case of old Giles Corey, the convicted witch who sought to 
save his goods for his heirs instead of the Crown by undergoing "peine 
forte et dure," was a rare one; colonials rarely enforced the forfeiture of 
a felons property. There is only a single known case in which the tra­
ditional penalty for petit treason was ordered against a white convict: 
Catherine Bevan of Pennsylvania, having conspired with a lover, her 
servant, to poison her elderly husband in 1731, was burned at the stake. 
Even after convictions for high treason, such as followed a 1690 upris­
ing against strict new English control over New York, while the dread 
sentence was read, requiring among other things that "their Bowells be 
taken out and they being alive burnt before their faces," the rebellious 
Colonel Jacob Leisler was in fact simply hanged. All capital cases were 
treated with the utmost solemnity. In Massachusetts, typically, in the 
early years, the governor, deputy governor, and upper house of the co­
lonial legislature acted collectively as judges, the lower house as jurors; 
almost always and everywhere no British subject was sent to the gallows 
without a trial before the highest court in the colony. Such trials were 
relatively rare, too, because colonial legislatures generally followed the 
early New England colonies in greatly reducing the number of crimes 
punishable by death. 
This trend was an especially striking departure from the practice in 
England. In the mother country, especially during the eighteenth cen­
tury, Parliament greatly multiplied the number of property crimes sub­
ject to hanging, the total eventually reaching past three hundred, in an 
utterly futile attempt to terrify wrongdoers into mending their ways. In 
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the American colonies, in contrast, murder and treason were the only 
universally capital crimes, although some others were listed in most 
codes. 
The difference in practice was equally sharp. Only a few habitual 
offenders paid for robbery and burglary at the end of a rope, and by the 
eighteenth century rape was the only sexual offense that carried any risk 
of death. Morality was still a concern, from Georgia to New Hamp­
shire, and those who disrespected religious teachings faced fines, sham­
ings, the whip, or stocks. But while adultery and sodomy remained 
hanging offenses on the books, there were few or no prosecutions. 
One strong sign of a growing humanitarian sentiment, on both sides 
of the Atlantic, was a decline in prosecutions for infanticide. In Massa­
chusetts, always a bastion of Protestant morality, the rate of indict­
ments in the late seventeenth century ran over twice that for Middlesex 
County, which includes sinful London, where illegitimacy was far 
higher in fact. But the rate in both places dropped fast, and by the 
1770s they had moved quite close together. While the American colo­
nies generally adopted the early seventeenth-century English law that 
made it a crime to "conceal the death of bastard child," the statute was 
always unpopular with juries, who found many ways of evading both 
that and the common law prohibition. Of the seventy-one cases of both 
kinds brought in Massachusetts, which led all of North America, only 
twenty-six resulted in conviction, just two after 1740, with executions 
dropping in rough proportion. 
Like their medieval predecessors, colonial juries in these and other 
cases generally decided matters on the basis of their own moral calculus, 
freeing women more often than men, being more tolerant of killings 
committed in fights than in robberies. By the later eighteenth century 
they often won the right, still denied in England, to judge matters of 
law as well as of fact. Their roles differed from the original in part be­
cause, given the nature of dispersed settlement, only in New England 
could anyone count on a jury of neighbors familiar with the accused. 
Increasingly the town constables or county sheriffs responsible for 
rounding up juries simply chose them by lot. They were in any case 
rarely called except in capital trials; the great majority of accused felons, 
usually poor and young, sometimes strangers, chose to plead guilty and 
throw themselves on the paternal mercies of magistrates rather than 
submit to the hard-eyed scrutiny of local landowners. 
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A growing American difference in capital and some other trials was 
that a new office, a public prosecutor, unknown in England, took over 
one side of the case in many colonies. Defendants in turn were allowed 
legal counsel, again unlike England, at least on points of law and some­
times as full advocates—although the right to a lawyer did not include 
the power to pay for or otherwise guarantee one, and while some attor­
neys volunteered to help in death cases, the typically young, poor, and 
ill-educated defendants were usually on their own. 
Otherwise, practice followed tradition. A trial began with arraign­
ment, within at most a few weeks after a grand jury's finding, where the 
indictment was read to the defendant. If he pleaded not guilty, by far 
the most common in death cases, twelve jurors were then called, with 
the defendant having the right to challenge. Once all were in place, the 
prosecutor gave an opening address, outlining the case and presenting 
sworn witnesses, with the defendant, rarely his lawyer, given a chance 
to cross-examine. The Crown then might present virtually any sort of 
evidence, including statements made by or taken from the accused; de­
fendants were rarely given the same latitude. Following testimony, and 
sometimes physical evidence, the defendant had a chance to make a 
statement in reply; the prosecution responded to that. Finally, the judge 
turned the case over to the jury after some instructions on points of law. 
The forms might be elaborate or casual, the evidence thick or thin, 
but the trial was always short—not as short as in the Middle Ages, 
when the jurors already knew all about the principals and the issue, but 
a day or so at most. The jurors, busy men, were often far from home, 
and if they felt the need to leave the courtroom at all, to deliberate in 
secret, they were in no mood to quarrel with the New York law that 
required that they meet "without Meat, Drink, or Candle light" until 
they returned a verdict—a rule that only a court order could loosen. In 
capital cases, far more often than in others, the usual verdict was not 
guilty. And even when guilt was found, most defendants, again as in 
the Middle Ages (but not the colonial seventeenth century), were 
spared the next stage. 
The most usual escape from the noose was through the ancient plea 
of benefit of clergy, by the eighteenth century stretched long past its 
already thin medieval rationale in England, and even farther in the 
colonies. Commonly invoked after sentence in all but rape, murder, 
and treason cases—it worked for manslaughter—the required Bible 
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reading was reduced to a few lines from Psalm 51 ("the neck verse"), 
beginning "Have mercy on me O God, according to thy loving kind­
ness." Virtually anyone unable to plead insanity, a rarer alternative, 
could manage to memorize the formula; by the early eighteenth century 
women were eligible to cop the plea, and in Virginia, as the ultimate 
absurdity, even slaves. Those who did, for first offenses, were branded 
on the thumb and let go. 
Benefit of clergy in England may have persisted, as much else, as 
frozen irrational tradition, but here it requires another explanation. The 
colonists were deeply hostile to inherited Roman Catholic forms, some­
times to Anglican ones, but even New Englanders occasionally allowed 
the ancient plea. And when "clergy" was not available, functional sub­
stitutes were: many were pardoned, others let off with cropped ears or 
striped backs. The reasons for all this lenience lie in the paradoxical 
nature of the colonial society and economy. 
British North America was full of the raw ingredients for homicidal 
violence. Ethnic diversity was the rule, with Anglo-Saxon Anglicans a 
minority almost everywhere. Most New Englanders still dissented from 
the established church back home; the conquered Dutch, in New York, 
stubbornly refused to cooperate with the local authorities. The Middle 
Colonies and the southern backcountry filled with Scots-Irish immi­
grants bitterly resentful of the English Crown, and a few Jews and 
Catholics joined a long stream of Protestant refugees from France and 
Germany. While by the eighteenth century the tight bonds that held 
together the traditional village communities of New England began to 
break down, Boston, Philadelphia, and especially New York were be­
coming truly polyglot capitals, doubling in size every few decades. 
The men at the very top of this potentially volatile and often bru­
tal society were used to physical violence; most served in the militia, 
many actually fought against French or Indians, some were accus­
tomed to physically "correcting" servants or apprentices, virtually all 
beat or spanked stubborn children—all these forms of punishment 
were thought a man's duty, not to be evaded through excessive softness. 
Meanwhile, the British authorities continually pumped single young 
criminals into the bottom of the white social pyramid. Beginning in the 
eighteenth century "transportation" to the colonies replaced hanging as 
the most common sentence for felony, and tens of thousands were 
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shipped across the sea as indentured servants, joining the other more 
nearly voluntary emigrants. 
But the overriding characteristic of the American colonies was wide­
spread abundance and economic growth, not loss of lands and chronic 
unemployment but widespread ownership and chronic labor shortage. 
There was little reason for desperation, no room for any class of profes­
sional criminals. And the confident, prosperous men who ran colonial 
justice systems, while used to and tolerant of some kinds of violence, 
were not worried about felonious crime of any kind. 
Certainly ordinary homicide seemed no threat. Although the records 
allow no careful description of most killings, some things are clear. As 
compared to the Middle Ages, robbery murder, especially involving 
whole bands of outlaws, was quite rare. The growing individualism of 
American society meant that the overwhelming majority of homicides 
were committed by men, and often women, as evidence of their grow­
ing independence, acting alone. Two other American characteristics 
dramatically cut the number of homicidal quarrels over land and labor. 
One is that Americans were farmers, rather than peasants, whose land 
was typically held in "fee simple"—that is, owned outright, with no 
communal obligations and restrictions. That meant they worked alone, 
or with family or slave labor, rather than communally, and so, unlike 
medieval peasants, did not continually squabble about whose turn it 
was to lend a plow or herd the cattle. Second and equally important, 
the court system was widely available to free men and heavily used in 
those areas, like early New England, where village closeness and com­
munity obligations made for friction. 
Other than infanticides, then, murder and manslaughter typically 
involved quarrelsome fellow servants, artisans, laborers, or small farm­
ers, sometimes spouses. Surprisingly few involved the still clumsy fire­
arms of the period, despite their wide availability. Capital punishment 
would deprive father, master, or colony of useful hands; better, then, to 
send a criminal back to work, if not truly penitent at least mutilated; a 
common sentence was to extend or impose a number of years of inden­
tured labor. 
The statistics, while fragmentary, show clearly that the murder rate 
among white colonials was comparatively low, executions lower yet, 
and both dropping over time. Strict Massachusetts juries convicted in 
capital cases at a relatively high rate, a little over 60 percent, but there 
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were only 232 convictions for homicide of any kind in the whole cen­
tury between 1673 and 1774; by the last generation this was far less 
than 1 per 100,000 annually. In Pennsylvania, which had the longest 
list of capital offenses in any colony, there were 170 death sentences, 
but only ninety-two convicts, or roughly one a year, were actually exe­
cuted, a little less than half for murder or infanticide, with habitual 
burglars a close second. In the small and proverbially disorderly colony 
of North Carolina, finally, where only about a quarter to a third of 
accused killers were convicted, there were only 67 capital verdicts, 20 
for murder, and (given the state of the records) just two men are actu­
ally known to have been hung. 
But in North Carolina, indeed all over the colonies, there was an­
other kind of problem. 
If the men on top of white colonial society did not doubt their ability 
to handle violent behavior on the bottom of it, they had also to deal 
with other people wholly outside and below it. The same labor short­
age that made life relatively good, and lives valuable, among even the 
poorest whites, made it economic to import larger numbers of African 
slaves. A growing slave trade was a part of the international market 
seized early by merchant shippers in Great Britain and its American 
colonies. And as slavery spread in law and fact, the need to control black 
behavior became a daily and continuous fact of life in the South, and 
sometimes, in the North as well, inspired fear and even hysteria. 
The earliest generations were the most brutal in the history of North 
American slavery, an institution still new to both races, As the traffic 
kept swelling through most of the eighteenth century, large numbers of 
raw Africans had to be taught some rudimentary English and trained in 
the needed agricultural skills by men who themselves had little experi­
ence in managing slave labor. The fact that the newcomers were pagan 
compounded the fact that they were black, a color long identified with 
fear and evil in all Indo-European languages, with their black "moods," 
"magic," "hearts," and "futures." English racism had helped make slav­
ery possible—there are no famous love stories, like that of John Rolfe 
and Pocahontas, in the early history of black-white contact—and it 
continued to strain all relations. Faced with a range of African reactions 
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from simple misunderstanding to fierce resistance, early slaveholders, 
with no more sophisticated techniques in their arsenals, were quick to 
resort to brute force and the whip. 
But the other side of brute force was fear; centuries before the Ro­
mans had recognized that "as many slaves, so many enemies." Virtually 
all the leading men in the South owned slaves by the early eighteenth 
century; slaves were the very basis of their wealth and influence. That 
their laborers had to be forced to work each day, often sullen if not 
mutinous, deeply colored the way in which they saw their world and 
used their institutions of law and control. And what was true of Mary­
land and Virginia was even more true of South Carolina and Georgia, 
smaller colonies settled after black slavery had been made legal. Free 
men would simply not work semitropical crops like rice and indigo, 
grown in malarial lowlands with high death rates, and in the coastal 
areas black slaves soon outnumbered white planters, with relatively few 
small white farmers to even the balance. 
One fear was of group flight and even rebellion. In practice the dan­
ger was not great; Africans from many tribes, of many languages, were 
rarely able to plot together in number. But the fear was not wholly 
unreasonable. To the south of Georgia was Florida, claimed by the tra­
ditional Spanish enemy, and to the west almost everywhere were Indi­
ans, many of them hostile, who could and sometimes did shelter and 
even help arm runaway slaves. South Carolina deliberately used slave 
troopers in its Indian wars, hoping to divide and conquer by intensify­
ing hatred between the two groups. While some allied tribes owned 
slaves of their own, others used their woodland skills to chase down 
runaways. Following the Stono Revolt in 1739, when several dozen Af­
ricans killed some whites and evaded the militia while striking out for 
freedom in Florida, the authorities paid a handsome £2,000 in bounty 
money to native trackers who returned the fugitives dead or alive. 
But while white fear of mass revolt was never far from the surface, 
the most basic need was to deal with the daily confrontations and acts 
of defiance, the routine resistance that, if not put down, would under­
mine the whole social and economic system. The first line of defense 
was the owner himself. Virginia in 1669 essentially declared that the 
masters rules had the force of law, meaning that whatever short of mur­
der he defined as "crime" on his own property could be punished by 
him as he saw fit. The whip was the usual instrument for punishing 
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"obstinacy"—indeed it became the very symbol of slavery—but shack­
les and mutilation were also common, and so long as the intention was 
"correction," the master could not be prosecuted, even if a slave died of 
"violent means." 
But as slavery was compounded by racism, and became a caste sys­
tem that defined the line not only between owner and slave but also 
between all blacks and all whites, the whole official machinery of law 
enforcement was needed to uphold it. In the 1680s the Virginia assem­
bly made it a crime for any slave to "lift a hand" against any Christian; 
by the early eighteenth century every southern colony had created in 
effect a whole series of separate laws, "slave codes," to govern their hu­
man property. 
The alternative to these codes, given the degree of white fear and 
hostility, was purely vigilante justice, beatings and even killings outside 
the law. In practice the fact that a slave was valuable property was the 
best defense against maiming or murder. A key and largely successful 
provision of slave codes, designed to assure that those accused of felony 
would be brought to court and not simply lynched, was that if a slave 
was condemned to death the colony itself would compensate the mas­
ter, at fair market value, for the loss. The law presumed first that no 
owner would deliberately destroy his own property and second that he 
would insist on formal proceedings if one of his blacks stole something 
from a nearby farm or assaulted a neighbor. 
The Virginia code, as matured by 1705 and widely imitated, called 
for patrols of whites to check on Africans traveling outside their plan­
tations without special passes or assembling in number; small plots, and 
rumors of plots, involving escape and revenge were enough to keep 
patrollers busy and slaves nervous. The code also created a separate 
court system to try slave crime, although administered by the same jus­
tices of the peace who ran the usual county courts. Rules of law were in 
fact observed, but the rules were unique. The two most important were 
that no black could testify against any white and that in capital cases— 
in powerful contrast to the usual proceedings—no juries were allowed. 
The rule of law was stressed by Virginians themselves as essential to 
justifying slavery to themselves and others. And whites, accordingly, 
were sometimes prosecuted for the murder of blacks, although the re­
cords tell little about why these incidents were chosen for action. In one 
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Virginia case, in 1716, a woman who had secretly buried a dead African 
was accused of murder by a coroner's inquest; the governor, in urging 
the case forward, justified the action in almost medieval terms: "At the 
same time the slave is the masters property he is likewise the King's 
subject." And when in 1739 two white men—one an overseer, neither 
an owner—whipped a black to death "in a most cruel and barbarous 
manner," the two were actually hanged. But there could be no more 
than these spasmodic convictions since slave testimony could not be 
used; in practice anything a master did was beyond punishment if not 
committed in the presence of other whites hostile enough to insist on 
prosecution. 
Justice ran in only one direction: blacks could not accuse whites of 
crime. Being property themselves, legally they had no property to be 
stolen by anyone of any color. African women could not, in law, be 
raped: no such crime was defined or prosecuted. But the special courts 
were not wholly sham affairs; white Virginians insisted on the essential 
fairness of the institution. Many accused slaves were declared not guilty, 
roughly a third, whether in cases of property crime, rape, or murder. 
Slaveholding justices, too, sympathetic at least to the owner, often al­
lowed benefit of clergy to the guilty. But given their original purpose, 
to deter crime by making slaves "affrighted," they were supposed to be 
harsh. And the numbers tell a stark story. 
Although Virginia's slave population grew rapidly, by the time of the 
American Revolution it had not reached much past 40 percent of the 
whole. This minority had relatively few opportunities to commit prop­
erty crimes off the plantation—the only ones for which in practice they 
were ever tried in court. Many of those guilty of felonious violence on 
the owner's plantation, especially against other slaves, were "sold to 
Georgia," often a death sentence in itself, without any formal proceed­
ings. Still others were lynched, or shot by pursuers, again leaving no 
trace in the record. The historian Philip Schwartz believes it impossible 
to tell how many, in these early years, were killed in this fashion. And 
yet a careful but incomplete tally of Virginia sentences during eighty 
years of the eighteenth century finds, after excluding known pardons, 
that some 555 slaves were sentenced to death, a number that dwarfs the 
count, for all races, anywhere to the North. During the same years, just 
77 free people are known to have been hanged in the same province. At 
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the level of capital punishment, clearly, the criminal courts of the Old 
Dominion were working far harder to keep control over blacks than to 
deliver justice among whites 
The crimes that inspired this terrible record reflect white concerns 
better than black actions. Crimes against property, as in many colonies, 
accounted for the majority. Acts of stealth and darkness, such as arson, 
given its deadly potential, and burglary, or breaking into private places 
at night, were much scarier than, for example, rustling hogs out of the 
woods. Some 155 slaves were accused of murder and attempted mur­
der, 109 convicted. They were tried and often hanged for killing other 
slaves—that is, destroying property—although doubtless far more of 
these escaped formal trials than those who murdered whites. 
Not one master in Virginia is known to have been murdered by a 
slave before 1740; the number of verified white victims of black homi­
cide during the eighty-year stretch of the century, most of them not 
masters but other free men, is just twenty-four; a careful maximum 
estimate ranges between sixty-four and eighty, meaning that probably 
fewer than one black-white killing occurred, on average, in any year. 
But these rare events inspired a disproportionate terror. Late in the cen­
tury, especially, fear of poisoning, secret and undetectable, perhaps ac­
companied by African spells, administered by trusted servants, in a 
master's own home, preoccupied white minds to an especially irrational 
degree. And when in 1747 "Eve," of Orange County, was convicted of 
petit treason for poisoning Peter Montague, her master, she was given 
the full medieval sentence: drawn to the stake in a hurdle and there 
burned alive. 
This fear of blackness, difference, mystery, and paganism in fact per­
vaded the American colonies, north as well as south. The fearsome 
events in Salem had begun with a black woman's kitchen witchery. In 
most places, as in Virginia, special restrictions governed not only slaves 
but freed people of African descent. These men and women were no 
longer slaves, but they were still black, objects of racism. They were also 
special objects of suspicion, when thoughts of insurrection were in the 
air, simply because of their relative sophistication and ability to travel 
freely, although there was no actual example of any joint conspiracy 
between them and their enslaved fellows. Everywhere they were denied 
full equality in law; in the South, like slaves, they could not testify 
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against whites in criminal cases; even the New England colonies for­
bade them from joining the militia—that is, learning to use guns. 
Gathered increasingly in towns, often along the waterfront and poorer 
neighborhoods that boasted what little there was of an underworld of 
prostitution, robbery, and alehouse violence, free blacks everywhere 
contributed disproportionately to the annals of colonial crime. And in 
fact the most dramatic examples both of slave revolt and of white hys­
teria occurred not in the rural South but in New York City. 
New York's slaves in the early eighteenth century were scattered 
about the city as gardeners, servants, porters, and longshoremen, num­
bering a little less than 20 percent of a uniquely polyglot and often 
mutually suspicious population. All colonial cities, wooden and 
crowded, were nervous about arson. And one night in the summer of 
1712, two dozen blacks fired a building and killed nine whites, shoot­
ing at others who came to put out the blaze, and fled. Angry New 
Yorkers hunted them out; some were shot, others slit their own throats. 
Those captured were tried, under provisions of a slave code much like 
Virginia's. But while the usual forms of law were followed, the usual 
punishments were not: thirteen were hanged, one was left to die, in 
chains, of thirst, four were burned to death—one of these over a slow 
fire lasting most of a day—and one was broken on a wheel. 
This episode, almost uniquely, was in fact a real plot, with real vic­
tims. A generation later, in 1741, matters were not so clear. Real fires 
were set in the most conspicuous places—the fort, the barracks, the 
governors mansion and chapel—and much of the city fled in fear. 
With no real clues, panicked authorities turned to the usual suspects 
and found an imaginative young white woman, Mary Burton, servant 
in a tavern where stolen goods were fenced, who told them that her 
master and mistress had conspired with black customers, free and slave, 
to set New York afire and slaughter its white inhabitants. With an au­
dience in the form of a special court, Burton kept coming up with more 
names; Africans condemned to the stake gasped out still others. There 
was that year a war with Spain, and the Papists were accused as well; 
the court was convinced that an itinerant dancing master, John Ury, 
was actually engaged in the plot as a Spanish priest in disguise. By the 
time the metastasizing proceedings were halted, with Burtons credi­
bility and the jails both strained past capacity, four whites and thirteen 
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blacks had been hanged, eighteen others—all black—burned to death. 
Those still in jail, several dozen in all, were then "sold to Georgia" and 
other places of exile, as the final victims of "the Great Negro 
Conspiracy." 
In British North America, then, through the seventeenth century and 
most of the eighteenth, both the incidence of homicide and the use of 
capital punishment present a number of paradoxes. In an age in which 
physical brutality was an accepted part of life, all thirteen colonies were 
full of the preconditions of violence, peopled often by alien white im­
migrants and convicts, in frequent conflict with hostile natives, built in 
large part on the unwilling labor of fearsome Africans. But as unparal­
leled levels of prosperity, generally full employment, and rapid growth 
absorbed all internal problems, the murder rate among and between 
white colonials was low and growing lower. Largely self-governing in 
criminal matters, the colonists used capital punishment far less, and for 
different offenses, than the authorities at home. 
In effect, both their aggressiveness and their fears were directed down 
and out. They often felt surrounded by enemy Indians and their Euro­
pean allies and by blacks, free and slave, who amounted to fully one-
fifth of the non-Indian population by the time of the American 
Revolution. In law as well as in practice, the dominant white popula­
tion then developed three different systems of justice, one for each of 
the three races. 
All of this was challenged, however—the prosperity, the race rela­
tions, above all the self-government—as toward the close of the eigh­
teenth century relations with imperial England moved into crisis. 
The American Revolution 
and the Early Republic, 1776-1829 
The American nation proclaimed in 1776 captured attention by defy­
ing the world s greatest imperial power. But the success and prestige of 
the new American Republic depended not only on its unexpected mili­
tary victory but also on the ideals that it stood for. The rational prin­
ciples of the late eighteenth-century Enlightenment were reflected in 
the Declaration of Independence and in the constitutions and laws of 
the new federal and state governments. While continued growth in 
area, wealth, and population was still the essential basis of national self-
confidence between the 1770s and the 1820s, a reputation for rational, 
humane innovation was one of the things that Americans were most 
proud of, and the rest of the Western world most curious about. New 
ways of thinking about and dealing with crime and punishment were 
high on the list. 
But the Revolution did not affect all Americans equally. The very 
ways in which it was fought, at the same time humanely and inhu­
manely, reflected the fact that there were great differences not only 
among the red, white, and black peoples who lived in the new nation 
and its territories but among its geographic sections as well. The old 
threefold division was replaced by a new one: as the Middle Colonies 
mostly joined the "North," or "East," the pulls between North and 
South now centered on a growing "West." And as the nation moved 
away from its hopeful revolutionary origins, the applause of foreign 
admirers was muted, and patriotic pride chastened, by continuing 
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problems of race, above all slavery, which carried over from its colonial 
origins. These in turn continued and in some ways widened the gap 
among regions, a gap measured by, among other things, differing mur­
der rates and different ways of dealing with several kinds of homicides. 
I 
The political quarrel that led to revolution broke out shortly after a long 
series of wars culminated in a combined Anglo-American victory over 
the French in 1763, which finally drove those persistent rivals off the 
continent. The British, with a huge new empire to administer, not only 
in Canada but also across the globe, tried to tighten control and raise 
taxes in the thirteen colonies. The colonists resisted not simply through 
petitions, pamphlets, and resolutions but through direct action. Direct 
action, on both sides of the Atlantic, was a traditional form of political 
protest, especially among those who had no right to vote—the great 
majority in England—or were frustrated, like many colonials, by deci­
sions made by high or faraway authorities. Americans throughout the 
eighteenth century had rioted over the "impressment," in effect kidnap­
ping, of sailors in port towns to serve in the royal navy, over the export 
of food in times of shortage and high prices, over the enforcement of 
unpopular customs taxes. These riots were not nonviolent: they de­
stroyed property, and British officials, especially native colonials acting 
in defiance of the communities they were raised in, were sometimes 
tarred and feathered^and scraping tar off the genitals, later, was a 
painful process. But while their houses were often burned, they them­
selves were almost never killed, certainly not deliberately. In contrast to 
similar incidents in London, for example, the number of casualties was 
kept low in part because there was no army to call on; in most mob 
actions it is the rioters, not the forces of law and order, who suffer most. 
But the low incidence of lethal violence among whites may also be ex­
plained more simply as not in the colonial tradition. 
While mob action was mostly urban, the most violent encounters 
involved men from the frontier, often ethnic Scots-Irish, with politi­
cal and other grievances against dominant easterners. And the issues 
tended directly or indirectly to involve the Indians. In 1763, when 
western Pennsylvanians believed that Quaker policies were denying 
them protection from attack, an armed band known as the Paxton Boys 
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marched east. Murdering peaceful "praying Indians" in villages along 
the way, they were turned back from Philadelphia only by Benjamin 
Franklins adroit diplomacy. 
America's first organized vigilantes, the South Carolina Regulators of 
1767-69, were more notable for their restraint. Partly because of a war 
with the Cherokee, the backcountry of that province was left with no 
organized law enforcement and plagued by outlaws. Bands of felons, 
mostly poor white war veterans, attracted escaped slaves and other fu­
gitives from the law and organized an intercolonial trade in stolen 
horses. The term "vigilante" applies simply to those who take the law 
into their own hands; these Carolinians, mostly local property owners, 
accused the outlaws of rape, kidnapping, and torture in addition to 
theft and proposed to "regulate" matters on their own. Holding extra­
legal trials in the absence of official courts, they sentenced captives to 
flogging, banishment, and forced service on the Regulators' own plan-
tations—but not death. The outlaws were crushed, and the Regulators 
almost as quickly disbanded when the provincial government provided 
district courts and sheriffs for the area. 
Two years later, the most lethal revolt in colonial history occurred in 
neighboring North Carolina, where again the backcountry was in tur­
moil. Leading frontiersmen there, too, proposed to "regulate" their 
own affairs, although the issue was not outlawry but the misbehavior of 
corrupt sheriffs and other agents sent out from the capital. The frontier 
was grossly underrepresented in the colonial assembly, and without le­
gitimate ways to protest defiant Regulators took to burning the barns 
and beating the bodies of offending officials. The royal governor finally 
led an eastern militia west to counter these loosely organized guerrillas. 
The two sides drew up facing lines near Alamance Creek, in May 1771, 
insulting each other but not firing until the governor gave the order; 
eastern artillery won the day after a loss of nearly twenty men on both 
sides. Two days later a prisoner was executed by a military court as an 
"Out Law." The next month twelve more were tried for treason by a 
special court; all were found guilty and six were hanged—triple the 
known total who suffered capital punishment for ordinary crime in 
the entire previous history of the province. The rest were reprieved, at 
the governor's own request. 
But this episode only underlined the fact that American colonists, 
during the entire period between 1763 and 1775, while continually 
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defying the agents of royal authority, were extremely reluctant to take 
their lives. As in earlier episodes, those who objected to new taxes and 
other imperial policies burned houses and trashed furniture, lit bonfires, 
threw garbage, laid on tar and feathers; the only tactical innovation was 
pioneered by patriots, disguised as Indians, who peacefully dumped im­
ported India goods into cold harbor waters at the Boston Tea Party. 
There were almost as many reasons to resent and even hate imperial 
authority as there were Americans: fear that the Anglican religion would 
be established everywhere, ethnic resentments of the English, the hun­
ger to swarm across the Appalachians. But one of them was the some­
times ugly behavior of imperial troopers, redcoats, newly stationed in 
towns like Boston. Rudyard Kipling, himself an imperialist, nonetheless 
observed that "single men in barracks don't grow into plaster saints." 
Eighteenth-century British soldiers, poor and hungry, who had often 
"volunteered" just a jump ahead of the hangman, were not the best of 
neighbors. Bostons own young men, like young townies everywhere, 
were loosely organized in gangs, proud of their "ownership" of certain 
corners, taverns, or women; the new guys in town, swaggering in their 
uniforms, were a threat to all of them. And when the friction got too 
hot, it was the British who fired, and killed. 
On the cold winter night of March 5, 1770, following several days 
of tense encounters, a big crowd, mostly young men and boys, pinned 
eight redcoats and their Irish captain, Thomas Preston, against the wall 
of the Customs House, center and symbol of imperial rule. Yelling in­
sults and waving sticks, throwing stones and snowballs, they dared the 
Brits to shoot. One threw a club; it hit a soldier. A single shot rang out 
immediately; then, after a pause of about six seconds, a whole round of 
shots—without Preston's order. A number of townsmen were hit in this 
Boston Massacre, five of them mortally, including the escaped slave 
Crispus Attucks, traditionally counted the first victim of the American 
Revolution. The crowd fell silent; Preston screamed at his panicked 
troops, lined them up, and marched them off, without pursuit or re­
taliation. The royal governor quieted the city with the promise that the 
troopers would stand trial for murder. 
On this issue the leaders of colonial dissent sided with the governor. 
Whatever else they stood for, they were insistent on their traditional 
"Rights as Englishmen." Their objection to tightened British rule was 
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precisely that it threatened these rights; it was their side, in resisting 
arbitrary imperial action, that upheld the memory of the Magna Carta, 
the English Bill of Rights won in the previous century, the very prin­
ciple of the rule of law. At a time when the British government threat­
ened to try patriot leaders in special courts back in England, trial by 
jury was symbolically and rhetorically central to the American cause. 
And so Preston and his men were duly indicted by a Boston grand jury, 
and after many delays were tried that September, with their defense led 
not by a British official but by a patriot leader, John Adams, later presi­
dent of the United States. 
Radicals hoped for a conviction. But Adams took great care, in chal­
lenging jurors, to strike those with strong anti-British leanings, carefully 
eliminating residents of the city of Boston itself. And even prosecution 
witnesses admitted that the scene that night was chaotic and threaten­
ing. Adams summed up the law: if the men were endangered, they had 
the right to fire in self-defense; if provoked, although not endangered, 
they had at worst committed manslaughter. One jury acquitted Pres-
ton—who had neither ordered shots nor fired them. Another found six 
of the soldiers innocent, the other two guilty only of manslaughter. In a 
final irony, these pleaded benefit of clergy and were let go with branded 
thumbs. The rule of law and the practice of restraint both triumphed. 
The war that began at the bridge in Concord on April 19, 1775, as the 
American Revolution finally turned to arms, was conducted (outside of 
Indian country) with the same obedience to rules and lack of atrocities 
that had marked the conflict up to then. It was, being war, violent and 
bloody by definition, and since it was in effect a civil war—John Adams 
once estimated that a third of the colonial population remained loyal to 
the British and another third took no sides—it was full of potential 
betrayals and tensions. The American armies, full of short-termers and 
fierce individualists, were hard to discipline: in Philadelphia, between 
1776 and 1781, courts-martial or civilian courts ordered three men 
shot and six hanged for spying, desertion, or treason, one of them on 
order of General Benedict Arnold, just months before he turned his 
coat and became the most famous traitor in American history. But 
through all of this, political opponents of the Revolution, while some 
were stripped of their property, all were harassed, and many were exiled, 
rarely had reason to fear for their lives—in powerful contrast to the 
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losers in the French Revolution, a few years later, who were drowned, 
butchered, and guillotined by the tens of thousands. 
And it was less the conduct of war than the hopes for its results that 
marked the Revolution, as between the opening of hostilities and July 
1776, when independence was finally declared, the patriot cause was 
transformed in a way that had enormous significance for the proposed 
new nation. For over a decade the colonials had been insisting only on 
their Rights as Englishmen, demanding no more than what was allowed 
the natives of the British Isles themselves. But now they were no longer 
to be "Englishmen" but citizens of "America." And Thomas Jefferson's 
famous Declaration of Independence was addressed to what we would 
now call world opinion, and based not on the rights of Englishmen but 
"the Rights of Man," partly as an appeal for foreign support. Thomas 
Paine, newly arrived from England, sounded the same call in declaring, 
"The cause of America is in a great measure the cause of all mankind." 
And the call was answered by the young men of the eighteenth-century 
Enlightenment, the Marquis de Lafayette, Kasimir Pulaski, and Thad­
deus Kosciuszko, come to fight for what America meant to them. 
The new nation could not be grounded on the same base as those in 
the Old World: the polyglot Americans shared no common ancestry, 
history, or religion, not even a unique language of their own. This 
country could be based only on its principles—the proud new prin­
ciples of freedom, reason, and natural rights. Up to the Revolution, 
leading Americans had been embarrassed by the way in which their 
provincial institutions only roughly and incompletely mirrored the En­
glish originals. Now it could be seen, to the accompaniment of Enlight­
ened European applause, that the very ways in which the New World 
differed from the Old—its simplicity, its closeness to raw nature, its 
lack (outside of New England) of any strong state support for religion, 
the absence of a true hereditary aristocracy—were not faults but virtues. 
Even before the Revolution was over, the former colonies, now states, 
began to act on these principles, and over the next several decades to 
transform their societies. 
For the native Indians, however, the American Revolution and its after­
math was a disaster. 
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From the viewpoint of the great imperial powers, England and 
France (generally allied with a fading Spain), eastern North America 
had always been a minor theater in their many seventeenth- and eigh-
teenth-century wars. But these conflicts loomed large among the white 
settlers of French Canada and the thirteen British colonies. And they 
were of life-and-death importance to original natives. Throughout the 
colonial era the British were able to hold their own in large part through 
alliance with the powerful Iroquois Confederacy. From the beginning, 
the inland Iroquois, by far the strongest and most diplomatically so­
phisticated of the eastern tribes, had stood aloof from the early contests 
between the English settlers and the natives of the New England and 
Chesapeake coasts. Their scouts and warriors were later crucial to the 
Anglo-American side in King William s War, Queen Anne's War, King 
George's War and ultimately the French and Indian War of 1756—63. 
In the final Peace of Paris, the French were at last driven off the con­
tinent and Canada awarded to Britain. But this very success led to 
tragedy. 
One issue in the Anglo-American political argument that followed 
the military victory was of crucial importance to the Iroquois. More 
than other natives they had come to understand the difference between 
white and Indian conceptions of landownership: whites owned land not 
tribally or communally but individually, not just to hunt over, or to use 
and move on, but to farm and fence, permanently, keeping all others 
off. The colonists, long pent up on the coast by French and Indians, 
were eager for land across the mountains: Indian territory. The British 
were not so enthusiastic; in the larger imperial scheme the white colo­
nies were sources of much trouble and little profit while the Indians 
had proved as loyal as their fur trade was valuable. The imperial authori­
ties then casually drew a line, on a map in London, across what they 
imagined was the crest of the Appalachians, and forbade their white 
subjects to cross it. And when the quarrel among the white men led to 
war, for this and other reasons, the Iroquois and others rightly judged 
that the land-hungry Americans were a bigger threat to their way of life 
than the faraway king, and chose to side with the redcoats. 
By the late eighteenth century in Europe, uniformed armies had 
developed civilized rules about the difference between friend and foe, 
soldier and civilian, the legitimate or "necessary" homicide of formal 
warfare and wanton murder. But no such rules were followed in the 
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murky conflicts, far from the more famous actions, that raged among 
the Iroquois, the Americans, and their respective native allies beginning 
in 1775. And when Thomas Jefferson complained to the world, in the 
1776 Declaration of Independence, that the kings Indians were a mer­
ciless people whose "known rule of warfare is an undistinguished de­
struction of all ages, sexes, and conditions," he was telling less than half 
of a complex story. 
The relations between whites and Indians on the margins of settle­
ment had long been tangled, as they traded, sometimes intermarried, 
and fought. Both groups mingled and borrowed from each other, iron 
tools, moccasins and muskets, the techniques of woodland ambush, the 
collecting of human scalps. The English had always complained that by 
their standards acts of war were hard to tell from simple murder: hos­
tilities were not announced by formal letter but by surprise raids, often 
on isolated settlements or cabins, with families kidnapped or butchered 
before they had a chance to learn the reasons why. But their own tactics 
often involved the destruction and uprooting of whole native villages, 
the extermination of peoples. And along the northern and western bor­
derland, the American Revolution was fought with a ferocity by then 
traditional. 
Although the Iroquois were most important, all the eastern Indians 
were drawn in. Neutrality was impossible, and hard choices had to 
made by every tribe, even village, as well as by each individual among 
the many half-breeds, or metis, who had for generations interpreted 
and counseled among the natives and the white authorities. George 
Washington's blue-uniformed "continentals" did not fight out west, 
but some redcoats did, together with state militiamen on short terms, 
hard to tell from buckskinned white guerrillas, including many in the 
southern backcountry loyal to the Crown. There were few pitched bat­
tles among this kaleidoscope of opponents—that was not the frontier 
way—but many killings, much treachery, and acts of atrocity and 
revenge. Most important was the disintegration of tribal organization 
through flight and forced migration, the destruction of villages and 
crops. 
Triumph for the new United States, completed by a 1781 victory on 
the faraway coast of Virginia, was a crushing defeat, a turning point, for 
the woodland Indians. Long since outgunned and outnumbered, their 
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only hope had been the alliance with Britain. Now the peace ceded all 
the British land east of the Mississippi to the victors. Under the law of 
the new United States, Indian tribes were considered "nations," of a 
sort, but within the boundaries and ultimately under the control of the 
larger American nation. And over the next forty years, several American 
governments, scarcely in control of their own advancing frontiersmen, 
made a number of treaties with the actual inhabitants, guaranteeing 
tribal boundaries "as long as grass grows and water runs," only to break 
them soon after. 
While some serious fighting and the usual murderous raids and re­
taliations accompanied the white onrush, the outcome was not in 
doubt. For three decades the British in Canada and the Spanish in Flor­
ida teased nearby natives with promises of aid, and the great chieftain 
Tecumseh rallied natives of all tribes to join together against the Ameri­
cans. But Tecumseh was killed in a cavalry charge early in the Anglo-
American War of 1812. And the end was reached when Britain and the 
United States made afinal peace, in 1815, and the Spanish sold Florida 
four years later. 
As all hope of violent resistance died, then, the biggest of the remain­
ing contested lands was the several million acres belonging to the Five 
Civilized Tribes of the Southeast. And their traditional leaders, the 
Cherokee, tried another tactic in their effort to hold on. After genera­
tions of contact with white culture and with the encouragement of pol­
iticians like Thomas Jefferson and a host of Christian missionaries, they 
decided not to resist but to adopt white institutions, learning to read 
and write, approving a form of government modeled after the Consti­
tution of the United States, carving out independent farms, many of 
them worked by black slaves. 
One of the two critical issues, they recognized, was homicide. And 
what their leaders, many of them metis, in effect proposed to do was to 
enact in a single generation what it had taken Anglo-Saxons centuries 
of evolution to accomplish. A promise to end the age-old practice of 
infanticide, killing unwanted babies, was perhaps only a bone thrown 
to Christian missionaries, and not really enforced. More serious was the 
direct assault on "the law of blood," the traditional insistence that any 
homicide must be revenged by the victim s clan. The Cherokee, like the 
ancient Angles and Saxons, did not recognize any distinction between 
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murder and manslaughter, indeed between murder and accident. Gen­
erations of alliances and battles with whites had turned on this tradi­
tion. And although it was not very different in practice from the way of 
their fierce Scots-Irish neighbors, the Cherokee began slowly to change 
it to meet white standards. 
Beginning in the late eighteenth century a tribal council declared 
that revenge should be sought only when killings had been done "with 
malice aforethought." Shortly after, a kind of police force, the Light­
house Regulators, was established, whose members were supposed to be 
exempted from revenge if they should arrest a killer. But these innova­
tions were resisted by many traditionalists. 
One typical case arose in May 1802, a time of peace, when a drunken 
Cherokee visited an outlying plantation, threw a baby into the fire, and 
then "killed a young woman with a Mattuck, splitting therewith her 
face from her forehead to the chin. . . . [T]he Man of the House . . . 
took his gun, loaded her with nails, for want of Bullets, and shot the 
Indian dead." Worried authorities on both sides agreed that the Chero­
kee was at fault—but the tribal elders claimed no power to restrain the 
man's family from further killing. Just months later, another tribal 
council pushed harder, and when a white man, Barefoot Runion, acci­
dentally killed a tribesman named Goose, the elders forbade retaliation. 
When Goose s uncle defied them and slaughtered Runions family, the 
council, trying to prevent war, arrested the killer, who was tried in a 
white court, pleaded in vain that he had killed only as a sacred duty, 
and was sentenced to hang. 
The Cherokee complained that their attempts to deal with interracial 
homicide were not matched on the other side, where the peacekeeping 
efforts of governors and generals, like those of royal officials earlier, were 
canceled by American legal procedures: frontier jurors simply refused 
to convict their fellows of killing Indians. But given the imbalance of 
power, it was the Cherokee who were forced to change. The next step, 
suggested by the white authorities, was another echo of ancient Ger­
manic law: the clan of any homicide victim was urged to accept money, 
perhaps $100 to $200, instead of blood, a solution only grudgingly 
accepted, beginning in 1803, as it left the unavenged spirits of the dead 
still restless. 
But in the end, all of these reforms proved useless. If homicide was 
one of the two biggest issues between Cherokees and whites, the bigger 
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one was land, and on that the whites could not be satisfied. In 1829 the 
state of Georgia, whose citizens especially hungered for their rich cotton 
plantations, declared the Cherokee's constitution and laws null and void, 
insisting at the same time that all Indians accused of crime be tried in 
state courts but that no Indian jurors or testimony be allowed. President 
Andrew Jackson and the Congress of the United States sided with 
Georgia and ordered the whole tribe removed west of the Mississippi. 
Since the days of John Rolfe, many white Americans had admired or 
sympathized with the Indians. During the eighteenth century, Europe­
ans had romanticized them as "noble savages," and once they posed no 
real threat, Thomas Jefferson, Tecumseh's nemesis General William 
Henry Harrison, and Andrew Jackson himself found much to praise in 
their sometime foes. Jackson, the most famous Indian fighter of them 
all, even adopted a three-year-old boy found clinging to his dead 
mother after one of his own battles with the Creek. The Cherokee 
found support, during the 1820s and 1830s, in the Supreme Court of 
the United States, which declared in 1832 that they had full authority 
over their own lands. But the decision was ignored, and in 1838 the 
whole of the tribe was forced on a long, deadly march to the dry lands 
of Oklahoma, an epic later known as the Trail of Tears. 
Under the new American Republic, then, as under the Province of 
Virginia two centuries earlier, there were several ways of dealing with 
native and interracial homicide. Indians who killed Indians on tribal 
land were ignored by the white authorities. Those living outside tribal 
lands were fully subject to white law. Otherwise whites who killed In­
dians were tried by whites, and generally freed; Indians who killed 
whites were surrendered to white courts, at peril of war, to confirm 
their legally inferior status. 
But while the Native Americans suffered massacre and defeat through­
out the Revolution and its aftermath, humanitarianism was flourishing 
within the new American nation, with an important impact on ways of 
dealing with crime and criminals. 
The nation was born at a time of great revolutionary optimism, when 
Benjamin Franklin, having taken a ride in the new "balloon," believed 
that all wars might be abolished: it was now possible to drop bombs 
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from the air, a tactic so unthinkably barbaric that no one would adopt 
it. The new American Republic, having shaken off the rule of kings and 
aristocrats, would lead the way to a new era: dozens of movements, 
hundred of societies, sprang up to improve education, eliminate drink­
ing, help the poor, heal the sick. And as part of this broader movement 
the Americans would reform and rethink the traditional ways of dealing 
with crime and criminals. Having begun their Revolution by insisting 
on their English rights, they enshrined some of them in bills of right, 
most famously the first ten amendments to the federal Constitution, 
adopted in 1789, collectively known as the Bill of Rights. 
The first of these amendments guaranteed freedom of speech, press, 
and religion, issues in the war just over. The second, inspired by the 
conduct of the Minutemen who at Lexington and Concord had been 
instantly ready to challenge the British when called, ensured the long 
colonial habit of widespread gun ownership: "A well-regulated Militia, 
being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to 
keep and bear arms shall not be infringed." But nearly half of the 
amendments dealt specifically with criminal procedure and were de­
signed to protect accused criminals from high-handed state action in 
ways that proudly and formally confirmed the ways in which the Ameri­
cans had already differed from English practice, and in some ways 
pushed beyond. 
These procedural guarantees included the need for warrants to carry 
on searches in private homes, the need for grand jury indictments in all 
capital cases, protection against double jeopardy—that is, not being 
tried twice for the same crime, as had occasionally been ordered by royal 
officials—and the right not to be a witness against oneself (to prevent 
confessions via torture). While the original concept of a jury literally of 
"neighbors" had long been lost in mobile America, the right to a speedy 
trial in the state or district of the alleged crime was guaranteed, to pre-
vent—as the British had threatened in the case of some patriots—re-
moval to distant or hostile jurisdictions. A defendant also had the right 
to be informed of all charges in writing, to subpoena defense witnesses, 
to have "the Assistance of Counsel," and not to pay "excessive bail." 
The several states in the new Republic separately added their own 
provisions designed to protect defendants. Those indicted for murder 
were now generally allowed to testify in their own behalf, if they so 
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chose. And the laws of evidence were carefully and formally elaborated 
with a care that went well beyond English precedents, with elaborate 
rules to keep hearsay testimony out of court, for example, and strict 
guidelines to be followed literally, at every stage, on pain of having con­
victions overturned on appeal to higher courts. But beyond these pro­
cedural rights, the most characteristic demand of the early republican 
era was that no one should suffer "cruel or unusual punishments." 
The first American law codes and constitutions were written at a 
time when enlightened thinkers were much influenced by the criminal 
theories of the Italian Cesare Beccaria and English reformers such as 
Jeremy Bentham and John Howard. What all these men wanted was to 
codify the law, that is, to put it in writing and so out of the hands of 
quirky or arbitrary judges, to get rid of the old and outworn, to make 
criminal law a part of a broader social policy. All law should be subject 
to the test of reason: the issue was not how old was the precedent or 
tradition but whether it made sense. And punishment, above all, should 
not be an end in itself, a form of revenge, as in the most ancient of 
theories. The idea was increasingly that crime was not the result of 
original sin, or a naturally weak or corrupted will, but of social circum­
stances, bad company, bad families, above all—as seemed obvious to 
anyone who saw the kind of people usually brought to court—of pov­
erty and ignorance. It was still rational, then, to think of punishment 
as a deterrent to weak wills who might otherwise be tempted into anti­
social behavior. But more than that, ideally, it should have the humane 
end of reforming the criminal so that he might return, purged of his 
misdeeds, as a useful member of the society. 
During and immediately after the Revolution, most American states 
got rid of such traditional irrationalities as benefit of clergy. They did 
away as well with whippings, brandings, cut ears and slit nostrils, and 
such obviously "cruel"—and in America always "unusual"—means of 
capital punishment as burning and butchering. The law of treason, in 
the federal Constitution, was defined to include only making war on 
the United States or aiding its enemies: eliminating the common law 
capital offenses of petit treason, such as murdering a husband or master, 
counterfeiting coin, or killing a government official. 
Most states, too, in codifying their laws, proudly drew a contrast 
with contemporary England by limiting the death penalty to a few 
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crimes only, including treason, murder, and sometimes rape or certain 
kinds of arson. Pennsylvania, most democratic of the new states, for­
mally eliminated capital punishment for robbery, burglary, and sodomy 
in 1790. But this, typically, only ratified earlier practice; few men had 
ever hanged for the first two, none for the last. More striking was an 
innovation: the offense of homicide, earlier split between "murder" and 
"manslaughter," was further subdivided in 1794. Murder "in the first 
degree" was a crime committed willfully, with premeditation, or as part 
of another felony, such as robbery or rape. Murder "in the second de­
gree" was, like manslaughter, defined as the result of a sudden or im­
pulsive passion, although unlike manslaughter the fatal action was 
actually intended to kill. Only "first-degree" killers were to hang. 
But with benefit of clergy codified out of existence and the various 
forms of maiming branded as "cruel and unusual," what was now re­
quired for most forms of murder, and indeed other offenses, was a 
new and "enlightened" form of punishment. Here again Quaker Penn­
sylvania led the way, with the establishment of Walnut Street Prison in 
1790. 
The few "prisons" that had existed earlier were places of "horrid 
gloom" like the copper mines of Simsbury, Connecticut, converted for 
penal use just before the Revolution, where shackled felons spent their 
time shivering under the perpetual drip of the cave walls. This worked, 
at best, as the grimmest kind of deterrence, with the bonus, it was 
hoped, that prisoners would do useful work. Those at Simsbury made 
metal; in other places offenders spent their nights in jail and their days 
slaving in irons, along the roads, as a form of public humiliation. 
But in a more enlightened time this kind of imprisonment was con­
demned as doing nothing to reform those who suffered under it. Wal­
nut Street, in contrast, was supposed to be a place where offenders 
would be locked in solitary confinement, still at work—work being 
good for both body and soul—living under harsh conditions, but with 
plenty of time, alone, to think about and repent for the crimes that had 
brought them there. The Walnut Street Prison was in fact not well de­
signed for this kind of reformation, but it served as forerunner to the 
penitentiary system that followed it, after decades of planning and pub­
lic agitation. 
The first four true penitentiaries were built between 1819 and 1829 
in Auburn and Ossining (Sing-Sing), New York, and in Pittsburgh and 
 81 The American Revolution and the Early Republic
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. They were designed to encourage the kind 
of "penitence" from which the name was taken. In New York, inmates 
worked together by day and went to lone cells at night; in Pennsylvania 
they stayed solitary all day, the better to enforce the rule, in both states, 
of absolute silence among inmates, who were supposed to be isolated 
from the bad company that had helped bring them to this sad place. 
Bibles were provided, to help, it was thought, in the process of indi­
vidual meditation and reformation. Hard labor and the strictest of lock­
step routines were also thought to be antidotes to the irregular habits, 
bad family upbringing, and sheer laziness that helped cause crime. 
These giant structures, with their massive walls, turrets, and huge 
gates, ironically reminded visitors of the Middle Ages; Eastern State, 
now in ruins, is still an awesomely gloomy sight. But they were in fact 
carefully designed and forward-looking testaments to the wealth and 
reforming optimism of the postrevolutionary generation. So was the 
simple act of incarcerating hundreds of inmates, who, despite all efforts, 
never really paid for their own upkeep through hard labor. Only a na­
tion as rich as the United States—or those mostly northern and western 
states who adopted penitentiaries—could afford to support so many 
able-bodied men outside of the workforce. But the new approach was 
the envy of the Western world, whose own reformers could only theo­
rize about the ideas that the Americans actually made into stone, mor­
tar, and system and which drew admiring visitors from Alexis de 
Tocqueville to Charles Dickens to see what they had wrought. 
One reason for the optimism behind the early penitentiary movement 
was that violent crime in the early American Republic, notably murder, 
inspired little worry among contemporaries then—and little interest 
among historians since. Richmond, Virginia, offers a good example. 
A frontier town of just 1,000 souls in 1784, it had grown by 1820 to 
over 12,000 permanent residents, the political,financial, and commer­
cial capital of the South s biggest state, full of the potential tensions 
posed by a population composed of casual travelers, slaves, free blacks, 
and settled whites. There were some hangings and some homicides, 
but in the course of the entire thirty-seven years not one hanging for 
homicide. 
82 Chapter 3 
Among the explanations for low murder rates in this period was the 
end, with independence, of the British practice of shipping felons to 
America. Not only was the whole class of indentured servants virtually 
eliminated, but, as the result of almost continual warfare in Europe, 
until after the defeat of Napoleon in 1815, there was no mass immigra­
tion of any kind. As in the colonial era, the new United States was rich 
and growing, with a marked need for labor and little long-term unem­
ployment among its young men. 
But a funny thing happened to murder in the young Republic: al­
though of little concern in real life, it became of enormous concern to 
the imagination, an object of fascination, of romance, for the first time 
associated with mystery. During the course of the later eighteenth cen­
tury, all over the Western world, the Enlightenment's stress on hu­
man rationality gave way, perhaps as reaction, to an emphasis on the 
deeper, less definable, wilder aspects of our human nature. This roman­
tic movement—which would last for generations—was no less humane 
than the Enlightenment, but it was far more complex. It helped inspire 
both a new mass interest in religion and a middle-class delight in secular 
courtship and love. But it also reached down into another level of the 
soul, the one that shivered not only with passion but with horror. 
The late eighteenth century was the age that in Europe produced the 
first "Gothic" literature, with all of its attendant sound effects, from 
the soft rustle of skirts and bodices through heavy breathing on to the 
clanking of chains and the shrieking of ghosts. And it was just at this 
juncture that the American novel was born, the very first, The Power of 
Sympathy, published in 1789 by William Hill Brown, dealing with mur­
der, love, and suicide, themes that have never since gone out of style. 
The murder novel was neither the first nor the only literary form to 
deal with these subjects. In New England, from seventeenth-century 
beginnings, the ritual of the gallows had included the obligatory exe­
cution sermon, immediately printed for the benefit of those potential 
sinners who had not heard it on the spot. But the original tightly gov­
erned village communities of the region were loosened over time. And 
so, too, with time the nature and appeal of gallows literature gradually 
shifted away from exclusively clerical themes toward others with more 
sensational appeal. Packed into pamphlets with the sermons were, in­
creasingly, narrative accounts of trials, the confessions or dying state­
ments of the condemned, even poems about them—often hard to tell 
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from a kind of boasting about colorful lives of sin and crime, not always 
elevated material for impressionable young people or servants. By the 
end of the American Revolution, a newer and even more subversive 
note was sounded, loudly: the historian Daniel Cohen notes that "vir­
tually all of the most popular crime pamphlets published in the early 
republic dealt with alleged miscarriages of justice," meaning both that 
established authority was wrong and that if murder was involved the 
crime remained unsolved, its elements mysterious. 
The most popular cases, as ever since, were not of course those in­
volving the dreary procession of poor and desperate people who were 
normally accused of homicide but those that featured more romantic 
and especially erotic subjects, betrayed wives or mistresses, seductive 
courtesans, virgins led astray. One of them inspired dozens of accounts, 
including A Deed of Horror! Trial of Jason Fairbanks. . . for the Murder 
of. . . His Sweetheart!!! published in August 1801. 
Fairbanks was a respectable youth from Dedham, Massachusetts, 
who had long been involved with Elizabeth Fales, daughter of a pros­
perous local family. But the courtship had resulted in neither marriage 
nor engagement; her parents presented "obstacles," perhaps related to 
his having no job, his incipient tuberculosis (favorite romantic disease), 
his partly crippled right arm. On Sunday, May 17, the two agreed to 
meet in a thicket of birches near her house on the following afternoon 
to reach "a final determination." 
Both of them seemed their usual selves that day, Betsy preparing for 
their tryst by reading an English novel about the tragic deaths of two 
young lovers. That afternoon, from the birch grove, nearby friends 
heard laughter—or maybe cries. About three o'clock Jason burst into 
the Fales household, carrying a knife, covered with blood, to tell her 
mother and sister that Betsy had killed herself and that he—with 
wounds to prove it—had tried to follow her. Rushing to the spot, they 
found the young woman suffering from multiple cuts all over her torso 
and a slit throat that allowed her only a few strangled gasps before she 
expired at their feet. 
At the inquest, a coroner's jury named Jason, weak from illness and 
loss of blood, only as an "accessory" to her death, suggesting suicide. 
But in August he was charged with murder before the supreme judicial 
court, and his weeklong trial was a sensation. The prosecution painted 
him as an "idle, pampered, lustful young man" who had played with 
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the younger Betsy s heart; the defense painted Betsy herself as having 
been corrupted by tales of romantic self-destruction. For readers, even 
more than for those in the courtroom, where speculation was not al­
lowed as actual evidence, there were many mysteries within the central 
mystery: Had Jason actually tried to kill himself? What were the "ob­
stacles" to marriage? Had he betrayed his sweetheart and boasted to his 
friends? Was she pregnant? How had she gotten slashed on the back? 
How could a sickly young man with a weak and shrunken arm over­
power a strong and healthy farm girl of eighteen? 
Twelve jurors deliberated all day August 7; at eight o'clock the next 
morning they declared Fairbanks guilty of murder. On Thursday, Sep­
tember 10, two companies of cavalry and Dedham's own militia es­
corted him through a thunderstorm from jail in Boston to the town 
common; ten thousand spectators were there to watch him hang. Many 
of them, grieving for his lost youth, together with thousands more 
readers, later, of the published accounts, were still not convinced that 
the mysteries had been solved. 
During the same time, too, romance came to shroud or exonerate an 
entirely different kind of homicide: killings committed in the name of 
"honor." In the course of the Revolution, provincial Americans had 
been exposed, often for the first time, to the manners and mores of 
aristocratic French and British officers, who made formal dueling a 
fashion. By that time, a century and a half after the fictional Three 
Musketeers, the weapons of choice were not rapiers but special pistols, 
and an elaborate etiquette had developed. An insult, real or fancied, was 
met with a challenge; the challenger had the right to name the weapons, 
place, and conditions of the encounter; all matters were negotiated 
among trusted seconds of the two parties involved. These associates also 
supervised the occasion itself. Typically, but not always, the antagonists 
stood with backs to each other, counted off ten paces, and at a signal 
turned and fired, if sometimes only in the air, honor being satisfied 
simply by the demonstrated courage to go through the ritual. 
The fact that proper forms were observed was perhaps not fully sat­
isfying to those shot dead in the process. But while dueling was every­
where illegal, and all participants in fatal encounters clearly guilty of 
first-degree murder as either principals or accessories, the law was in 
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many places simply ignored; in the army and navy, where the practice 
flowered especially, there was not a single case of court-martial. 
For a brief time dueling was practiced both north and south: indeed, 
the most famous duel in American history was fought by Alexander 
Hamilton and Aaron Burr, two residents of New York State, meeting 
in New Jersey. The long-standing political antagonism between the for­
mer treasury secretary and the incumbent vice president of the United 
States, both former revolutionary officers, had embittered Burr's failed 
candidacy for governor in the spring of 1803. The loser blamed defeat 
on statements and rumors fueled by his old enemy, and sent a letter of 
challenge. Hamilton not only disapproved of dueling on principle but 
two years before had watched his eldest son, Philip, die in agony, in his 
own home, after having been shot on "the field of honor." But however 
reluctant, he had no way out within the rules of his time, place, and 
class. On the morning of July 11, after arranging his affairs, he and his 
seconds rowed across the Hudson to the same traditional spot, on Wee­
hawken Heights, where Philip had gone, carrying the same borrowed 
pistols. At the signal, Hamilton shot into the air; Burr did not. 
The outcry over this killing was intense, and Aaron Burr, after some 
delay, was indicted for murder both in New York and in New Jersey 
and had to flee in secrecy. The charges were later forgotten; more im­
portant than what happened to Burr was what happened to dueling 
itself—from then on not only condemned in theory but prosecuted in 
practice, it virtually disappeared in the North. 
Its death was hastened by the fact that from the beginning, and cer­
tainly by the nineteenth century, leaders in New England and the 
North had consistently challenged the traditional, external code of 
honor in the name of the newer, internal concept of dignity. The dif­
ference between the two, as analyzed by social scientists, is that between 
two different conceptions of the relation between individual and soci­
ety. "Honor" is a matter of reputation, as judged by the community; a 
persons worth is what it appears to be, to outside observers. "Dignity" 
is a matter of the soul; a person's worth cannot be judged from the 
outside, but only by the individual conscience—a doctrine long en­
couraged by Protestant ministers—or by God himself: all of us must 
eventually stand before Him wholly alone, and the opinions of others 
will matter not. An insult, then, to a "man of honor" must be answered 
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publicly; a "man of dignity" may ignore the same insult, as not touch­
ing his inner worth. It is the same lesson taught by generations of moth­
ers: "Sticks and stones may break my bones, but names can never hurt 
me." Of course, even men of dignity if injured in some real way may 
sue for assault, or libel: New Englanders, more than southerners, were 
notorious for taking quarrels to court. 
Dignity, with its emphasis on self-control, discipline, and delayed 
gratification, was well suited to the conduct of life in an increasingly 
commercial and capitalist North, and to a polyglot society in which 
people of other religions and ethnic groups could not be expected to 
share the same standards of conduct and propriety. Honor, in contrast, 
continued to flourish in the more ethnically homogeneous white South, 
where all of a man's peers—blacks and other social inferiors did not 
count—were assumed to hold the same values and where, at least as 
important, the need to maintain personal dominance over slaves was a 
daily battle and the slightest insult could not be tolerated. 
After 1803, then, for many decades, the "code duello," or code of 
honor, was almost exclusively identified with the South. At the simplest 
level it involved nothing more than the ancient insistence that a real 
man could neither ignore an insult nor back down from a challenge in 
public. Here the mores of the backcountry Scots-Irish needed no over­
lay of French ritual. No quarter was given or taken; European travelers 
to Georgia or Tennessee brought back gory accounts of the number of 
men whose ears or noses had been bitten off, or eyes gouged out, in 
tavern brawls. These fights, if conducted "fairly," were considered a 
form of purely private recreation, carried on without official interfer­
ence from the few extant officials of law enforcement. In Richmond, 
during its frontier stage, there were no prosecutions for assault; it was 
not done to call the sheriff. The combatants were kept out of court only 
by the fortunate fact that it is hard for adult human beings to kill each 
other with no more than fists, feet, and teeth. 
But when weapons were involved, the casualties could mount. Ten-
nessee's own General Andrew Jackson, for example, emerged unscathed 
from two wars with the British and several with the Indians, but he was 
not so lucky in dealing with his fellow white southerners. While honor 
was satisfied by deliberately or accidentally missed shots in some early 
encounters, he killed at least one young hotshot who had insulted his 
wife, and was himself severely injured in several duels (or brawls), for­
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mal and informal. And the fact that his legendary temper was fueled by 
continual pain from old wounds and bits of lead still lodged in various 
parts of his body was no bar, in 1828, to his landslide election to the 
presidency of the United States. 
But even more fundamental than the concept of honor in explaining 
southern violence was the fact of slavery, and the legal and personal 
habits and tensions that came with it. For those interested in the aboli­
tion of slavery, the revolutionary and early national periods were a time 
first of hope and then of disappointment. In the midst of the war for 
independence, the supreme judicial court of Massachusetts boldly 
eliminated the institution at a stroke, ruling that it was self-evidently 
incompatible with the Enlightened battle cry of "natural rights." Other 
northern states were slower, mindful of the property rights of owners, 
but within a few years all provided for at least gradual emancipation. In 
the South, too, abolition societies sprang up, and all of the famous gen­
eration of Founding Virginians, including Jefferson, James Madison, 
and George Washington, recorded their opposition to slavery at least in 
theory. Many individual blacks were freed during and just after the war, 
some in recognition of military service, others at least in part because 
of unfavorable conditions in the international market, where tobacco 
prices were depressed. 
But while it was not hard to free slaves in northern areas where they 
were relatively few and slave codes light, it was not so easy in the South. 
There, especially in coastal neighborhoods, Africans and their descen­
dants were often a majority of the population, their unpaid labor crucial 
to the economy, their trade value often worth more than plantation 
land itself. And in the Constitutional Convention of 1787, the oppo­
sition of the Deep South states prevented the Founding Fathers from 
abolishing the institution outright and put off the end of the infamous 
and deadly international trade until 1808 at the earliest. 
One salve to the white conscience was that the nature of slavery had 
in general improved over the eighteenth century. Even before the Revo­
lution a "Great Awakening" had brought Christian missionaries to the 
quarters, and as the generations passed Africans became African Ameri­
cans, and they and their masters came increasingly to share each other s 
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language and beliefs. It grew generally harder then (although never im­
possible) to treat slaves as less than human. The humane principles of 
the Enlightenment combined with revolutionary idealism to soften law 
and practice in Virginia, where, although rape might still result in legal 
castration, "cruel and unusual" forms of capital punishment were out­
lawed for all peoples. Masters and overseers, too, were in 1788 made 
liable for charges of manslaughter if "correcting" a slave resulted in 
death, and over the years several prosecutions resulted. 
But none of this was emancipation. Thomas Jefferson, as usual, put 
one prime reason most memorably: "We have a wolf by the ears." 
White southerners simply feared black revenge—that is, murder— 
should they let go. Virginia typically came to forbid freeing individual 
slaves unless they were sent out of state and provided for; it was impos­
sible for the races to live together, Jefferson argued, given implacable 
prejudice on the white side, and on the other "ten thousand recollec­
tions of the injuries they have sustained." 
During the 1790s these fears were aggravated by the great slave revolt 
in Santo Domingo, which before resulting in the independent state of 
Haiti gave life to fears of widespread black-white murder. And during 
the same decade, Eli Whitney's cotton gin helped create a new and 
valuable cash crop that made black labor more profitable than ever, 
decisively ending both the postrevolutionary depression in the South 
and any hope that slavery would be willingly abolished. 
Over the next several decades, as cotton land expanded beyond 
Georgia and South Carolina into the rich bottomlands of Alabama, 
Mississippi, and the newly acquired territories of Florida and Louisiana, 
Virginias economy was revived in part by its ability to sell its human 
capital south and west. In fact no other sector of the American economy 
boomed as loudly during the early nineteenth century, fixing slavery 
more firmly than ever. 
At the same time there were continual reminders that this form of 
property was uniquely dangerous. Echoes of Santo Domingo never 
faded, revived by the discovery of large-scale black conspiracies orga­
nized in 1800 by Gabriel Prosser, near Richmond, and in 1822 by 
Denmark Vesey, in Charleston. And on August 13, 1831, a charismatic, 
educated slave preacher named Nat Turner got a mystic sign from the 
color of the sun that the time for his band of confederates was come. 
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At two o'clock on the morning of the twenty-second, six of them 
moved in to murder three white men, a woman, and a child on the 
Joseph Travis farm; over the course of the next forty hours they picked 
up several dozen more slaves, many armed and mounted, and moved 
across the countryside, slaughtering about sixty whites—sparing some 
nonslaveholding poor folks—until they were met and put down by 
U.S. troopers, the state militia, and assorted volunteers. 
While this insurrection was the only one in the history of the Repub­
lic to push beyond plotting into action, it drove the South wild with 
fear. Turners captured band were quickly executed, but he himself dis­
appeared; no one knew how big the plot was, or where he was, and in 
an atmosphere full of rumor far more blacks were put to death after 
panicky proceedings than whites were killed originally. Matters quieted, 
some, only after Turner was found in a nearby swamp, on October 30, 
and tried and hanged on November 11. 
But while fears of insurrection dominated white imaginations in pe­
riodic waves, what really dominated the lives of owners and overseers 
was the daily grind of getting work out of the unwilling. The whip was 
not only a private but sometimes a public, legal weapon, as planters 
turned to the law and whipping post to deal with petty slave thieves and 
runaways, or simply proud men and women who would not bend to 
their orders. And for the truly dangerous, or stubborn, above the whip 
still hung the noose. 
The mildly humane changes of the revolutionary era are reflected in 
the records of capital punishment in the Commonwealth of Virginia. 
Far fewer slaves than earlier were hanged for committing property 
crimes, just 13 percent. Another 13 percent were sentenced for "in-
surrection"—mostly the Prosser and Turner affairs. The vast majority, 
then, were judged guilty of serious crimes against the person, with first-
degree murder accounting for 40 percent of the total. But while execu­
tions overall were in decline, in proportion to population, the grand 
total, after 1784, some 626 men and women, was still enormous and 
far in excess of that for free whites; all of the 20 sent to the gallows in 
Richmond between 1784 and 1820, for example, were black slaves. 
But at the same time white southerners themselves paid for the sys­
tem in many ways beyond their continual edginess. Jefferson com­
mented that the absolute ownership of other human beings encouraged 
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self-indulgence of many kinds, including the instant gratification of 
passing temper. A woman observing southern child raising from the 
outside noted that "the nurse . . . often fosters in her bosom a little 
Nero"; another, an insider, noted ironically that the system produced 
"slaves to passion." Both observations were confirmed in fact by the 
behavior of two such passionate Neros, Jefferson's own nephews, Lil­
burne and Isham Lewis, of Livingston County, Kentucky. 
Late on a Sunday, December 15, 1811, a young house servant, 
George, accidentally broke a pitcher belonging to Lilburne's dead wife, 
Lucy. The drunken master, with his brothers help, then decided to 
teach all hands a lesson by herding the other slaves into a kitchen cabin, 
bolting the door, and proceeding, with an ax, to dismember the terri­
fied boy while he was still alive. His remains were burned in a fireplace, 
a long process that Lilburne enlivened with passionate lectures about 
the duty of obedience; to complete the Gothic scene, cabin and chim­
ney collapsed that night in an earthquake. The incident was uncovered 
shortly after, when a neighbor found his dog chewing on Georges head, 
and Lilburne and then Isham were indicted by their horrified peers for 
murder in the first degree. Since the only other eyewitnesses were black, 
and so legally unable to testify in court, conviction was by no means 
certain, but Lilburne, his reputation and "honor" fouled beyond re­
pair, ended the suspense in April by committing suicide in the local 
graveyard. 
Lewis's murderous insanity shocked the local justice system into tak­
ing action, but southerners were normally more tolerant. In Kentucky 
the maximum penalty for manslaughter, by far the most common form 
of homicide and for practical purposes the only sentence that Lilburne 
risked, was then just six years, less than that for horse theft, breaking 
and entering, and a dozen other offenses. And in impoverished South 
Carolina, at the same time, the collective jitteriness about keeping the 
slaves in order was a great strain on the states ramshackle system of law 
enforcement. Conditions, and local opinion, greatly favored white de­
fendants in murder cases, whatever the color of victims: only a little 
over a third of those presented to grand juries resulted in conviction, 
and as many melted away with escapes beforehand or pardons and the 
plea of benefit of clergy afterward. Archaic and neglected, the historian 
Michael Hindus notes, "white justice . . . was largely a private affair, 
 91 The American Revolution and the Early Republic
and one not taken too seriously," meaning often that courts were by­
passed in favor of private vengeance, fights and duels. 
The promise of revolutionary reform, then, was unevenly distributed 
across the new nation. Relatively low and apparently dropping levels of 
homicide in more populous areas sparked optimism about new meth­
ods of treating crime. But much of this was offset by unknowable but 
clearly higher rates among whites, slaves, and Indians in the South and 
especially the Southwest. There was hope in the crucial fact that despite 
bitterly partisan politics, fueled among other things by wars declared 
and undeclared, enemies foreign and domestic, the officeholders of the 
early Republic established the crucial habit of surrendering their seats 
when voted out, and purely political assassination was almost un­
known. And yet when in 1829 Andrew Jackson, Indian fighter, slave 
owner, brawler and duelist, was inaugurated as the seventh president of 
the United States and a great mob of celebrants nearly destroyed the 
interior of the White House, it was hard to deny that the nation was 
capable of dangerous violence and applauded some of its forms. 
The Antebellum Decades 
and the Civil War, 1829-1865 
The years between the election of President Jackson and the Civil War 
were a time both of enormous growth and of mounting tension. Ameri­
can cities in the East and Midwest grew at a rate unmatched before or 
since, swelled by the first beginnings of the urban industrial revolution 
and more immediately by the first great waves of immigration from 
Europe. To the south, the boom in King Cotton, richest of American 
exports, continued across the Mississippi Valley into the newly annexed 
state of Texas. Toward the end of the period the long westward move­
ment reached a climax when, just as the United States filled out its 
continental borders as a result of a war with neighboring Mexico, thou­
sands of Americans rushed to the Pacific in search of gold in California. 
But all three kinds of growth posed problems in terms of murderous 
disorder. Middle-class Americans in the antebellum years were more 
aware of murder, in fancy and in fact, than in any previous time, some­
times fascinated, sometimes fearful. Many of them, full of romantic 
idealism, hoped to make the Republic a more orderly and peaceful 
society; Christian reformers worked toward a new millennium, free of 
criminal violence and the social problems associated with it. But in 
the real world, for many reasons, the promising start of the 1830s and 
early 1840s turned bleak as the homicide rate rose markedly, and these 
antebellum years turned out, ironically, to be the most disorderly and 
bloodiest in our history. 
Sheer newness, heavy immigration, and crowding created some of 
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this bloodshed, sobering earlier optimism as the decades passed. But 
more important than any of these was the fact that growth led directly 
to an increasingly violent national confrontation over the ancient curse 
of slavery, resolved only through the ultimate violence of a massive 
civil war. 
I 
Murder, as a subject, continued central to the romantic movement in 
literature, which reached its peak in the midcentury years. One height 
was scaled by Edgar Allan Poe, who not only embellished the older 
Gothic tradition but also invented the detective story, another genre 
that has not yet run its course. But in basing his famous Parisian "Mys­
tery of Marie Roget" on the true case of New York's Mary Rogers, ap­
parent victim of a botched abortion, Poe was merely one of many. This 
was an age in which the oldest form of crime literature, the execution 
sermon, simply disappeared under a wave of newer ones: poems, songs, 
and trial pamphlets, popular newspaper and then magazine coverage, 
and a host of murder novels typically, if often fancifully, based on al­
ready notorious real incidents. 
This wave of blood in print was driven by the fact that the American 
reading public, proportionately the biggest in the world, was an enor­
mous source of profit to writers and publishers who knew how to ex­
ploit it. As the number of those living in "urban" places multiplied 
more than five times between 1830 and 1860, reaching well over six 
million, two crucial discoveries were made almost simultaneously. First, 
it was not necessary to market newspapers through expensive yearly 
subscriptions; in 1831 the first "penny paper," the Boston Times, de­
signed to sell by the issue, inspired imitators all over the country. A 
second truth, even more enduring, was that nothing on the streets sold 
better than sex and violence. 
One way of exploiting the interest in crime was by sending a reporter 
each day to the local magistrates' courts, to write a regular column 
about the little tragedies and comedies that brought people to the 
dock—hungry young mothers, drunken Irishmen full of fanciful tales 
delivered in brogue. But nothing beat a juicy murder. Of the ideal in­
gredients, blood and sex were common enough, but mystery and, per­
haps above all, a victim or an accused of at least respectable status were 
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not so easily found. Still, if nothing sensational was happening in Cin­
cinnati at the moment, with a little creative embellishment Philadel­
phia, Boston, and certainly New York could be counted on to provide 
something for eager readers. 
James Gordon Bennett, one of the giants of American journalism, 
founded the New York Herald in May 1835 on just $500 in working 
capital. After surviving a fire and finding a racy style suitable for life in 
the big city, he hit full stride the following April when a young prosti­
tute named Helen Jewett was found axed to death in a brothel one 
morning, and not far away a cloak belonging to Richard Robinson, a 
client from the previous night. 
Between them the two typified the kind of young people who were 
flocking to the Big City, and now read its papers. "Helen Jewett," origi­
nally from Maine, had arrived with the more prosaic name Dorcas 
Dorrance: the Herald described hers as a life of sin, yes, but also 
refinement and glamour, green dresses, rich patrons, a taste for Lord 
Byron's poetry. Robinson, a clerk just nineteen years old, was the classic 
young man on the make, a type that could also be read in two ways. 
And in the two months between murder and trial s end, reporters ob­
served, embroidered, and invented a host of gossipy details about high 
life and low, judge, jurors, lawyers, and spectators. The Herald origi­
nally described the accused as "a villain too black a die for mortal" but 
when the rival New York Sun declared him guilty, changed its mind, 
insisting in contrast on his injured innocence. And it was Bennett who 
won in the end, when the verdict freed his "client"—who had helped 
in the meantime to triple his circulation. 
Crime literature of all kinds benefited from continual improvements 
in technology, notably the ability to reproduce illustrations cheaply 
and, through the rotary steam press, a dramatic fall in the cost of pub­
lishing pamphlets. The National Police Gazette, a nickel weekly founded 
in 1845, took advantage of both in covering a notorious Boston case 
that conveniently occurred that very fall, and sounded some echoes of 
the earlier Robinson-Jewett affair. 
Albert J. Tirrell was a married "gentleman" of Weymouth, Massa­
chusetts, who in the spring of 1845 was indicted for adultery with an 
unnamed "paramour," perhaps as a device—not unusual—to get him 
to return quietly to his young wife and daughter. While still under this 
cloud, on October 22 he checked Maria A. Bickford into a Boston 
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lodging house of dubious reputation. The following Monday morning, 
the twenty-seventh, Bickford was found with her jugular vein and 
windpipe completely severed, her bed set afire, her hair partially burned 
and face charred and blackened. 
Several papers printed the next day's inquest testimony almost ver­
batim. A bloodied razor, mans clothing, and a letter from "A.J.T." to 
"M.A.B." were found in the room; witnesses testified that Tirrell was 
about the place at least much of the night and that at 5:30 A.M. a young 
man of his description, referring breathlessly to "a little difficulty," had 
rented a horse to ride to Weymouth. On this basis, the coroner's jury 
concluded that Bickford had been murdered by her lover. 
That he had disappeared allowed the press to fill in its own details. 
Probably the most accurate version of Bickford's life was supplied by 
her estranged husband, who described her as a small town girl seduced 
by the big city into deserting him for a life as prostitute. But nothing 
stopped the papers from inventing Bickfords of their own and casting 
her, according to their various versions of mid-Victorian sexual fanta­
sies, as either an innocent victim of a villain's lust or a home-breaking 
sexual predator. The National Police Gazette supplied an erotic drawing 
in which a mustachioed Tirrell, in formal dress, slashed a Bickford 
draped backward on a bed, her billowing hair conveniently falling 
around a huge expanse of white bosom. And the first novel, Julia Bick­
nell: or, Love and Murder! Founded on a Recent Domestic Tragedy, came 
out within a week of Tirrell's capture in the Gulf of Mexico, Decem­
ber 5, on a vessel bound for New Orleans. 
The trial, in March, was a vivid illustration of the way in which 
American procedures had changed since the colonial era, when the 
courtroom was dominated by the judge, the office of prosecutor was a 
new American invention, and in felony cases defense counsel was only 
partially and reluctantly admitted. The Constitution had since guaran­
teed the right to an attorney; in Massachusetts, as in many states, each 
county had a public prosecutor; and by the 1840s a major capital trial 
was viewed by spectators (and readers) as a duel of wits and rhetoric 
between two sides, with judge serving merely as referee. 
Tirrell's case was argued by three men, headed by the flamboyant 
Senator Rufus Choate, leading advocate of the day. His summation— 
by then a traditional highlight—took six and a half hours, enough 
time, in an earlier day, for several whole murder trials. In the course of 
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provoking "reasonable doubt," his first argument was that Bickford— 
in his version, of course the seductress—had slashed her own throat. 
This theory did not easily fit with the physical evidence, above all the 
burning bed. But for that he had an alternative, truly novel and inge­
nious hypothesis: his client had suffered from "somnambulism" since 
boyhood and had perhaps killed the accursed woman in his sleep, under 
the control of a kind of nightmare. In the peroration that followed he 
noted that "in old Rome . .  . it was always the practice to bestow a civic 
wreath on him who saved a citizens life." "Do your duty today," he told 
the jurors, "and you may earn that wreath." 
The jurors took only two hours to find Tirrell not guilty of the mur­
der. They earned, as a result, not wreaths of honor but at best mixed 
reviews from the nations press. Sentimental outpourings on behalf 
of Tirrell, his widowed mother, and his restored young family were 
matched by much indignation as the villain went free. The old, simple 
morality of the execution sermon was by then long dead, as readers got 
no single message at all. Much of the literature of homicide now sug­
gested that what had once been clear was now mysterious, and further 
that the justice system was not only sometimes mistaken but even cor­
rupt. In the democratic atmosphere of the Age of Jackson, the penny 
papers often vied with each other in casting criminal trials as contests 
of the rich against the respectable working class. Ten years before, while 
the Heraldhad hinted that some rich patron of Helen Jewett had con­
spired to pin the crime on young Richard Robinson, the Sun had de­
nounced the accused as a well-connected wastrel who had managed to 
buy his way out of trouble with the help of a $1,500 defense team. And 
in Tirrell s case it was hard to deny that money bought ingenuity, as 
"somnambulism" swept the East Coast as a fashionable defense. 
But "somnambulism" and indeed innocence were not the only argu­
ments used by his defense to save Albert Tirrell from the gallows: one 
of his lawyers, in open court, directly attacked the death penalty itself. 
And even more strongly than the celebrity given trial attorneys and the 
sentimental fascination with selected defendants in murder cases, the 
humane side of the romantic era was represented by the movement to 
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amend or even halt the practice of capital punishment. This was actu­
ally a many-sided movement, based on several rather different but not 
incompatible approaches to criminal reform. 
The first of these was based on the needs of a changing economic 
system. Especially in the North and East, the rapid growth of an urban 
commercial economy was dependent on rational, predictable behavior, 
rules made and followed, contracts reliably executed. All of this behav­
ior, which we have come to call middle class, in turn required a new 
kind of working class. Farmers were used to working hard but unevenly, 
with each day or season bringing its change and long slack periods be­
tween harvest and planting. American farmers, too, typically owned 
their own land and were used to working independently, unlike peas­
ants, without coordinating their labor with anyone else. But now em­
ployers required people who could tell time, work ten or twelve hours 
a day, six days a week, all year round, meanwhile placidly taking direc­
tions from supervisors and cooperating with their peers in the office or 
factory. 
The need for this new kind of cooperative, tractable workforce was 
one reason—by no means the only one—for the powerful support 
given many of the reform movements that flourished especially during 
the 1830s and 1840s. The penitentiary movement, still growing, de­
pended in part on the faith that character could be reformed and virtue 
taught through insistence on strict clockwork routines. Beginning in 
the late 1820s, a powerful temperance movement promoted modera­
tion in the use of liquor—early Americans drank heavily and often— 
with real success. By the 1830s reformers were calling for total absti­
nence; by the 1840s, legal abolition. Several northern and western state 
laws in fact decreed absolute prohibition. 
The movement appealed strongly to businessmen. While occasional 
binges did little harm on the farm, and a man who drunkenly chopped 
up the chicken coop was a problem only to himself, his family, and 
perhaps the chickens, lurching intoxication in factory or office could be 
a disastrous disruption of cooperative routines. And one of the most 
important tasks of the new urban police forces, which first appeared in 
the 1830s and 1840s, was to enforce the new temperance laws, if not 
shutting down all traffic, then restricting it to adults, in licensed places, 
during approved hours—and of course arresting drunks. From the 
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1820s through the 1840s, all of these reforms resulted, one historian 
has estimated, in more than halving the average per capita consumption 
of alcohol. 
The public school system, too, was created in the same era: Pennsyl­
vania was the first state to provide for tax-supported education open to 
all in 1834, with others following shortly. The issue was neither literacy 
nor numeracy; Americans had always learned somehow to read, write, 
and figure, and led the world already. But as the great Massachusetts 
educator Horace Mann insisted, the very fact of mass democracy de­
manded a responsible, orderly population. Discipline was an obsession 
in these early schools, and learning to sit still, take turns, mind the 
teacher, hold your water, and listen for the bell was perfect training 
for later work in a factory or office. In 1841 one cotton manufacturer 
testified that those employees with public school educations indeed 
had better morals, "were more orderly and respectful in their deport­
ment, and more ready to comply with the . . . regulations of an estab­
lishment." 
The same logic, the same search for order and discipline that helped 
the public school movement called at the same time for the abolition of 
public hanging. The simplest argument was that hanging was simply 
"cruel" punishment—and the very fact that it was fairly "unusual" 
made it more so. With the exception perhaps of sheriffs in slave coun­
try, there were no truly experienced hangmen in the United States, no 
one who could guarantee a quickly broken neck. Given the "short 
drop" then practiced, without expert placement of the knot the victim 
often jerked violently about for eight or twelve minutes, spinning in the 
air, his contorted face and antics horrifying—or worse, delighting— 
the ten or twenty thousand who often gathered to watch him strangle. 
But it was not the tortured victim but those unruly spectators who most 
concerned those worried about public order. 
The old Puritan ideal, in which gallows rituals were intended to in­
spire introspection and repentance, was clearly dead. Indeed death it­
self, for the middle class, was becoming increasingly distasteful: instead 
of looking it straight in the face, those who could afford it were finding 
others, a whole new class of professionals, to "undertake" the often 
messy business of washing and clothing corpses and preparing them for 
burial. In this atmosphere, observers agreed, public hangings were 
simply lewd spectacles whose supposed moral lesson often backfired. If 
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any elevated sentiment was aroused, it was sympathy for the con­
demned. The "deterrence" argument might apply to the punishment 
itself but surely not to the sight of it. In England, the nation that led 
the European world in hangings, American reformers were well aware 
that pickpockets notoriously worked the crowds come to see other pick­
pockets die. And here as there the public "gallows tree" seemed only to 
encourage drunken, disorderly, unseemly behavior in the masses. 
And so Pennsylvania in 1834 decreed that state hangings should 
henceforth be held privately, inside jail or prison walls, attended only 
by sheriff, family, a handful of witnesses, and a doctor, a move that 
quickly spread across the North and East. 
But the move to make capital punishment a more private matter was 
by no means the ultimate reform. And the rationale behind it, to make 
a more orderly society of Americas untidy young democracy, was only 
one of the four that drove contemporary reform. And the other three 
reforming rationales did not aim to make hanging more acceptable but 
to abolish it outright. One of them was based on the continuing En­
lightened belief in the superiority of America's republican institutions, 
a second on romantic humanitarianism. Third and newest was a pro­
found religious reawakening, which began in the 1820s and continued, 
with pauses, to make waves over the next three decades. Together they 
combined to make an attack on the death penalty the center of a fun­
damental debate about human nature itself. 
The medieval case for capital punishment had been based in part 
on the Old Testament, added to the even older demand for simple 
retribution. Some thinkers of the rational Enlightenment contributed 
more sophisticated theories of deterrence, while for many conservatives 
simple tradition was argument enough. None of these arguments, an­
cient or modern, was now safe from attack. 
Those who argued for American superiority,first, were not interested 
in tradition but progress. Progress had already been made in the revo­
lutionary generation by generally limiting the death penalty to murder, 
then subdividing that into first and second degrees, excusing those who 
had killed in fits of anger, perhaps under the influence of drink. More 
recently the old finding of "not guilty by reason of insanity" was clari­
fied; under the "M'Naghten Rule," borrowed from England beginning 
in 1843: those who qualified were "laboring under such a defect of 
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reason, from disease of the mind," that either they literally did not 
know what they were doing at the time of the crime or they could not 
know right from wrong. Now many reformers believed that all mur­
der, all crime, was the result of such external influences, some sort of 
physical or moral disease—Albert Tirrells somnambulism, perhaps, 
was an example—and so it was time to get rid of the ultimate penalty 
altogether. 
The case specifically against deterrence was led by Edward Living­
ston, the Enlightened jurist who wrote the legal code of Louisiana and 
hoped to influence other states. Abstract ideas, such as fear of death, 
had no effect on the minds of criminals, in contrast to the kind of 
behavioral change demanded by the penitentiary. And with the help of 
reformers in England, Livingston used a battery of statistics—among 
the first times this key weapon in the arsenal of social science was tested 
in the field—to show that hanging had in fact no impact on the crime 
rate and that murders often occurred immediately after executions for 
murder. Brutal sights naturally brutalized those who saw them, violat­
ing our natural moral sense. And for the state itself to endorse legal 
homicide could only encourage disrespect for life, and so illegal homi­
cide. Benjamin Rush had put it neatly, during the revolutionary era: 
"Murder is propagated by hangings for murder." The old Puritan no­
tion that the eyes of the world were upon us, finally, was as powerful 
for this generation as it had been for Rush, and Livingston's most fer­
vent appeal to lawmakers was that the United States was still the world s 
only true republic and should take the lead in showing the way to the 
future. To do the right thing was, then, not only a patriotic duty but 
would be a blessing to all mankind. 
The romantic contribution to rational appeals like Livingstons was 
its stress on our common humanity. Across the Atlantic, giants like 
Charles Dickens and Victor Hugo were writing fiction that explored 
the hearts and minds of criminals from the inside; so in America were 
men as different as the ardent southerner William Gilmore Simms and 
the Quaker abolitionist John Greenleaf Whittier. Their work suggested 
that even those who commit homicide have feelings like ours—Albert 
Tirrell as son, husband, and father—and that an injury to any of us is 
an injury to all. The fear felt by those under sentence is our fear, and 
the experience of those actually hanged, their breeches all wet and be­
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shitted from loss of control over bladder and bowels, is an affront to 
human dignity. 
In full agreement with these sentiments,finally, the preachers of the 
Second Great Awakening used them to overturn the traditional the­
ology that had dominated American religion from the beginnings. In 
an earlier time, the prevailing Calvinist Protestantism had stressed the 
doctrines of original sin and predestination. All are sinful, no one can 
possibly earn or deserve salvation by their own efforts. God determines 
those whom He will "elect" to salvation long before birth; in what 
amounts to something like a divine lottery, these, a minority or rem­
nant, are winners; the rest, losers. But in the second quarter of the nine­
teenth century, the new interpretation stressed that Man was made in 
God's image, that human nature was naturally innocent, like a child's, 
and if properly nurtured all of us are perfectible. God loves us all—so 
should we. There are, then, no losers, not even among the more obvi­
ously miserable of His Creation. 
Sentiments like these helped inspire the temperance movement to 
reform drunkards, Dorothea Dix's campaign to improve conditions 
among the insane, the years of work put in by the old war hero Samuel 
Gridley Howe to reach the soul of Laura Bridgeman, a child born deaf, 
dumb, and blind. The continued spread of the penitentiary movement 
was testament to a faith that even hardened criminals could be re­
deemed. And of course the ultimate criminals, and victims, were those 
condemned to death before the natural process of repentance and re­
demption could run its course. 
For this new religious left the very model of progress had been that 
from Old Testament to New, or as they interpreted it, from a stress 
on God's vengeance to Christ's love. God's famous words to Noah, the 
medieval justification for the death penalty, "Whoso sheddeth Man's 
blood, by Man shall his blood be shed," might be interpreted not as an 
order but simply as a prophecy. And to cite the Old Testament selec­
tively was to overlook the death penalty it commanded elsewhere for 
adultery, blasphemy, even gathering sticks on the Sabbath. 
Some combination of these arguments made sense to governors and 
lawmakers in many states. Through the 1830s and early 1840s, Ten­
nessee, Alabama, and Mississippi made hanging no longer mandatory 
but, at the jury's discretion, optional even after first-degree verdicts in 
102 Chapter 4 
murder cases, a practice that quickly spread to other states. Capital pun­
ishment itself survived close votes in Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, 
and New York. The widely copied Maine Law of 1837 decreed that 
at least a year must pass before a convicted felon could be executed, 
and then only after issuance of a written death warrant from the gover­
nor. And finally the new state of Michigan, in 1846, abolished hanging 
altogether. 
But even as Michigan was followed by Wisconsin the next year, and 
by Rhode Island in 1852, the movement had already passed its peak. 
Conservative clergymen and lawyers had of course rallied, adding to 
their older arguments the idea that the very dignity of human life cited 
by their opponents demanded an awesome penalty for those who took 
it. Most discouraging was the result of a popular referendum in the state 
of New Hampshire, with Vermont perhaps the least murderous state in 
the Union, a place of deeply religious, settled communities where con­
flict was handled by set rules and the Protestant sense of dignity had 
long triumphed over the sense of honor. And in this peaceful state, in 
the summer of 1844, as an adulterous young farmer convicted of stran­
gling his wife lay in jail awaiting execution, the death penalty was put 
to a popular referendum; the result was nearly 2 to 1 in favor of keep­
ing it. 
But more important than either abstract argument or popular senti­
ment in defeating reform was the concrete reality that things were 
simply not working as hoped. It was growing harder to deny, first, that 
the penitentiary movement was not living up to its promise, that in 
actual operation prison was no more than a dismal place that had no 
redeeming effect on its inmates. Even more disheartening was over­
whelming evidence that, after more than half a century of criminal law 
reform, the nation's murder rate was higher than ever and that for sev­
eral reasons disorder threatened to tear the whole society apart. 
The changing character of American cities in the antebellum decades, 
above all their increasing disorder, was most dramatically shown by 
the adoption of regular salaried police. Americans had long resisted 
the kind of authority—perhaps "French," certainly autocratic—repre-
sented by such officers. The English before them had feared a "standing 
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army" in peacetime, and the new United States had inherited the idea 
that providing muscle to the government might threaten individual lib­
erties. For centuries a few rotating night watchmen had been patrol 
enough, looking above all for fire, sometimes answering calls to break 
up fights. Arrests were made by these watchmen, or coroners, some­
times by ordinary citizens on the spot. Otherwise people went to court 
to get warrants against others who had stolen from or injured them, 
bringing constables or sheriffs along, for a fee, to supply the needed 
strong arms and authority. But beginning in the 1830s, the citizens first 
of Boston, then New York, then major cities from east to west, aban­
doned their reservations and put regular salaried officers on the street. 
As in London, which had pioneered in police patrol beginning in 
1829, the new police were expected tofill a number of municipal needs. 
But in the United States virtually all of the early police departments 
were founded to deal with one specific problem: mob riot. During the 
single year 1834 a mob of teamsters, wholly without official interfer­
ence, burned down an Ursuline convent just outside of Boston, sending 
nuns and pupilsfleeing into the night; Philadelphia and Baltimore wit­
nessed major race riots; and New York mayoral elections brought 
clashes between Jacksonian Democrats and the new Whig party that 
pushed the city close to anarchy. As over three days of street fight­
ing escalated into gunfire, the Whigs had just broken into an arsenal, 
threatening a bloodbath, when order was restored. 
One immediate reason for all this violence was the onset of a com­
mercial depression. But there were deeper reasons, rooted in the shift­
ing nature of urban populations and economies, why not only the 
frequency but also the very nature of riot was changing. 
Throughout the colonial period direct action had been a quasi-
tolerated tactic of the politically powerless, and in the revolutionary era 
played an honored role in patriot victory. Led usually by community 
notables, mobs had often destroyed property but rarely harmed people, 
and were seen, at least ideally, as the outraged expression of a united 
community, vented on traitors or outsiders. But increasingly riots in 
the new Republic were directed not at limited or political targets but at 
groups, defined in terms of religion, race, or class, by members of other 
groups, typically young men from the "lower orders." They were not 
well controlled, they were intended to hurt, and sometimes they killed. 
In an earlier generation, when the basic economic unit of towns from 
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Portland to Baltimore was still the household, the violent potential in 
their young male populations was restrained by built-in social controls. 
Indentured servants and apprentices lived in the masters household, 
were treated legally as his children or wards, and worked under careful 
discipline. However rowdy on recognized holidays, they still responded 
when the reins were pulled tight. Habits of obedience and deference 
ran all through colonial society: even the furious crowds who had wit­
nessed the Boston Massacre had responded dutifully when their leaders 
told them to stay quiet and trust in the law. 
But indentured servitude essentially died after the Revolution, and 
apprenticeship decayed. Bigger economic enterprises meant impersonal 
labor relations, with employers and employees no longer under the 
same roof. There were few organized forms of male recreation in ante­
bellum cities, no ball clubs, no parks, no spectator sports. Young men 
left to themselves have always organized themselves into gangs, strut­
ting like peacocks and fighting like roosters. Sometimes they joined and 
transformed existing institutions. Volunteer fire companies, observers 
noted, increasingly turned their traditional competition to be first and 
most conspicuous when the bells rang into more direct action, battling 
each other instead of the fire. Others joined political clubhouses; their 
elders had jobs for tough young men who could vote early and often 
and keep rivals away from the polls. Still others, like New York's High­
binders and Forty Thieves, operated as criminal gangs with no cover at 
all. And none of them deferred to their betters: when Henry Lambert, 
one of New York's leading businessmen, returned from a wedding one 
June night in 1825 his carriage was hit by a stone; crossing the street, 
expecting that he and his aristocratic party would awe the young assail­
ants, they were instead tripped and taunted, and Lambert was beaten 
to death by drunken members of the Spring Street Fencibles. 
And as the nineteenth century progressed, such aggression by and 
among young men was intensified by the equally elemental hostility 
among ethnic groups. While colonial and early republican America had 
been made up of diverse peoples, virtually all but blacks and Indians 
had been of northern European Protestant descent. But the year 1815 
marked the fall of Napoleon on the other side of the ocean and the end 
of the War of 1812 on this, opening the gates to long pent-up European 
immigration. Germans came in number, as did the English, but the 
most notorious and violent of the newcomers were the Catholic Irish. 
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Anti-Catholicism was a long Anglo-American tradition, and anti-
Catholic parades and ceremonies were part of the urban ritual year. 
Through the colonial period all this had been carried on in the absence 
of live opposition, as the French and Spanish, in peacetime, remained 
safely out of reach. But once the Irish began to arrive, they not only 
fought back but transformed the very nature of urban street warfare. 
Persecuted for centuries by their Anglo-Saxon Protestant rulers, the 
Irish had a long tradition of hostility to official authority. Together with 
their ethnic cousins and bitterest enemies, the "Scots-Irish" Presbyteri­
ans or "Orangemen" of Ulster, they drank whiskey even more heavily 
than the early Americans drank rum. And they fought more seriously, 
replacing fists and feet with clubs and bricks, escalating the relatively 
harmless battles of earlier years into murderous affrays. 
Developments in New York showed the way. Traditionally the most 
polyglot of American cites, and by the 1820s the biggest, it was the first 
to attract the Irish in number. New Yorkers had often found reason to 
riot in earlier years, whether as political protest or simply as entertain­
ment. But deaths resulted when in 1799 local Orangemen had the ill 
wit to mount an anti-Catholic parade on St. Patrick's Day, and again 
when in 1806 a gang of Highbinders tried to storm a Catholic church. 
In a nation still unused to dealing with diversity, in New York as 
everywhere the ethnic thread shot through all the other occasions of 
mob disorder. Labor disputes, tavern riots, and attacks on brothels all 
rose dramatically in number and intensity over the first three decades 
of the century. Many of them were essentially ethnic conflicts in dis­
guise, as blacks, native whites, and Catholic and Protestant Irish tended 
to congregate in specific occupations and neighborhoods and battled 
over control of their own jobs and turf. Political parties, too, divided 
along ethnic lines, as the labels "Jacksonian" and "Whig" thinly dis­
guised older quarrels during the great Election Riot of 1834. 
Much of the ferocity of the Irish, in particular, was born of despera­
tion. Unlike the Scots-Irish they arrived typically as wholly impoverished 
peasants, unable to buy land or even move out of their port of entry, stuck 
in the city without skills. Their very presence as a pool of unskilled labor, 
ready to hire out at the lowest wages, threatened all the Protestant jour­
neymen and artisans a little further up the occupational scale. And they 
themselves were for parallel reasons especially hostile to the African 
Americans, those nearest to them on the same metaphorical ladder. 
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The African Americans had been there first; that many were skilled 
workers and small businessmen only intensified jealousies among poor 
whites of all groups. But most blacks were stuck in unskilled labor, back 
work along docks and ditches, in direct competition with Irish immi­
grants. Black New Yorkers themselves repeatedly rioted against visiting 
"blackbirders," or agents sent to catch and return fugitive slaves. Still, 
they were more often targets than aggressors, up and down the East 
Coast, as their own growing community institutions, theaters, schools, 
above all churches, were continually harassed. Only months after the 
Election Riot in New York, in July 1834 thousands of white New York­
ers, at first set off by meetings to discuss the abolition of slavery, rioted 
over several days, destroying businesses, a schoolhouse, and St. Phillip's 
African Episcopal Church in an all-out effort whose object seemed to 
be nothing less, according to the historian Paul Gilje, than "to purge 
the city" of the black presence. The riot was quieted only when a thou­
sand militiamen answered an emergency call and were issued live am­
munition with orders to volley across barricades into the crowd. 
But the militia was a blunt and untrustworthy weapon: citizen vol­
unteers, sometimes sympathetic to rioters, they were under the control 
of a possibly hostile governor rather than local authorities. The under­
paid and undermanned night watch, traditionally a refuge for the old 
and weak, had been a joke since Shakespeare's time. And as towns be­
came cities, personal authority in the old manner no longer worked. In 
Boston, Mayor Josiah Quincy had been able, in July 1825, to put down 
a series of attacks on the brothels of Ann Street by personally leading a 
kind of posse of truckmen to arrest the rioters; ten years later, Mayor 
Theodore Lyman vainly begged with a surging mob on Broad Street 
which not only nearly lynched William Lloyd Garrison, editor of the 
abolitionist Liberator, destroying the presses, but also roughed up the 
mayor himself and stormed his office in the process. And in June 1837, 
after it took eight hundred state cavalry to put down a street battle 
sparked when a group of volunteer fire companies bumped into an Irish 
funeral, the city fathers had finally had enough. 
Mayor Samuel Eliot then ringingly declared that while riot was un­
derstandable in despotic countries, it was not tolerable in the American 
Republic, where every individual shared in government through the 
vote. An aldermanic committee was critical of the Irish, but as good 
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businessmen they insisted that in a free country with high wages and a 
chronic shortage of labor their neighbors must learn to tolerate them. 
And all agreed both that the volunteer fire companies must be replaced 
by less combative professionals and that Boston needed a professional 
police force to deal with "the lawlessly violent." 
And so, in May 1838, the first police were assigned to regular patrol, 
charged with seeking out trouble before it got out of hand, with rein­
forcements in reserve to answer riot call or other emergencies. 
During the 1840s and 1850s all major American cities followed Boston 
in authorizing professional police, and a few funded professional fire­
men. But the worst was yet to come. Propelled by powerful social, po­
litical, and technological developments, riots grew continually bigger 
and more intense, and a thin line of municipal employees was little 
more help than a glass of water in a house fire—when not actually 
acting more like a stream of kerosene. 
The new men did prove useful in many ways. The eyes and ears of 
the city while on patrol, they performed a range of functions from light­
ing street lamps and unsnarling traffic to harassing drunks. They made 
arrests when called, sometimes broke upfights. Man for man they were 
usually bigger and healthier than any opponents, but not always as bat­
tle ready; Americans were reluctant to put them into uniform, and re­
sistance was led by the cops themselves, who found it easy to take off 
their badges and slip into friendly saloons when the weather on patrol 
was too hot, too cold, or perhaps somewhere in between. In this and 
other ways they were much like members of the urban gangs they were 
often called to confront. Although Boston insisted that they be married 
taxpayers, many in other cities were simply strong young men who had 
nothing to sell but their muscles. 
Unlike the London bobbies—civil servants, charged with being po­
lite, careful to avoid controversy—these early police were wholly un­
trained, in most cities patronage employees, at election time the strong 
arms of the party in power. Depending on the political winds of the 
moment, they were alternatively supposed to enforce or ignore a host of 
laws against drinking, gambling, and whoring that were widely unpopu­
lar in their own class and neighborhoods; there was more money in ig­
norance than in outrage. They could count on no automatic respect for 
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The Law in cities full of clashing values and peoples. They had then to 
establish their personal authority through sheer toughness, on the spot. 
It was not enough: in the 1840s and 1850s, nothing was or could have 
been enough. 
All city life in those years was dominated by a great surge in immi­
gration, as what had been a growing stream became a flood. Some 
180,000 newcomers to the United States had come officially in the 
thirteen years between 1819 and 1831, 893,000 between 1832 and 
1844. Then, between 1845 and 1857, the number soared fourfold to 
3,600,000. During and after the Hungry Forties many were Germans 
of all classes, others from elsewhere on the Continent. But above all the 
newcomers were Irish, who in 1844 had begun to see their basic crop 
turn black and slimy from a new potato blight; the resulting Great Fam­
ine, over the next several years, forced millions either to starve or to 
flee. Suffering from malnutrition, tuberculosis, and then cholera, ar­
riving sometimes nearly naked—the average life expectancy off the 
boat was under fourteen years—these people were far more desperate 
than any whites that had come before them. And their arrival in waves 
simply swamped all institutions of charity and police. 
Reformers to then had had some success in making northeastern 
America a more orderly place, drying up the drinking habit, improving 
education, providing places of refuge and hope—at least in theory— 
for the miserable and criminal. But the Irish had little interest in tem­
perance, and the Germans imported a new drink, lager beer, which 
swept the country. Catholics everywhere resisted a public school edu­
cation that in practice stressed moral training out of the King James 
Bible. And the effect of this flood of peasants on the urban economy 
was to push crime and misery to new heights. 
During the 1840s, with the use of stationary steam engines, factories 
were able for the first time to move away from rural sites along water­
falls, until then their only power sources, and into the cities. And in 
time the existence of a big pool of wholly unskilled urban labor would 
enable these steam-powered factories to create a true urban industrial 
revolution. But with the movement just beginning, that time had not 
yet come. The city still needed mostly skilled workers, artisans or "me­
chanics." Outside of digging canals and laying track for the new rail­
roads that stretched hundreds of miles into the countryside, there was 
little for the unskilled to do, and in the cities themselves they fought 
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fiercely over the few available jobs as porters, servants, and longshore­
men. The traditional American labor shortage, the most fundamental 
reason for historically low rates of homicide, among other crimes, had 
been cited as late as 1837 by the aldermanic committee that helped 
create the Boston police. But within a decade it was gone, flooded out, 
in cities all over the North and Midwest. 
And just at this time a revolution in small arms, begun with Samuel 
Colt's invention of the revolver, began to reach full stride. The American 
gun culture reached back to the early seventeenth century. But when the 
Second Amendment was passed in 1789, and for decades afterward, 
there were none as yet that could accurately be called handguns. There 
were great heavy military weapons, dragoon pistols, and finely crafted 
single-shot dueling pistols, but both were expensive and bulky. Colt's 
1832 invention was not an immediate breakthrough, but after some 
sputtering it inspired a number of improvements and imitations, and by 
the 1840s revolvers were being manufactured in quantity. And they con­
tributed in two different ways to raising the number of urban killings. 
Small and deadly, easily loaded, capable of firing several shots, these 
were the first firearms that could be carried and actually hidden on the 
person; Henry Deringer's models could be fitted into a woman's muff. 
Equally important, it is far easier, as much psychological research has 
shown, to overcome the natural inhibition about killing when the only 
act required is the mechanical one of squeezing a trigger, at a little 
distance, rather than wrestling at closer range with a living and hard-
breathing body. 
In any case the new weapons were immediately used to upgrade the 
arsenals of street gangs. Some states and cities had begun to outlaw 
possession of slingshots, brass knuckles, and billies, but the constitu­
tional guarantee of the "right to bear arms" stopped them there. For 
the first time in our history law-abiding citizens in the cities felt they 
had reason to fear murderous violence; two of the great diarists of 
the period, New York's George Templeton Strong and Philadelphia's 
Sidney George Fisher, both independently noted that the men of their 
aristocratic circles were beginning routinely to go armed, with revol­
vers, to protect themselves against thugs. So did some cops, but infor­
mally, and a little uneasily; city governments, still distrustful of the 
novel (and not wholly trustworthy) police, did not officially issue any 
weapons but wooden batons. 
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And during the same period, finally, the political tensions surround­
ing the central issue of slavery began visibly to shake the national union, 
threatening civil war. One effect of the resulting fears was to intensify 
already high levels of violence against blacks. African-American com­
munities in northern cities grew continually through this period, 
swelled mostly by freed people pushed out of the South and fugitive 
slaves fleeing from it. The influx had always been resented by unskilled 
workers, and now the competition for jobs was more vicious than ever. 
The growing move to abolish slavery added to hostilities; blacks and 
white reformers, men and women, gathered to talk together in public 
meetings, often for the first time, raising sexual fears of "amalgam­
ation," or miscegenation, driving mobs to move in and burn down the 
halls in which mixed meetings were held. Up and down the social scale, 
too, African Americans were seen as the root cause of the nation's po­
litical divisions: it might somehow help to keep North and South to­
gether if they could be kept down, pushed back, driven out. And the 
same national divisions promoted political instability at the local level, 
preventing city governments from moving toward truly centralized, im­
partial, and well-trained police. 
In Philadelphia, the first real effort to create a police force began only 
when Catholic-Protestant conflict reached new heights in 1844. Ten­
sion between Irish and Orangemen had often erupted before, much of 
it centered about jobs in the city's recently mechanized textile industry. 
Then in 1843 a "Native American" or anti-immigrant party was orga­
nized around the key symbolic issue of Protestant Bibles in the schools. 
After much bluster, invective, parading and counterparading, a young 
Protestant, George Shiffler, was shot to death the following May 6, and 
became an instant martyr in this crusade. A counterattack on a Sisters 
of Charity school the next day sparked a melee that killed two passersby 
and "many" combatants on both sides. The Irish were badly outnum­
bered: two more Catholic churches and a female seminary were burned 
down on the eighth, as rioters defied state troops. And as the city sim­
mered, loudly, into the summer, a mob attacked St. Philip de Neris 
Church on Sunday, July 7. As they deployed first battering rams, then 
rifle fire, some five thousand state troops were called in to protect the 
city's reputation. The mob, uncowed, finally brought up a cannon, with 
soldiers volleying back, until at two o'clock the next morning the toll 
was counted at two soldiers and thirteen civilians dead. 
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Here as elsewhere, while there were dozens of reasons to riot, race 
and religion remained the big two. And local government had few re­
sources short of the militia to deal with trouble once it moved past the 
size of a street fight. Just outside Philadelphia, in 1849, the authorities 
had to call in an organized street gang to help put down a mob. In 
October 1856 a local Baltimore election was entirely dominated by 
such youth gangs: the police either stood by or actively cooperated as 
Blood Tubs, Stingers, Plug Uglies, and Tigers took over the polls to 
drive out German and Irish immigrant voters. Pistols, rifles, then can­
non were again brought in by the private gangs, and a contemporary 
historian claims that "more men were killed than were lost on the 
American side in the batde of Palo Alto, in the war with Mexico," just 
ten years earlier. In the November presidential election, while the gov­
ernor of Maryland appealed vainly to the mayor for police help, the 
toll was 8 dead, 250 wounded. In New York the next year, when the 
legislature ordered the disbanding of the (Democratic) city police in 
favor of a new, state-controlled (Republican) "metropolitan" force, the 
two sets of cops took the battle to the streets. Two days after this was 
legally—but not physically—settled in favor of the Republicans, the 
Dead Rabbits and Bowery B'hoys turned out to celebrate the Fourth of 
July with a fight; when the new Metropolitans tried to move in they 
were mobbed by both sides, and the militia, again, had to come to their 
rescue. 
Gentlemen, and others, continued to go armed. 
During these same years, while riot drew the most attention, the mur­
der rate was also climbing, further shattering the dreams of romantic 
reformers. And in this era, for the first time in American history, a 
combination of official and unofficial records makes it possible over a 
period of time to draw at least some statistical generalizations about the 
nature of ordinary urban homicide cases, most of which fell far outside 
the realm of romance. 
The records in question are not those of the new police departments. 
Murder, unlike riot, was not high on their list of priorities. Their main 
contribution in both cases was simply (sometimes) to break up fights. 
Early police reports typically said little or nothing about homicide. The 
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officers might make arrests in such cases, but so did coroners and ordi­
nary citizens, or constables if someone notified a magistrate and swore 
out a warrant. In a few cases the intercity telegraph proved useful in 
tracing known fugitives across the country, as in the case of Albert Tir­
rell, wanted in Massachusetts and captured off the coast of Louisiana. 
But if a killer was not known, it was not yet police business to find out 
"whodunit." 
There were "detectives" in every big city, but they were private en­
trepreneurs, or at best moonlighting cops or constables. Their specialty 
was recovering stolen goods, for a split or reward, and their expertise, 
often earned on the other side of the law, consisted almost wholly of 
knowing who had the stuff and where to find it, with no other ques­
tions asked. It took many years to accept this kind of "detection" as 
even partly a public responsibility. To establish an official "detective 
bureau," as Boston did in 1846, was to invite an endless round of deals 
and scandals involving crooks and ex-crooks on and off the city payroll. 
Bankers and grocers, visiting farmers who had lost watches and wallets, 
all had business with the cops. But there was no money in "solving" 
murders, and no one assigned to do it. 
Neither the police nor anyone else had any special skills or tools that 
would help in homicide cases, and no one but the coroner was officially 
charged with trying to identify a killer. In the relatively few cases that 
posed mysteries, then, no one had any interest in pursuing matters past 
the inquest stage, except suspicious neighbors, sometimes angry family, 
and of course the penny press. 
It is in fact the birth of the penny press, with its absorbing interest 
in murder of all kinds, that when used with court records makes it 
possible to trace the story of those homicides that came to official atten­
tion, from the preparation of indictments to the execution of sentence. 
And for Philadelphia, second-largest city in the country, midway be­
tween the North and the South, it is possible not only to say with some 
certainty how the justice system dealt with these cases but to add some­
thing, with the help of accounts in the papers, about who was involved, 
when, how, with what, and finally (with many reservations), why. 
The official procedure began, as for centuries, with an inquest. In 
the years under review, 1839-59, most of the city's coroners, like those 
across the country, were not usually doctors but low-caliber elected of­
ficials; it was a literally stinking job to probe into the bloated bodies 
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of drowning victims, or battle maggots over the remains of corpses 
found in vacant lots. Investigation was rarely intense; a doctor might be 
called for an autopsy, but taxpayers resented the additional expense, and 
Coroner Samuel Heintzleman's 1840 reelection campaign turned on 
the issue of excessive postmortems. The inquest was generally held near 
the spot where the body was found, on the same day or the next; it 
generally lasted no more than a couple of hours, although later in the 
period, in sensational cases, a publicity-hungry coroner could string 
it out over some days. Many of the jurors, paid a dollar a day, seem 
to have been regulars, perhaps political cronies, rather than gathered 
at the spot according to law. In 1845 the city limited their number 
to six. 
In addition to finding a physical cause of death—"John Smith died 
of a violent blow to the head"—inquest jurors, if they found it a homi­
cide, were supposed to name a specific suspect if possible, either by the 
traditional formula that this had occurred "at the hand of a person or 
persons to this jury unknown" or (far more often) "at the hand of James 
Jones." But sometimes they exercised their broadly political function by 
going beyond the how and the tentative who to push their way into the 
trial jury's turf by suggesting why. Infanticides often inspired such ver­
dicts from sympathetic jurors, who might find that a newborn had been 
drowned by its mother "while in a state of temporary insanity." That 
effectively blocked later attempts at prosecution; so did an opinionated 
verdict such as the one that declared, in October 1855, that a dead gang 
member had died "from a wound in the heart from a pistol in the hand 
of Robert Doran in defense of his own life, while being pursued and 
attacked by the deceased and others to this jury unknown." 
The great majority of homicides that came to the coroners attention 
were "solved" at this level, immediately after the death. Homicide was 
and is usually an impulsive crime, and few killers thought about effec­
tive escape; Catherine Hollinger, having stabbed her husband to death 
when he said he was not interested in dinner, was found weeping and 
hugging his body; big John Rox, after taunting his best friend into a 
drunken boxing match, was too far gone even to notice that the smaller 
man was dying on the other end of the deserted bar; John Daly was still 
cursing Daniel Smith, beating his head against a stone curb, when pas­
sersby pulled him off. Not yet used to having regular police on patrol, 
nineteenth-century bystanders often chased down killers on the spot. 
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If homicide was found, then, at the inquest level, the apparent killer 
was in most cases easily arrested and identified. The next step in the 
proceedings was for the coroner to relay the verdict, and ideally the sus­
pect, to a magistrate for arraignment. The magistrate then had the 
power to ask some questions, hold or not hold the suspect, grant bail 
or not. If—as in virtually all homicides—the suspect was held, the 
magistrate was then required to send the case on to the district attorney, 
who in most urban jurisdictions had long before succeeded the county 
sheriff as the officer in charge of preparing indictments. 
The district attorney rarely contradicted the inquest findings and did 
little independent investigating, although sometimes he was able to 
supply a suspect's name, or change one, on the basis of evidence that 
turned up later. In Pennsylvania he might indict for any of four degrees 
of homicide. After murder in the first or second degree, voluntary man­
slaughter was the appropriate charge when there was no evidence of 
"cool depravity of heart, or of wanton cruelty." Involuntary manslaugh­
ter was purely accidental killing, but aggravated by the fact that the 
accused had been acting unlawfully, or "without due caution," as in 
shooting a pistol in the street or driving too fast. Having drawn such an 
indictment, the prosecutor might at any point decide to "nol-pross," or 
proceed no further on a case, on the grounds usually that it would not 
pass a jury or that new information made the case moot. Otherwise he 
in turn was supposed to forward his indictment to the Philadelphia 
County Grand Jury, twenty-four citizens randomly chosen by lot and 
charged with deciding whether or not to "ignore" it or issue a "true 
bill," holding the suspect for trial. 
The grand jurors, in deciding whether to return true bills after hear­
ing the district attorney, used their own discretion. Both they and trial 
jurors were of course all male, their names taken from tax lists, usually 
settled small businessmen and skilled workers representative of the ac­
tive political community. The frequency with which in effect they or 
the prosecution combined to throw cases out of the justice system en­
tirely illustrates the first striking characteristic of the system in these 
years: like their medieval predecessors, and unlike the severer 
magistrates of the colonial era, antebellum Philadelphians were reluc­
tant to convict for murder. Between 1839 and 1859, of those accused 
killers named in indictments, nearly 30 percent never went to trial at 
all. Of those who did, 98 percent pleaded not guilty: a good bet, be­
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cause only 50 percent were convicted. In the end, then, only 35 percent 
of the indictees were found guilty of anything. 
The number of indictments for these years—271—must not be 
mistaken for the actual number of homicides committed, or compared 
with modern rates calculated on the firmer basis of body counts cer­
tified by a medical examiner. In addition to a large number of in­
fanticides, the mid-nineteenth century total excludes those deaths not 
identified as homicides at an inquest and killers who escaped before 
being identified. Newspaper stories suggest that there were a fair num­
ber of suspicious cases, or dead bodies unaccounted for. There were 
a few murder-suicides, often involving husbands and wives, which of 
course escaped prosecution. The indictment totals also include only 
a fraction of the significant number of homicides committed in the 
course of riots. The authorities, for political reasons, were often reluc­
tant to prosecute rioters for murder, and jurors were even more re­
luctant to convict two or three or seven out of the hundreds, even 
thousands, who may have been involved, nearly all of whom, outside of 
the defendants, could be counted on to throw smoke, provide alibis, or 
pointfingers in different directions, leaving acquittal as the shortest way 
out of the resulting fog of testimony. 
Rates of indictment, then, with all of their omissions, are substan­
tially lower than actual "murder rates," and can only be compared with 
each other: the question, how many? can only be answered with reser­
vations. But the relative height is clear: from 3.7 per 100,000 of Phila-
delphia's population in 1839-45, they moved up to 4.0 per 100,000 
during 1853-59—both of them the highest rates of indictment for any 
comparable period in the whole of the nineteenth century. 
A parallel warning applies to those homicides that are analyzed be­
low; based on newspaper accounts, and restricted to the 70 percent of 
indictments that actually came to trial, they are not a truly representa­
tive sample of all the city's killings, omitting many infanticides, riot 
cases, and other incidents that were ignored by the grand jury or aban­
doned by the district attorney, as well as killers who escaped custody or 
died in jail. But this is all the records allow, and it tells us something 
about both crime and punishment. 
Justice in this era was swift, certainly, if not always sure. Virtually all 
cases of murder were settled within ten months from the date of the 
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crime to the sentencing. And while big cases might take a week—Phila-
delphia's leading defense lawyer, D. Paul Brown, could fill a courtroom 
with as much wind as Rufus Choate—most trials took no more than a 
morning, with deliberations lasting somewhere between a few minutes 
and a few hours. But juries took their jobs seriously. Just as grand jurors 
often ignored bills certified by the prosecuting attorney, representing 
the state, trial jurors were equally independent. Whatever the actual 
nature of the crime, it was the custom in Philadelphia for the prosecu­
tion to indict simply for "murder"—all but 13 cases of the 271. But 
with some instructions from the judge (and sometimes hints from the 
prosecution itself), jurors not only freed half of those in the dock but 
usually knocked down the formal charge a degree or two when they 
did convict. 
White jurors, too, once they took their places in the court of justice, 
were surprisingly fair in dealing with the city's black community, the 
largest in the free states. For urban blacks, the antebellum decades were 
the worst since colonial days and slavery. With the right to vote taken 
away in New York and Pennsylvania during the 1830s, and by the end 
of the era denied in all but two New England states, they were not 
counted as full citizens and so were unable to participate in formal civic 
life or government, to serve as lawyers or even jurors. In Philadelphia 
nearly half were unable to read, write, or figure at all, and even the 
educated were shut out of good jobs. They fought back, bravely, against 
persecution and above all slavery, defying federal law by helping fugi­
tives escape. But they were outnumbered in all cities by bitterly hostile 
Irish competitors, frequent victims of gang raids into their neighbor­
hoods, burned out and beaten in major riots. And yet despite their 
segregated, insecure position in the city, judges and juries treated them 
in reasonably evenhanded fashion; several independent studies, of Bos­
ton, New York, and Philadelphia, have shown little or no difference in 
the ways in which nineteenth-century blacks and whites were convicted 
or sentenced for crime, whether intra- or interracial. 
Philadelphia's population more than doubled between 1839 and 
1859, from about 250,000 to 544,000, most of the increase through 
massive white immigration. Its African-American population, many 
pushed out by persistent persecution, grew more modestly, from about 
18,000 to 22,000. Some 25 of the 190 incidents of homicide that came 
to trial involved black defendants, an overrepresentation of between 
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two and two and a half times what would be statistically expected. This 
is high. But it is hardly surprising, given poverty and misery, and it is 
not as high as the overrepresentation of the Irish, in some times and 
places, or later of Italian immigrants. And it is also misleading, given 
the nature of black homicide in the period. 
Many riot murders—almost all of them involving white mobs— 
escaped the system entirely. And it is striking that in all but one of the 
black cases the defendants who came to trial acted alone, while many 
of the incidents involving whites were affrays, mini-riots, or street fights 
in which not one but four, nine, in one case fourteen defendants were 
indicted: if the black overrepresentation is measured not in terms of 
number of homicide incidents, each of which usually accounted for a 
single indictment, but in terms of accused killers, it drops dramatically, 
to well under two. While young blacks did form gangs and fight, they 
were far less murderous than their white counterparts. 
Although generally armed, African Americans were not well armed. 
In an age in which they might be assaulted at any time, especially if 
found outside their own neighborhoods and at night, it was only pru­
dent to carry a razor or a knife—and as a result a majority of black 
killings, far more than white, involved sharp weapons of some kind. 
Guns, although far more common than earlier, were still relatively ex­
pensive. One of the reasons for the overall rise in the rate of indictment 
in the whole population was an increasing use of revolvers: about 15 per­
cent of cases between 1839 and 1852 were firearm deaths, 25 percent 
between 1853 and 1859. But it is striking that just one single black 
case involved a gun: on an October afternoon in 1857 three teenaged 
boys defied adult warnings by playing with a loaded revolver; when the 
gun went off it instantly killed eighteen-year-old Eddie Dempsey. (The 
friends were held guiltless of any crime.) 
Only one African American committed murder as part of a robbery: 
Samuel Zephron was executed in April 1845 for attacking and robbing 
another black man, Cuffee Todd. Even more notable, there were only 
three cases in which blacks killed whites. On August 1, 1841, Mary 
Walker, raving and waving an umbrella, attacked seventy-three-year-old 
Catherine Murdoch on the street; she was found not guilty by reason 
of insanity. In May 1847—in the one case involving multiple defen-
dants—a white man, William Siddles, was attacked by Henry Raymond 
during a riot and then beaten fatally into the ground with the help of 
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Henrietta Moore and Sarah Crosby. The three were first found guilty 
of murder in the second degree, and then, after a successful appeal for 
another trial—a rare procedure—freed on the grounds that while they 
had clearly been identified as beating someone, it was not clear that the 
dead man was the victim. The last of the three cases involved a nurse or 
baby-sitter, Hannah Jones, accused of hitting little Jane Histon with a 
shovel and depriving her of food; a doctor cleared Jones by testifying 
that the child was badly diseased and had died naturally. 
This scorecard—zero convictions in the end—may be compared to 
the three cases in which whites stood trial for killing blacks. During the 
summer of 1849, Thomas Carr, while helping his wife wash clothes in 
the Schuylkill, chased a bunch of black kids off the dock with a brick; 
Lewis Jaspar fell off and drowned. The jury found Carr not guilty. Two 
years later Allen Barber and George Reynolds pushed Alexander Red­
ding off a balcony into the street, cracking his skull. Both were found 
guilty of manslaughter and drew two years each. 
The third case is one of the rare ones in which a gang killing was 
brought into the system. The novelist George Lippard, in his enor­
mously successful Quaker City, published in 1844, suggested that 
"hunting the nigs" was a kind of sport, with big gangs of hunters, out­
numbering their prey, risking little during violent forays into black 
neighborhoods. And the newspapers did report not only riots but also 
smaller affrays in which African Americans were at least beaten, perhaps 
killed. But in May 1847 four white men were accused of breaking Jacob 
Andersons head with a club: two of them were found guilty, one of 
manslaughter, drawing five years, one of second degree murder, draw­
ing six—heavy sentences for the time. 
Of incidents involving black principals, two more, other than the 
Zephron-Todd robbery murder, were thought heinous enough to earn 
a hanging. James Morris, a sailor, jealous of his beautiful wife, drunk­
enly chopped down shipmate Aaron Cross with an ax, although the 
victim apparently had never met the woman; his unusually botched 
hanging in January 1841 was widely condemned as butchery. Fifteen 
years later, Peter Mattocks killed his girlfriend, Elizabeth Gilbert, a 
prostitute known as "Quite Nice." The fact that he had hidden the 
body was evidence of forethought, or at least afterthought, and earned 
him a conviction forfirst-degree murder; he was executed without fan­
fare in May 1856. 
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In other respects the black cases much resembled the white: mostly 
fatal fights, for reasons hard to figure a century and a half later, others 
involving husbands and wives, a religiously fanatic uncle angry at a 
faithless nephew, a handful of infanticides. 
But the infanticides illustrate the problems not simply of black women 
but of women generally, especially poor and single women, and the way 
that the world had changed since colonial times. 
It is impossible to measure the actual extent of infanticide, although 
it is clear that the proportion of cases not reported to a reluctant justice 
system is bigger, by some order of magnitude, than that for adult homi­
cides. Through the 1850s no record was kept of "dead infants found" 
in vacant lots, privies, and gutters, but at times during the following 
decade the reported annual total for Philadelphia reached about one 
every other day. In addition to these, thousands were reported each year 
as stillborn, or having died either of suffocation or of a number of other 
causes impossible for the medical science of the day to distinguish from 
strangulation, at a time when only a small minority of births were at­
tended by a doctor, none of them among poor women. 
During the colonial era the need for men and women to comple­
ment each other in the household economic unit meant that few people 
stayed unmarried long, and quite young children were welcomed as 
extra hands. But in the wage economy of the midcentury city children 
were only hungry mouths until they could earn cash. And while most 
men could easily support themselves, and had little economic need to 
marry, it was extremely hard for an unskilled woman to make it on her 
own, utterly impossible while caring for a baby. And to this stark eco­
nomic fact was added another: there was no way for a poor woman 
safely to give up a live infant. Wet nursing was expensive, and before 
the invention of pasteurization, much later in the century, cow's milk 
was slow death and the poorhouse the last stop for almost all "found­
lings" admitted to it. 
Abortion was legally an alternative in Pennsylvania, as in most states. 
The practice was not outlawed until the 1860s or later. Until then, to 
end a pregnancy before "quickening," usually the sixth month, was not 
a crime under common law, and a sharp increase in the practice accom­
panied the move from country to city. But while contemporaries esti­
mated that perhaps a quarter of all American pregnancies were aborted 
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by the 1850s, only the middle and upper classes could afford safe and 
reliable procedures. Widowed, single, or abandoned women, like Mary 
Rogers, the young New Yorker whose fate inspired Edgar Allan Poe, 
could find themselves in real danger. 
One of the most sensational Philadelphia murder cases of the period 
involved such a woman, Eliza Sowers, a mill worker from Manayunk. 
In the summer of 1838, Eliza, just twenty years old, was "promoted" 
to a job as housemaid in the establishment of her supervisor, William 
Nixon. In September she tearfully broke her engagement to an "honest 
lover" on the grounds that she was "unworthy" of him. On October 3 
she left on a mysterious errand in the city; ten days later Nixon and 
a Dr. Henry Chauncey appeared to tell her incredulous family that 
she had died of "impacted bowels." Her brothers demanded an exhu­
mation, and found that her intestines had been punctured by a sharp 
instrument. 
At the resulting trial the famous D. Paul Brown, Esq., defended 
Chauncey, with Nixon and a second doctor, William Armstrong, as 
accessories. Although Nixon was known for sexually harassing the girls 
at Eckstein's Mill, the defense insisted that the "honest lover" was the 
real seducer. And while it appeared that Chauncey, in effect, was house 
physician to Mary Kingsley s infamous downtown brothel, he insisted 
that Sowers had administered herself with such ancient (and poisonous) 
abortifacients as pennyroyal and oil of tansy; he had come, in all charity, 
only when her condition grew desperate, and volunteered to clean up 
the afterbirth. 
All this time the classic ingredients of sex, blood, and betrayal had 
brought huge crowds to the courtroom and the streets outside; when 
the jurors declared that they had reasonable doubts about the guilt of 
Armstrong and Nixon, and convicted Dr. Chauncey only of medical 
malpractice, there was loud talk of lynching. D. Paul Brown, unruffled, 
went on the stage of the Musical Fund Hall the next week to lecture 
about Shakespeare; the proceeds, with no apparent irony, were donated 
to a favorite reform, the Society for Meliorating the Condition of Im­
pecunious Laboring Females. 
But the condition of too many impecunious laboring females was 
pregnancy, and those who could afford neither a baby nor a doctor had 
reason to fear Elizas fate, and often kept hoping to the end of term that 
things somehow would work out. Three other cases of adult deaths 
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from abortion came to trial in the period. But this was surely an under-
count of the actual number of such fatalities. And infanticide was in 
effect abortion ex post facto. In reporting on the story of Ann Dowell, 
a serving girl from a respectable New Jersey family, the Public Ledger 
gushed in November 1840 that "some of its features resemble [Sir Wal­
ter] Scott's tale of The Heart of Midlothian." But there was nothing 
remotely romantic about those that came to trial; these are the only 
ones about which there is any information at all, and they range be­
tween the sordid and the revolting. The Public Ledger resorted to its 
usual early Victorian formula: having teased its readers, it claimed that 
it "cannot give details" even in the Dowell case. Almost all of the ac­
cused were single mothers; several had not reported their pregnancies 
to anyone, trying to the last minute to hide their bellies under the bil­
lowing clothing of the day. Typically they had given birth alone, and 
then perhaps stuffed the infant s throat with a rag to keep it from crying 
out, or—having gone to the privy, the only place in the home or board­
inghouse where they might safely be alone—had dropped it down, into 
the vault below, immediately on cutting the cord. 
The men who ran the justice system tried to avoid these cases: every­
one knew what the problem was, no one knew the solution. It is hard 
at this date to see why the coroner selected some and not others: un­
avoidable evidence, yes, in the broken neck, the cord tied around the 
throat—but beyond that perhaps pressure (or lack of pressure) from 
the neighbors? The papers report cases in which neighbor women ral­
lied round, either to point the finger or alternatively to protect some­
one. Once Coroner Heintzleman, holding a hearing over a tiny body, 
was told to look at one recently pregnant young woman; when she pro­
duced a live baby he asked her, in a variation of Solomons judgment, 
to prove the child was hers; she passed the test simply by nursing it. 
Cases that went on to the grand jury, too, often stopped right there: 
a large number of indictments bearing single women's names were ei­
ther ignored or nol-prossed. Just ten cases reached trial; it is not appar­
ent what the jurors saw in some and not others, but one black woman 
was sentenced for "concealment," and one white—not the mother but 
a friend—was found guilty of murder in the second degree; the sen­
tences were 1 to 3 and 3 to 6 years in prison, respectively. All the rest 
were freed. 
These ten cases represent nearly half of the twenty-two for which 
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women were tried. The others fared, statistically, precisely the same as 
the men: six guilty, six not. None of them used guns. Of the women's 
victims, four were male, eight female. Two of the three accused of 
stabbing their husbands were found guilty (as were two of the three 
husbands accused of killing wives, not counting one declared insane). 
Sarah Bonner, who threw a fatal brick at her drunken son-in-law, was 
freed. Two midwives who botched abortions—one was the owner of 
an herb store—were found guilty. So was a nursemaid who fed a child 
pins and needles; another, a black child, was declared not guilty of 
poisoning her charge—the only poisoning case. Hannah Jones, above, 
was freed. The other four incidents involved violent attacks on adult 
women; three of the accused were freed. 
Just one incident resulted in a conviction for murder in the first de­
gree. On July 10, 1840, Julia Ann Jones was seen and heard screaming 
by a window, blood all over; neighbors who rushed in found her land­
lady, Mrs. Sarah Coleman, almost equally blood covered, calmly stand­
ing over the body. Coleman, a.k.a. Davis, claimed that Jones had slit 
her own throat, but a jury believed she was jealous of Mr. Davis. Ap­
parently shocked by Coleman's seeming callousness as much as by the 
nature of the crime, the jurors sentenced her to death. But only three 
women had ever been hanged in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
(none in the city), the condemned woman had obviously been drinking, 
and the governor intervened to commute the sentence to life in prison. 
But homicide, as always, was overwhelmingly a male affair, men ac­
counting for a little over 90 percent of indictments, the same figure as 
in the Middle Ages. And in a northern city in this period it was specifi­
cally an affair of a special subset of poor or working-class white males, 
members of a "bachelor subculture" whose values and attitudes con­
trasted strongly with those of the middle class. 
Ever since the eighteenth century Enlightenment reformers had been 
stressing the need for rational beings to control their anger, or aggres­
sive impulses. This emphasis, reinforced by the romantic movement, 
had become by the nineteenth century perhaps the main issue in raising 
children. By the early Victorian era, as a result, the ideal had in many 
cases become reality, and self-restraint was widely practiced as well as 
admired. 
The men of the middle classes were by then moving away from the 
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kind of physical force thought necessary to run a business or household 
in the colonial era. Since early in the century, as the business of earning 
a living moved out of the household and into the office or factory, the 
home itself had come to be idealized as a gentle "haven in a heartless 
world," a place of refuge from the competitive struggle of the market­
place. Few households kept apprentices any longer, or, in northern 
cities, male servants who needed "correcting" with a switch. A good 
wife, firmly removed from anything that might earn wages or profits, 
could handle a serving girl or two with no more than the moral force 
that radiated from an idealized version of womanhood. Both roman­
tic and Christian reformers agreed that children should no longer be 
beaten or cowed until their naturally evil wills were broken but rather 
nurtured lovingly so that their naturally innocent natures could be pre­
served into maturity. 
At least some of these nonviolent values penetrated far to the south 
and west. Southerners certainly idealized family love, and many mem­
bers of the plantation elite, such as Jefferson Davis of Mississippi, tried 
hard to live by rules of moderation and gentility. The veteran dueler 
Sam Houston of Texas, hero of the republic and later state of Texas, 
was one of those who came to embrace the abolition of capital punish­
ment. Two young men growing up in frontier Illinois, Ulysses S. Grant 
and Abraham Lincoln, both refused on principle to hunt animals, ei­
ther for food or sport—a position absolutely inconceivable in any ear­
lier generation. In his response to dueling, above all, the southern-born 
Lincoln, whose life was spent moving north through Kentucky, Indi­
ana, and Illinois, offers a perfect example of the gradual triumph of the 
ideal of dignity over honor. 
The future president wrote a satirical newspaper piece in 1841 that 
offended the honor of James Shields, a pugnacious and humorless little 
Scots-Irish politician, who issued a formal challenge. Lincoln, the one­
time wrasslin' champion of Clary's Grove, had the choice of weapons, 
and was first tempted to suggest cow dung at five paces. The final offer 
was nearly as absurd: cavalry broadswords, with the duelers teetering 
along a ten-foot plank just nine inches wide. Shields, doubtless think­
ing of the figure he would cut in such a contest, was happy to settle 
peacefully; an apology was good enough. Dueling did not afterward 
take hold as part of the political culture of Illinois, and Lincoln never 
again allowed himself to be maneuvered into such a position. 
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But the new nonviolent ideals, however far they radiated south and 
west, were unquestionably northeastern in origin. And they were 
equally, although not exclusively, middle class. Many ambitious mem­
bers of the working class saw the advantages of sobriety and restraint as 
means of moving ahead in the urban economy. The fact that in 1860 
nearly halfot all the adult males in New York City were counted as 
officers of one or another Protestant organization is testament to the 
fact that the religious revival reached into many modest households, 
while the slow progress of the domestic virtues is reflected even more 
clearly in the dramatic drop in per capita alcohol consumption. But the 
most striking fact about the Victorian value of nonviolence was less its 
slow penetration into the working class than its nearly complete tri­
umph over the urban middle class, as the domestic horsewhip followed 
the duel into obsolescence. 
The case of James Wood is illustrative. Wood in 1839 was the well-
known owner of a fashionable confectionery store on Philadelphia's 
Chestnut Street, and had lived comfortably for years, as a widower, 
with his only daughter, Eliza. When that fall she shattered this cozy 
domestic arrangement by eloping with a lover, he brooded for two 
weeks and then walked over to her new household and shot her dead. 
The case demonstrates that the very emotional intensity of the senti­
mental family could implode into homicide. But it was doubly rare; 
Wood was declared insane not only because he was the only male Phila­
delphian to murder a daughter in the period but also because homicide 
of any kind did not normally involve any gentleman of education and 
social standing. 
Stories in the papers do not list the occupations of those involved 
in homicide with any reliability, but it seems that Wood and William 
Nixon, Eliza Sower's supervisor and betrayer, ranked as high as any. The 
other "owners" ran places like taverns and blacksmith shops, not far 
removed in manners and mores from the working class. And the record 
shows clearly that neither the domestic conditions nor the dignified 
ideals of the middle class had seeped down among many of those who 
still worked with their backs and hands, in a more brutal world than 
that of the gentlemen who directed or paid for their labor. Nor, as yet, 
had the disciplined behavior that other reformers had been trying to 
impose through church, school, penitentiary, and police. 
Who were Philadelphia's killers, and who were their victims? In the 
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absence of direct clues in the form of reliable occupational descriptions, 
there is much circumstantial evidence about the social class of those 
involved. The Philadelphia city directories of the era provide some of 
it. These books list the names and addresses of all those people—black 
as well as white, often working class as well as middle class—who were 
essentially settled residents and wanted family, friends, and perhaps po­
tential customers or employers to be able to find them. Only 34 percent 
of defendants in homicide cases can clearly be found in these books; 
53 percent were definitely not listed; the rest cannot be determined be­
cause of duplicate names or lack of addresses. The victims seem roughly 
similar. And in New York, where Eric Monkkonen has studied coro­
ners' reports, which (sometimes) list place of birth, the estimate for the 
proportion of foreign immigrants among named killers during the same 
era ranges up to 80 percent of the total—nearly twice their percentage 
in the population. While this may be high, it seems clear that these still 
unsettled newcomers to the city, mostly Irish and German, accounted 
for far more than their share of urban violence. 
The dates of homicide, too, offer clues to the kinds of people in­
volved. The summer months led as usual, but not by as much as in 
other times. January was tied with June for second place, behind Au­
gust. The cold weather, in this age when the new railroads were still 
being built, meant a slowdown in river and road traffic, little construc­
tion work, fewer orders in shops or the still-new urban factories. Less 
employment among the city's workers in turn meant more free time to 
wander, drink, fight, and get in trouble. 
The days of the week offer even better evidence of the importance of 
underemployment. Nineteenth-century men worked six days a week, 
in busy or good seasons. The workday usually ran 10 to 12 hours, some­
times fourteen, leaving relatively little free time on weekdays. Saturday 
was payday—and Saturday nights and Sundays the only times free of 
the pressures of work or exhaustion. But while between 1839 and 1859 
Saturday was the most lethal day of the week, followed by Sunday, the 
margin was slight; the two days combined, or 29 percent of the week, 
accounted for only 34 percent of all homicides, a far lower propor­
tion than in times of full and regular employment, such as the 1950s. 
Among the special subset of young male working-class Philadelphians 
who did most killings, not much burdened by either family or job, any 
day, or any night, was time for drinking and fighting. 
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If, then, most homicides involved unemployed or underemployed 
young men, disproportionately immigrants or other newcomers, all of 
the evidence above also suggests the circumstances of the killings. And 
after time, the best clue is place. Only about 25 percent of them (not 
counting the infanticides) occurred in the homes of either accused or 
victim. The dominant site was the street (scene of 39 percent), followed 
by the saloon (10 percent), with the rest at work or "other"—rivers, 
privies, rooftops. Newspaper accounts typically tell us only that there 
was a "fight," or an "attack": few suggest what it was about. 
Only a tiny number of urban killers had anything resembling a cal­
culated motive. No known cases involved issues such as inheritance or 
insurance money, the kind beloved by mystery writers in later years. 
There were only five robbery murders. Even domestic killings were rela­
tively rare in this period, with a total of seven, and only eight more, 
aside from the infanticides, involved other relatives or in-laws. 
Domestic violence was certainly not uncommon; the earliest known 
records for the Boston Watch and Police, for example, during the 
1840s, show that breaking up fights, probably most of them in private 
homes, was their biggest single job. But it appears that few of these 
battles were fought to the death. Of the few, husbands killing wives, as 
shown in most (but not all) studies of different times and places, had 
an edge, in this case slight, over wives killing husbands. The numbers, 
however, are too small to support much generalization about this fact, 
or about the high conviction rate. The one thing absolutely clear about 
the Philadelphia figures is that homicide was almost wholly the business 
of pugnacious young unmarried males. 
But there seems a striking difference between the deadly urban fights 
of this era and those that had led to murder and manslaughter in the 
Middle Ages. Six hundred years earlier, the typical homicidal quar­
rel occurred among men who had known each other for years, lived 
nearby, and—whatever the immediate spark—had probably argued 
then or earlier over matters of some substance in their lives: property 
lines, rights to graze on common land, fair share of communal work. 
But in mid-nineteenth-century Philadelphia only a minority of fatal 
fights seemed to involve both of those dimensions: long-standing en­
mity or grudges and substantial issues that might conceivably be settled 
by confrontation. 
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The homicides that occurred in homes—often boardinghouses— 
sometimes combined both elements, as when a married couple attacked 
a boarder down the hall who persistently woke them up by coming home 
late and drunk, or a landlord and tenant quarreled over the rent or the 
noise level. Others involved just one of them. Rivalfiremen, or their sup­
porters, took shots or threw bricks at one another now and then—long-
standing quarrels, little substance. A few men fought over the attentions 
of a woman at a dance, or in a whorehouse—not long-standing rivalries, 
but for young folks, at the moment, of some apparent substance. 
But in poring over dozens of case studies, a historian is continually 
struck by the fact that the answer to why a given fight erupted has two 
levels. The circumstances, the people, the background, the spark, are 
different each time, but the more basic issue involved seems always the 
same. And at that level why remains a mystery, if any rational answer is 
expected. The answer to What was at stake? is too often, Nothing— 
except perhaps an alcoholic conception of male honor, a matter as im­
portant to underemployed young Philadelphians as to South Carolina 
grandees or backwoods Scots-Irish. 
If this makes little sense on the surface, it did to the members of the 
bachelor subculture of the antebellum decades. No longer under the 
quasi-paternal eyes of master craftsmen, with the decline of formal ap­
prenticeship no longer able to achieve the status of "master" them­
selves, more and more young men simply worked for wages, with little 
to look forward to. In some big cities as many as 40 percent of the adult 
men under thirty-five were still unmarried (the Irish were especially 
used to late marriage and bachelorhood). They lived with no supervi­
sion and no responsibilities, usually in boardinghouses filled with oth­
ers like themselves. And if there was little future, there was always the 
present: they were still young, they had little to lose, and they could do 
with their free time what they liked. 
What they did, in an atmosphere thick with alcohol fumes and cigar 
smoke, was watch terriers scramble bloodily around in rat pits, or bat­
tling birds tear each other apart in cockfights, pit bulls in dogfights. 
They gambled in billiard halls, hung out and drank in saloons and 
whorehouses. They joined ethnic fire companies to fight, and politi­
cal clubs to fight. There was little else to do: the one truly organized 
form of recreation was prizefighting, with bare knuckles, by far the 
most popular of working-class sports in the period. Professionals and 
128 Chapter 4 
semiprofessionals trained hard for these bloody bouts, ended only when 
one man could no longer stand up: they gave up whiskey, women, and 
late nights at least for a time. But the spectators, the amateurs, members 
of a culture that honored strength and violence, could have it both 
ways, and the very business of enjoying their vices often led to assault. 
And inevitably, sometimes, assault led to murder. 
And so a party of young men, roistering down the street after a 
dance, encounters a railroad agent who objects to their singing; a fight, 
a stabbing, a death: two guilty of manslaughter. Two men decide to 
fight outside a tavern; another declares one of the principals is too 
drunk to stand up and offers to stand in; a passerby intervenes, takes 
sides, and is fatally stabbed: ten years for murder in the second degree. 
One man accuses another of throwing a watermelon rind at him; fatal 
fistfight: not guilty by reason of self-defense. A ship's mate—maybe— 
knocks a sailor overboard to drown; witnesses disagree about who did 
what: mate found not guilty. A man teases another's dog with a knife; 
the owner's brother objects, the man persists, the brother is stabbed: 
guilty of manslaughter. 
None of this was of much concern to the more settled members of the 
community who staffed and ran the justice system. 
Violent death was a part of life—the early railroads were especially 
lethal, with boiler explosions and train wrecks—but true accidents were 
rarely prosecuted as manslaughter, voluntary or involuntary. Given the 
number of lethal incidents, it is impossible to know why, over the 
twenty-one years, some thirteen cases of traffic accidents and pistol 
range misfirings wound up in court—drunkenness? callousness?—but 
just five of the killers were found guilty, and all were lightly punished. 
The rare robbery murders involved, with one partial exception, vic­
tims nearly as modest as the killers. Samuel Zephron, as described 
above, killed a fellow African American. In 1852 Blaise and Mathias 
Skupinski, Polish exiles, killed and dismembered a sixteen-year-old 
Jewish peddler whose head, to the delight of the penny press, was 
later discovered under the ice of the Delaware River. In March 1853 
Mrs. Ellen Lynch and her sister, Honora Shaw, respectable but hardly 
wealthy women—Lynch s husband was a marine—were killed by Ar­
thur Spring, a boarder in the household, ex-convict, and former suitor 
of Mrs. Shaw, while in search of a hidden cache of $80. 
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Robbery murder, as in the Middle Ages, was thought an especially 
heinous crime, and these men were all hanged. So was Peter Mattocks, 
who killed a woman, his girlfriend, as described above. But these five 
were the only ones to go to the gallows in the Philadelphia County Jail 
during the twenty years covered. Three other killers were convicted of 
murder in the first degree but were reprieved to prison terms. Sarah 
Coleman, described above, was a woman, and she had been drinking. 
John Capie and Carson Emos, who stabbed Christopher Soohan to 
death in 1853, had clearly been talking beforehand about killing some­
one, anyone—Soohan was a stranger—but they too were drunk, ex­
tremely so. To judge from newspaper accounts, a few other cases seem 
to have involved premeditation and the specific intent to kill. But jurors 
ignored the legal definitions, used their own common or moral sense, 
and pushed verdicts down a degree or two; manslaughter was by far the 
most commonly arrived at. 
Juries, then, usually exercised their power to deliver mercy rather 
than vengeance. Most killings involved furious action, but they were 
essentially, as in the Middle Ages, the result of sudden flares of anger. 
The weapons were whatever came to hand. But while fists, feet, sticks, 
and bricks still outnumbered guns and knives combined, in the heat of 
the moment it seems that whatever was used, there was an attempt to 
maim if not kill. From the jury box, however, it was often hard to say 
who started it, and the outcome was a kind of lottery, in which only a 
lucky (or unlucky) blow, jab, or shot separated the defendant from the 
deceased, or indeed made a homicide out of what would otherwise have 
been no more than a staggering punching match. 
American jurists in this period made an important amendment to 
the inherited English common law. In line with the actual decisions 
made by jurors since the Middle Ages, judges in many states greatly 
modified the idea that a man attacked by another had a "duty to re­
treat." In fact, the leading text for many decades, John Prentiss Bishop s 
Commentaries on the Criminal Law, published in 1856, insisted, not 
quite seriously, that "if a man murderously attacked by another flies 
instead of resisting, he commits substantially [the] offense of misprision 
of felony"—meaning that he himself has, by not standing his ground, 
criminally encouraged the assault. 
In Philadelphia, certainly, the loose plea of self-defense was hard to 
deny and worked in nearly half of all cases. Drunkenness explained, if 
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not quite excused, most of the others, and jurors were inclined to be 
tolerant. So were judges: three to six years, the modal sentence, seemed 
punishment enough. 
Unlike riot, after all, ordinary interpersonal homicide in the midcen­
tury city was no real threat to the social order. Stray shots occasionally 
hit bystanders, or sitters, as when a husband missed his wife and struck 
a neighboring woman on the backyard privy. But this happened only 
in poor neighborhoods. A man of dignity might carry a gun, and then 
often did. But if he chose his friends carefully, and refused to argue with 
drunken strangers, he had little to fear. 
But if urban homicide was a minor threat compared to riot, both is-
sues—indeed all issues, as the antebellum years progressed—were over­
shadowed by the looming threat of civil war. The continued expansion 
of the United States reached its climax in these decades with the annex­
ation of Texas, the conquest of California and the Southwest from Mex­
ico, and the establishment of northern and northwestern boundaries 
through treaties with Great Britain. And while there were many occa­
sions for murderous conflict along the frontier, the great westward 
movement was increasingly dominated, and in part inspired, by the 
political contest between the free and the slave states. 
As always, the advance was marked by conflict with the Indians, 
much of it murderous. But the Native Americans in this period did 
little to slow the relentless movement west. From Illinois through Min­
nesota the woodland tribes, in no position to resist, were continually 
pushed back; the Black Hawk War of 1832, better described as a "re­
bellion" by the already subdued Sac and Fox of Illinois, resulted in 
something close to extermination. The tribes of the old Southwest had 
already been conquered, with the Cherokee banished across the Missis­
sippi. Elsewhere, in the Middle and Far West, the policy was to get the 
survivors to sign treaties agreeing to settle onto "reservations," like 
those of the Five Nations in Oklahoma, where they might be baptized 
as Christians, taught to farm, and prepared eventually for citizenship. 
The policy was unevenly followed, with the Indians having little real 
understanding of what it meant. And it was wholly impossible to apply 
to the essentially nomadic and formidable horsemen of the plains. Be­
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ginning in the 1840s, as Mormons, pioneers, and gold-rushers crossed 
into Utah, Oregon, and California, they were occasionally attacked by 
these still unconquered warriors. But well-armed caravans, sometimes 
with army escorts, were not often bothered; the whites, as yet, were just 
passing through. 
Most violence along the western frontier was then intraracial, much 
of it the familiar result of neighborhood quarrels and tavern brawls. 
What was new and most striking in this period was the increasingly 
murderous character of vigilantism, which like much else fell, not quite 
neatly, along geographic lines. 
Along the northern band of the Midwest, the Lake Plains, farmers 
and others came in large part from New England and upper New York, 
settling often in communities, even migrating as whole religious con­
gregations, bringing with them their concept of dignity and their tra­
ditionally low rates of homicidal violence. In Marion County, Indiana, 
typically, mostly rural but including the new capital of Indianapolis, the 
justice system was largely occupied with the kind of moral issues that 
concerned eastern reformers: gambling, prostitution, above all drunk­
enness. From the time the county was organized through midcentury, 
only eight men were indicted for homicide, four of them in a single 
incident. Across the Ohio in Kentucky, meanwhile, as in other south­
ern jurisdictions, courts and sheriffs were kept busier with interpersonal 
crimes, assault and murder, in addition to the traditional concern with 
keeping slaves in line. 
But in both North and South, the first task on the frontier was to 
establish an effective justice system, and it did not always go smoothly. 
When rapid settlement outran government, or when raw conditions, 
corruption, or simple fear allowed criminals to flourish, local citizens 
increasingly took matters into their own hands. The kind of organized 
attack on outlawry pioneered by the South Carolina Regulators had for 
some decades been confined to relatively small movements in Indiana 
and Kentucky, Illinois and Tennessee. Meanwhile the original name, 
Regulators, was often transformed into Vigilantes, used in the sense of 
Thomas Jefferson's dictum "Eternal Vigilance Is the Price of Liberty." 
And the mushrooming of Committees of Vigilance, beginning in the 
1830s, was encouraged by the way in which their self-justifying ide­
ology fit the democratic Age of Jackson. 
From the beginning the American Republic had been moving toward 
132 Chapter 4 
democracy, allowing virtually all white males to vote, making more 
offices subject to direct election. By the 1830s the key officials in 
county justice systems, sheriffs, prosecutors, and magistrates, were all 
usually elected rather than appointed. An obvious next step in the de­
volution of power was direct or democratic justice, imposed by the citi­
zens themselves. Vigilance committees in frontier areas were typically 
organized by ambitious young men, sometimes land speculators, meet­
ing often in Masonic lodges, anxious to bring order to their communi­
ties. Horse thieves and counterfeiters, among others, threatened their 
property values. And if local law enforcement could not deal with 
criminals—who often crossed state lines—then vigilantes, bypassing 
legal authority, could and did appeal not only to the elementary right 
of self-preservation but to the spirit of democracy, the right of self-rule, 
justice delivered directly by "the people." 
This was much the same argument that was, at the same time, voiced 
by or on behalf of the less articulate urban mobs, who also believed 
themselves to be championing the values of their own communities, or 
subcommunities. It was an obviously dangerous rationale: Abraham 
Lincoln, as early as the 1830s, warned of "the spirit of lawlessness 
abroad." But it was also powerfully appealing. Dozens, even hundreds, 
of vigilante groups sprang up in the antebellum decades, each claiming 
dozens or even hundreds of members. One of the biggest operated 
across Alabama and Mississippi during the early 1830s, when fears of 
"the Murrell Conspiracy," an alleged outlaw plot to foment a slave in­
surrection, inspired "Captain Slick" to make war on horse thieves and 
gamblers. Another wave, a decade later, hit Iowa, East Texas, Illinois, 
and the Missouri Ozarks. Successful movements typically scared off or 
hunted down outlaws, or those they defined as outlaws, and when the 
hunt was successful often conducted mock trials, with "guilty" verdicts 
never in doubt. But while in the early Republic a severe flogging was 
usually thought warning enough to possible confederates, by the ante­
bellum era those found guilty were more often executed, hanged from 
a tree. 
All of these were homicides: premeditated, first-degree murders in 
law, "justifiable" homicides in the eyes of the vigilantes themselves. The 
toll is obviously hard to keep—there are no official records—but the 
number of "known victims" counted by Richard Maxwell Brown shows 
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at least the direction: 5 victims in the 1830s, 64 in the 1840s, 119 in 
the 1850s. 
In the 1850s, too, just as the verb "to lynch" changed its meaning 
from "whip" to "kill," vigilantism reached its most famous peak in the 
new state of California. Following the discovery of gold in 1848, the 
territory, then state, filled more rapidly than any in history; its immi­
grants, from many countries, had little in common but the desire to get 
rich quick. With prices of the most basic necessities relentlessly high, 
and only a few winners in the goldfields, the state was full of desperate 
young men wholly without community or family ties. Violent crime 
inevitably soared. And when in 1851 it was reported that the number 
of murders in the raw new port of San Francisco had reached over one 
hundred, many committed by robber bands such as the Sydney Ducks, 
Australian ex-convicts originally from Ireland, a committee of vigi­
lance was established. The members published an ad hoc constitution, 
hanged several alleged killers, banished others, and effectively ran the 
city for two years. 
The San Francisco movement of 1851 is a textbook example of what 
Brown calls "positive" vigilantism. First, as in many other places, the 
absence of law created a crisis. Vigilantes then established a formal 
structure, with officers and organizational rules of their own, in effect a 
kind of parallel government that targeted known criminals with the full 
support of the law-abiding community. Finally, when the crisis was 
over, they disbanded and returned the business of justice to constitu­
tionally elected authority. 
But not all vigilantes organized formally, enjoyed clear majority sup­
port, or disbanded once legal government was in place. As a result 
armed "Moderators" sometimes formed to challenge them, charging 
not only that they were defying the law but also that their real purpose 
was to win the kind of political power that they could not earn through 
the vote, a response that set off small civil wars, in effect, in Iowa, East 
Texas, and the Ozarks. Above all the community outrage that sparked 
vigilante action was often directed not against thieves and killers but at 
unpopular minorities. In fact the most fateful single lynching in U.S. 
history involved, in 1844, the charismatic founder of one of the leading 
American religious movements. 
Ever since Joseph Smith published the Book of Mormon, in 1829, 
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his growing band of followers had been persecuted wherever they 
moved, from New York to Ohio to Missouri. Their experiments in 
communal living, appeal to the poor, and clannish obedience to "the 
Prophet" branded them as "peculiar" in all of these locations. In Mis­
souri, during the 1830s, when their growing numbers gave them politi­
cal control of Caldwell County and threatened dominance over its 
neighbors, they engaged in several skirmishes with the state militia and 
local irregulars. Eighteen of them were massacred in one outlying vil­
lage before the remaining Saints moved east, across the Mississippi. 
Smith, jailed for treason, was able finally to escape and resume his lead­
ership, and in 1839 he began to supervise construction of a New Zion 
along the river bluffs of Hancock County, Illinois. 
Within two years the Saints' new city of Nauvoo had become the 
biggest in the state, attracting thousands of converts from Canada and 
England as well as the East. But neighboring "gentiles," in Illinois as in 
Missouri, were alarmed by the establishment of a virtual theocracy in 
their midst—as well as by the threat to local property values. The Pro-
phet's final revelation, that some Mormons, under certain conditions, 
might be allowed to marry several wives, was the final straw. After sev­
eral confrontations between armed Saints and local vigilantes, on June 
24, 1844, Joseph Smith and his brother Hyrum surrendered to Gover­
nor Thomas Ford on a charge of inciting to riot and were lodged in the 
Carthage County Jail under promise of protection. Three days later a 
mob burst into the jail as the county militia stood by and shot both 
men to death. Leadership then passed to Brigham Young, a less inspired 
theologian than Smith but a brilliant organizer. It was Young who de­
cided to abandon Nauvoo to the weeds and organize the key movement 
in Mormon history, the great hegira to the desert spaces of Utah. 
Through all this turmoil in Illinois, battle lines between Saints and 
gentiles had been drawn in part along political lines: the big and highly 
disciplined Mormon vote had been Democratic; the anti-Mormon 
Vigilance Committee of Safety that was accused of leading the assault 
on the jail was fiercely Whig. Ten years later it was politics, again, and 
again ethnic-religious politics, that led San Francisco a second time into 
vigilantism. 
The city in the fall of 1855 was under the control of an Irish Catholic 
Democratic machine, accused by more middle- and upper-class Whigs 
of corruptly protecting gambling and prostitution. When a notorious 
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gambler, Charles Cora, shot a U.S. marshal to death that November he 
was tried by an obviously fixed jury that reached no decision, and so re­
mained in jail while awaiting a retrial. The conduct of the case was de­
nounced by James P. King, a bitterly anti-Catholic newspaper editor of 
Scots-Irish descent. When King in turn was assassinated on May 14 by 
City Supervisor James Casey, a former inmate of Sing-Sing Prison, a new 
committee of vigilance was formed almost immediately, claiming mem­
bership in the thousands. On the sixteenth, commanding a cannon, they 
took the jail housing Cora and Casey, tried them with the usual trap­
pings of formality, and hanged both. Two more hanged, twenty ban­
ished, a hundred more scared out of the city, and the job was done. 
But by that time the struggles between Whigs and Democrats in­
volved not merely differences in religion and morality but the very sur­
vival of the Union. From the founding of the Republic the addition of 
new territories and states to the Union had been bound up with the 
issue of political balance, South versus North, slave states versus free. 
And with the acquisitions won in 1848 through war with Mexico, the 
contest for the loyalties of the West, from Kansas to California, had 
helped create a crisis. 
What heightened this midcentury crisis was the fact that the South 
was increasingly on the defensive. By 1834, shortly after Nat Turner's 
rebellion, slavery had been abolished in all of Europe and the Ameri­
cas except for Cuba, Brazil, and the southern United States. Educated 
southerners, exposed to the same currents of humane thought that in­
spired romantic reformers, were painfully aware that their "peculiar" 
institution was increasingly viewed as barbaric throughout the Western 
world, and they looked desperately for ways to justify it. One tactic was 
to insist that slavery was positively good for the slaves themselves, an 
institution not only sanctioned in the Bible but also ratified by nature 
and history, which had rescued pagan Africans from sin and misery. A 
good slave owner then fed, clothed, and protected his charges, as right­
ful head of a kind of grateful "family." This vision required, for one 
thing, even greater efforts to promote Christianity in the quarters. 
Equally fundamental was better protection under law, above all in the 
law and practice governing interracial homicide. 
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In general the southern states had lagged in the redefinition of homi­
cide and the change in its treatment; most held on to anachronisms like 
benefit of clergy, and kept a wide range of capital offenses on the books. 
But they did move to reform their slave codes. South Carolina, in 1821, 
was the last state to make the killing of a black slave by a white man 
explicitly a murder: prior to that it had been a minor crime, misde­
meanor rather than felony. And although the great majority of such 
killings never reached court, the number of formal indictments rose 
continually, throughout the South, and so did convictions: ten years in 
prison, heavy by Philadelphia standards, was not an uncommon sen­
tence, and the death penalty was at least occasionally invoked when 
whites killed blacks. 
Blacks themselves continued occasionally to kill whites. But the rate 
of execution for this as for all slave crimes continued in general to fall. 
So did the rate of conviction, and in a number of cases the sentence 
given was that for second-degree murder or even manslaughter, in rec­
ognition, direct or indirect, that this form of human property had 
emotions like other people and that the same kinds of mitigating circum­
stances and provocations might apply. The highest courts were especially 
vigilant to ensure that slaves were fairly treated: in Mississippi, between 
1834 and 1861, 5 of 13 black-white murder convictions were overturned 
or remanded for retrial; in Louisiana, between 1844 and 1859,2 of 5; in 
Alabama, between 1825 and 1864, an astonishing 9 of 14. 
These figures suggest not only the concerns of southern jurists but 
the relative rarity of fatal attacks on whites as well. Reform had little 
effect, however, either on northern opinion or on southern jitters. And 
if one southern reaction to growing isolation was to defend slavery as a 
civilizing and humane institution, an even stronger one was fear, even 
paranoia, about outsiders who might foment slave insurrection, and 
thus the ancient nightmares about murder. After Nat Turner s rebellion 
in 1831, repressive legislation supplemented by mob activity effectively 
blocked any public criticism of the "peculiar institution" from the in­
side. But while no documented "conspiracy" was uncovered between 
that date and the Civil War, slaves were still tried and occasionally 
hanged for "insurrection"—which covered a range of defiant behav-
iors—and panicky rumors of plots coexisted with professions of the 
loyalty of black "family." Governor Hammond of South Carolina could 
combine both contemporary southern reactions in the same essay: after 
 137 The Antebellum Decades and the Civil War
praising the "heartfelt" and "benignant" ties that bound master and 
slave in mutual benefit and even love, he turned to address outside crit­
ics: "Allow our slaves to read your writings, stimulating them to cut our 
throats! Can you believe us to be such unspeakable fools!" But neither 
argument worked to stop rising criticism, and worse. 
Northern mob attacks against blacks and their abolitionist allies con­
tinued throughout the antebellum decades. But especially after passage 
of the Fugitive Slave Law in 1850, which stripped accused runaways of 
the most minimal of procedural protections, the opposition also took 
to the streets. Opponents of slavery could use the same ideology as 
proslavery vigilantes to justify opposition to existing law and practice. 
Just as committees of vigilance sprang up south of the Mason-Dixon 
line to harass and sometimes lynch alleged abolitionists, abolitionists in 
turn organized under the same name in eastern cities to aid escaped 
fugitives, appealing to a "higher law" than the Constitution. And while 
initially most abolitionists had been pacifists opposed to physical force, 
violent rhetoric in time helped inspire violent action. The mob that 
stormed Bostons federal courthouse in May 1854, killing a guard in 
a vain attempt to free the fugitive Anthony Burns, was egged on by 
two of the leading Christian reformers in Massachusetts, the Rever­
ends Theodore Parker and Thomas Wentworth Higginson; eventually 
it took two thousand armed state militia, federal troops, and local police 
to escort Burns down to the harbor and a ship back to Charleston. 
And in that same year, 1854, the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska 
Act, designed to allow the settlers of Kansas Territory to decide for 
themselves whether or not to allow slavery, pushed the sectional contest 
to bloody new heights. The great majority of these settlers were small 
farmers who wanted mostly to raise cattle, wheat, and corn—and to 
keep all blacks out of the territory, whether slave or free. But some were 
footloose "border ruffians" from slave country, just across the Missouri 
line, and a few others carried guns sent by antislavery northerners or­
ganized as "emigrant aid" societies. Among the abolitionists were the 
five sons of a fierce old man from Ohio, the religious fanatic John 
Brown. In the spring of 1855, as southerners massed along the bor­
ders to keep the others out—enough of them, Missouri Senator David 
Atchison trumpeted, "to kill every God-damned abolitionist in the 
Territory"—Brown himself slipped in with a wagon full of guns and 
sabers and proceeded to help organize the free-state forces. 
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No real "vote" was possible as the southerners, although greatly out­
numbered, had support from the federal government. But two different 
governments were elected, quasi-legitimate posses and militias clashed, 
and in May 1856 the proslavery sheriff of the territory led an attack that 
destroyed and burned the antislavery capital of Lawrence. When John 
Brown heard the news he swore to "regulate" matters, and to "strike 
terror in the hearts of the proslavery people." On the night of the 
twenty-fourth, Brown led his sons and a few others into a small south­
ern settlement along Potawatomi Creek, where the company pulled five 
men out of their cabins, in front of pleading wives and mothers; Allen 
Wilkinsons throat was slit; James Doyle, his two sons, and James Harris 
were hacked to death with broadswords. As Brown saw it, six on his 
side had been murdered, and five on the other would nearly even the 
score: "Without the shedding of blood there can be no remission of 
sins," he believed. 
This was a new element in American homicide: ideological murder 
as an act of terrorism. If there had been any hope for peace in Kansas 
the Potawatomi Massacre killed it. As both northerners and southerners 
poured rifles and ammunition into the territory, some two hundred 
men died in the summer and fall of 1856, with Brown playing a leading 
role as guerrilla chief, before a determined new governor disarmed and 
disbanded both sides. 
And John Brown was not through. After leaving Kansas and going 
on a northern lecture tour to help raise money and arms for the anti­
slavery forces, he returned to an old dream: to raise an insurrection 
among southern slaves. While crisscrossing the free states, Canada, and 
Kansas, he elaborated a plan to invade Virginia, establish a provisional 
government, and, calling on slaves to rise up and join him, bring revo­
lution to the South. 
That the old man's biblical eloquence could raise a small party of 
raiders is hardly a surprise. But it is a measure of the growing despera­
tion of the times, of deep northern frustration, that he could draw sev­
eral prominent New Englanders into his scheme. The old romantic 
ideals were gone, victims not only of discouragement but of the fact 
that antislavery swallowed up all other reforms. Browns co-conspira-
tors, fellow members of "the Secret Six," included the Reverends Hig­
ginson and Parker, the old warrior Samuel Gridley Howe, the young 
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idealist Franklin Sanborn, the philanthropic merchant George Luther 
Stearns, and the country gentleman Gerrit Smith. Fifteen years earlier 
such men would have been crusading against capital punishment in the 
name of nonviolence; now, although not aware of all the plans, they 
were endorsing the use of terror tactics to raise a bloody rebellion. 
Whether or not Brown himself was insane, his plan clearly was. On 
October 16, 1859, the Lord's Day, twenty-one men, five of them Afri­
can Americans, followed the old man into the arsenal at Harper's Ferry, 
Virginia. They cut telegraph wires, captured hostages, gathered up a 
few slaves, and as their first victim shot to death a free black man, the 
local baggage master, who challenged the raiders along the railroad 
tracks. The liberated slaves refused to bear arms; no others appeared. 
Instead, as word of the "insurrection" spread, it attracted a swarm of 
terrified white men in arms who surrounded the embattled old guerrilla 
and his little party. One of Brown's black raiders was shot and butch­
ered, his ears cut off; two others were killed under a flag of truce. By 
the time Colonel Robert E. Lee appeared to take charge, seventeen men 
had died, including two of Browns own sons. The leader himself, badly 
wounded, was captured with a surviving remnant, as Lee, characteris­
tically, ensured that they got immediate medical attention. 
Governor Henry A. Wise insisted on trying the six survivors as 
traitors to the Commonwealth of Virginia, faster than a federal pro-
cedure—a grand jury was already in session—in part to forestall a 
lynching. All were condemned to death. Browns trial, running be­
tween October 27 and 31, was an opportunity for martyrdom that he 
seized with a skill that undermined the "insanity" defense suggested by 
a court-appointed lawyer. Several of his fellow captives, still hoping, 
vainly, to live, denied that they even knew him. But he himself wel­
comed death, and under sentence was able in words to win at least some 
of what he had hoped to win at arms. Even the southerners who saw 
and heard him admired his courage, and most his eloquence. But the 
South was frenzied with fear, while northern newspapers proclaimed 
him a hero. Upon his execution, on December 2, Ralph Waldo Emer­
son, the hitherto aloof philosopher of reform, declared, "He has made 
the gallows as glorious as the cross." Twelve tumultuous months later, 
South Carolina seceded from the Union, beginning the final chain of 
events that led to the Civil War. 
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Just as the years leading to the Civil War were far more murderous than 
those leading to the Revolution, the war itself was the bloodiest Ameri­
cans have ever fought. But like the Revolution it was fought with re­
markable civility, at least among white men in the eastern theater. And 
while its domestic effects on the northern homicide rate were paradoxi­
cal, to the south from start to finish it was marked by the most momen­
tous nonmurders in our history. 
The reasons for the war's high kill rate resulted from a deadly conflu­
ence of old lessons and new technology. Virtually all of the successful 
generals on both sides had gone to West Point, and there studied, as 
generals do, what had worked best in the last round of wars: in this case 
the offensive audacity of Napoleon Bonaparte, best symbolized by the 
bayonet charge. Napoleonic tactics had worked to near perfection dur­
ing the one-sided Mexican War of the late 1840s. Fifteen years later, 
improved artillery, Gatling guns, and repeating rifles with several times 
the range of earlier muskets combined to make such charges nearly sui­
cidal. They remained popular, however, among commanding officers. 
Modern scholars have estimated that only about 15 to 20 percent of the 
troops in any given engagement were able to overcome their deep in­
hibitions against killing fellow humans and actually fire their weapons 
directly at them. But even with only a fraction of the available firepower 
in use, bodies piled up quickly at Antietam, Chickamauga, Gettysburg, 
and Cold Harbor. The end result was that of the 2,500,000 who ever 
wore either blue or gray uniforms, many of them on short three-month 
enlistments, some 620,000 men died, or one out of four. 
Despite this unprecedented level of carnage, with all the hatreds it 
generated, the war was largely confined to uniformed combatants, with 
formal and informal rules about flags of truce, hospitals, and burial 
details all honored, few civilian casualties, and rare atrocities. As in the 
American Revolution, one exception was in the west, notably along the 
Missouri-Kansas border, where the smoldering feud of the John Brown 
era had never died. William Clarke Quantrill, who had earlier fought 
on both sides, emerged as a guerrilla captain whose pose as champion 
of the Confederacy was a thin cover for his real occupation as armed 
robber, horse thief, and slave stealer. For outlaws like this, the war was 
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an opportunity; with the army busy elsewhere, a band ranging from a 
few dozen to several hundred seemed invulnerable. In his most notori­
ous single act, Quantrill and several hundred horsemen, seeking re­
venge as well as booty, raided a rebuilt Lawrence, Kansas, on August 
21, 1863, and finding no resistance rounded up about one hundred 
fifty men and boys, tied them with rope, and over a course of two hours 
massacred them all in front of their wives, mothers, and sisters. 
Among regular soldiers the most infamous exception to the general 
observance of the rules of combat involved black victims. "Colored" 
troopers were recruited into northern armies once President Lincoln's 
Emancipation Proclamation of January 1863 made the abolition of 
slavery an official war aim, and the Confederate government was deeply 
disturbed. Many southerners, proud of their military traditions, were 
simply outraged; President Jefferson Davis, more ruefully, admitted that 
if black men proved good soldiers the whole argument justifying slavery 
on the ground of racial inferiority would collapse. General Nathan Bed­
ford Forrest was one of those who could not accept this conclusion, and 
when in April 1864 his Confederates overran Fort Pillow, Mississippi, 
they refused to accept the surrender of half of the garrison; blacks, with 
their hands up, were methodically bayoneted to death, and Forrest later 
claimed the river ran red for nearly two hundred yards downstream. 
On the home front, too, race hatred was a major issue in the most 
murderous civilian outburst of the war, the New York City Draft Riots 
of July 1863. 
Until that time the Union forces had relied wholly on volunteers, 
including over fifty thousand Irishmen from New York. But with the 
early enthusiasm gone with the mounting death tolls, that barrel had 
run dry. And for the first time in history the government required all 
men to register for conscription—all except those who could pay $300 
to hire a substitute. The move sparked riots in several cities but espe­
cially New York, with its heavy concentration of immigrants. Class 
resentment was an obvious issue, and so was politics; the federal govern­
ment was Republican, the immigrants were Democrats, and the Demo­
cratic governor of New York State declared the draft unconstitutional. 
As thefinal provocation to the Irish, the simple sense that this American 
war was not their fight had been further embittered by the Emancipa­
tion Proclamation that winter, which seemed to turn it into a crusade 
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on behalf of their traditional African-American rivals. And so, on Mon­
day morning, July 13, when federal marshals began to spin out names, 
a largely Irish mob stormed the building, burned the office, and took 
to the streets. 
The streets were theirs by midmorning. With the militia away with 
the Union army, only a few hundred policemen (many Irish them­
selves), plus a like number of miscellaneous federal guards, sailors, and 
marines, were available to take on a mob that panicked authorities es­
timated at some fifty thousand. The rioters fought everyone, attacked 
every symbol of authority, beat surrounded cops and soldiers to jelly, 
and nearly killed the Irish police chief. But above all they targeted the 
city's fifteen thousand African Americans. Despite pleas from the Ro­
man Catholic hierarchy and heroic action by several individual priests, 
a mob stripped and burned the Colored Orphan Asylum at Fifth Ave­
nue and Forty-third Street, where only a courageous intervention by 
one Paddy McCaffrey and several firemen saved the children themselves 
from massacre. Others were not as lucky. Over the course of several 
days black men were stripped and lynched all over lower Manhattan, 
until on Thursday morning, the sixteenth, the tramp of veteran troop­
ers returning from the Battle of Gettysburg heartened the authorities. 
With a last failed assault on the 7th Regiment Armory on lower Second 
Avenue, the rioters dispersed on Friday. President Lincoln then an­
nounced that the draft would resume. 
The riot was the most dangerous in American history, according 
to Adrian Cook "an insurrection of anarchy, an outburst against any 
kind of government control by the people near the bottom of society." 
But careful reading of contemporary records confirms modern findings 
about mobs: as in most riots—and indeed warfare—the bloody work 
was carried on by a minority. The authorities were awed by the tens 
of thousands who filled the streets, mostly to cheer. And the numbers 
were important: the sheer moral pressure of crowd size, as always, both 
encouraged rioters and inhibited all but the most determined of by­
standers, like McCaffrey, from intervening to help the victims. Actual 
fighting, however, was confined at any given spot to small bands of 
young men who already knew each other, as members of street gangs 
or fire companies. And despite figures greatly exaggerated by contem­
poraries and many later historians, a careful modern estimate puts the 
death toll not in the hundreds sometimes claimed but at about one 
 143 The Antebellum Decades and the Civil War
hundred ten. While terrifying to the middle and upper classes—Brooks 
Brothers was one of the stores broken into and looted—thosefive days 
in New York were, for better and worse, not unique but simply the last 
and biggest of the long series of urban riots that had begun in the Jack­
sonian era. 
Otherwise, on at least parts of the home front, the Civil War had 
a more calming than inflammatory effect. In some unsettled areas, as 
along the southern border, violence of all kinds increased. But in New 
York the murder rate, as measured by coroners' reports, dropped in all 
years but 1863, the date of the Draft Riots; in Philadelphia the pro­
portionate number of homicide indictments fell by a third. The expla­
nation seems simply that the poor, young, and underemployed males 
responsible for most urban homicides were drawn off into the army, 
where killings won medals and applause. 
But in the larger history of murder in America, the most important 
Civil War chapter was written in the rural South. 
Historians have argued for years about the causes of the Civil War. 
The clash between North and South was about two different economic 
systems, yes, and perhaps two different cultures. Violent northern at­
tacks on the sinfulness of the "peculiar institution" maddened south­
erners who saw themselves doing no wrong. The North was insensitive, 
and the South—where in some places a fatal duel or brawl was almost 
a qualification for office—was aggressive. Recent scholars have stressed 
the importance of the southern "culture of honor," which branded 
compromise a cowardly way out of confrontation. But aggravating all 
of these reasons for conflict, south of the Mason-Dixon line, was the 
simple fact, as important to the nonslaveholding majority as to the 
planter class, that slavery was a form of racial domination. And to imag­
ine it gone was to conjure nightmares of murderous revenge. 
John Brown's raid pushed this ancient fear to new heights during 
1860-61, as events pushed the sides toward war and rumors sparked 
committees of vigilance to flog out confessions and lynch blacks—and 
a few whites—all over the South. Talk of "war between the races," the 
possibility of "utter annihilation of the one or the other,"filled the U.S. 
Congress. One recent historian believes that there may actually have 
been some black plotting in Adams County, Mississippi, early in the 
Civil War, to take over several plantations. This single incident seems 
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the closest to the real thing—but even for this there is no firm evidence, 
no dates, no details, nothing except that 1 alleged plot? or perhaps 2? 
resulted in 5? or 6? or maybe 40? extralegal hangings by panicked lo­
cal leaders, about to go off to war and leave their wives and children 
unprotected. 
These Confederates were not afraid of northerners, as they showed 
on battlefields throughout the war, but they were clearly fearful of what 
might happen among the slaves back home. The war was fought almost 
entirely in slave country, and as it went on thousands, then millions, 
found that as the South crumbled they were free to escape in fact, and 
more gradually learned that the Emancipation Proclamation had freed 
them in law. The famous wartime diaries of Mary Chesnut, one of the 
thousands of women left alone on the plantation, are especially elo­
quent on her inability to penetrate the impassive "veil" worn by her 
black charges, indeed the inability of neighboring slave owners gener­
ally to predict how house servants or field hands would react to their 
new condition. As it turned out, hundreds of thousands moved out to 
meet the Union armies, some timidly, some boldly, many to enlist. A 
handful even joined the Confederates. A number stayed home and kept 
at work; a few, encouraged briefly by the federal government, hoped to 
take over the land for themselves. Still others enjoyed the new freedom 
to travel, to look for lost or sold relatives, to see the wider world. 
The range of reactions was, in short, enormous. But it was not infi­
nite. The freed men and women were confused, ecstatic, sullen, heed­
less, faithful, ambitious; despite the obvious opportunities they were 
not, in any number, vengeful. There was no orgy of rape and murder; 
the white South woke up from its two-centuries-old nightmare long 
before it had to face the cold dawn of military defeat. 
The war ended on a tragic note for both sides. On Friday night, 
April 14, 1865, John Wilkes Booth shot and fatally wounded Presi­
dent Lincoln at Ford's Theater, as he and the North still celebrated 
General Robert E. Lee's final surrender, just five days before. And this 
most famous murder in American history was followed by one of its 
most notorious miscarriages of justice. 
Booth himself, after twelve days of flight, was shot to death in a 
burning Virginia barn. But the dashing actor had involved several im­
pressionable and dim-witted young men in the plot to kill the president 
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and other major administrationfigures, and these were quickly arrested, 
together with Mary Surratt, who ran the boardinghouse where Booth 
had held court. President Andrew Johnson ordered that they be tried 
by a military commission—a move of very doubtful legality, as the 
criminal courts of the District of Columbia were fully available. And so 
on May 10, less than a month after the crime, the alleged conspirators 
were brought before nine general officers, with Judge Advocate Joseph 
Holt presiding. 
The prisoners were indicted for conspiring with Confederate Presi­
dent Jefferson Davis, among others, although not a shred of evidence 
pointed to him. With Holt favoring the prosecution at every turn, 
Dr. Samuel Mudd was condemned to life in prison for the sole crime of 
splinting the leg of the fleeing Booth, an utter stranger to him (a sen­
tence later commuted by President Ulysses S. Grant). And while there 
was little doubt that Lewis Paine, George Atzerodt, and David Herold 
had in fact plotted to kill Lincoln, much of the public was outraged at 
the treatment given Mary Surratt. Mrs. Surratt's young son John may 
perhaps have gone for the plot, but teenagers have always been good at 
hiding things from distracted mothers, and the pious Catholic widow 
made an unlikely conspirator. But while no credible testimony involved 
her directly, and her distinguished volunteer attorney quit the case in 
angry protest at its proceedings, in the frenzied atmosphere of that sum­
mer she was nonetheless found guilty and on July 7 joined the other 
three on the gallows. 
The first presidential assassination in American history and its bungled 
aftermath brought an appropriate end to a violent era. The three pre­
ceding decades, capped by the war itself, had been the bloodiest in 
the American experience. It is impossible to measure just how bloody. 
But careful study of the urban murder rate, even through records that 
omit much actual homicide, suggests that it was the highest in the 
nineteenth century, while riot, dueling, vigilantism, small civil wars 
along the frontiers, and the always uncountable brutalities of slavery ac­
counted for much more. And the future, North, West, and South, was 
still unsettled. 
The Civil War to World War I, 
1865-1917 
The years from the later nineteenth century into the early twentieth are 
in many ways the classic period in American history, as all sections in 
their own fashion recovered from the Civil War. In the North, East, 
and Midwest, these were the years of the most rapid industrialization, 
when almost every index of size and power pointed jaggedly up and the 
modern physical city began to take shape. In the West, the whole con­
tinent between Kansas and California was filled up with new states. 
In the South, most wracked by the devastation of war, black slavery 
was replaced by violent intimidation and segregation as forms of racial 
domination. 
Much homicide in every locale was composed of the same familiar 
elements as always and everywhere: domestic argument, drink, flar­
ing anger, the challenge to honor. But everywhere, too, murder as al­
ways both reflected and contributed to social, political, and economic 
change. Regionally distinctive rates and patterns resulted from racial 
tension in the South, labor problems in the North, Indian warfare and 
unsettled conditions in the West. But toward the end of the era these 
distinctions began to lose some of their earlier force, as a result of the 
growing power of the urban industrial revolution all over the country, 
together with the many values and institutions allied with it, from sober 
behavior to better police work. 
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In the former Confederate states, the first task of the dominant white 
majority was to restore as fully and as quickly as possible the power 
enjoyed before secession. And between 1865 and 1877 they won back 
much of what they had lost in the formal Civil War by turning, in 
effect, to an intermittent but ultimately successful guerrilla "war of na­
tional liberation" based on systematic homicide. 
With the Union army on the ground in 1865 and the federal govern­
ment in charge, reforming northerners wished ideally to remake or "re­
construct" the conquered states in their own image. Many black leaders 
hoped to break up plantations into smaller units, turning former slaves 
into small farmers. At minimum, the triumphant Republican party ex­
pected to establish itself through friendly governments elected with the 
support of the new freedmen, white southern allies, and northerners 
come down either to help reform the region or seize personal advantage 
in the midst of postwar confusion. 
But none of these wishes came true. While the Congress was able to 
establish Republican rule for varying periods and new state govern­
ments struggled to bring the nineteenth century to the benighted Car­
olinas, the region was simply too poor to support such innovations as 
penitentiaries, insane asylums, and public schools in addition to the 
state-supported railroads and other improvements favored by northern 
capitalists. Belief in the sanctity of private property was too powerful to 
permit the confiscation of ex-rebel plantations. And while for brief pe­
riods it seemed that the white South might accept a black share in po­
litical power, the federal government was too divided, inconsistent, and 
unwilling to commit the money and the manpower needed to ensure 
real social change. 
The two major goals of the resisting southern majority were to 
get the blacks back to work under conditions as close to slavery as 
possible and to win back native white rule. The two were related: 
control of the political and justice systems was essential to uphold 
"black codes" and "vagrancy laws" designed to keep blacks out of a 
truly free labor market. And the winning tactic was the same in both 
cases: armed resistance to Republican state and county governments 
supported from outside, intimidation of the freedmen through assault 
and murder. 
148 Chapter 5 
In the chaos that immediately followed the war, much violence 
resulted simply from the lack of local law enforcement. But one new 
trigger for bitter and defeated young men returning home was to find 
African Americans trying out new roles, defying old rules, and above 
all voting. During the year following the Confederate surrender in 
April 1865, federal commanders reported 33 white-black homicides 
in Tennessee, 29 in Arkansas, at least 70 in Louisiana, all of these fig­
ures surely undercounted, at a time when it seemed to some that a 
black man's life was worth no more "than a stray dog." Murderous 
race riots, earlier confined to the North, swept into Charleston, Nor­
folk, and Memphis, where former slaves had taken refuge in unprece­
dented numbers. On July 30, 1866, as African Americans were hold­
ing a political convention in New Orleans' Mechanics Hall, a black 
man's casual pistol shot at a white newsboy sparked a general assault on 
the building, and, with the local cops aiding the rioters, some thirty-
nine were killed in nearby street fighting before occupying federals 
arrived. 
By that time resistance was taking more organized form. "Patrolers," 
during slavery a specialized form of night watch, had roamed the coun­
tryside in tense times, looking for runaways or simply blacks without 
passes. After the war this official institution, together with the unofficial 
"vigilance" tradition, was easily turned to only slightly new, if now il­
legal, uses. The Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, led by General Nathan 
Bedford Forrest, the officer responsible for the Fort Pillow Massacre, 
was only the most famous of the several secret societies that terrorized 
black and white political opponents across the countryside during the 
late 1860s. 
Intransigent native whites, mostly Democrats, simply refused to rec­
ognize the legitimacy of mostly Republican governments elected with 
black support, and were especially infuriated by armed black state mi­
litia. In some states, as in prewar Kansas, two governments claimed the 
right to rule at the same time, with the outcome in Mississippi, Loui­
siana, and South Carolina decided by mini-civil wars. And in 1877 
the federal government formally surrendered, withdrawing the last blue 
troops used to support embattled Republican rule, leaving race relations 
in local white hands. The toll in violent death by then was past count­
ing, with ordinary killings, lynchings, deaths in riots, Klan murders, 
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and casualties inflicted by or on Republican or Democratic militias al­
most impossible to disentangle. 
And under native white rule after 1877, the South remained the most 
murderous section of the country; in fact, Horace Redfield, writing in 
1880, commented that "the number of homicides in the Southern 
States is proportionately greater than in any country on earth the popu­
lation of which is numbered as civilized." While there were no reliable 
statistics across the whole of the South, Redfield counted the number 
of killings listed in the only states with statewide newspapers, Texas, 
Kentucky, and South Carolina, a method that almost surely under-
counted the number of black deaths, at the hands of members of either 
race. But even by this flawed measure, during 1878, just after Recon­
struction, these three states had a "murder rate" roughly eighteen times 
that for New England. 
The reasons, to a more modern observer, are several. Poverty and 
desperation are close to the top of the list. Poverty, too, reinforced a 
tradition of weak government and law enforcement; it had been hard 
since the seventeenth century for sheriffs and justices to catch and con­
vict local bullies in rural counties, and it was still hard in upcountry 
Georgia, the hills of Kentucky and Tennessee, and many other ju­
risdictions where vengeful feuds bypassed the formal system. "Every 
man should be sheriff on his own hearth," was an old saying in North 
Carolina. 
Blacks, too, now often armed, were no longer valuable property, pro­
tected by their masters either from racist whites or from each other. 
The historian Lawrence Levine has noted that Stagolee, the most cele­
brated legendary black badman of this period, was a figure "wholly 
without social purpose or redeeming qualities," who preyed alike on 
strong and weak, men and women. His place in folklore was an appro­
priate reflection of a former slaves world in which the justice system in 
many counties was not protector but predator. 
It had always been the hope even of romantic reformers to make 
convicted prisoners pay for themselves. In the postwar South, states too 
poor to feed and clothe mostly healthy young men in idleness, the hope 
seemed more like a necessity. The solution hit upon was the "convict 
lease system," through which prisoners were in effect sold for a term to 
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the highest bidders. The highest bidders in this era were typically the 
owners of mines, railroads, or swampy timberland, places where free 
men would not work. Gangs of prisoners could be held in chains. They 
didn't drink or show up late, and the price of their labor could be 
pushed down close to zero if maintenance costs, food and clothes, were 
kept at a minimum. Death rates ran up to 40 percent a year. And the 
men were easily replaceable: the opportunities for corruption were ob­
vious, as some counties could turn a profit by sentencing numbers of 
young black men for small or imagined crimes and then selling them 
off to the mines. 
And if some places invented black crimes, others ignored them en­
tirely, even offenses as serious as homicide, so long as they affected Af­
rican Americans alone. With every reason to distrust the justice systems 
in most counties, black men and women then resorted to often mur­
derous ways of settling arguments of every kind, in cabins, barrooms, 
and work gangs. 
And for both races, the old code of honor still held in the minds 
both of men with grievances and of those called to judge them. 
A Louisiana lawyer, Thomas J. Kernan, outlined the "Jurisprudence 
of Lawlessness" for the American Bar Association in 1906, describing 
the ways in which southerners could get away with murder. A man was 
expected to fight, even kill, if a woman's honor was involved; the state 
of Texas officially adopted the otherwise "unwritten law" that justified, 
in jurors' eyes, the murder of a wife's lover (but not a husband's) caught 
in adultery. And if many states had abandoned the old common law 
"duty to retreat" in order for a killing to qualify as self-defense, in Ker-
nan's South it had long been replaced by something like a duty to ad­
vance. Almost any insult, or to an outsider the most trivial challenge to 
personal respect or reputation, could justify a homicide. In practice du­
eling had long been above the law, and as the old formal code decayed, 
with its elaborate rules, it was enough to shoot a man on sight so long 
as he—or the community—knew or should have known that it was 
coming. Any street brawl that a defense lawyer could stretch into any­
thing remotely like a "fair fight" could qualify as a duel of sorts, and 
win acquittal. In the South, as everywhere, it was the killer, the survi­
vor, whose story was heard, the victim silent as the grave. And unlike 
the situation in the North, not only the society's bottom rails but also 
its social and political leaders were often involved in homicide. 
General Goffe repulsing the Indians at Hadley, Massachusetts, 1676, during King 
Philips War. Credit: Corbis-Bettmann. 
Eastern State Penitentiary, in Philadelphia, founded in 1829 as part of a new 
approach to reforming murderers and other criminals. Credit: Corbis-Bettmann. 
California vigilantes executing the orders of "Judge Lynch" during the gold rush, 
1850. Credit: Corbis-Bettmann. 
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Execution of 38 Sioux at Mankato, Minnesota, on December 26, 1862—the 
largest mass execution in U.S. history. Credit: Corbis-Bettmann. 
Murder of Colonel Henry F. O'Brien on July 14, 1863, during the New York City 
draft riots, the most lethal mob uprising in U.S. history. Credit: Corbis-Bettmann. 
Jesse James as a teenaged 
Confederate guerilla in 
Missouri, 1864. Credit: 
Corbis-Bettmann. 
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Mrs. Mary Surratt, the pious Catholic 
widow who ran the boardinghouse 
where John Wilkes Booth and others 
plotted to assassinate Lincoln. Credit: 
Corbis-Bettmann. 
Photograph taken by Matthew Brady of the hanging of four Lincoln conspirators, 
including Mary Surratt, on July 7,1865. Credit: Corbis-Bettmann. 
Six members of the Mollie Maguires attending their last devo­
tions in the prison chapel, Pottsville, Pennsylvania, June 21, 
1877. Credit: Corbis-Bettmann. 
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A Baltimore crowd being fired upon by the Sixth Maryland Regiment, during the 
Railroad Strike of July 1877. Credit: Corbis-Bettmann. 
A group of white Southerners preparing to lynch a black man, 1882. Credit: 
Corbis-Bettmann. 
Lizzie Borden at about the time of the 
murders, 1892. Reprinted with the 
permission of the Fall River Histori­
cal Society. 
Andrew Borden's body as it was discovered on the couch, August 4, 1892. Re­
printed with the permission of the Fall River Historical Society. 
Herman W. Mudgett, also known as H. H. 
Holmes—America's first famous serial sex killer, 
1895. Credit: UPI/Corbis-Bettmann. 
 151 The Civil War to World War I
When all of these elements came together the result was rural Edge-
field County, South Carolina, around the turn of the century. Former 
Governor "Pitchfork Ben" Tillman, an Edgefield native, was then serv­
ing as senator from the Palmetto State, an unashamedly violent man 
whose father and an older brother had killed men over card games, and 
whose nephew, also a politician, shot down a hostile newsman in front 
of the state capitol early in 1903—successfully pleading self-defense. 
During the same years the murder rate in Tillmans home county was 
something over 30 per 100,000, bigger even than the carnage recorded 
in medieval England. 
But while the southern white-on-white murder rate was the highest in 
the country, it was white-on-black killings that in this era reached their 
most notorious peak. Lynchings occurred in every state of the Union 
outside of New England—New Jersey had several—with more than 
3,700 incidents recorded between 1889 and 1930, and victims of every 
color. But the South accounted for well over 80 percent of these, and 
it was only in the South that murder was used in effect as social policy. 
The lynching phenomenon fascinated contemporaries at the time, 
and has occupied scholars ever since. But while southern lynching took 
many forms, much of its morbid appeal results from the sheer barbarity 
of many incidents. As often in the past, racial hatred allowed otherwise 
ordinary men and some women to gather in mobs—the attendance of 
women and children at these occasions was often noted—and to treat 
their victims as less than human. The results included the most barbaric 
episodes in the history of American homicide: special excursion trains 
took passengers to Paris, Texas, in 1893, to watch a retarded black man 
die, over the course of an hour, of red-hot irons thrust into his body 
and down his throat; in 1911 an accused rapist was tied to a stake on 
the opera house stage in Livermore, Kentucky, and tickets bought the 
privilege of shooting at him from the seats. 
Mass lynchings of this kind often followed certain communal ritu­
als: a prominent site was selected close to the alleged crime, the vic­
tim was given time to pray, hanged, and then shot up or burned after 
death—more rarely before—with the first match, or shot, ceremonially 
awarded to the injured person or family. In about one-fourth of the 
cases the victim was castrated or otherwise mutilated, with body parts 
or bits of rope then sold off as souvenirs and whatever remained left 
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to swing as a warning to the black community. These sadistic orgies 
were explained then and later in terms of communal horror at "THE 
Crime," black rape of a white woman; the participants seem often to 
have ranged across the whole of the local white social spectrum. Senator 
Tillman boasted that he would gladly lead a mob to avenge such an 
outrage. In fact all southern defenses of lynching centered on THE 
Crime, with much success across the country. 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, an era of intense 
racism fostered by the pseudoscience of Social Darwinism even among 
the most educated, the brutish inferiority of blacks was an article of 
faith. The sensational yellow press of the era fed on lynching; although 
most editorials condemned the bypassing of the court system, and cer­
tainly torture, there was much clucking about a natural impatience with 
the law's delays, and the actual news stories were written by sympathetic 
southern stringers. Feature writers and illustrators reveled in the oppor­
tunity to produce socially acceptable pornography, a one-two punch 
best involving a first-person account of the alleged crime—"The negro 
seized me. Then I fainted. God was merciful"—followed by a lurid 
depiction of its aftermath. Meanwhile even the northern-born Epis­
copal bishop of Arkansas, in 1903, joined a host of other respectable 
apologists in declaring, "While I do not justify lynching, I can find no 
other remedies adequate to repress the crime for which it has been made 
a punishment by the people of the South." 
Later psychologists, too, have concentrated on the rape issue, in ar­
guing that, for example, in an era of repressed sexuality white men pro­
jected their own sexual fantasies onto blacks and then punished them 
savagely out of guilt. But these explanations, like those of contemporary 
apologists, are at best partial explanations for a complex phenomenon. 
The offenses for which black men, and some women, earned lynching 
ran a great gamut, from urging fellow blacks to return to Africa through 
arson, assault, burglary, and horse theft on to "wild talking." Rape, de­
spite all the furor, accounted for only about one-sixth of the alleged 
crimes; by far the most usual was murder of a white male. 
And only a minority of lynchings involved great mass mobs. A care­
ful study of Georgia, where lynching was common, and Virginia, where 
it was not, estimates that big crowds accounted for perhaps 30 to 40 
percent of all episodes. Many of the others were simply illegal on-the-
spot executions carried out by gangs of armed men; given the tradi­
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tional weakness of law enforcement in rural areas, something like the 
old medieval institution of hue and cry lived on in the South, and 
the line between a legal posse, an extralegal search party, and an illegal 
lynching bee was a thin one, crossed only when a fugitive was either 
caught or shot down. Often, too, when a black allegedly wronged a 
white a small number of family or friends of the victim would raid a jail 
to abduct and execute a man whose crime had otherwise failed to out­
rage many others. A last form,finally, was "terrorist" lynching, usually 
carried on at night by organized groups such as the Ku Klux Klan and 
intended specifically as warning to those who might follow a "trouble­
maker." 
Simple racial prejudice, too, fails as a full explanation for lynching. 
Prejudice was of course involved—some 85 percent of southern victims 
were black, including virtually all of those subject to barbaric indig-
nities—but while racial prejudice was nearly universal, lynching was 
quite unevenly distributed across the South, with some areas virtually 
immune. (Contemporary white South Africans, too, were among those 
shocked by the American resort to lynching.) Other simple psychologi­
cal explanations—such as lynching as an aggressive response to inner 
frustration—fail for parallel reasons. While this may be accurate, it 
explains too much: frustration is part of the human experience, and all 
share the biological capacity for aggression, but only in some places, 
at some times, did southerners or others react to frustration in this spe­
cific way. 
While general explanations may have some value, then, the most use­
ful explanations for the why of southern lynching look closely at the 
where and when for clues to the kinds of historic forces and changes 
responsible for the phenomenon. Interracial southern lynchings, while 
never absent earlier, began to rise sharply in the late 1880s, peaked in 
the 1890s, when they averaged about one hundred a year, and then fell 
sharply through the early twentieth century. As the great antilynching 
crusader Ida Wells Barnett pointed out at the time, no explanation that 
hinges on either black male lust or white male sensitivity to it can ex­
plain the timing; white women had often been routinely and calmly left 
alone on plantations full of black men, notably during the Civil War— 
why the sudden upsurge in concern more than twenty years after? And 
no general psychological reason can account, either, for the rapid falloff 
early in the twentieth century. What does best explain the curve are 
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specific and often turbulent internal changes in southern politics and 
society. 
When the federal government left the South to itself in 1877, the 
place of African-American men and women had not been fully settled. 
White domination had been assured, but with slavery gone its forms 
were not yet clear. Millions of black men still voted; others competed 
for a variety of jobs; and in cities and countryside men and women 
jostled with whites, testing the limits of subordination. For both blacks 
and poor whites, the several economic substitutes for slavery, above all 
sharecropping and a one-sided tenantry, were being fixed in law, ac­
companied by much resistance to their specific terms. And the political 
backing for these legal instruments was still not firmly in place; during 
the later 1880s and 1890s, the message of the Populist party and other 
appeals to rebellion against the traditional Democratic elite were di­
rected at black as well as poor white voters. The result was continual 
tension and violence at the polls, as poor whites feared that plantation 
owners would order black tenants to vote against them and rich whites 
feared an interracial alliance of the dispossessed. 
The geography of lynching supports this analysis. Two kinds of areas 
stood out. One was the counties where staple crops were grown, no­
tably cotton, the one most valued in the international market and above 
all in the "black belt" where the population of former slaves was thick­
est. The other was the fastest-growing counties, as in Texas or South 
Georgia, newly opened by the railroads and filling with both African-
American and white in-migrants ready to exploit new lands through 
raising livestock or lumbering. In both cases the need to draw sharp 
racial lines, to validate white "honor" and power by demonstrating 
black impotence or "dishonor," was unusually strong. The fears of 
whites in the black belt were exaggerated by their minority status, and 
in the new areas freedmen and women might prove "uppity" in the 
absence of local traditions, in contrast to Tidewater Virginia, for ex­
ample, which had long shown them their place. 
The solution eventually found was two-sided, political and social. 
Elite white fears of black voting were put to rest by a variety of non­
violent exclusionary tactics widely adopted by the late 1890s. Success­
fully claiming, before the U.S. Supreme Court, that a political party 
was a kind of private club, Democratic leaders won the right to re­
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strict primary voting, in many areas all that mattered, to chosen white 
"members." Poll taxes and literacy requirements, with tests adminis­
tered by white officials, eliminated hundreds of thousands more freed­
men. These last requirements eliminated many poor whites as well— 
but in some states a "grandfather clause" exempted those who could 
prove that their ancestors were legally registered—at a time when Afri­
can Americans were of course still slaves. 
The other or social side of this bargain, demanded less by the elite 
than by poor whites, was legal segregation as a means of showing their 
own superiority. Racial segregation had long been common in the 
North as well as the South, but nothing approaching the near-total 
apartheid dictated by legislation passed around the turn of the century. 
The goal of absolute separation and physical distance made little sense 
to the elite, long accustomed to African-American mistresses as well 
as mammies, and was never in fact achieved in practice. But few ob­
jected to it in principle, and it made a nicely symmetrical package when 
coupled with voting exclusion. 
The sharp downturn in lynching that followed the turn of the cen­
tury had many causes beyond this all-white "bargain." Many south­
erners of education and standing had long opposed the practice, and 
their objections strengthened as the region developed a more diversi­
fied commercial economy and social structure and the old culture of 
honor and violence slowly crumbled at the top. Formal dueling died 
out within a generation of the Civil War, and the homicide rate began 
to fall not long after that. Individual sheriffs and governors had always 
fought illegal punishment as an affront to the honor of their own com­
petence, a blot on the reputations of the justice systems of their states, 
and a discouragement to investors. While prosecutions were rarely at­
tempted and never successful, state militias were called on dozens of 
occasions to ring local jails or escort black prisoners to trial. Courageous 
white southerners, men and women, worked for the same ends—but 
never together with—African-American antilynching crusaders like Ida 
Barnett and the founders of the National Association for the Advance­
ment of Colored People (NAACP), beginning in 1909. 
But the most basic reason for the falling curve was simply that lynch­
ing was no longer needed. By the early twentieth century the use of 
murder as social policy had achieved its ends: southern blacks were 
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tightly fixed in place, economically dependent and politically powerless, 
and nothing more was needed to hold them down. 
By that time national anxieties had long since stopped focusing on the 
South and race. The year 1877, traditional end to Reconstruction, was 
in fact a neatly marked crossroads. That spring the last blue troopers 
were withdrawn from the old Confederacy, effectively ending federal 
occupation and closing the official aftermath of the Civil War. But the 
end of one fearful era was at the same time the beginning of another; 
a few months later the biggest and bloodiest labor strike in American 
history spread along the railroads of the upper South, North, and Mid­
west. And for many members of the middle class, as the clash between 
labor and industry introduced the nation to wholly new and sometimes 
terrifying forms of murderous violence, the specter of sectional civil war 
was simply replaced by the specter of vertical class war. 
The great Railroad Strike of 1877 began in a depressed July, when 
railroad workers in West Virginia walked off the job to protest a 10 
percent wage cut, the second in four years. The governor sent the mili­
tia to help move the trains, but when these citizen-soldiers fraternized 
with strikers in Martinsburg, their numbers swollen by working-class 
supporters, he applied for help from the U.S. Army. President Ruther­
ford B. Hayes, having just ordered U.S. troops out of the South, ap­
proved this novel reassignment. But the strike spread next to Baltimore, 
where fires were set, rocks thrown, and ten men killed in clashes with 
the jumpy Maryland militia. In Pittsburgh, as in Martinsburg, the local 
militia refused to act against a local crowd. Elite troopers from Phila­
delphia, rushed in by the Pennsylvania Railroad, were unable to stop 
widespread looting and the burning of railroad property; twenty-five 
men died by the time the federal army took control. Farther west, in 
Chicago, street fighting between local police and workingmen killed 
up to fifty more. And all over the country, political demonstrations, 
marches, and speeches—in St. Louis a weeklong general strike—drove 
home the point that railway workers were not alone. 
America's middle-class newspaper readers were shocked by this ap­
parently sudden outburst. Six years earlier, in March 1871, the city of 
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Paris, under military siege from outside, had briefly declared a "com­
mune," a kind of worker's state. The brief reign of the Commune was 
marked both by ambitious reforms and the vicious murders of the arch­
bishop of Paris and more than thirty parish priests before it went down, 
literally in flames, in house-to-house fighting with French troops. But 
while it died in France, the Commune lived in the imaginations of 
middle-class Americans, supplying a vocabulary and set of images as 
frightening as those of the Haitian Revolt had been to the southern 
planter aristocracy. It was then easy to imagine that the inspiration for 
working-class discontent was foreign, that the aim was "communard" 
or "communist." 
In fact, the American labor movement of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century was at best divided and weak, its aims generally 
modest, even conservative. In a long post-Civil War period of mone­
tary deflation, most strikes, like the one in 1877, aimed at nothing 
more radical than the restoration of wage cuts. And while the acceler­
ating demands of the industrial era did fuel new tensions between those 
who earned wages and those who paid them, what was labeled "labor 
violence" was often simply overlaid on traditional kinds of ethnic, po­
litical, and cultural differences that had long inspired murderous con­
flict in America, and sometimes perverted its system of criminal justice. 
One of the best examples of this tangle of motives is the murky his­
tory of the Mollie Maguires in the coalfields of eastern Pennsylvania. 
At one level this was simply a labor dispute, magnified by its position 
at the very base of the triad of coal, steel, and railroads that powered the 
new American economy. Trouble in the coalfields was chronic; few jobs 
in the world are as hard or dangerous as deep-tunnel mining, and after 
the Civil War the miners sporadically tried to organize as the Work­
ingmens Benevolent Association. At the same time the region was con­
tinually plagued by violence, not only the usual tavern brawls but also 
ambushes, robberies, or assassinations involving groups of men with 
blackened faces, apparent strangers to their victims. Several of the tar­
gets were the owners, paymasters, or supervisors of small mines; in one 
case a party of armed men in disguise invaded the home of George K. 
Smith, on November 5, 1863, and shot him in front of his family; 
several suspects, arrested by the sheriff, were freed by a mob. Both 
the national press and the local establishment, long used to branding 
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Catholics as undercover subversives, blamed these outrages on Irish 
miners organized as the Mollie Maguires, a secret society that had de­
clared a kind of war on their oppressors. 
And the gauntlet was picked up by the other side. Economic leader­
ship in the coal region, by the early 1870s, was exercised by the Reading 
Railroad, as principal landlord, buyer, and shipper. Reading President 
Frank Gowen was able easily to crush the Miners' Union with the aid 
of the economic depression that set in beginning in 1873. But the Mol­
lies were different. The local politicians who ran the county justice sys­
tem, Gowen believed, were cowed, corrupted, or sympathetic to the 
miners. His own private Coal and Iron Police—in that country a par­
allel law enforcement system, legally deputized by the Commonwealth 
of Pennsylvania—were able to break strikes, and strikers, with the help 
of a cooperative state militia. But it could not deal with an apparently 
secret organization that sent unpopular foremen, coal weighers, and 
owners threatening notes illustrated with nooses and pistols. Gowens 
solution was to call on Allan Pinkerton's private detective agency. Pink­
erton in turn called in James McParlan, one of his operatives, himself 
an Irish Catholic. And it was McParlan, as "James McKenna," who 
showed up at Pat Dormer's Pottsville tavern, on a cold night in Decem­
ber 1873, and by his own heavily stereotyped account in that single 
evening sang, danced, drank, and fought his way into the hearts of the 
patrons, as afirst step toward penetrating the Mollie Maguires. 
"By his own account" (key words, in the absence of reliable outside 
corroboration), "McKenna" was able to pass himself off as a killer, and 
the next April won induction into the Ancient Order of Hibernians 
(AOH), a traditional Irish patriotic organization that allegedly served 
as cover for the Mollies. Between then and February 1876 he served 
usefully as an AOH "secretary"—many members were illiterate—and 
won the confidence of the leadership. And when based on his tips al­
most two dozen alleged killers were rounded up and put on trial, it 
was James McParlan who served as the star witness, the one whose col­
orful testimony about initiation rites and conspiracy to murder revealed 
secrets, won convictions, and according to most papers brought peace 
to the families of foremen, owners, and loyal miners all across coal 
country. 
Were there any Mollies in the anthracite fields? Surely yes; the Irish 
had centuries of experience, back home, with forming secret societies 
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(as well as with treacherous informers paid by their oppressors). Were 
at least some of them killers? Yes again; Jimmy Kerrigan and MuffLaw­
lor confessed and saved their lives by testifying against a few others. 
Were they guilty of all the outrages and murders in the anthracite re­
gion? As surely no; this was hard country without them. Allan Pink­
erton, while paying McParlan, was also encouraging committees of 
vigilance to take direct action. So were some local newspapers. And on 
Friday night, December 10, 1875, a gang of men entered the home of 
two alleged Mollies in Wiggans Patch, tied up several of the occupants, 
shot another, killed Elizabeth McAllister with one panicked bullet, 
and surrounded Charles O'Donnell in a deadly ring, pumping at least 
twenty-five shots into his head and torso at such close range that his 
skin was roasted. 
In addition to righteous vigilantes, testimony about the Mollies and 
their opponents points to many other familiar elements of midcentury 
American homicide: local political rivalry; rioting fire companies in 
Mahoney City; strong drink and brawling among Modocs, Buckshots, 
and Sleepers. The coal country was entangled in a web of often personal 
vendettas, and the ethnic thread stood out as usual. The Irish had been 
imported to do the worst jobs, under the supervision of more skilled 
Welsh or Orange miners. These traditional Protestant enemies ranked 
high among victims of violence whether or not they had any direct 
connection with the mines. In August 1875, the wild young Welshman 
Gomer James, acquitted of killing a Mollie two years earlier, was him­
self assassinated, by an unknown gunman, while running a beer stand 
at an outing of the Shenandoah Rescue Hook and Ladder Company. 
Politics, too, played a role, national as well as local; George Smith, as­
sassinated back in 1863, was apparently unpopular mostly for his sup­
port of the Civil War draft, the issue that had cost so many other lives 
in New York and elsewhere. And Black Jack Kehoe, alleged "King of 
the Mollies," was convicted in 1877 of a crime committed fifteen years 
earlier, when Frank Langdon, a mining foreman who had accused Ke­
hoe of insulting the Union cause and flag, was stoned to death by a 
small mob following a Fourth of July picnic. 
But whatever their other crimes or motives, it was as threats to the 
mines and the Reading that Frank Gowen pursued the Mollies. And 
the trials were classic examples of what economic domination could do 
to a local justice system. In the interests of efficiency, twenty accused 
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killers were tried in just nine proceedings for the murders of ten men 
in three different jurisdictions; all of the victims except for one police­
men were mine owners, supervisors, bookkeepers, watchmen, or fore­
men. Gowen himself, a former prosecutor, played an active role in court 
as the head of several legal teams invited by the district attorneys of 
Carbon, Schuylkill, and Columbia counties to assist in the proceedings. 
Irish Catholics were systematically excluded from all juries. Alibi wit­
nesses in the early trials were immediately convicted of perjury, as a 
warning to others, if their testimony clashed with McParlan's; one man 
drew three years. While Jack Kehoe had clearly been angry at Frank 
Langdon, who had docked his own pay and fired some members of his 
family, he was never placed at the scene of the 1862 killing; he was 
nonetheless found guilty of premeditated murder for having said, "You 
son of a bitch, I'll kill you," sometime before the stoning. And while 
lawyers hired by the Ancient Order of Hibernians conducted an able 
defense, every man indicted was convicted, all of murder in the first 
degree, and all appeals were refused. 
It was an awesome show of power, with groups of prisoners repeat­
edly brought up from jail to court in chains, for the benefit of press and 
public. And the lessons were brutally underlined by the executions that 
followed. The convicts were not young gang members but in many 
cases family men, community leaders of a sort, all of whom took the 
last rites of the Catholic church on the gallows, most of them still pro­
claiming innocence. Ten were hanged on a single "Black Thursday," 
June 21, 1877, four at Mauch Chunk and six at Pottsville; although the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania had banned public executions since 
1834, the audience at the Pottsville jail included some fifty newspaper 
reporters as surrogates for millions of readers across the country. Three 
more men followed on March 25, another three days later on the 28th, 
followed by single hangings on June 11 and December 28, a pair the 
next January 14, another on the 16th, the last October 9, 1879. Twenty 
executions in less than two years—nearly half the total for the Com­
monwealth of Pennsylvania during the entire decade of the 1870s— 
made it quite clear who was in charge of the state and the system. 
But while the Mollies and other sensational cases drew international 
attention, most of the killings resulting from labor troubles did not. 
Between the Civil War and World War I, while the United States had 
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the weakest labor movement of any major industrializing nation, it also 
had the most murderous record of labor violence and the most time lost 
in strikes. Both ends of the paradox are rooted in the same simple fact: 
the ethnic diversity long unique to America was increasing even faster 
than the population itself, as beginning in the 1880s a "New Immigra­
tion" from southern and eastern Europe began to outnumber older 
streams from the north and the British Isles. 
Before the Civil War the few existing labor unions had been orga­
nized much like medieval guilds, as mutual benefit societies, small so­
cial clubs, or fraternities. But this simple model was harder to follow 
as the workforce in individual factories, mines, and railroads got big­
ger. And as specialized skills were lost to mechanization, with work­
ing people reduced in many industries to interchangeable parts, it was 
easier for employers to take advantage of their differences. Many own­
ers deliberately mixed hostile groups in the workplace, confident that 
Greeks and Turks, Jews and Italians, would not join a common union. 
And when Irish miners went on strike, or Italian laborers, there were 
always hungry Chinese or Poles ready to take their place. 
Labor violence rarely pitted workers directly against their employers 
but more typically against each other. Strikes in this period were acts of 
last-ditch defiance, in many places not clearly legal, everywhere vulner­
able to the labels "radical" or "un-American." For those who walked 
out, the key to success was to make sure, physically, that no other work­
ers went back in. Strikers saw themselves fighting for their families, 
while strikebreakers, or "scabs," were typically even more desperate, 
many of them blacks or others excluded from whole job categories or 
even industries, as the result more of union or other workers' hostility 
than by employers. For them a strike was an opportunity. But they 
knew that they were expendable, that the new jobs would usually be 
lost even when the strike failed, as most did in this era. With the extra 
dimension of racial or ethnic tension added to the basic economic con­
flict, they knew, too, that even if protected by Pinkertons or other hired 
guns they had to be ready to fight their way to work, and could never 
fully rest secure at night. 
For decades, all across the country, sticks and stones and pistol shots 
took their toll, one, two, or three lives at a time, in innumerable skir­
mishes between strikers and strikebreakers. But these routine events did 
not capture the public imagination as powerfully as those that seemed 
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to threaten the social order more profoundly. The difference between 
the kinds of killings that did and did not scare Americans is clearly 
shown in the reaction to two political assassinations in the year 1881. 
That July 1, President James A. Garfield, in the virtual absence of 
security in Washington's Baltimore and Potomac train station, was 
shot in the back by an unsuccessful Washington lawyer. The assassin, 
Charles Guiteau, believed (among many other things) that Garfield 
should have appointed him ambassador to Paris. When the president 
died of his wounds after two months of pain, Guiteau was charged with 
his murder. The trial, in which he served as his own counsel, stretched 
through ten long farcical weeks of interruptions, tantrums, and out­
bursts enough to prove conclusively that the man was insane, believing 
"God told me to kill." Judge and jurors, however, reflecting the public 
demand for vengeance, rejected the obvious verdict of insanity and con­
demned Guiteau to hang, a sentence he met willingly: "I am going to 
the Lordy," he wrote, shortly before his execution. 
But if Americans were angry at this lone madman, a native middle-
class American, they were not frightened. In contrast, the bombing as­
sassination of the popular reforming czar, Alexander II, by self-styled 
"anarchists" or "nihilists" set off an international wave of fear and in­
dignation that refused to recede for decades. And beginning in 1881, 
a fledgling anarchist movement in the United States produced just 
enough inflammatory words and newsprint about dynamite and "the 
propaganda of the deed" to provide cartoonists and editorialists with 
convenient symbols for "foreign radicals," helping to fuel an intermit­
tent popular unease that occasionally bubbled up into fear and fury, 
most famously in May 1886. 
Workers at Chicago's McCormick Harvester that year had been out 
since February, sometimes battling with strikebreakers. On May 1, in 
an unrelated development, several labor organizations launched a drive 
for adoption of an eight-hour day, a movement that inspired tens of 
thousands to quit work and march all over the city. On the third, a 
crowd of demonstrating lumber workers drifted toward the McCor­
mick plant to help harass the scabs and were met by two hundred po­
licemen, clubs, and bullets. Four men were killed that afternoon, and a 
leading anarchist, the German-born August Spies, called an indignation 
meeting for the next night at Haymarket Square. 
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Long hot speeches, the evening of the fourth, together with cold 
wind and rain, had by ten o'clock reduced the hastily called meeting to 
about three hundred men, women, and children. Most of the speakers 
had left, Mayor Carter Harrison had checked the scene and saw no 
danger in the oratory, when Police Inspector John Bonfield, at the head 
of nearly two hundred men, took it upon himself to order the crowd to 
disperse. His blue column was standing quietly in formation when a 
bomb, apparently thrown from an alley, landed amidst it. All discipline 
exploded in the smoky confusion that followed, as the terrified police 
fired wildly into the crowd and at each other. The bomb itself killed 
Patrolman Michael J. Degan that night, several in the crowd were shot 
to death, and during the following several weeks six more policemen 
died either of bullet wounds or shrapnel. 
Over the next few days, the city, and nation, had little more notion 
of what they were facing than the cops that night on the scene, and 
reacted in the same way. The fact that many local anarchists had in fact 
talked long and often about bombing made them obvious targets. But 
to outsiders all apparent radicals looked alike; hundreds were rounded 
up and beaten as Cook County District Attorney Julius Grinnell ad­
vised the already fired-up police force to "make the raids first and look 
up the law afterwards." On May 27 a grand jury indicted ten anarchists 
for murder and conspiracy to murder, all of them foreign-born except 
for the dashing former Confederate Albert Parsons, who escaped the 
city before sensationally showing up to surrender in open court. It 
would have been hard in any case to find an impartial trial jury in Chi­
cago, but Judge Elbert Gary left nothing to chance. Potential panelists 
were not chosen by lottery, as usual, but by a special bailiff nominated 
by Grinnell; the eight defendants actually tried quickly used up their 
twenty peremptory challenges, and the judge allowed none for such 
causes as prejudice against labor unions or foreigners. 
Since no actual bomb thrower could be identified then or later, the 
prosecution concentrated not on the murder but on the "conspiracy" 
count in the indictment; it was easy to show that several of the men had 
advocated the use of bombs in general, if not in this specific case, as a 
form of social protest. The jury took only a few hours to declare all 
eight guilty, and under Illinois law to call for the execution of all but 
one. After all appeals failed, three of the men successfully applied for 
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clemency to Governor Richard Oglesby; the other four refused to beg. 
Louis Lingg committed suicide on November 10, 1887, by explod­
ing a smuggled dynamite cap in his mouth; Parsons, George Engle, and 
Adolph Fischer were hanged the next afternoon. 
The country was unevenly divided by these proceedings. Most labor 
leaders, their own movement deeply wounded by the association with 
violence, had little sympathy for the Haymarket Eight, whose ideas 
were radically different from their own. Many intellectuals, however, 
were deeply troubled by the threat to free speech implied in convicting 
men not for specific actions but for ideas, however naive or even abhor­
rent. As Chicago calmed down, too, and it became obvious that anar­
chism was no real threat to the Republic, they were joined by many 
local business and political leaders. But theirs was still minority senti­
ment, and it was an act of political courage, even suicide, when in 1893 
a new governor, John Peter Altgeld, in granting the three survivors a 
full pardon, denounced the judge, the trial, and the conduct of the 
prosecution. 
The Haymarket affair, as clearly as the trials of the Lincoln con­
spirators and the Mollies, reinforced the obvious fact that in times of 
real or imagined crisis murder trials turned on political opinion. Some­
times that opinion reflected genuine community sentiment, sometimes 
it could be manipulated, as by Frank Gowen or Judge Gary. In either 
case, the kind of rough impartiality shown by Philadelphia juries in 
ordinary homicide cases, and certainly the usual sympathy for defen­
dants, dried up when jurors felt their own place in the social order was 
threatened. 
Usually the label "foreign" or "radical" hung heavily on the necks of 
workingmen accused of murder in the course of strikes, or conversely 
helped free policemen or sheriffs' deputies accused of shooting them 
down. But this was not true always or everywhere. In many places, 
community sentiment and local politics were in fact pro-labor, and im­
ported strikebreakers, especially blacks or other strangers, were passion­
ately hated. The trigger-happy Pinkertons, too, were highly unpopular 
in many areas. All of these forces converged in the town of Homestead, 
Pennsylvania, in the summer of 1892, when the management of the 
Carnegie Steel Mill locked out union workers and prepared to bring 
in scabs. 
On July 6, six hundred Pinkertons were spotted floating up the Mo­
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nongahela in covered barges; Homesteaders lined the bank, someone 
fired a shot, and soon the strikers alongshore and the men on the river 
were exchanging rifle and pistol fire. Seven of the invaders and nine 
strikers were dead by the time a truce was arranged, and the surviving 
Pinkertons were made to run a brutal gauntlet through the town. Com­
pany lawyers, in the aftermath, threw a blizzard of indictments for mur­
der and riot at scores of union men. But while the select grand jury of 
Allegheny County passed these true bills, ordinary jurors would not 
cooperate; most charges were dropped, and the few men who came to 
trial were all acquitted. 
But the tide still ran against union men in this era. Although the 
murder charges did not stick, the Amalgamated Association of Iron, 
Steel, and Tin Workers was effectively broken by the expenses of de­
fending its members in court. And much public sympathy, at first fa­
vorable to men defending their homes from invasion, was lost when 
three weeks after the battle on the river Alexander Berkman, an anar­
chist with no union connection, attempted to murder Carnegie's lead­
ing executive, Henry Clay Frick. 
The rest of the century, then, was punctuated by major strikes, most 
of them failures, several murderous. Given the precedent set by Presi­
dent Hayes, many of them, especially those involving interstate trans­
port on the railroads, the nations biggest employers, were broken with 
the aid of state or federal troops. And the new century began with the 
third presidential assassination in one long generation, as the widely 
beloved William McKinley was shot down at a reception in Buffalo, 
New York, on September 6, 1901, by Leon Czolgosz, a lone Polish-
born anarchist. McKinley died eight days later. No one, including him­
self, offered any defense of young Czolgosz, who was indicted, tried, 
and sentenced in a matter of weeks, hanged on October 29. 
While both Reconstruction in the South and labor troubles in the 
North have faded, or been blotted, from popular historical memory, 
events in the West have not. But the reality of the post-Civil War era 
of "cowboys and Indians" has been badly distorted by time and the 
romantic imagination. The fact that small boys and Hollywood pro­
ducers have changed sides over the years is not enough to set it straight. 
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The final extermination of the original natives as major players in the 
drama of American expansion was accomplished within a single gen­
eration, a process that began during the war itself. The end, if not ro­
mantic, was often dramatic as played out on the deserts, plains, and 
mountains of the West; but while costumes, scenery, and players all 
changed, the essential outlines of the plot did not. 
The policy of herding Indians onto reservations, adopted before the 
Civil War, was full of trouble and corruption from the start, and it was 
impossible to enforce on the warrior horsemen of the West. Many in­
dividual chieftains surrendered to it when bribed and harassed by the 
army. But those who agreed to the reservation treaties, adopted Chris­
tianity, and tried to learn farming were often scorned by others, and 
many young warriors thought of the reservations simply as winter oases, 
places to wait out the hard weather and pick up rations before return­
ing, refreshed, to a life of hunting and raiding. Many tribes were in­
volved, from the northern Sioux and Cheyenne down to the Kiowa and 
Comanche of the Texas plains, on across west and south to the fearsome 
Apache. All these peoples differed greatly in culture, and each had a 
distinctive history. But with variations the story of the Sioux, the big­
gest and most famous tribe, is the story of them all. 
Originally from the woodlands of the Lake Country, the Sioux had 
been moving out onto the plains for decades, driving back or killing 
off other tribes. By the 1850s they had established an empire, becom­
ing the leading trappers and traders of the prairies, continually mov­
ing west, north, and south as they decimated the buffalo. Sometimes 
loosely allied with Blackfoot, Cheyenne, and Arapahoe, bitterly hated 
by the Pawnee, they dominated the northern plains by the time the 
white men began first to cross and then to settle them. Several groups 
signed treaties during the 1850s, but few really understood what a "res­
ervation" was supposed to be, and no chieftains had the authority 
needed to hold individuals to their terms. 
Serious trouble broke first at the Lower Sioux Agency near the an­
cestral homelands in Minnesota, where Chief Little Crow had tried 
hard to settle down and learn the white mans way. But traders cheated 
his people over the price of furs, the promised cash was siphoned off, 
the flour was wormy and the beef rotten. When they complained, one 
local trader, Andrew Myrick, sneered, "Let them eat grass, for all I 
care." The young men heard him. On August 17, 1862, Little Crow 
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himself, dressed in broadcloth and tie, went to Episcopal services as 
usual at the agency; that same day four young men burst in and shot 
down a German farm family and their guests at Sunday dinner, to start 
the biggest Indian massacre in American history. 
Over the next few days, under a bitterly disillusioned Little Crow, 
the Sioux first systematically slaughtered the local traders—Andrew 
Myrick was later found with his dead mouth stuffed with grass—then 
fanned out among the local farmers, many of them unarmed Germans 
and Scandinavians wholly innocent of the long and vicious tradition of 
frontier warfare. The amount of rape, mutilation, and butchery of chil­
dren seems to have been exceptional even by the fearsome standards of 
that tradition. And when the army, after several pitched battles, was 
finally able to win the release of over two hundred women and children 
held as hostages and to round up many defeated Sioux, the official rec­
ords of the new state of Minnesota counted 644 civilian deaths, the 
army 113 of its own. 
The 1,500 Sioux then in army custody were not, however, ordinary 
prisoners of war; in the view of outraged Minnesotans, and many in the 
army, they were simply killers. And it was for murder and attendant 
atrocities that nearly 400 of them, virtually all of the male adults, were 
tried by a military commission. Some 307 were sentenced to death be­
fore President Lincoln personally reviewed the transcripts and, with an­
other and bigger war already on his hands, commuted the sentences 
of most. But at Fort Snelling that December, 39 warriors were finally 
hanged on a single snowy day, by far the biggest mass execution in our 
history. 
Little Crow and many of his warriors, though, had escaped. The 
chief himself was shot—murdered?—by a local farmer the next sum­
mer while picking berries in the north woods, but most followed the 
traditional routes west, moving in among other Sioux tribes and help­
ing spread war across the plains. The Cheyenne were eager to smoke 
the war pipe with their allies after an entire peaceful village of nearly 
three hundred, mostly women and children, was murdered at Sand 
Creek, Colorado, by the local militia under Colonel J. M. Chivington. 
And for the rest of the 1860s through 1877 the plains were full of 
hostiles. 
By the late nineteenth century, as their numbers and prowess re­
ceded, the natives had won many white champions; a few westerners 
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and many military men admired their courage and way of life, and 
eastern reformers were eager to make good citizens of them. The federal 
government then always had proponents of a "peace policy." But Gen­
eral William Tecumseh Sherman, in overall charge of operations, was 
implacable, and most white westerners agreed with General Philip 
Sheridan that "if a white man commits murder . .  . we hang h i m , . .  . if 
an Indian does the same we have been in the habit of sending him more 
blankets." The issues were in any case decided on the plains themselves. 
The government repeatedly set aside reservation lands "forever," and 
then broke its word, as when for example gold was discovered in the 
Black Hills, sacred territory to many natives. On their side many young 
Indians saw no need to honor promises made by others, and as the 
buffalo were exterminated lived increasingly off plunder taken in raids. 
They encountered few cowboys but many wagon freighters and army 
convoys; isolated farmers were especially easy targets, the men killed, 
the women raped and sometimes captured, in what to the warriors was 
traditional warfare and to the whites simply murder and kidnapping, 
reason to call out the army and excuse to shrink the reservations further 
in revenge. 
Indian warfare was like no other. One-on-one most plains or desert 
warriors on their own turf were far better fighters than black or white 
U.S. cavalrymen, and without native scouts the army was virtually 
helpless. But there were plenty of these scouts—Pawnee and Crow, 
even Apache, Kiowa, or Sioux who had their own reasons to take arms 
against their fellows. Mass cavalry charges were nonexistent, pitched 
battles few and mostly won by the army: Colonel George Armstrong 
Custer's famous 1876 debacle at the Little Bighorn was a rare excep­
tion. Given better tactics, artillery, and no women and children to slow 
them, the army could not lose. But what really defeated the Indians was 
attrition and loss of habitat. By the early 1880s white hunters with 
repeating rifles had helped cut down what had once been millions of 
buffalo to a few hundred. Hemmed in by farmers and miners, ex­
hausted by cold and hunger, the last Sioux holdouts were finally pushed 
onto their shrunken reservations for good within two years of slaugh­
tering Custer's regiment. 
The timing was different with different tribes—a handful of Apaches 
under Geronimo held out until 1886—but by then virtually all Indian 
people had been effectively disarmed and penned up. And their new 
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status meant a change in the treatment of Indian homicide that had 
existed since the seventeenth century. 
Throughout this final era, as always, homicide was the most frequent 
single precipitant of war, or military action, while military action was 
sometimes, but not always, treated in white law as a legal excuse for it. 
White civilians who killed Indians were either killed in return by the 
victims tribe or, given the refusal of juries to convict, effectively went 
free. The unrepentant J. M. Chivington, the Methodist minister/mili-
tia colonel who had slaughtered a whole village then under the sworn 
protection of the U.S. Army, went on a dramatic lecture tour with over 
one hundred scalps as stage props; no one indicted the Tucson vigi­
lantes who killed, raped, and enslaved scores of peaceful Apaches in 
April 1871. Meanwhile individual Indians who killed whites were ei­
ther for diplomatic reasons granted some kind of amnesty—as Lincoln's 
intervention at Fort Snelling—or tried and usually hanged as murder­
ers. Finally, Indians who killed Indians in Indian country were in law 
ignored. 
Early in the Republic, the native tribes had legally been declared 
"dependent nations." But on the reservation their status was not so 
clear; charismatic individual chiefs retained much of their influence, 
while formal power rested with white reservation agents and mission­
aries. The avowed end was to turn them into American citizens, farmers 
and Christians, but the end was not clearly in sight. As part of the 
conversion process, and in the tradition established by the Cherokee 
generations before, formal "Indian police" and "courts of Indian of­
fenses" were organized on the agencies. But unlike the Cherokee, the 
plains Indians staffed but did not direct these institutions; the "courts" 
dealt only with violations of agency rules, and the police were appointed 
and controlled by the white agent in charge. 
The ultimate legal question, as so much in Indian history, was pre­
cipitated by a murder, in this case on a Sioux reservation. On the Rose­
bud Reservation a long political quarrel between Chief Spotted Tail and 
Captain Crow Dog of the Indian police was settled by gunfire, as the 
captain, shortly after resigning from the force, simply shot down the 
chief in cold blood. The killer was immediately arrested by his ex-
mates, and the white courts of Dakota Territory assumed jurisdiction 
and condemned him to die. But in 1883 the U.S. Supreme Court 
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ruled, in ex parte Crow Dog, that under existing law formal justice did 
not cover intraracial killings on the reservation, arguing that it would 
be unfair to try a people still moving out of a "savage" state according 
to the alien rules of an "external and unknown code." Congress moved 
in 1885 to close this loophole: the Indians might settle minor crimes in 
their own fashion, but murder, manslaughter, felonious assault, rape, 
arson, burglary, and larceny would be tried under the rules of the state 
or territory surrounding the reservation. After nearly three centuries, in 
short, any homicide in the United States, anywhere, and by anyone of 
any race was to be treated under white rules. 
Throughout the West, meanwhile, the spaces left by the natives were 
increasingly filled with new people and economic activity, ranchers and 
farmers, railroads and miners, towns and then cities. The process of 
settlement was relatively quiet in some places, notoriously violent in 
others. Given continual change and the enormous distances and social 
variations between Abilene and San Francisco, it is hard to find any 
single theme. But, with some regional exceptions, it may be said that 
with respect to murder as with other matters, newcomers brought their 
histories with them, and that after a period of sometimes brutal shaking 
out new communities tended, with some especially sharp edges, to re­
create familiar patterns. 
The farmers who settled places like Iowa and the Dakotas generally 
came from either relatively peaceful places back east, the band stretch­
ing from Minnesota back through Maine, or from the Scandinavian 
countries or Germany. Family men, or men who established families as 
soon as they could, they brought settled traditions with them, and even 
the hazards of the brutal climate and unsettled world of the Great Plains 
could not easily push them over the edge into violent behavior. 
It was different among the "cowboys," whose heyday began imme­
diately after the Civil War, when wild cattle were rounded up in South 
Texas and then herded hundreds of miles across unfenced plains to the 
railheads of Kansas. But while the era of the "long drive" has lived for 
generations in memory, it lasted less than ten years in reality before 
farm settlement and barbed wire clogged the route. Gamblers and other 
hustlers in the "cow towns" along the way were of course delighted in 
general by the annual invasion from the Southwest, but not always as 
pleased with the behavior of individual cowboys, or with each other. 
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Still, places like Abilene and Dodge City averaged no more than about 
1.5 homicides per cattle trading season, and their marshals mostly con­
cerned themselves, like their eastern counterparts, with arresting drunks 
and other misdemeanants. And it is a historian's unpleasant duty to 
inform readers steeped in Hollywood legend that nowhere in the Wild 
West, not ever, did any two cowboys or anyone else stand in the middle 
of a street, revolvers strapped to their sides, and challenge each other to 
a fatal "quick draw" contest. 
Far more murderous than the cattle plains were the mountains of 
mining country, dotted with towns like Bodie, California, that flour­
ished for a few brief years in the late 1870s and early 1880s. Bodie in 
its heyday suffered little from larceny or burglary and experienced few 
robberies and no recorded rapes. At the same time, as a town of about 
five thousand it witnessed at least twenty-nine murders and nonnegli­
gent manslaughters between 1878 and 1882, which translates to the 
extraordinary rate of 116 per 100,000 annually. 
The reason for both the low rate of most thefts and the high rate of 
killings seems identical; and in terms of murder, classic. Bodie s few 
women were mostly prostitutes, and in a get-rich-quick atmosphere its 
dominant male population, in Roger McGrath's classic formulation, 
was "young, single, intemperate and armed." A few rich drunks were 
eagerly rolled, but no one was foolish enough to try to rob a bank, 
barroom, or boardinghouse in a town bristling with shotguns round 
the clock. Overwhelmingly the killings resulted from fights between 
more or less willing contestants, the issues rarely money or even women 
but—as in the saloons of early republican Norfolk, or antebellum Phila-
delphia—simply honor itself, the stubborn refusal, especially when in 
liquor, to back down when challenged for the most trivial of reasons. 
And the tolerance for this behavior, the willingness to honor a plea of 
self-defense, was even more powerful than in the contemporary South: 
40 men were arrested for homicide in thefive years studied, 1 lynched, 
just 7 put on trial, and 1 (one!) found guilty. 
The last classic ingredient in Bodies lethal mixture was racial and 
ethnic difference: roughly half its 1880 population was foreign born, 
including 850 Irish, 300 Chinese, and 100 Mexicans. Like antebel­
lum Philadelphians, Bodie s juries could generally treat these foreigners 
justly when they were brought to trial. But, as in the South and East, 
much western violence was racial, with the Apache Indians especially 
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ferocious in dealing with Mexicans, the Mexicans with Chinese, and 
the dominant whites with all of them. 
The Chinese brought to work on the railroads and later in the mines 
were especially vulnerable. Bitterly resented by rival laborers, once the 
major roads were built they settled in towns and cities, running small 
businesses and doing odd jobs. Wholly unable to count on the white 
court system, and often involved in illegal gambling, an honored occu­
pation in their culture, they relied for a rough measure of justice and 
protection on fraternal associations, sometimes gangs, or "tongs." Tong 
rivalries themselves accounted for much murder within local Chinese 
communities, but unlike Mexicans, Indians, or blacks, the Chinese 
seem almost never to have retaliated against whites. Interracial homi­
cide, then, ran almost wholly in one direction, with few prosecutions 
and several mass killings. 
In 1882 the U.S. Congress, responding to racist pressures and a se­
ries of violent incidents, mostly on the West Coast, passed the first of a 
series of Chinese Exclusion Laws that effectively shut off immigration. 
But the violence reached its height three years later in the coal mining 
town run by the Union Pacific Railroad at Rock Springs, Wyoming. 
Several hundred Chinese were brought into the area following a failed 
strike, then a lockout, of angry white miners. After a brief turf battle on 
September 2, 1885, a mob gathered outside the local "Chinatown" and 
then moved in through its shacks and dugouts, driving out some in­
habitants, murdering others, robbing all, and finally burning everything 
to the ground. The bodies that remained, dead or alive, were mostly 
incinerated; no count was possible, but the estimated number of victims 
reached fifty by nightfall. 
No one was ever indicted by the local authorities. The railroad was 
above all eager to avoid further trouble and quickly put the Chinese 
back to work. And with the cooperation of the U.S. Army, called in at 
first to help the refugees, the Union Pacific arranged a unique penalty 
for murder; known participants in the massacre were simply given back 
pay and tickets out of Wyoming Territory. 
The national press, in contrast, was almost wholly united in outrage, 
but most papers seized on a rationale: "no one single person concerned 
in the massacre was a native born American." Rock Springs was instead 
the work of "the worst of our European immigrants: degraded Poles, 
ignorant and besotted Hungarians, and lazy Italian convicts." This 
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handy, ironic—and utterly false—explanation helped, in later years, to 
erase the memory; the kind of violence represented at Rock Springs, 
which did no credit either to labor or to industry, was not really part of 
the American historical tradition. 
The popular taste in western violence, then and later, ran neither to the 
drunken brawling of places like Bodie nor to the one-sided killings vis­
ited on the Chinese but instead to shootouts involving outlaws and 
lawmen. Men in both categories—there was much crossover—were al­
most instantly madefigures of Myth, their stories told and exaggerated 
in the press, dime novels, and worshipful biographies. But there was a 
core of reality to it all. However encrusted by fantasy, the contemporary 
West was in fact often filled with murderous gunfire, the result first of 
the Civil War and always of weak law enforcement in a time of rapid 
economic development. 
The greatest school for banditry after the war was banditry during 
the war, especially the mini-Civil War along the Kansas-Missouri 
border that had begun in the John Brown era. Wild Bill Hickok was 
among several gunmen who had fought on the antislavery side with 
Brown, but ex-Confederates hold the numerical record. Frank James 
was among Bill Quantrill s Raiders who burned the town of Lawrence 
in 1863 and murdered all its male inhabitants; his brother Jesse joined 
next year, at seventeen, in time to help slaughter seventy-five unarmed 
Union soldiers at Centralia, Missouri. This one guerrilla band also in­
cluded the Daltons, the Youngers, and a host of other outlaws later 
made famous: one historian has found that roughly half of the 296 
Raider alumni who can be identified by name went on to violent crimi­
nal careers. 
Local law enforcement was severely disrupted when these men began 
raiding, and it remained weak and divided throughout their lives. Some 
of the West, still not organized into states, was administered by the 
federal government, which appointed county sheriffs and town marshals; 
with statehood these officers were elected or chosen by mayors or town 
councils. Either way the process was political, the lawmen often inept or 
defied by one local faction or another. And both horses and railroads car­
ried outlaws quickly out of one town, county, or territory into another, 
where they were either unknown or had sheltering connections. 
It was these connections that allowed the James brothers, Americas 
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favorite killers, to escape justice for so long. Riding typically with a 
dozen or so well-armed men, including the Youngers and other local 
guerrillas turned outlaw, they operated almost entirely in the South or 
border states during the Reconstruction era, trading openly on their 
Confederate histories. And Jesse, a strikingly handsome young man 
who eventually married a childhood sweetheart, had a kind of genius 
for public relations, granting occasional interviews that helped add a 
touch of sympathy to the fear they inspired in potential witnesses. The 
gang was the first to rob banks in broad daylight, the second to hold up 
trains, and it counted on the postwar unpopularity of rich corporations 
not only among the Missouri dirt farmers they came from but all over 
the country. The men murdered several people in the course of their 
robberies, many of them purely innocent bystanders: the veryfirst was 
the ride-by shooting of a student at William Jewell College, and one 
casualty of a raid on the Kansas City Fairground was a ten-year-old girl. 
But they still managed to project a kind of Robin Hood image that 
endeared them to credulous readers and, more important, helped them 
to evade indictment. 
In the absence of effective national police, the niche later filled by 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, banks and railroads in the West 
even more than in the East often bypassed the usual machinery of local 
law enforcement by hiring their own private agents to cross county or 
state lines, above all the Pinkertons, who were then deputized or com­
missioned by compliant governors. In the case of the James brothers, 
however, the detective agency only burnished the legend of the poor 
outlaw as victim. The Pinkertons did kill John Younger in a shootout 
in March 1874, but lost three of their own. And the following year 
they shot themselves spectacularly in the feet. On the night of January 
28, 1875, acting on a tip that Jesse was visiting home, several detectives 
threw a bomb into his boyhood cabin, killing his eight-year-old half-
brother and tearing off his mother s arm. (The incident was exploited 
the next year in one of the Mollie Maguire trials, when the defense 
tried to discount a witness from the agency by placing him at the 
murder scene.) 
The gang was only broken in the summer of 1876 when in its one 
move out of the South it attempted to rob the First National Bank of 
Northfield, Minnesota, got badly shot up by the local citizens, and lost 
three men killed. Cole Younger, arrested, copped a classic plea by ex­
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plaining to a sympathetic reporter, "We were victims of circumstances. 
We were drove to it, sir." While the James boys themselves escaped, it 
was never the same. Following two unusually brutal railroad murders, 
the governor of Missouri in 1881 officially offered a huge $10,000 re­
ward for either of them, dead or alive. Jesse, although never indicted for 
any crime, let alone convicted, was thus declared an "out-law" in the 
medieval sense of the phrase, a target and a temptation. And it was 
while living with his wife and children in a small cottage near St. Jo­
seph, Missouri, under the alias "Howard," that he was shot in the back 
by Bob Ford, one of his own gang, while performing the quintessen­
tially domestic act of adjusting a picture on the wall. Tragic ballads were 
already written and legends still growing when Frank surrendered five 
months later; with public sympathy and outrage on his side, he was 
acquitted of any crime and returned home to live as a quiet farmer. 
But many elements of the James story were by then being repeated 
farther west. Giant railroads crossed the continent as early as the 1860s, 
and just as the extermination of the buffalo opened the plains to cattle, 
the impounding of the natives opened the whole country to white 
entrepreneurs, with ranchers and sheepmen, bankers and miners, gam­
blers, homesteaders, and speculators contending for dominance. As 
Civil War veterans with weaker local roots than the James brothers 
drifted west to find outlets for their talents, some of them murderous, 
many found robbery a tempting shortcut to all this new wealth, or 
cattle rustling a profitable supplement to small ranching. While the 
Missourians had helped make the Colt .45 a famous weapon, most of 
the serious shooting was done with sawed-off shotguns, as bankers and 
Pinkertons from Kansas to California alternated between chasing gun­
men and hiring them. 
The most notorious of these gunmen was William Bonney, a trans­
planted New York Irishman who moved out of Kansas to New Mexico 
Territory as "Billy the Kid." Later legend has him killing twenty-one 
(white) men, perhaps because he was himself just shy of his twenty-
second birthday when shot down by a onetime friend, Sheriff Pat Gar­
rett, for a $500 reward. An ugly little man, with none of the romantic 
qualities of Jesse James, contemporaries knew him simply as a "low­
down, vulgar, cutthroat" and hired killer; but for a historian he is 
important above all as a symptom of the troubles afflicting the post­
war West. 
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New Mexico was the most turbulent of territories, thinly settled, full 
of conflict between its long-established Mexican farmers and sheep­
herders and incoming cattlemen from Texas, who often staked out ter­
ritory that had belonged to the older inhabitants for generations, while 
the Apache preyed on them all. It is symptomatic that the Kid's death 
total was usually given with a cynical caveat—"not counting Indians or 
Mexicans"—and that one of his employers, the cattle baron Colonel 
John Chisum, routinely ordered that any Indian or Mexican trespasser 
on his immense acreage be shot on sight. Chisum was the biggest single 
rancher in the territory, but his dominance in Lincoln County was chal­
lenged by several other banking, merchant, and grazing factions willing, 
like their counterparts all over the West, to hire their own gunmen 
whenever local sheriffs were either weak or hostile. Bonney was one of 
those brought in to fight the resulting Lincoln County War of 1875 ­
81, before turning to simple banditry toward the end. But his own 
exploits pale before the estimated total of two hundred lives lost in that 
contest and the legacy it represented. 
Racial hostility continued throughout the history of the territory. 
While the Apache were eventually confined to reservations, during the 
1870s and 1880s, the Mexicans did not go away. Local champions like 
Elfego Baca contested Anglo dominance in the justice system directly, 
running successfully for sheriff, while Juan Jose Herrera organized the 
Gorras Blancas, or White Caps, an all-Mexican vigilante group that was 
accused of using murder as well as sabotage to fight against railroads 
and others who were strangling their way of life. Herrera s later move 
into elective office only underlined the deadly serious nature of politics 
in New Mexico, a place where sheriffs and local officials were routinely 
killed by the losing side. Uniquely in this country, in fact, political as­
sassination seems to have established itself as a part of territorial culture, 
sometimes reaching to the highest levels. Albert B. Fall, New Mexico's 
leading politician and later its first senator, was suspected by many of 
arranging the 1896 murder of crusading Judge Albert Jennings Foun­
tain and his little boy along a lonely road outside of Las Cruces, just as 
Jennings was leading a grand jury investigation of criminal activity in 
Lincoln County. 
New Mexico is clearly an extreme case, and most western towns and 
counties were usually quiet places, their sheriffs little concerned with 
homicide and marshals more worried about stray dogs than killers. But 
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the exceptions were real and numerous, and many boom areas hired 
enforcers with violent reputations to bring "order" with little concern 
for "law." Between 1886 and 1895 Sheriff John Slaughter, one of the 
richest ranchers of Cochise County, Arizona, simply shot twelve men 
to death while they were in his official custody; there were no official 
repercussions. And as Virgil and Wyatt Earp, their friend "Doc" Hol­
liday, and scores of others moved easily from work as private guards to 
public lawmen, and occasionally to gambling, rustling, or robbery, it is 
impossible to keep score. Given the encrustations of legend, the fact 
that there were at least two sides to many of these men and every town 
they worked in, there is no one reliable version of what happened even 
during an encounter as famous as the 1881 Gunfight (or ambush?) at 
the O.K. Corral in Tombstone, Arizona; the killing of Frank and Tom 
McClaury and Billy Clanton by Holliday and the Earps may in fact 
have been murder, manslaughter, or justifiable homicide. In any case, 
the day of the gunfighter passed fairly quickly. 
One barometer both of the extent of banditry and the weakness of 
regular law enforcement is the toll of deaths taken in formal vigilante 
movements: of over seven hundred known victims across all of Ameri­
can history, Richard Maxwell Brown has counted more than five 
hundred between 1860 and 1900, mostly in the plains and Far West, 
with Montana Territory leading all others. But as the various contend­
ers for riches in the Wild West either won or lost, and as justice systems 
settled down, the count by decade shows a clear pattern: even as western 
populations shot up, the trend was down, with 179 during the 1860s, 
125 in the 1870s, 107 in the 1880s, 25 in the 1890s, and just one lone 
"outlaw" hanged between 1900 and 1909. By that last date Billy the 
Kid was just beginning to be resurrected as a kind of hero, while the 
last of the famous bandits, Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid, had 
been driven out of the country by pursuing Pinkertons. And as of April 
1915, when Frank James deprived Kearney, Missouri, of its only tourist 
attraction by dying peacefully in the cabin he had been born in, the 
business of train robbery, shootouts, and cattle rustling had pushed all 
the way west to the little town of Hollywood, California. 
But violence in the West did not die out with the traditional badmen, 
nor did the Pinkertons and other private gunmen die out when they 
were no longer needed to fight them. Instead the focus simply shifted, 
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as it had earlier across most of the nation, to issues involving capital and 
labor, with a murderous intensity seen nowhere else. 
The more quickly and richly the West developed, the more it re­
sembled the rest of America in the Age of the Robber Barons, but on a 
bigger western scale. As access to water and railheads became critical on 
the plains, small ranchers in general gave way to big ones. On the Pacific 
coast, operations once as simple as commercial fishing and lumbering 
increasingly demanded capital and large-scale operations. Nowhere was 
the change more dramatic than in the Rocky Mountains, where the 
quirky lone prospectors of legend soon gave way to giant mining cor­
porations. As the more easily gathered precious metals on the sur­
face quickly played out, mining for gold and silver became the kind of 
capital-intensive, technologically sophisticated business that mining for 
copper, lead, and coal had always been. At the same time mining, like 
other western industries, required unskilled laborers of a kind, and un­
der conditions, that virtually guaranteed violence: single men mostly, 
concentrated in large numbers, employed by big impersonal corpora­
tions traditionally denounced for lacking "a body to kick or a soul to 
damn." And it was around the mines that labor trouble reached its most 
spectacular peaks. 
The men who organized the Western Federation of Miners (WFM) 
were westerners and miners, wholly familiar with rifles and shotguns, 
professional experts in the use of dynamite. And when in 1892 the 
owners of the lead and silver mines around Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, 
locked them out after losing a strike, a small war broke out. Pinkerton 
guards killed a union man in July, the miners killed a Pinkerton, and at 
the cost of five more deaths blew up a refining mill, took two captives, 
and at gunpoint drove strikebreakers and guards out of the town. The 
state militia could not cope, court injunctions were ignored, and the 
governor called in the U.S. Army. 
Ever since its 1877 withdrawal from the South, the army had been 
involved in labor disputes, usually helping to break strikes; with the 
end of the Indian Wars that became its main domestic duty. And in 
Idaho the Coeur d'Alene area was simply turned in effect into a military 
district, rebellious miners herded into outdoor bullpens and deported 
without trial. 
From that date well into the twentieth century, elements of the same 
scenario were replayed continually throughout the mountains: armed 
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confrontations and shootings, sometimes involving several hundred 
men on both sides, the militia, occasionally the army, martial law, bull­
pens, and deportations. The justice systems in mining country, where 
the sole employers also owned everything from the boardinghouses to 
the grocery stores, were wholly distrusted—usually by the unions, 
sometimes by the owners. And in between the bigger strikes, murder 
and intimidation were part of the contest, dynamite blasts and shotgun 
ambushes sometimes monthly occurrences. 
The Western Federation of Miners was the biggest single union to 
endorse the founding of the American Socialist party, in 1901, but 
peaceful reform within the political system was not enough for mili­
tants like Big Bill Haywood, the charismatic leader of the union. A year 
after failure in the Colorado Labor War of 1903-04, Haywood led his 
men into a wholly new kind of labor organization, the Industrial Work­
ers of the World, or IWW, nicknamed the Wobblies. A full generation 
after the great Railroad Strike of 1877, nearly twenty years after Hay-
market, the worst fears of much of middle-class America were realized. 
In powerful contrast to all older unions, and to the Socialist party, the 
new union in June 1905 declared its belief in revolution, renouncing 
politics in favor of direct action, including sabotage. Six months later 
there was apparent confirmation of what that might mean. On Decem­
ber 30, 1905, former governor Frank Steunenberg of Idaho, an old 
enemy of the Wobblies, opened the gate to his home in Caldwell and 
was blown to pieces by a bomb tied to a fish line. 
The state of Idaho next day put up $ 15,000 in reward money, a sum 
that drew the immediate attention of the head of the Denver office of 
the Pinkerton Agency—the aging James McParlan, once the scourge of 
the Mollie Maguires. A shady sometime bodyguard of a high WPM 
official, a man then operating under the name "Harry Orchard," was 
quickly arrested; McParlan arranged to have him put in solitary con­
finement, with himself as sole visitor and confidant. The old detective 
proved a psychological master, flattering, threatening, and filling his 
subject s dim but suggestible brain with stories of his own glory days 
back East, and with visions of going free at once if he turned state's 
evidence. Orchard soon broke down and dictated a wild confession in 
which he not only admitted to scores of murders but painted a picture 
of the Wobblies that remarkably resembled the Mollies, with an inner 
circle covertly gathering to plot some twenty-six assassinations. Idaho 
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officials then attempted to extradite Big Bill Haywood and two other 
WFM officers out of Colorado; failing that, they simply kidnapped 
them illegally and put them on trial for conspiracy to murder Frank 
Steunenberg. 
No other issue had ever aroused American radicals like this one. Still 
comparatively weak but growing in numbers, socialists and Wobblies 
mounted huge demonstrations across the United States, singing the 
Marseillaise, talking national strike, even revolution, if the three should 
be convicted. The trial opened on May 9, 1907, as a powerful symbolic 
contest. Haywood was a colorful proletarian defendant, an ex-cowboy 
and homesteader who had lost one eye in a mining accident. The prose­
cution was led by young Idaho Senator William Borah, the opposition 
by a law partner of Colorado Senator Tom Patterson, together with 
Clarence Darrow, the most famous defense lawyer in the country. Bo­
rah established that Haywood knew that Harry Orchard had done the 
deed, but he had no other evidence besides the bomber's own baroque 
confession. Darrow ripped that document, and James McParlan, to 
pieces, and in final summations he had no oratorical peer. The judge, 
swayed neither by President Teddy Roosevelt's pretrial denunciation 
of Haywood nor by New York parades in his favor, instructed a jury 
mostly of Idaho farmers that Haywood was simply not guilty as 
charged. The other two defendants were later freed as well, while Harry 
Orchard, shortly sentenced to hang, had his sentence commuted to life. 
But Haywood and the IWW would not stop scaring middle-class 
Americans. Besides miners, his Wobblies appealed on the ground 
mostly to western itinerants, often immigrants, lumberjacks, fishermen, 
and migrant agricultural workers, and on paper to radicals of every 
kind. His union organizers were hard to tell from railroad tramps; ro­
mantic figures, experts at propaganda, song singers and orators, they 
went where the trouble was and tried to make something out of it, 
organizing men whom no other union would or could help in any way. 
Given their numbers, a few union men, inevitably, were criminals; a 
few more, violent fanatics. On October 1, 1910, after months of street 
fighting in Los Angeles, John and James McNamara of the Iron Work­
ers blew up the rabidly antiunion Los Angeles Times building; the ex­
plosion, which went off at 1:07 A.M., killed twenty people, all of them 
cleaning women and others working late, none of them bosses or edi­
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torialists. Even Clarence Darrow could not free the brothers, who con­
fessed in midtrial. But the most famous Wobblie martyr was Joe Hill, a 
genuinely girted songwriter, who was convicted of the robbery murder 
of a Salt Lake City grocer in 1914. The jury did not buy his classic 
alibi—that he'd spent the night with a married woman he gallantly 
refused to name—and under Utah law he was shot by a five-man fir­
ing squad on November 19, 1915; his last shouted words were "Don't 
mourn for me, boys—Organize!" 
But however murderous a few of their number, members of the 
IWW were far more often victims than perpetrators of violence—shot 
by company guards, hounded by sheriffs, sometimes lynched by ill-
organized and panicky "vigilantes." More than the occasional picket 
line fatalities back East, involving blacks or Hungarians against Irish 
workers, killings involving the Wobblies represented direct confronta­
tion between labor and capital, reminding Americans everywhere that 
murder was one of the weapons in both arsenals and keeping alive the 
illusory specter of Red Radical Revolution in the United States. 
But the great irony of the period following the Civil War was that while 
the conflict between labor and capital was often murderous, and created 
fears even wider than those of slave insurrection before the war, the 
dominant tendency of the contemporary urban industrial revolution in 
most of the country was to push homicide rates down, well down from 
their antebellum peak. 
What happened after the war was in some ways what reformers had 
worked toward before it. The abolition of slavery was obviously impor­
tant; wage labor, whatever conflicts it generated, did not rest on the 
continual use of physical force. But some of the other antebellum re­
forms also took hold, even in areas where slavery had not reached di­
rectly. The ones that worked best were those directed at creating a more 
orderly society—among other things, a less murderous society—rather 
than those romantic reforms that attempted to change hearts and souls 
more profoundly. 
Attempts to abolish capital punishment, to make penitentiaries truly 
reform their inmates, to abolish prostitution—none of these died, but 
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none was fully relevant to the demands of the new industrial order, and 
none flourished as they had earlier. In contrast, the police, the temper­
ance movement, the public schools—the items on the reform agenda 
designed to discipline the population—were successful as never before. 
And underlying all of them were the direct demands of the new kind 
of work itself, which helped create a whole new social psychology. And 
as the urban industrial revolution finally took off in the United States, 
the most dramatic single index of this change in mass social psychology 
was a substantial drop in the homicide rate—a phenomenon noted all 
over the developed world—together with a rise in suicide. 
One striking difference between the antebellum and postbellum years 
was that big urban police departments decisively won the battle for the 
streets. Some elements of the move toward a more effective force were 
already in place before the Civil War ended. New York had uniformed 
its reluctant cops as early as 1853, Philadelphia in 1860, Chicago in 
1863. Telegraphic communication between big city stations was gen­
erally established by the 1850s. The effect of the Draft Riots was to kill 
any reluctance to provide the men with revolvers, and the outcome of 
the war helped establish a stable two-party system, from the local level 
on up, and provide the authorities with the continuity and confidence 
to use the force decisively. 
The volatile combination of street gangs, volunteer fire companies, 
and racial /ethnic tensions did not disappear immediately, and riot did 
not recede without a fight. At the same time, as noted, the conflict 
between labor and capital often heated up dramatically. But as city de­
partments put a heavy emphasis on battle-readiness and drill, only the 
great Railroad Strike of 1877 proved, in general, too much for them to 
handle on their own. Sometimes the reluctance of local cops to step in 
against strikers made it necessary to call in the militia, and during a few 
race riots, mostly in the South, they stood by without seriously inter­
vening. But otherwise the most famous urban "riots" of the late nine­
teenth and early twentieth century were simply occasions when, as at 
Haymarket Square, the cops or the military attacked badly outgunned 
and often peaceful demonstrators. 
With every passing decade the police advantage grew. As late as 
1870, in Philadelphia, a raid on a downtown gambling house had been 
successfully thrown back by small arms fire; just ten years later that 
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would be unthinkable. Call boxes, signal systems, then telephones 
and paddy wagons that could deliver ten orfifteen beefy men to the site 
of a disturbance, and, by the second decade of the twentieth century, 
automobiles—all made it easier, whenever the will was there, to put 
down most riotous occasions before they got out of hand and truly 
murderous. 
The job was eased still further by a host of changes in the nature of 
big city life. The level of violence among arriving immigrants was de­
termined both by their earlier history—that is, the culture they brought 
with them, especially their attitudes toward drinking, fighting, and so­
cial authority—and by the state of the cities they settled into. No ethnic 
group in the later nineteenth or early twentieth century, neither the 
Jewsfleeing pogroms nor the Italians devastated by cholera, was as des­
perate as the midcentury Irish, or as collectively pugnacious. The grow­
ing urban industrial economy and a variety of support systems made it 
easier to absorb newcomers. The outcome of the Civil War, too, helped 
cool racial violence. African Americans, no longer in the eye of the 
storm, now had the vote, some political protection, a few jobs on the 
police force. Equally important, the once easy sport of "hunting the 
nigs" got more dangerous as black communities got bigger and better 
able to fight back. 
Young men still joined street gangs, and the bachelor subculture did 
not wholly die out. The line between horsing around with the guys and 
deadly combat was still thin. Owen Wister, in another context, caught 
it right: "When you call me that, smile." But there were now alterna­
tives to fighting as a form of entertainment; ethnic ball clubs and prize 
fights among African-American, Irish, and Jewish gladiators helped 
sublimate aggression short of homicide. By the 1890s, in an important 
move, boxing matches were fought with gloves on. Bicycle expeditions 
to amusement parks, later cheap movies, provided truly harmless things 
to do, and organized rackets and political street work were less mind­
lessly violent than random riot. 
But the drop in homicide rates that began during the late nineteenth 
century is far too widespread to be explained in terms of cutting down 
on riot deaths in American cities. Everywhere it has been studied in the 
developed world, from Stockholm, Sweden, south to Sydney, Australia, 
from London across the Atlantic to New York and Philadelphia, then 
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on west to Oakland, the rates of all violent crime, however measured, 
were declining at the same time. A phenomenon that broad is best ex­
plained in terms of the most fundamental economic and social change 
in the period: the urban industrial revolution itself. 
Before the Civil War, the efforts of reformers and businessmen to 
create a more orderly workforce, as described in chapter 4, had been 
swamped by the invasion of disorderly Irish immigrants. But the Irish 
were, or remained, disorderly mostly because of chronic underemploy­
ment: during the 1840s and 1850s there was simply too little unskilled 
or semiskilled work to do in cities. It was in the decades after the war, 
the most economically expansive in our history, that the urban indus­
trial revolution really took off. This was the era that created the physical 
city that still exists: high-rise buildings, libraries, ball parks, and mu­
seums, all of them enabled by the great manufactories, then new, now 
all but gone. And at the same time as this upsurge in blue-collar op­
portunities, the invention of the typewriter, the telephone, and the de­
partment store, together with expanding local government, created an 
explosion in white-collar office jobs as well. The common denominator 
in all this work was regular, predictable, cooperative behavior, the same 
kind that made the trains and trolleys run, and kept great crowds of 
tens or even hundreds of thousands of people moving peacefully to and 
from work, every day, at the same hours. 
Increasing sobriety was essential to the change. Despite much hypoc­
risy and corruption, liquor control was the biggest single item on the 
police agenda. Cops arrested drunks in staggering numbers, and were 
charged by lawmakers with limiting the days, hours, and number of 
places where liquor might be sold, sometimes to hold off the more ex­
treme reformers, led most famously by the Women's Christian Temper­
ance Union, who legally dried up whole towns, counties, and states. 
Saloon keepers cooperated with cops by throwing out unruly custom­
ers, cooling off potential trouble. By the time of World War I, across 
the nation, the average yearly alcohol intake had dropped substantially, 
and the federal government was on the eve of prohibiting the sale of 
liquor altogether. 
Education, with its stress on schoolroom discipline, was almost 
equally important. While public schools had been established in much 
of the country during the 1850s, attendance had not usually been re­
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quired by law. But between 1870 and 1900 the average yearly number 
of school days per pupil jumped from seventy-eight to ninety-nine, the 
average number of eligible children attending from 57 to 72 percent. 
In the context of controlling violence, as important as the three Rs was 
the continued stress on learning how to do repetitive tasks, cope with 
boredom and frustration, and curb impulsive behavior and aggression. 
Factory and office, finally, reinforced and rewarded this learned be­
havior and (relative) sobriety. And a measure of the successful change 
in mass social psychology is provided by the statistics of homicide in 
Philadelphia, then the city with the broadest industrial base in the 
United States. Between 1839 and 1859, measured by indictments for 
homicide as described in chapter 4, the city's murder rate stood at 3.6 
per 100,000 annually. That number dropped between 1860 and 1880 
to 3.2, and between 1881 and 1901 to just 2.5, the same downward 
trend observed in much of the developed world. 
But while these homicidefigures help describe what was happening, 
and when, they do not explain why. Two additional sets of clues help 
provide a psychological explanation for what was happening in the in­
dustrial city: the statistics for the other kinds of violent death, suicide 
and accident. 
On the one hand, while the urban industrial revolution created 
wholly new ways of dying—through electric shock, or falling down 
elevator shafts—in Philadelphia the rate of old-fashioned or "simple" 
accidents such as drowning fell dramatically. During 1869-71 the age-
standardized rate of drowning was 18.5 per 100,000 a year; by 1899­
1901 it had fallen to 8.0. And while the statistics of suicide are no­
toriously unreliable, as friends and family sometimes cover up what is 
thought a shameful death, the opposite movement here is even less mis­
takable. The suicidefigures, standardized to account for a slightly aging 
population, more than doubled between the 5.8 per 100,000 officially 
recorded in 1868-72 and the 12.2 in 1899-1901. 
How to account for these three strong trends in violent death? Social 
scientists have long noticed that homicide rates are often high in groups 
whose suicide rates are low, that moving from the bottom toward the 
top of the scale of income and education the homicide rate falls as sui­
cide rises. An even sharper focus is offered by the suicide-murder ratio, 
or SMR, the result of dividing the suicide rate by the sum of both rates. 
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The SMR, invented by the psychologist Martin Gold, is based on 
the concept that both kinds of death are expressions of extreme frus­
tration, manifested as aggression. Homicide is the result of aggression 
directed outward, at others; suicide results from aggression directed in­
ward, at the self. Another way of putting it is that homicide is charac­
teristic of people of "honor," suicide of people of "dignity." A low ratio, 
as among low-income groups, indicates a tendency toward outward ag­
gression; a higher number, as among the educated middle class, indi­
cates a tendency toward inward aggression, and the equation as a whole 
shows that both rates tend to be higher among groups, such as males, 
with a stronger tendency toward aggression in either form. The figures 
for accident, in this model, tend simply to reinforce those for homicide, 
the accident prone being remarkably similar to the homicidal in their 
tendency to alcoholic, reckless behavior, to the quick acceptance of 
physical challenges along the riverbank or on the street. 
Put in motion, over time, the SMR explains exactly what was hap­
pening to the whole of the urban industrial population, indeed the 
whole of the United States after the Civil War. Even more important 
than income, among men, was the nature of occupation and education. 
American suicide rates, in the late nineteenth century, were lowest 
among people who did the older kinds of work: merchants and traders 
as well as farmers and teamsters. The rates were higher among those 
whose work demanded formal education, close supervision, or both: 
modest mill workers and clerks as well as higher-status doctors and law­
yers. And in Philadelphia as a whole, over time, as the population grew 
less free-swinging and more sober, regimented, and introspective, sui­
cide rose as murder fell. 
The connection between this change and the nature of work is best 
illustrated by the different histories of three different ethnic groups. 
The city's Irish, once infamous for their violence, over the late nine­
teenth century went to parochial school, got their knuckles rapped 
when they got rambunctious, and graduated into jobs in factories, of­
fices, and most famously the civil service, where they again learned to 
stand in line, keep out of trouble, do the job, and wait for promotion. 
And as they stopped spitting into each others drinks and settling dis­
putes with fists, feet, and bricks—earlier in the century bricks had been 
known in some quarters as "Irish confetti," sprinkled freely about on 
festive occasions—their murder rates dropped. Once the highest of any 
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major group in Philadelphia, toward century's end the rate among those 
of Irish surnames fell to 1.8 per 100,000, or well below the citywide 
average. 
The direction among African Americans was tragically different. No 
group in the city, or indeed the nation, made greater strides in educa­
tion, as the postwar promise of freedom and legal citizenship made 
schooling the apparent key to opportunity. In Philadelphia, between 
the 1850s and the 1890s, the black literacy rate soared from about 20 
percent to over 80 percent; even in the South, by century's end, the 
majority at least of young adults could write their names andfigure. No 
period in African-American history witnessed more cultural achieve­
ment, as colleges, newspapers, and churches multiplied and knit com­
munities together in mutual support. 
Across the whole of the country the number of the highly educated, 
doctors first, many of them women, and then lawyers, grew at an aston­
ishing pace. But in terms of economic gain, all of that learning, for 
most, went heartbreakingly for nothing. Few African Americans could 
afford to hire the professionals who had sacrificed so hard for their de­
grees, and fewer whites wanted to. And as a result, after reaching a peak 
in 1910, the proportion of doctors and lawyers in the black population 
plummeted and did not recover for three generations. There was simply 
no basis of economic support below the professional level. In an age of 
truly implacable "scientific" racism, the most qualified of school gradu­
ates were unable to ring their dark faces with white collars, to join the 
new urban army of clerks, typists, and salespeople. Unions and employ­
ers combined to keep blacks out of the new factory work, too, for which 
they were fully qualified, and many were driven out of the older kinds 
of blue-collar skilled work as carpenters, masons, and plumbers, jobs 
that they had long held in many cities. They were not only denied a 
chance to grab at the fabled American "ladder of opportunity" but in 
many cases actually kicked off. 
The effect of denial and despair, of being confined to medieval jobs 
in a modern world, was ominous. Many of the most ambitious were 
driven into dangerous careers in bootlegging, gambling, and prostitu­
tion, where business disputes had to be settled physically, without tak­
ing them to the courts. African Americans living in high crime areas, 
still fearful of whites, carried guns, once rare in their communities, 
more often than whites. And in Philadelphia, inevitably, their rate of 
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indictment for murder, in the antebellum years only moderately high 
and lower than the Irish, rose raggedly just as the Irish sank, and it had 
reached 11.4 per 100,000 by the 1890s. 
By that time, however, these rates were exceeded by those of a third 
group, those born in Italy, whose story further underlines the point. 
Philadelphia's "murder rates" for the early twentieth century are for 
technical reasons measured not by indictments, as above and in chap­
ter 4, but by the comparatively lower rate of actual convictions, sen­
tences to death or the penitentiary. Between 1901 and 1907, this rate 
among non-Italian whites was just 1.3 per 100,000 annually; and 
among blacks, 12.9. But the Italians, arriving often as single men, came 
from the nation with the highest homicide rate in Europe; their dis­
positions not improved by the ocean voyage, their arsenals upgraded 
by the American gun culture, as newcomers they killed each other 
and occasional bystanders often enough to reach the truly astonishing 
homicide conviction rate of 26.5 per 100,000. 
But unlike the blacks, the Italians were admitted into factory work, 
won some security, settled down into lives with legitimate economic 
futures for themselves and their families. And while the African-
American conviction rate stayed high, the Italian rate went down, and 
by 1908-15 had fallen to about the black level, at 11.4 per 100,000 
and dropping fast. 
For the whole of the first two decades of the twentieth century, 
meanwhile, as evidence of the power of the urban industrial revolution 
to change murderous behavior, the rates among non-Italian whites con­
tinued to fall, as they had for decades, reaching 0.7 in 1915-21 . 
Throughout most of the period after the Civil War, the nature of homi­
cide in Philadelphia remained much the same as before it, with some 
changes in names and ethnicity. The stories behind all indictments 
through 1901 and a sampling of indictments plus arrest reports in the 
years 1902, 1908, and 1914 tell us that men and women were still 
being killed over cards, words, and dirty looks. The great majority of 
the killers, as before, were not clearly found in the city directories: 
young men mostly, with few skills, often transients or new arrivals to 
the urban industrial city, with only an occasional member of the middle 
or upper middle classes. 
One form of homicide, however, did typically involve people of re­
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spectable status—that is, murder-suicide, as would be suggested by the 
concept of the SMR. These killers, not as young as most, were usually 
married, often white-collar workers, skilled craftsmen, even profession­
als. And while not available for either arrest or indictment through the 
justice system, beginning in 1914 they were listed and described in 
incident reports filed by the Philadelphia police. There were seven cases 
that year, a significant fraction of the sixty-seven of all kinds; all but 
one of them involved passionate love, jealousy, or domestic despair, as 
when, just before killing themselves, forty-two-year-old Wesley Whar­
ton shot thirty-eight-year-old Agnes Welch for refusing to live with 
him, or thirty-five-year-old Alexander Glaser, going blind, shot his 
sleeping wife. 
Otherwise, the proportion of incidents occurring in the home after 
the Civil War stayed nearly the same as before it, at about 25 percent, 
and so did those occurring in the street or saloon, which moved from a 
little under to a little over 50 percent. Rational motivation of any sort 
remained rare; in the three twentieth-century years sampled, although 
the accounts are murky in many cases, just 2 among 174 incidents of 
murder and manslaughter clearly involved robbery or intent to rob. In 
fact robbery at gunpoint was so rare in the urban East that when there 
was a holdup in a Bronx saloon, in November 1895, the story was 
headline news in Philadelphia and ran for a week; the New York cops 
could figure only that it must have been done by troupers from Buffalo 
Bill's Wild West Show, then playing the town. 
Statistically the most significant increase over the years was in the use 
of firearms; after holding flat for most of the nineteenth century at 
about 25 percent, the proportion of gun deaths in the early twentieth 
century leaped up over 40 percent. The jump is the clear result of a 
population shift, the upsurge of immigration, and especially of murder 
indictments among African Americans and Italians, two groups more 
likely than others to carry lethal weapons. 
By then a third race was established in the city; a small "Chinatown" 
had evolved in the 1890s, composed mostly of fugitives from violence 
and intolerance out West. The newcomers brought their institutions 
with them, on a small scale, and the peace of Race Street, as in San 
Francisco, was occasionally disturbed by tong rivalries and pistol fire. 
The rare crime brought to the justice system posed serious fair trial 
problems, with the official interpreter in at least one case a member of 
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a tong hostile to the accused. And it was a "tong war" that led to the 
proceedings against Jung Jow and Mock Kung, two young men who 
were hanged in March 1908 for shooting a rival leader, on orders, they 
insisted, of the dominant Hip Sing. 
Infanticide remained the same dreary problem throughout the nine­
teenth century, but during the early twentieth century indictments all 
but dried up, the apparent result of two changes that greatly eased the 
situation of single mothers. The more important was the invention of 
pasteurized cow's milk, which made it far easier for desperate young 
women to leave infants at the poorhouse or foundling home with some 
real hope that they might survive. The other was the growing prac-
tice—although still not routine, especially for poorer women—of giv­
ing birth in hospitals, with care available and witnesses about. 
The fact that murder and other crimes were clearly more common 
among the poor had, in the era of antebellum reform, suggested that 
the causes might be environmental, that crime was the result of depri­
vation, the lack of decent family life, bad education, desperation. But 
since then there had been a dramatic change in the prevailing intellec­
tual climate, the result in part of the growing prestige of the sciences, 
above all biology, as the result of the widespread intellectual acceptance 
of the Darwinian theory of evolution. And by the late nineteenth cen­
tury the dominant idea was no longer that criminals were basically souls 
like the rest of humanity, who might ideally be reformed, but that they 
were truly different, mentally and even physically inferior to other 
people, and looked it. 
The change was the work specifically of Cesare Lombroso, an Italian 
psychiatrist, who published a book in 1876 that claimed, on the basis 
of skull measurements taken in prisons and insane asylums, that mur­
derers were brutish types, with low foreheads, beetling brows, and small 
brains. These and other criminal types were "atavisms," he argued, 
throwbacks to an earlier stage of human evolution. This was an idea 
taken from the pseudoscience of Social Darwinism, which had flour­
ished even before Charles Darwin's 1871 publication of the Descent of 
Man, and (with no support from Darwin himself) attempted to range 
people, indeed whole races, along an imagined scale from "low" to 
"high." In the United States, the sociologist Robert Dugdale in 1877 
published The Jukes, a highly influential study of a clan of upstate New 
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Yorkers full of crazies and evildoers of many kinds. Despite his often 
inaccurate genealogies and vague definitions, Dugdale, like Lombroso, 
helped to underline the idea that crime, perhaps especially homicide, is 
primitive, inherited behavior and, at the extreme, that killers and other 
lawbreakers are a kind of distinctive subspecies. 
But however popular in intellectual circles, the idea that murder­
ers are obviously "primitive" did not fit the vicarious experience most 
Americans got through their newspapers. Much of the appeal of Jesse 
James was his romantic good looks, and while homicide was statistically 
most common among the poor and desperate, it was not the routine 
street fights but murder among the respectable, ideally the rich and 
famous, that got the ink and the attention. The most notorious cases of 
the day involved schoolteachers, ministers, or congressmen, colorful in­
cidents like the shooting of Wall Street speculator Jim Fisk by another 
one, Ned Stokes, in 1872, or in 1906 the death of the leading architect 
Stanford White at the hands of Harry K. Thaw, a jealous husband and 
young heir to millions. And while few in Philadelphia got national at­
tention, among its many hundreds of killings there were a sprinkling 
involving professionals and other members of the middle class such as 
Dr. Albert Goerson, hanged in 1885 for poisoning his wife and daugh­
ter. And then, beginning in 1895, the case of thirty-four-year-old Her­
man Webster Mudgett more than compensated for any earlier lack of 
local notoriety. 
From the perspective of our own day, one of the most striking things 
about analyzing the long string of homicide indictments in the City of 
Brotherly Love is the near-absence of rape or sex killings among them: 
just one child murderer in the 1870s, another, homosexual, in the 
1890s. Throughout the nineteenth century murders of this type were 
rarely prosecuted, in pan because sex killers, however crazy, were more 
likely than most others to act secretively and escape the undeveloped 
system of criminal detection of the day, and in part, it seems, because 
there were simply not as many of them as there are now. And during 
the century's final decade, neither Philadelphia nor the nation was ready 
for cases like that of Mudgett, or Dr. H. H. Holmes, who long held a 
unique place in the annals of American crime. 
Mudgett s bizarre and almost incredibly complex story began to come 
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to light when he was arrested in Boston on November 16, 1895, and 
transported to Philadelphia for arraignment in an elaborate murder-for-
insurance scheme. It was in Chicago, the previous year, as Dr. H. H. 
Holmes, that he had persuaded one Benjamin Pitezel and his very re­
luctant wife, Carrie, to go along with a plan to insure Pitezel s life for 
$10,000 and then fake his death, substituting a stolen corpse. It was 
with this in mind that Mudgett set up Pitezel in business in Phila­
delphia as "B. F. Perry," and then—skipping the part about another 
body—caught him in a drunken stupor, chloroformed him, and set up 
a small fake explosion that obliterated some of his features. 
Over the next several months, simultaneously trying to conceal her 
husband's death from Carrie and diddle her out of her share of the 
scheme, Mudgett in effect kidnapped three of the Pitezel children, took 
them traveling over much of the Northeast, strangled and buried little 
Howard outside Cincinnati, then gassed Alice and Nellie in Toronto. 
But the scheme was revealed by one Marion Hedgepath, a train robber 
with whom Mudgett (at the time posing as "H. M. Howard") had been 
jailed for an unrelated swindle in St. Louis. Mudgett had promised the 
bandit a share of the Pitezel insurance money if he would help find 
a cooperative lawyer. Hedgepath did supply a name, heard about the 
$10,000, and when he got no cut wrote directly to the Fidelity Mutual 
Company. 
Once Mudgett was in custody and Pinkertons and others hired by 
Fidelity began to trace his path across several states, it was found that 
he was married to three women, was wanted in Texas for horse theft, 
and had lived for several years in Chicago. It was there, as Dr. Holmes, 
that he ran a drugstore and with various legal and illegal funds built 
a huge and curious many-chambered "castle" full of trapdoors and 
chutes, leading to a giant incinerator. Up through his trial, in late Oc­
tober, he continued to assert innocence of murder but admitted to 
fraud, to having planted an already dead body in Pitezel's place, freely 
volunteering that as a former medical student, with much knowledge 
and curiosity about human anatomy, he had often trafficked in corpses 
for purposes both of dissection and deception. Toward the end he 
changed the story to read that Pitezel had committed suicide. And 
once convicted, in the months before his hanging in May 1896, he 
opened up another line entirely, giving out several "confessions" to 
a fascinated reading public, in the last of which he boasted of some 
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twenty-seven murders all told, mostly by asphyxiation, strangulation, 
and chloroform. 
A handsome man of thirty-four, his brown beard barbered as neatly 
as his fashionable clothes were tailored, Mudgett was as full of lies as of 
charm: some of his alleged victims turned out to be still alive. But the 
old "castle" back in Chicago, examined shortly before it was destroyed 
in flames, did in fact yield burned traces of human remains, and sev­
eral people closely associated with him, many of them young women, 
boarders and mistresses, had in fact disappeared mysteriously. He ad­
mitted at one point to raping young Alice Pitezel, then fifteen, before 
her death, and there were at least hints of necrophilia in the accounts of 
some killings. 
Mudgett s criminal career coincided closely with that of London's 
"Jack the Ripper"; the papers, having exhausted "fiend" and "monster," 
invented the word "multi-murderer" to describe him. The term "serial 
killer" would not be coined until late in the twentieth century; by what­
ever name, he appears to be America's first. 
Philadelphia's justice system evolved slowly over the years. The clearest 
trend was the declining role of the trial jury, a change noted all over the 
United States. Criminal and especially homicide trials in the colonial 
era had been dominated by magistrates, often part-time amateurs; the 
early Republic had for ideological reasons stressed the role of citizen-
jurors. But in an age when the legal profession above all valued order 
and efficiency, jurors were the unpredictable wild cards in the system. 
As always before, the twelve men in the box often undermined careful 
precedents and black letter law by in effect finding excuses to punish 
folks they thought had earned it and to free those who had not on 
the basis not of the evidence but of their own moral judgment. A 
favorite out, whatever the law might say about the M'Naghten rule, for 
example, was "temporary insanity" as a means of exonerating attractive 
women who had killed faithless lovers, or abandoned servant girls who 
had strangled newborns. And elite reformers were notably worried about 
the intelligence and impartiality of immigrant juries, especially in cities. 
But to counter these unruly amateurs, the nineteenth century wit­
nessed the rise of the professional public prosecutor. In many states and 
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jurisdictions it was still the coroner who played the key role in homicide 
investigation, such as it was. That role often pushed out of the realm of 
simple fact, or cause of death, into the realm of law, or legal responsi­
bility for death. Drawing on common law distinctions, a coroners jury 
might find not only that a given case was an "excusable" homicide— 
that is, an accident, with no legal liability involved—but "justifiable" 
as well. This last category stretched from the clearest case—legal exe-
cution—to others not always so clear, in the absence of surviving wit­
nesses, as when a policeman shot down a criminal while defending his 
own life (the only case in which such a homicide was generally "justi­
fied") or a home owner in mortal fear killed an armed invader. This 
kind of decision short-circuited the whole indictment /trial process en­
tirely and was one of the reasons why district attorneys, as in New York, 
now took charge of cases from the beginning. 
But prosecutors had their own ways of getting past juries. This was 
the period when for the first time many cases were disposed of through 
plea bargaining among defendants, their lawyers, and the district attor­
ney. The issue was not overcrowded dockets, the pressures of too many 
cases, but simply uncertainty on both sides about what a jury might do. 
Guilty pleas, once rare, were now routinely exchanged for shorter sen­
tences. Accused killers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen­
tury were often indicted for more than one count of homicide, both 
murder and manslaughter, allowing not only juries to decide at the end 
of trial but defendants to choose before or even during it. In first-degree 
cases in the city of Philadelphia only 7 such pleas, still, were recorded 
in the twenty years between 1860 and 1880, but the number then shot 
up to 149 between 1881 and 1901. During the 1890s more cases were 
pleaded than went to trial; and although the proportion dropped early 
in the next century, it still remained high, at nearly 40 percent. 
One clue to an increasing professional efficiency in the prosecutor's 
office, and his ability to dominate grand juries, was that fewer and fewer 
indictments were for any reasons dropped before trial. Back in the pe­
riod 1839-45, fully 28 of 96 men and women indicted for homicide 
were never brought to the dock; by 1895-1901, only 9 of 215. And at 
the same time, from the 1870s on, district attorneys exercised their 
authority in another way, bringing in charges of voluntary manslaughter 
for incidents involving clearly accidental deaths. 
What this change reflects is an increasing if left-handed stress on the 
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importance of life, an insistence that homicide of any kind is intoler­
able, that any killing must be weighed and judged through the full of­
ficial mechanisms. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, 
incidents that would never in earlier times have gotten past a coroner s 
inquest were brought further into the justice system, deaths from ex­
ploding boilers or firecrackers, "no-fault" traffic accidents—a trend 
that underscores the fact that more serious voluntary homicides were 
actually in decline. 
The urban industrial city's insistence on peaceful behavior, its lower 
threshold of tolerance for violence, is reflected also in the tendency of 
jurors to favor the prosecution. However gradual, the shift was striking: 
while only a little over one-third of murder indictments had resulted in 
convictions of any kind before the Civil War, the proportion reached 
nearly two-thirds during the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen­
tury. Consistent, too, with the growing condemnation of killing of any 
kind, Philadelphia's justice system was ever more reluctant, in most 
cases, to invoke the death penalty. 
The city's prosecutors still headed the list of indictments in most 
cases with murder in the first degree, and jurors agreed in a few— 
twelve in the three sampled twentieth-century years. But eight of those 
convicted were spared in the end, less through the judicial process of 
appeal than through the essentially political process of commutation by 
the governor. 
Just one of the twelvefirst-degree convicts, Harry Shappello, won an 
appeal. On retrial his 1914 sentence for shooting his wife was reduced 
to second-degree murder. But Philadelphia's homicide trials, conducted 
in the regular quarterly county courts, were not often appealed success­
fully to the supreme court of Pennsylvania, and never beyond that to 
the U.S. Supreme Court. Across the country in general the grounds for 
appeal, although loosening somewhat, were still extremely stiff by the 
standards of the late twentieth century. The Bill of Rights was not then 
generally held to apply to the states, which interpreted their own crimi­
nal codes as they chose and often allowed, for example, evidence found 
in searches without warrants. 
The most careful study of the criminal appeals process for the period 
is of Oakland, California, between 1870 and 1910, and there, too, 
criminal appeals were rare and successful ones rarer still. While any 
death sentence called for an automatic appeal in California, as in a few 
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progressive states (Pennsylvania was not one of them), only two of seven 
sentenced to hang escaped the noose. And in noncapital cases appeals 
were expensive, the grounds thin and stiff, most convicts poor and 
without influence; only 4 percent of all murder convictions were ap­
pealed on any ground, with the same general lack of success. From coast 
to coast the county criminal courts were for all purposes laws unto 
themselves, with higher courts far away and the federal system virtually 
nonexistent. 
Philadelphia's Judge Robert Ralston in 1911 published an indignant 
book entitled The Delay in the Execution of Murderers, outlining what 
he believed was a process entirely too cumbersome and lengthy. In the 
city, since only one judge served on a first-degree case, an immediate 
appeal might be made after the verdict to a panel of three other county 
judges, on the grounds that the decision was against the weight of the 
evidence. Appeal to the state supreme court could be made only after 
sentence had been passed. After the high court affirmed a conviction 
the matter then went to the governor, whose decision as to whether or 
not to commute or pardon was reviewed with the help of a board of 
pardons, consisting of the lieutenant governor, attorney general, secre­
tary of the commonwealth, and secretary of labor, or any three of them. 
The next to last step was the governor's signing of the death warrant. 
Then, given a decent interval for the condemned to reflect and perhaps 
repent, the hangman took over for the last one. 
Despite Ralston's impatience, the process was reasonably brisk, given 
the several steps involved. Of the 66 first-degree verdicts declared in 
Pennsylvania between 1896 and 1902, the modal time between calling 
a jury and execution was between 10 and 11 months, with only 18 
stretching a year or more, the longest just 2 years. The modal first-
degree jury trial, including the selection of the panel, took just 2 days, 
with the longest lasting only 17, and a handful 10 or 12. Appeals to the 
three-judge review panel were in fact "almost invariable," at least in 
Philadelphia, and 41, or nearly two-thirds, were appealed to the state 
supreme court. But there were only two second trials granted, one by a 
Philadelphia three-judge panel, one by the supreme court on the 
grounds that inadmissable evidence of a prior conviction had been al­
lowed. And there were only two other reversals (involving a single case, 
with two defendants), on the grounds that detectives had not shown 
that a confession was properly obtained. In one other case the highest 
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court ruled that a condemned man, on the record, had not been asked 
to say anything before sentence of death was pronounced upon him: 
Jonas Preston Jr., of Chester County, was then allowed a two-month 
respite, given his say, and lawfully hanged on May 20, 1899. 
The political process, as represented by the board of pardons, was a 
better bet to save men from execution than the process of legal appeal. 
After reviewing supporting letters and petitions, the governor and his 
allies commuted thirteen death sentences to life in prison, about a fifth 
of all cases. But even more political, and far more merciful, were the 
trial juries who, reflecting the sense of the community, convicted so 
rarely offirst-degree murder in the first place. 
Pennsylvania's general reluctance to take life was fully in tune with na­
tional trends, as the antebellum movement to make death discretionary, 
even in first-degree murder cases, reached more than half the states. 
While real prison reform was mostly stalled, around the turn of the 
century the optimism of the Progressive Era helped revive the long dor­
mant movement to abolish capital punishment, and Arizona, Oregon, 
Washington, Kansas, and the Dakotas all joined in during the first two 
decades of the new century. Meanwhile actual judicial executions had 
in fact been declining raggedly across all of the United States since its 
founding, the most spectacular drop occurring just as the nation 
emerged from the colonial period—when in some years it had occa­
sionally reached 35 per 100,000 (counting slaves)—down to between 
3 and 4 per 100,000. By 1900 it had fallen well below 2, the figures 
swollen by hangings in the South and West, far lower in the industrial 
North and East. In the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania itself the great 
urban industrial cities of Pittsburgh and Philadelphia accounted for 
proportionally far fewer executions than the more rural counties. And 
in Philadelphia at least, by the early twentieth century there would have 
been very few indeed, except for an ominous racial trend. 
Throughout the later as in the earlier nineteenth century, the justice 
system—like those in Boston, New York, and even bloody Bodie, 
California—had treated all races with remarkable evenhandedness. In 
Philadelphia, barring the murky problems posed by riots, blacks who 
killed whites got the same kinds of verdicts and sentences as whites who 
killed blacks. White victims in these cases, when not obvious aggressors 
on the street, were typically co-workers, lovers, or drinking companions 
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of the accused African Americans, men or women of some social dis­
tance from judges and most jurors. While Philadelphia's black com­
munity was until the first decade of the twentieth century the biggest 
in the North, the city did not share white southern fears or paranoia 
about blacks. Among other things the rare cases involving alleged inter­
racial rape were handled like all others, and the prevailing racist stereo­
type, at least among the elite, was voiced by Judge Peter Gordon in 
1893: "There is nothing in history that indicates that the colored race 
has a propensity to acts of violent crime; on the contrary, their tenden­
cies are most gentle, and they submit with grace to subordination"—a 
fact the judge ascribed to centuries of servitude. 
Both stereotype and treatment, however, changed with dramatic 
suddenness in the late 1890s. In 1897 Marion Stuyvesant was for a time 
accused of murdering his middle-class white employer, and then in 
1898 Face Epps and Sam Dodson pushed an elderly grocer to her death 
during a clumsy robbery. But the real turning point arrived symboli­
cally in the century-turning year 1900, when three black transients 
robbed a socially prominent lawyer, Roy Wilson White, and beat him 
to death with an iron bolt just outside the Broad Street Station. The 
three accused men, in order to avoid any charge of legal lynching, were 
fiercely defended in an unusually long trial by a group of volunteers 
from the Philadelphia bar. But they were sentenced to die nonetheless. 
And two years later William Lane found no champions at all. 
Lane, a butler in the household of Mrs. Ella Forbush, a moderately 
rich widow, stabbed his employer to death during a quarrel on April 
Fool's Day, 1902. He then summoned her two little girls, aged seven 
and ten, into the kitchen and slit their throats. He was arrested imme­
diately, at a time when the grand jury was in session, indicted that af­
ternoon, pleaded guilty the next morning, and despite obvious signs of 
insanity—he had made no attempt at concealment, and claimed not to 
remember anything after the first murder—was sentenced to death the 
day after that and hanged just fifty-one days later, a local record that 
still stands. 
In the early twentieth-century years sampled, following these dra­
matic incidents, blacks accused of homicide were found guilty some 80 
percent of the time, far more than whites. Although most of these kill­
ings involved other African Americans, and the system in one sense was 
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showing sensitivity to the deaths of black victims, the result of a new 
stereotype that added fear to the earlier contempt is most clearly shown 
in the disparity in legal executions. 
All told in a city averaging about a million and a half people, roughly 
6 percent black, some twenty-four persons were hanged between 1900 
and 1916. Of the twenty-four, eleven were black. Five of them had 
murdered whites: Lane, the three who killed Roy White, and Samuel 
Archer, a newcomer from the South who panicked and shot a police­
man when stopped for acting suspiciously outside a downtown store. 
All of the rest, like most of the white convicts, had killed wives or sweet­
hearts; not really dangers to the wider community, they had simply 
violated the general sense that men should not kill women, and as Af­
rican Americans they found little sympathy among the jurors or board 
of pardons who decided their fates. Here, too, the Philadelphia story 
mirrored national trends: it was always easier to condemn black men to 
death than white, and it may be noted that none of the states that abol­
ished capital punishment in this era had substantial black populations. 
The last man hanged in Philadelphia, indeed Pennsylvania, was 
James Reilly, in March 1916, following the age-old rituals from last 
meal to final blessing and last words, with the press ready to pronounce 
whether he had "died like a man" or a coward, repentant or defiant, 
quickly or at length. At that point the commonwealth introduced a 
new means of capital punishment, an electric chair at the state prison 
in Rockview. 
New York State had begun the movement toward electrocution, 
billed as more humane than hanging. The proposition was hard to 
prove; the subjects themselves were in no condition to testify, and the 
first witnesses were not convinced, on August 6, 1890, after watching 
the pioneering wife-killer, William Kemmler, strain and thrash about 
in the midst of noisy sparks, smoke, and the odor of burning flesh. 
Other states were slow to follow. Most clung to hanging, except for 
Utah and Nevada, dominated by Mormons who believed literally in 
the idea of blood atonement and shot murderers by firing squad in 
order to fulfill the verse from the Book of Noah. About a quarter of 
them, all over the nation, had converted to electricity by the time Penn­
sylvania made the move, most, for reasons of economy, moving the 
procedure out of county jail yards into a single state prison where the 
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one chair was conveniently housed. On July 17, 1916, Jacob Miller, a 
twenty-one-year-old white man who had shot a policeman during an 
attempted robbery, became the first Philadelphian to die at Rockview. 
The move toward professional efficiency and "science" evidenced both 
by the growing authority of prosecutors and by adoption of the electric 
chair was also reflected in two other closely related trends: an increased 
reliance on police detective work and on forensic expertise. Both move­
ments were slow to start, and erratic, but the difference between the 
Civil War and World War I eras was in the end immense. 
Virtually all rational or scientific aids to detective work were pioneered 
in Europe or its colonies, then spread reluctantly to a conservative En­
gland and even more slowly to the United States. The idea of rogues' 
gallery photographs of known criminals was born in Belgium during 
the 1840s, adopted by the Paris Surete and Scotland Yard, and finally 
crossed the Atlantic twenty years late. Another and more precise means 
of identification, the "Bertillon system," was invented in France by 
Alphonse Bertillon during the 1880s. Elaborate measurements of ear, 
nose, and finger lengths, cranial circumference, and the like, were 
found to be nearly unique to every individual and were kept in central 
offices and prisons. This in turn was supplanted, beginning in the 
1890s, by the even surer method of fingerprinting, used first in India 
and Argentina, then England, although neither the Bertillon system nor 
fingerprints were widely accepted in the United States before the turn 
of the century. 
One result of Bertillon's method, over time, was finally to kill Lom­
broso s idea that criminals as a class are physically set apart from their 
law-abiding fellows. While Lombroso fascinated academics for a gener­
ation, by the early twentieth century careful measurements had clearly 
established that there were no consistent physical differences between 
criminals and professors of sociology and that Europeans had no bigger 
craniums than Africans. 
Neither Bertillon nor rogues' gallery pictures were of much use in 
homicide detection anyway; killers, unlike many burglars, counterfeit­
ers, and shoplifters, were rarely repeat offenders with records conve­
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niently on file. Much more helpful were advances in medicine, espe­
cially pathology and toxicology. In many cases of murder, the victim's 
body is the best single source of evidence; as the nineteenth century 
progressed, doctors were better able to analyze it for clues. 
Medical testimony in murder trials had been commonly used since 
the eighteenth century. The very first step in proving any case a homi­
cide was to establish the cause of death. But in the United States that 
job was in the hands of an inquest jury; most of the coroners in charge 
were political hacks, some of them undertakers eager to expand their 
clientele, few of them doctors. Massachusetts in 1877 threw out the 
whole system in favor of investigation by trained medical examiners 
alone, but no other state followed during the nineteenth century. Else­
where doctors might be called into the inquest, but taxpayers' reluc­
tance to pay their professional expenses was added to a traditional 
aversion to disturbing the dead, and only about 8 percent of late nine-
teenth-century inquests involved autopsies of any kind. 
In law any causal connection between a killer's action and a death 
made the case a homicide, and when an alleged victim had hung on for 
some days, weeks, even months after being beaten or shot, under com­
mon law anything less than a year and a day, doctors for prosecution or 
defense might wrangle about whether it was the resulting injury or 
some wholly unrelated illness or heart condition that had finished him 
off. These contests in court left much to a jury's discretion, for several 
reasons. "Expert" testimony in court was legally distinguished from or­
dinary or eyewitness testimony. Experts, once their qualifications were 
ratified by the trial judge, were allowed to draw inferences, or conclu­
sions, not simply to describe the nature of a wound, for example, but 
to offer the opinion that it had been delivered by a knife, club, or bullet. 
But American jurors were traditionally resistant both to circumstantial 
evidence and to experts of any kind, their resistance sharpened in this 
case because judges allowed any physician to testify as "expert" and 
because the few Americans trained in pathology were mostly specialists 
in infectious disease rather than violence, and nobody in the room re­
ally knew what they were talking about. 
France was the leader here, in determining cause of death from the 
nature of wounds or condition of heart and lungs and time of death 
from lividity or rigor mortis. Late in the century Professor Alexandre 
Lacassagne, who held the chair of Pathology and Forensic Medicine at 
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Lyons—there were no such experts in the United States—was espe­
cially famous for identifying bodies from bits of hair, bones, and teeth 
and finding the differences among various red or brown stains under a 
microscope, distinguishing human blood cells from animal. Lacas­
sagne, too, in 1888 was the first to venture that a specific bullet had 
been fired from a specific revolver, having carefully counted and mea­
sured the individually unique rifling marks made by each gun. And he 
and other continental colleagues and rivals continued, as before, to find 
new and better methods of detecting poisons, not only isolating the 
inorganic metals but the more complex organic compounds. 
Poison was in fact a special case. While this was—apparently—an 
extremely rare method of committing murder, accounting in the Phila­
delphia series for less than 1 percent of all those treated by the justice 
system, it had a special place in folklore and the popular imagination. 
The stealthiness of the method, its violation of the cozy sanctuary of 
home and kitchen, had scared slaveholding Virginians in the eighteenth 
century, and continued to scare thereafter. Virtually by definition this 
was a first-degree crime, deliberately premeditated: the horror it in­
voked is reflected in the fact that Sarah Jane Whiteling, convicted of 
poisoning her husband and two little children, was in June 1889 the 
first and only female hanged in Philadelphia since the American revo­
lution (perhaps because she had neither youth nor good looks in her 
favor). Unlike barroom brawling, poisonings often involved people of 
high status, disproportionately women, motivated by jealousy, greed, 
and lust. This was the stuff both of high drama and of the increasingly 
popular genre of detective fiction that reached its peak, late in the nine­
teenth century, with Arthur Conan Doyle's celebrated Adventures of 
Sherlock Holmes, which badly misled readers about the nature of most 
ordinary cases. 
Arsenic was the potion of choice, in both real and fictional incidents, 
trailed at some distance by cyanide of mercury, and American readers 
followed several celebrated British cases in the course of the nineteenth 
century while contributing a few of their own. Cordelia Botkin set a 
long-distance record in September 1898 by mailing a box of loaded 
bonbons from her home in San Francisco to Mrs. Elizabeth Dunning, 
her lover s wife, then living in Dover, Delaware. Dunning and her sister 
ate them and died four days later. Three months after that, in Manhat­
tan, socialite Raymond Molineux anonymously sent a bottle of Bromo 
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Seltzer laced with cyanide to Harry Cornish, athletic director of the 
Knickerbocker Athletic Club, who had, he believed, dishonored him 
by winning a public weightlifting contest. It was Cornish's landlady, 
Katherine Adams, who ultimately drank it and died in convulsions. 
And over the next decade Belle Gunness, a widow from LaPorte, Indi­
ana, may have set a numerical record by poisoning and then robbing as 
many as fourteen suitors and then, with the help of a confederate, bury­
ing them about the place. 
Gunness escaped prosecution; in April 1908 a body that did not 
much resemble hers was found in the burned ruins of her farmhouse, 
and she was never seen again. Botkin nearly got away with her crime, 
Mrs. Dunning's family doctor having mistaken arsenic poisoning for an 
excess of corn fritters. And it was only after the Cornish-Adams inci­
dent that the club doctor got suspicious, and Molineux was found to 
have earlier poisoned Harry Barnett, a fellow Knickerbocker and his 
rival for the hand of one Blanche Cheeseborough. But while medical 
ignorance accounted for a number of undetected nineteenth-century 
murders of all kinds, the bigger problem by far was the indifference of 
the justice system at the level of intake and investigation. 
In dealing with possible homicides the two related issues were money 
and class, or more precisely, taxpayer dollars and community standing. 
In the great majority of cases, the facts that homicide was obvious and 
that there was an immediate suspect made detection easy and cheap. 
When the dead person was a known member of the community, cor­
oners and police, with the press looking over their shoulders, were 
increasingly willing at least to begin the often expensive and time-
consuming business of finding out what had happened and who was 
responsible. But it was a different matter when anonymous "floaters" 
were pulled from the river, or under suspicious circumstances the bod­
ies of poor people were found in the street, and no one of any influence 
or standing had reported them missing. The business of "detective 
work" as we now know it had been made a public responsibility only 
a few decades earlier; even public prosecution was a relatively recent 
American invention. And in the late nineteenth century homicide de­
tection was still a relatively low priority. 
City police departments, in their published annual reports, typically 
boasted above all of their ability to "keep order," to cut down distur­
bances on holidays or during parades, to put down strikes or riots. 
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Some of them, like Philadelphia's, also proudly published lists of prop­
erty reported stolen and then recovered. In an age in which the majority 
of citizens lived far closer to real poverty than we now do, most missing 
items were pathetically small, shoes and shirts and sealing wax, pillow­
cases and socks. Detectives were most happy to deal with the bigger 
cases, bank burglaries and jewel thefts, which might result in legal re­
wards or illegal deals. They could then use their extensive knowledge of 
and connections with the criminal underworld, maybe even the rogues' 
gallery. But there was still no money or prestige in homicide, and little 
mention in the annual reports. 
A semiofficial history, The Philadelphia Police: Past and Present, pub­
lished in 1887, listed all the city's detectives by name. There were thir­
teen of them, including two clerks who never left the office, for a city 
of close to a million. Just one was a specialist, in horse theft. In thirty-
two dense pages, describing the men's histories, exploits, and notable 
captures, overwhelmingly of thieves ranging from larcenous servant 
girls to bank robbers, there are only five mentions of homicide, com­
manding just forty-one lines of type. Henry Clay Mintzhouser had 
however earned the nickname "the Murder Detective" by contributing 
to at least two cases; the second, in which he had been called out of 
town to Chester County, involved a killer who had fled to Italy, and 
"the county commissioners would not incur the expense of having the 
murderer extradited and brought back." 
Under these conditions coroners were under pressure not to make 
waves. To declare a dubious and unidentified corpse a homicide rather 
than a suicide or an accident victim would rarely lead to a solution, and 
won no points with the police who would have to handle it. Inquests 
found homicide "at the hands of a person or persons unknown" when 
there was an obvious gunshot wound to the head, but a broken skull 
was more likely to be labeled the "result of a fall while in a state of 
intoxication," and in May 1900 a dead transient found in the Delaware, 
his hands tied behind his back, with bag, wallet, and money missing, 
was labeled a "suicide." It is impossible to say just how many of these 
cases were neglected or mislabeled, but in the five years 1839-41 , 
1870, and 1900 combined, the Philadelphia Public Ledger—a rela­
tively conservative paper, although not averse to street sales—reported 
174 possibly suspicious deaths, just 82 of which resulted in murder 
indictments. 
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It was not that police detectives were either wholly corrupt or utterly 
helpless, but simply that they had no tools, standing, or expertise that 
set them aside from other citizens. Nineteenth-century policemen in 
general inspired no awe and not much respect. They were often at­
tacked on the beat, sometimes killed, and when they themselves at­
tacked or killed were subject to the same criminal processes as others, 
tried and not infrequently convicted for assault or manslaughter. They 
did make homicide arrests, but so did coroners, magistrates, and, of­
ten, private citizens. Urban crowds routinely acted as unofficial posses, 
blacks and whites cooperating in chasing down killers on the street, 
even braving bullets without waiting for official help. The only thing 
that distinguished the police was their habit of making dozens of drag­
net arrests in especially frustrating and well-publicized cases (one of the 
problems that makes homicide arrests, in that era, an untrustworthy 
index to the actual "murder rate"). But in terms of homicide their 
major contribution was simply prevention, through breaking up small 
fights and bigger riots, rather than detection. 
As of the early 1890s, the state both of police detective work at its 
average and of scientific expertise at its best is well illustrated by the 
single most famous murder case of the century. It was ten minutes past 
eleven in Fall River, Massachusetts, on the stifling Thursday morning 
of August 2, 1892, when Lizzie Borden summoned the family maid, 
Bridget Sullivan, from the second floor of the modest house on Second 
Street: "Come down quick. Father's dead. Somebody came in and 
killed him." Bridget was then directed to get the family doctor and to 
fetch a friend, for comfort. A neighbor woman also hurried in, and sent 
her yardman for another doctor. It was a passerby, overhearing all the 
excitement, who first thought to call the cops. 
Dr. Bowen arrived well before the police and found Andrew Borden 
on the couch in the downstairs parlor, virtually unrecognizable, his face 
shattered from numerous head wounds, dead perhaps twenty minutes 
or so. Patrolman George Allen followed shortly, informally deputizing 
a gawker to guard the door and bar all but police, physicians, and 
family, a post the poor man held faithfully, quite forgotten, all day long. 
A small crowd inside was then tending to Lizzie, who seemed calm 
enough, and Dr. Bowen went out to telegraph her elder sister, Emma, 
who was visiting on Cape Cod, when someone noticed the absence of 
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Andrew s second wife, Abby. It was two frightened women, not police­
men, who then ventured upstairs and found a second body, as battered 
as the first. The blood in the second-floor bedroom had started to co­
agulate, and Bowen calculated that Mrs. Borden, stepmother to the sis­
ters, had been killed some time before her husband. 
Andrew Borden was the old city's leading banker; Fall River simply 
ground to a stop, as every mill and shop in town emptied out on word 
that he and his wife had been butchered in broad daylight, in their own 
home, on a busy street full of houses just a few feet apart. And the case 
has inspired much of the same fascination ever since. There was no sex 
involved, with elderly victims and Lizzie a plain spinster of thirty-two. 
But there was certainly violence, and above all there was mystery. 
The house at number 92 was much like the "locked box" puzzle 
beloved of later writers. Front and back doors had been fastened 
through most of the day, except when Lizzie or Bridget briefly ventured 
out. Emma had spent the night many miles away, and the one other 
surviving member of the household, a visiting uncle, had left early in 
the morning and could account for nearly every move. Imagination first 
conjured a "wild-eyed" or "bushy-haired" stranger—maybe one of 
those new immigrants—or perhaps an enemy of Andrew Borden, a no­
toriously cold, tight, and unpopular man. But while the key figures in the 
case were observed coming and going, their own accounts mostly backed 
by neighbors and others, no one saw anyone else, or heard a sound. 
Suspicion fell on Lizzie partly because of her manner, her restrained 
New England response to the deaths, and partly because of a number 
of mildly inconsistent or improbable stories she told at the time and 
then at the inquest, suggesting for example that someone might have 
tried to poison the family earlier that week. It was said that she or some­
one like her had tried to buy poison earlier that summer. Gossip also 
had it that she and Emma, whose mother had died years before, did 
not get along with Abby, their stepmother; until the double murders 
Andrew s remarriage may in fact have deprived them of at least some 
part of a $500,000 inheritance. And then, despite three close searches 
for evidence by Fall River police and detectives, on three separate days, 
looking among other things for a weapon or bloodstained clothing, the 
very next morning Lizzie was observed burning a blue dress with dark 
stains. It was old paint, she said. 
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Lizzie was arrested after the inquest, which, since Massachusetts 
had dispensed with the coroner and his jury, was a private affair with 
no counsel or cross-examination allowed. But she was a rich as well 
as a sympathetic figure, able to hire the Pinkerton Agency—the Fall 
River police actually resorted to a private detective of their own—and 
her three-member defense team was headed by George D. Robinson, 
former governor of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. The trial 
opened on June 5, 1893, before three judges of the state supreme court, 
with two regional district attorneys conducting the prosecution. Some 
108 panelists were carefully interviewed to yield the twelve jurors, 
mostly nearby farmers, none from the town itself. 
With tens of millions of international readers hanging on every re­
ported detail, Robinson, the very image of the shrewd old Yankee, was 
the star of the trial. He successfully moved to have Lizzie's inquest tes­
timony disallowed as evidence, on the grounds that at the time she was 
"virtually" under arrest, had not been allowed counsel, and had not 
been told of her right, under the constitution of Massachusetts, to re­
main silent for fear of self-incrimination, advice that was then "custom­
ary" although not strictly required. A druggist's rather vague testimony 
about her possible attempt to buy poison was also disallowed as irrele­
vant. In cross-examination, the friend who had seen her burn a dress 
made it clear that it was not the dress she had seen Lizzie wear on the 
fateful morning. And Robinson had a field day with inconsistencies in 
testimony by the police. 
But it was the expert witnesses brought by the prosecution itself to 
establish the time and manner of death who proved the most important 
to the defense. The district medical examiner and another one from 
Boston were joined by two Harvard professors, a doctor and a toxicolo­
gist. Mrs. Borden had suffered nineteen head wounds, probably from 
an ax; she had not cried out and the first blow had hit her straight on, 
implying that it was wielded by someone she knew. Andrew had almost 
certainly been napping on the couch when he got the first often, prob­
ably from the same weapon. Neither had any trace of poison in their 
systems, disallowing Lizzie's public suspicions. But Robinson helped 
bring out that the amount of spattered blood must have been enor­
mous; many witnesses had agreed that his client was spotless, only min­
utes after Andrews death, although the house had no bathrooms and 
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running water only in one downstairs sink. The toxicologist, judging 
from the state of Abby s stomach contents, testified that she had died at 
least an hour and a half before her husband; neither Bridget nor any­
one else suggested that Lizzie, in the long interval between physically 
strenuous crimes, had looked or acted abnormal. She had also never left 
the house, barn, or yard. And while there were three axes or hatchets in 
or about the place, none in good order, toxicological tests established 
that the hairs on one of them had come from a cow, and the stains were 
rust; Dr. Edward S. Wood testified that if human blood had been on 
any of them it was physically impossible in a short time to have washed 
or rubbed off enough to escape his microscope. 
The defense witnesses were then an anticlimax. With no blood and 
no weapon, twelve good men and true were not going to convict a pious 
female Sunday school teacher, beyond all reasonable doubt, of two vio­
lently gory acts of murder. It took them just over an hour to confirm 
that, on June 20. It was not their job in law to solve the puzzle, to 
determine "whodunit," only to do justice by the book and according 
to the evidence. But both contemporaries and posterity have naturally 
wanted more. 
It still seems almost inconceivable that anyone from outside the 
house could have killed the Bordens. Andrew may have had enemies, 
but why would an intruder so viciously attack Abby, how could he slip 
in, and where would he hide for an hour and a half, dripping no blood, 
in a narrow ten-room house in which Lizzie and Bridget were con­
tinually coming and going, until Andrew's return for his morning nap? 
At the same time no single trace of physical evidence ever pointed to 
Lizzie, a woman of spotless prior reputation and behavior. The same 
lack of clues applies to Bridget, whom no one suspected at the time, 
and who, despite possibly greater opportunities to smuggle an incrimi­
nating package out of the household, had no apparent motive for such 
a passionate outburst. 
Most later historians have gone along with the verdict expressed by 
contemporaries: 
Lizzie Borden took an axe 
And gave her father forty whacks; 
When she saw what she had done 
She gave her mother forty-one. 
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But the little ditty is quite wrong about the number of blows and the 
sequence of events. At least. 
In the last two decades before World War I, the gap between "police" 
and "expert" detective work shown in the Borden case closed markedly, 
as advances were made on both fronts. 
American police work still trailed behind other advanced countries, 
simply because the criminal justice system had no single "capital" such 
as Paris, London, or Berlin. The federal role in ordinary law enforce­
ment had been confined mostly to the appointment of local marshals 
in the territories, a job that shrank close to the vanishing point when 
territorial New Mexico, in 1912, was admitted as the last of the adjoin­
ing forty-eight states. Postal inspectors had been created in 1836, and 
the Treasury Department founded the Secret Service in 1864, mainly 
to guard against counterfeit money and excise stamps, although in time 
the officers provedflexible servants of several government agencies. The 
establishment of a small Bureau of Investigation inside the Justice De­
partment, beginning in 1908, helped the federal government again to 
expand its modest role in law enforcement, when as part of the moral 
spirit of the Progressive Era the Congress passed the Mann Act in 1910 
and the Harrison Act in 1914, concerned, respectively, with interstate 
prostitution and the sale of certain drugs. But none of these agencies 
had much prestige, certainly neither the authority nor the resources to 
deal with homicide in the states, as Scotland Yard or the Paris Surete 
had in their countries. 
The looseness built into the federal system made it far easier than in 
more tightly governed European nations for men like Herman Mudg-
ett-Howard Holmes to marry three women and perhaps to kill an un­
known number of victims. England in 1837 had required that all death 
certificates be registered in London as a reaction to the discovery that 
one woman had poisoned a number of people in several jurisdictions, 
each of them ignorant of what was happening in the others. But the 
registration systems adopted in this country—Philadelphia, typically, 
required records of all births, marriages, and deaths beginning in 
1860—applied only to individual counties, hundreds of them, at best 
to some of the forty-eight states, with no central file keeping. 
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Individual police departments and detectives, however, had very early 
begun informally to swap rogues' gallery photographs and "wanted" 
notices. And as part of the late nineteenth-century push toward the 
prestige and efficiency of "professionalism," a number of occupations 
actually or potentially involved in law enforcement founded associ­
ations designed to help them, among other things, to trade experience 
and information across state or even national lines. This was the era 
when both the American Bar Association and the American Medical As­
sociation were organized; the American Prison Congress was founded 
in 1870, the International Association of Chiefs of Police in 1901. And 
by the twentieth century there was an accelerating amount of informa­
tion to share in this way. 
Gunsmiths, for many years, had occasionally been called to testify 
whether a given bullet had come from a large- or small-caliber gun, for 
example, or to judge whether a suspected murder weapon had recently 
been fired. (Spider webs in the barrel were a good clue, and rust.) But 
in 1902, aware of early European experiments, Judge Oliver Wendell 
Holmes of the Massachusetts Supreme Court set up a demonstration 
in which bullets were fired from a defendant's gun into a wastebasket 
full of cotton, then microscopically compared to those found in the 
victim's body. The resulting conviction, widely noted, helped establish 
a whole new era in the study of guns and bullets. And although meth­
ods were crude, and still subject to the errors made by self-trained "ex­
perts" with more flair for dazzling juries than using microscopes, the 
science of forensic ballistics was unquestionably launched. 
Forensic medicine made even longer strides. One key year was 1904, 
when Dr. Charles Norris, trained abroad, took a post as professor of 
pathology and head of the chemical and bacteriological laboratory at 
New York's Bellevue Hospital. Norris quickly expanded his role; a 
champion of the medical examiner system all over the country, he won 
his first major victory in 1915 when, nearly forty years after the Com­
monwealth of Massachusetts, New York City threw out its elected coro­
ners. Norris himself was soon appointed chief medical examiner, and 
proved a man with a powerful flair for publicity and organization. As a 
phone line made his expanding laboratory available to the police 
twenty-fours a day, his office was soon screening thousands of reports 
of suspicious deaths every year, while he and his assistants, some on 
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call, others installed as pathologists in each of the city's five morgues, 
performed autopsies in up to a third of them. 
The crisp new methods that Norris introduced in New York were 
typical of the Progressive Era, a time that stretched from the end of the 
nineteenth century well into the second decade of the twentieth. One 
key to the successes of the period is that the spirit of reform was buoyed 
by an economic expansion of unprecedented length, which enabled lo­
cal taxpayers to pay for sometimes expensive innovations. While farm 
products had been the major American contribution to the interna­
tional economy since the seventeenth century, now, especially after vic­
tory in the Spanish-American War of 1898, American manufactures 
increasingly joined cotton, wheat, and beef in the export market. When 
World War I broke out in 1914, tragedy in Europe proved an economic 
stimulus to the still-neutral United States, which supplied food, arms, 
and capital to the warring powers. 
Progressive reforms had begun, and were always strongest at the local 
level, with attacks on municipal waste and corruption. And the stress 
on moral, orderly behavior, the same impulse that led to federal laws 
against drugs and prostitution, found its first targets in patronage-
ridden city police departments, with their traditionally profitable rela­
tions with protected brothels, speakeasies, and thieves. As the successes 
of the urban industrial revolution helped enrich local treasuries, the 
introduction of civil service was followed by higher pay and expansion 
in number. In Philadelphia the fifteen detectives of 1898 were more 
than doubled to thirty-three in 1903, and the force as a whole was 
increased by nearly a third between 1900 and 1910. And most impor­
tant was a shift, all over the country, in the priorities and mission of 
local police. 
American police had from very early been used as the eyes, ears, and 
right arms of local governments and given a wide range of duties while 
roaming their beats, lighting gas lamps, cleaning streets, running health 
inspections in plague years and soup kitchens in hard times. But other 
departments took most of these jobs as local governments expanded. 
And as the Progressive Era opened, there was a special objection to 
the old practice of putting up homeless people in the station houses 
at night, condemned as inefficient or "unscientific" charity, which 
made life too easy for the lazily unemployed. In New York City Police 
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Commissioner Theodore Roosevelt, in a key symbolic shift, ordered the 
lodging ended in 1896. By the early twentieth century, in New York 
and in most other places, cutting down on the functions of police was 
promoted as a way of freeing them for the two jobs they had left: con­
trolling traffic and fighting crime. And fighting crime came to mean 
among other things an increased stress on homicide detection. 
One turning point in Philadelphia was the Mudgett case. Fidelity 
Mutual Insurance had a financial stake that led to hiring the Pinkertons 
and others to help convict Mudgett of Benjamin Pitezel's murder. But 
it was a Philadelphia special officer, Frank Geyer, who traveled at city 
expense over much of the Midwest and into Canada during 1895-96 
to find the bodies of the three Pitezel children, a business that involved 
a good deal of time and ingenuity. Although at the trial his evidence 
about the deaths of Howard, Alice, and Nessie was ruled irrelevant, it 
is significant that the city accepted Geyer s mission as a public respon­
sibility, undertaken at public expense, and perhaps even more impor­
tant that in dramatizing the business of homicide detection he became 
a kind of public hero. 
It is even more significant that in this country the use of fingerprints 
for purposes of murder detection was championed not by a doctor or 
scientist but by a policeman, Detective Sergeant Joseph A. Faurot of 
New York. Faurot, for years in charge of a small registry of criminal 
identification, had a passion for learning new methods, and finally wan­
gled a trip to Scotland Yard to learn the state of the art firsthand. On 
his return he was able to demonstrate the newfangled technique in sen­
sational fashion, when in the spring of 1908 the body of Nellie Quinn, 
a pretty young nurse, was found in an Upper West Side rooming house, 
with an empty whiskey bottle under her bed. Faurot dusted the bottle 
for prints and found that they were not Quinn's; after taking inked 
impressions from several boyfriends he found a set that matched; a 
young plumber, George Cramer, confronted with this novel evidence, 
then confessed to having murdered the woman in a drunken rage. As 
this and later cases made headlines across the country, other depart­
ments bought first the idea and then the equipment. 
In the years after 1910, detectives in Philadelphia began routinely 
making careful incident reports of each reported homicide, taking pho­
tographs and in some cases looking for prints. Perhaps of most symbolic 
import was the adoption of a new feature in the departments annual 
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reports. Beginning in 1913 there was each year an official column de­
voted to all "murders" reported, together with a case-by-case listing of 
the results: arrest if any, indictment, trial, and verdict. This "box score" 
treatment had earlier been reserved for important property crimes and, 
when the heat was on, during the Progressive Era, for violations of the 
gambling and liquor laws. It was a clear sign that in the City of Broth­
erly Love, as elsewhere, the solution of homicide cases had become, at 
last, a major departmental priority. 
Between 1865 and 1917, the last shots fired in the Civil War and the 
first after American entry into World War I, differences across the 
United States had been narrowing. The conquest of the Indians, thick­
ening settlement, and economic advance brought eastern problems to 
the trans-Mississippi West. The South, struggling to modernize, was 
solving its own economic and racial problems to the satisfaction at least 
of the dominant whites. And in a time of apparent peace, progress, and 
prosperity, as the era of the badmen, vigilantism, and lynching slowly 
faded, murder rates fell all over the country, following the lead of east­
ern cities, indeed of the Western world in general, where the urban 
industrial revolution was transforming mass behavior. But in 1917 that 
Western world had been learning for three years what Americans would 
shortly discover, that peace, progress, and prosperity cannot be taken 
for granted, and that nothing in history moves along straight lines with­
out interruption. 
World War I to World War II, 
1917-1941 
The First World War opened a new chapter in American history, a pe­
riod of awesome international power and prestige. The several Ameri­
can colonies had first been settled as distant outposts on the fringes of 
the emerging world marketplace, and even through the expansive nine­
teenth century the new nation remained in some ways an economic 
colony to the Continent. In 1914 the United States was still a net 
debtor, absorbing capital and technology from more advanced Euro­
pean nations, when the Western world was rocked by the outbreak of 
war. By the time the United States entered the conflict just three years 
later, it was a net creditor; with victory in 1918 it emerged as incom­
parably the strongest economic, military, and political power on the 
planet. 
American dominance continued through both the prosperous 1920s 
and the depressed 1930s. But unlike Britain in the previous century, or 
France in the eighteenth, the United States was never able to enjoy an 
unchallenged cultural superiority to match its economic and military 
power. And it was only partly from jealousy that many Europeans 
thought of this country as still barbaric, crude, and immature. One key 
index to the "uncivilized" nature of this giant upstart was the persis­
tently high U.S. murder rate, as compared with other Western nations, 
a charge that was hard to deny, 
World War I itself was followed by a round of pent-up violence. And 
during the 1920s, the "Lawless Decade" that followed the passage of 
214 
World War I to World War II 215 
the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution, prohibiting the sale 
of drinking alcohol, many thoughtful Americans were both fearful of 
and embarrassed about murderous violence and what it seemed to im­
ply about "the national character," judicial institutions, race relations, 
and other sensitive issues. 
These concerns led among other things to the reform and strength­
ening of police, above all to the growing power, at the national level, of 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation. But in fact, as older regional differ­
ences continued to flatten, the urban industrial revolution strengthened 
its hold—even during the Great Depression of the 1930s—and old 
forms of violence faded out, the murder rate by the end of the period 
was clearly in decline. 
I 
World War I was for the Europeans a war of carnage much like our own 
Civil War, and for many of the same reasons. But for the Americans the 
engagement was short and satisfying; war was declared in the spring of 
1917, but fresh troops reached the battlefields in number only in 1918 
and pushed the Allied cause over the top that summer and fall. As mea­
sured by thefigures of the Bureau of Vital Statistics, the national homi­
cide rate took a dip during that year. Sigmund Freud, in Civilization 
and Its Discontents, wrote in 1931 that during wartime a nation might 
bind itself together in love, directing internal aggression outward to­
ward a common enemy. A simpler explanation for 1918, as for 1861 — 
65, was that a number of aggressive young men were away, killing with 
the army instead of on the streets. With its many diversities and ten­
sions, the United States has only rarely been a nation united, certainly 
not bound in love, and the immediate effect of world war was to pro­
mote several kinds of ugliness. 
Given traditional isolation, and the reluctance of many ethnic 
groups to fight Germany on behalf, it seemed, of the British Empire, 
the United States government felt the need to justify our involvement 
by taking both the high road and the low. That is, while President 
Woodrow Wilson called on the nation to "Make the World Safe for 
Democracy" he also defended the need to segregate African Americans 
from the rest, in the name of reducing racial frictions, and the new 
Committee on Public Information poured out propaganda to teach 
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people to hate Germans. Once hailed as half of the dominant "Anglo-
Saxon race," they were now denounced as "Huns." But the war lasted 
too short a time to slake this officially cultivated thirst for violence, and 
with only a relative handful privileged to go and fight abroad—a mil­
lion troops—the mass of fired-up Americans had to do their hating at 
home. And they tended to focus on the usual suspects: foreigners, rad­
icals, and blacks. 
Anti-German hysteria reached a tragically ironic peak on April 4, 
1918, when a crowd in Collinswood, Missouri, far from the action, 
lynched Robert Paul Prager, a young man with a German name and 
accent who was suspected of "disloyalty"; it was discovered only after­
ward that he had earlier tried to enlist in the U.S. Navy, to fight on 
behalf of his adopted country, but was rejected because of a glass eye. 
Fear of radicals had never died down, especially in the West, and was 
inflamed further when the Russian revolution, begun in the spring of 
1917, was taken over by the communists that November. The most 
obvious American target was then the Industrial Workers of the World, 
since the early twentieth century the leading target of local antiunion 
violence. Once the war broke out Big Bill Haywood and other leaders 
of the "Wobblies," like the American Socialists, declared their opposi­
tion as pacifists on principle, although many individual members had 
signed up to fight. The federal government jailed dozens for obstruct­
ing the war effort at the same time as local raids and lynchings were 
stepped up. Official harassment continued after victory in 1918 into 
the "Red Scare" of 1919, led by Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer 
and J. Edgar Hoover, the young head of the Federal Bureau of Investi­
gation. As hatred of Germany segued into fear of revolutionary Russia, 
the IWW organized an unsuccessful but scary general strike in Seattle, 
with all of the city's working people called to quit work at once. And 
that fall witnessed the culmination of several years of beatings and kill­
ings in the Pacific Northwest. During a celebration of Armistice Day, 
November 11, parading American Legionnaires in the lumbering town 
of Centralia, Washington, exchanged shots with Wobblies inside their 
Union Hall. Three Legionnaires were killed; the others rushed in and 
seized Wesley Everett, himself a veteran, who shot down one more be­
fore he was castrated and hanged from a railway trestle over the Che­
halis River. 
The Wobblies had in any case always won more publicity than mem­
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bers, and in the long run it was impossible to hold out against murder­
ous intimidation, combined with government pressure. Americans had 
mostly gotten over their communist-anarchist Red Scare jitters by the 
fall of 1920, and refused to panic that September when a bomb blast 
outside the House of Morgan killed thirty-four passersby on Wall 
Street. And by the time a broken Bill Haywood skipped bail and sailed 
for Russia in 1921, the IWW, indeed American radicalism more gen­
erally, was effectively dead. 
It was harder to stop the African-American push for jobs and recog­
nition, stimulated both by wartime rhetoric and war production. Blacks 
had been leaving the South for years before 1914, pushed out by pov­
erty, the invasion of the boll weevil in the cotton fields, and the success 
of the lynching campaign to deny them civil rights and the vote. But as 
the United States was called to make arms for British, French, and fi­
nally American troops, the need for labor created new job opportunities 
in northern cities and factory towns. And unlike Bill Haywood and 
many radicals, W. E. B. DuBois of the NAACP, by then the dominant 
leader of the American black community, was persuaded by President 
Wilson's democratic oratory to support the war effort. Thousands of 
African Americans joined the army, a few of them, unlike in the Civil 
War, as officers; the government had to warn the unsuspecting French 
not to treat these black soldiers like the rest of the liberators, but it was 
hard to deny their pride and high expectations. 
Black pride and entry into new places combined with white resent­
ments to make murderous trouble all through the war. In East St. 
Louis, bursting with war workers, blacks in July 1917 answered months 
of harassment by firing at white invaders, accidentally killing two po­
licemen; the riots that followed cost thirty-nine black lives, officially, 
and nine white. That August outside of Houston a crowd of African-
American soldiers marched toward the city, after a clash between white 
cops and black military police, and shot down two of the local officers; 
it took units of the Texas and Illinois national guards plus six hundred 
federal troops to put down the invasion: thirteen men were hanged for 
murder. Washington, D.C., Charleston, South Carolina, and Long­
view, Texas, all witnessed major race riots between then and the war's 
official end. The biggest hit Chicago, in the summer of 1919, following 
two years of gangfights, house bombings, and jockeying over boundary 
lines in parks, bars, streets, and factories. After an incident sparked 
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when on July 27 an African-American kid drifted over the unofficial 
line separating black and white bathers at a beach on Lake Michigan 
and was either drowned or stoned to death, three days of fighting took 
twenty-three black lives and fifteen white. 
But while the excitement over foreigners and radicals retreated, the 
blacks did not. Factory jobs ebbed away as the war ended, but African 
Americans continued to flow north into the cities, expanding their turf, 
insisting on their rights. Between 1917 and 1920 the very term "race 
riot" was redefined; no longer helpless victims of mob invasion, blacks 
were fighting and firing back. And these newly urban people not only 
voted and built communities but also earned a new place in city and 
nation. Their contributions to popular culture, long hard to deny, 
earned special recognition in the unofficial Jazz Age nickname given the 
1920s, just as the authors and artists of the Harlem Renaissance im­
pressed their white peers with their inventive talents. A corner was 
clearly being turned, however slowly; one by-product of the Chicago 
riot was the appointment of a commission that produced a pioneering 
sociological study of conditions in the city's ghetto, the result of dis­
crimination in jobs, schools, and housing. And as Social Darwinism 
waned and the racial climate changed, Americans all over the country 
joined the NAACP in protesting violent outrages; one woman, on a 
cruise to a Europe devastated by the loss of millions of war dead, wrote 
to the attorney general of the United States that she was offended by 
having constantly to explain such barbarities to foreigners. 
But even without the indignities provoked by racism, Americans had 
much explaining to do over the Roaring Twenties that followed the 
war, a time when the national murder rate, problems in law enforce­
ment, and apparent flaws in the justice system got more national and 
in many cases international attention than ever before. 
For most observers, the key issues centered around the Eighteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution, the culminating moral reform of the 
Progressive Era, which in 1919 forbade the sale of drinking alcohol. 
One result was to involve tens of millions of ordinary Americans in 
routine lawbreaking, as every working-class beer or middle-class cock­
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tail party involved an offense against the United States. The other was 
to inspire, on a giant scale, a largely new form of crime. 
Since the nineteenth century organized gangs had been involved in 
extortion and labor racketeering, bullying at the polls, gambling, and 
sometimes liquor sales. For ambitious young urban entrepreneurs, once 
Irish, more recently Italian or Jewish, this was a traditional if crooked 
way up the American ladder. But now the need for both bullets and 
brains was greater than ever. The old games were still played, from 
running brothels to cracking safes, but the new one was different. It 
required planning and cooperation as never before, first to make or 
import illegal alcohol, then to distribute it across a given state or city, 
all without interference from either rival gangsters or local, state, or 
federal authorities. These human obstacles could be cut in or bribed, or 
they could be intimidated or killed. The stakes were huge, and if killing 
was needed, many of the players had come home from the war with an 
expertise in automatic weapons. Even more important, during the 
1920s, were mass-produced automobiles, which as mobile striking 
units or "getaway cars" were the most important technological aid to 
murder since the invention of the revolver, especially when bristling 
with tommy guns. 
Gangs in different states or cities sometimes cooperated. But unless 
or until a monopoly was established over a given territory, rivals fought 
for control of the turf, hijacked each other's beer trucks, executed 
troublemakers, and killed civilians while careening around corners and 
spraying gunfire across city streets. The death toll in some places was 
appalling: the Chicago Crime Commission estimated that in that city 
alone, during the Lawless Decade, there were some four hundred gang­
land murders, virtually all officially unsolved, the killers speeding away 
in Buicks or dumping bodies in the river or in abandoned lots, leaving 
no witnesses willing to talk. During the same period one estimate is 
that across the nation the enforcement of Prohibition directly cost a 
thousand lives, as sheriff's deputies, patrolmen, and treasury agents shot 
up and were shot down by gangsters. 
The nation and the wider world were appalled, and also perversely 
delighted. The gangster world was so quintessentially American: fast, 
high-tech, violent, and full of colorful rags-to-riches stories. However 
immune to successful prosecution, the leading figures were generally 
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well known; boasting was more their style than hiding, as an air of 
power and ruthlessness was part of the mystique of success, and pub­
licity was not only heady stuff but a useful weapon as well. These men 
did not pretend to the gallant or Robin Hood fantasies that had earlier 
clung to Jesse James, but Americans were still ready to romanticize 
Dutch Schultz, Owney Madden, and Jack "Legs" Diamond in New 
York, the Purple Gang in Detroit, and above all Scarface Al Capone in 
Chicago. 
Alphonse Capone had been imported from Brooklyn in 1919 as a 
battle-tested thug, then still in his teens, to work for Johnny Torrio. 
Chicago's notoriety over the next several years resulted from an unusu­
ally vicious series of turf wars, with Capone commanding a small army 
of enforcers. He himself, it was said, personally murdered with tommy 
guns and revolvers, and in one case a baseball bat, used to obliterate the 
heads of two allegedly traitorous underlings helplessly tied to their 
chairs. Torrio, his nerves shot, got out of the business in 1925, but 
Scarface loved it, grandly granting interviews to newspapermen and re­
formers, holding forth in a silk dressing gown, waving a cigar. By 1929 
he was able to arrange his most famous killings with a phone call from 
his Palm Island estate on Biscayne Bay. 
George "Bugs" Moran was the last threat to the Capone monopoly 
of the Chicago liquor trade. And early on the morning of February 14, 
five men in a squad car parked outside Moran's headquarters in a North 
Clark Street garage, three of them dressed as cops. The men inside 
clearly thought this was another routine or sham official "raid" and 
obediently lined up, hands against the wall: six gangsters and an op­
tometrist, Dr. Reinhardt E. Schwimmer, one of the wide-eyed hangers-
on that badmen then attracted. The five visitors then machine-gunned 
all seven to death and left within minutes of their arrival. No one was 
ever tried for this St. Valentine's Day Massacre, but everyone knew 
who was responsible: Moran himself, badly shaken, commented, "Only 
Capone kills like that." 
And the fascination with murder did not stop with the new breed of 
gangsters. Sensationalized violence had been a staple of the popular 
press since the 1830s, but it reached new heights throughout the Law­
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less Decade as one notorious case chased another across the headlines 
in a nearly continuous stream. A careful count revealed that between 
November 8 and December 8 of 1926 the New York World was devot­
ing about 15 percent of its total space—including advertising—to 
crime news; and the tabloid Daily News, 33 percent. 
During most of that month the national focus was on "the Case of 
the Minister and the Choir Singer," which included all of the tradi­
tional ingredients, sex, blood, and mystery, the difference being the 200 
reporters and 50 photographers who covered it, and the estimated 12 
million words it generated by wire. The case had its origins when in the 
summer of 1922 the Reverend Edward Wheeler Hall of New Bruns­
wick, New Jersey, was found dead in a local lover's lane, together with 
his mistress, Eleanor Mills. Both had been shot, but their throats were 
also slit and their bodies arranged in a kind of embrace in the midst of 
a scene strewn with their love letters. No action was taken by a grand 
jury at the time, but four years later the governor, smelling publicity, 
demanded that the case be reopened on the basis of alleged new evi­
dence involving the widow, Frances Hall, and her brothers, Henry and 
Willie Stevens. The evidence proved flimsy, and the bespectacled defen­
dants, high in the middle class and well into middle age, made unlikely 
villains; after an excruciating month in court the jurors set them free in 
a matter of hours. Later speculation about the killings pointed to the 
Ku Klux Klan, then active in New Jersey and elsewhere as self-described 
guardians of Protestant values and sexual virtue. The conclusion was 
suggested by the obvious staging of the scene, a kind of warning of the 
wages of sin, and by the fact that Mrs. Mills, profane singer of holy 
songs, had had her tongue and vocal cords cut out. But no investigation 
followed, and the case again faded. 
A very different puzzle was offered the next year when Judd Gray 
and Ruth Snyder were tried for the murder of her husband, Albert. The 
mystery here is the lack of mystery. Although the lovers had faked a 
burglary, and she at first blamed Albert's bludgeoning on "a foreigner. 
I guess. Some kind of Eyetalian," they were utterly inept murderers, 
and soon confessed and turned on each other. Perhaps it was their very 
Long Island suburban ordinariness that appealed to millions of readers, 
or the detailed accounting of their affair together, but they held center 
stage for eighteen days in the spring of 1927. Snyder in fact managed 
to seize one more front page in January of the next year, when as a 
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climax to the pornography generated by the case a reporter smuggled a 
camera into Sing-Sing to catch her likeness in the very act of becoming 
the first woman ever to die in the electric chair. 
But the unease about executing Ruth Snyder was minimal next to 
the debate about the judicial process and the death penalty generated 
by the other two most publicized cases of the decade, the very different 
murders of a little boy in Chicago and two shoe company employees in 
New England. 
In the spring of 1924 Bobby Franks, just fourteen, was picked al­
most at random as the victim of a "perfect crime" plotted by his distant 
relative, eighteen-year-old Richard Loeb, and Loeb's friend and sexual 
partner, Nathan Leopold, then nineteen. The two youths, pampered, 
rich, and brilliant, respectively the youngest graduates ever of the Uni­
versities of Michigan and Chicago, had tired of committing vandalism, 
setting fires, stealing small items, and cheating at cards. A bigger thrill 
would be murder, best done after a kidnapping, best yet after collecting 
a ransom. The plan was made and rehearsed, the ransom note already 
composed on a stolen typewriter, when after cruising the North Side and 
losing a couple of prospects they spotted Bobby and talked him into their 
rented car. With Leopold driving, Loeb butchered the boy with a chisel, 
and after he had bled to death the two stuffed him into a culvert. 
But for all their intelligence—Leopold was supposed to have an I  Q 
of 200—the teenagers failed to destroy all the evidence, and an inten­
sive manhunt (the officers joined by a too-talkative Loeb) turned up the 
body, the chisel, the typewriter, and Nathan Leopold's eyeglasses. The 
two soon confessed, each blaming the other. As Leopold's father begged 
Clarence Darrow to take their case, the Chicago Tribune offered to 
broadcast the trial over the radio. 
There was no hope with a jury, the "sense of the community." "Fun-
Killers" to the popular press, the two were Jewish, homosexual, rotten-
spoiled, "moral imbeciles." Darrow chose a bench trial, before a single 
judge. He then pleaded his clients guilty for an astonishing thirty-three 
days, mostly devoted to disagreement among "alienists," or psychia­
trists, brought by both sides. The strategy was announced before it all 
began: "While the state is trying Leopold and Loeb, I will try capital 
punishment." 
Capital punishment was then in fact healthier than either of the de­
fendants. The actual number of hangings or electrocutions continued 
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to slide, but legal abolition had lost its political appeal. While in most 
states reserved as a practical matter for murder, execution for rape was 
not uncommon in the South, almost always for blacks, and Kentucky, 
having adopted the electric chair in 1911, reinstituted hanging in 1920 
as a more painful alternative for this crime alone, following an especially 
vicious child rape and murder. Much more rarely robbery or kidnap­
ping might earn death for those convicted. The sporadic legislative abo­
litions of the Progressive Era had dried up, and Washington, Oregon, 
and Arizona all reversed themselves as a result of the violent emotions 
stirred during and just after World War I. The only states that did not 
practice capital punishment in the 1920s were then Michigan, Wiscon­
sin, and Rhode Island, the three that had signed off during the antebel­
lum period of romantic reform, together with Kansas and the Dakotas, 
which had joined them during the Progressive Era and weathered the 
war. Illinois was emphatically not on the list. 
But Clarence Darrow, playing to a national audience as well as to 
Chief Justice John R. Caverly of the Cook County Court, summed up 
in an eloquent twelve-hour plea that some papers printed in full. Aside 
from the traditional argument that state-sponsored hanging was barba­
rous both in itself and in its effect on society, he made two substantive 
points. First was that his clients were "mere boys," not that much older 
than their victim; Illinois had never executed anyone that young, and 
almost never anyone, of any age, who had voluntarily pleaded guilty to 
murder. The second was more controversial: he did not know, or care, 
Darrow insisted, whether they were "insane," medically or legally. (In 
fact, given the planning and the attempt to hide evidence, it was clear 
that they did not qualify under the M'Naghten rule.) But there was 
clearly something wrong with them: "somewhere in the infinite pro­
cesses that go to the making up of the boy or the man something 
slipped." Perhaps it was heredity, perhaps Leopold s reading of Fried­
rich Nietzsche on "the superman" or Loeb's obsession with crime 
stories. The alienists had been divided, or uncertain, except for one 
Dr. William Krohn, who, Darrow pointed out, had abandoned the 
practice of medicine sixteen years earlier to make his living solely as an 
expert witness for prosecutors willing to hire him. But no expertise was 
needed to see that his clients were sick, "emotionally defective": the 
very lack of comprehensible motive that made the crime so horrible was 
itself a proof that his clients were in some sense not responsible actors. 
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In the end Judge Caverly sentenced Leopold and Loeb to life in 
prison without parole, largely, he said, because of their youth. Reform­
ers were moved by the rest of Darrow s argument, but much of the 
public, partly influenced by rumors of his million-dollar fee, was out­
raged by his success. As the New York Morning Telegraph put it, "Law, 
the bastard daughter of justice, handed her mother a frightful beating 
in Chicago yesterday." (Both sides on the capital punishment issue felt 
vindicated by the eventual aftermath: after years of highly pampered 
life in Northern Illinois Penitentiary, Richard Loeb was stabbed to 
death after a failed homosexual rape in 1936, while Nathan Leopold, 
paroled in 1958, went to work as a lab technician in an impoverished 
Puerto Rican church.) 
The outcomes were different for Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Van­
zetti, accused of robbery murder in the spring of 1920. The crime in­
volved five men who on the afternoon of April 15 drove up to the Slater 
and Morrill Factory in South Braintree, Massachusetts, just as the shoe 
company's payroll arrived, shot down Paymaster Frederick Parmenter 
and his guard, Alessandro Berardelli, and then escaped with $16,000 in 
a touring car of unidentified make. Sacco and Vanzetti, one a skilled 
shoemaker, the other a fish peddler, were arrested on May 5, after they 
had stopped by a garage to ask for what may have been the bandits' 
car. Both were found to be carrying guns and radical pamphlets, 
and—unsure of the charge—gave evasive answers when asked for 
alibis. 
This behavior was not unusual among the little group of Italian an­
archists to which both men belonged, and whose members, during the 
last stages of the postwar Red Scare, were being continually questioned, 
illegally rounded up, asked to betray their friends, and sometimes 
beaten and deported by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 
And over the next seven years, while the case grew enormously complex 
both legally and technically, the issue of political belief remained at its 
core. Supporters argued that principled pacifist champions of the work­
ing class could not possibly have committed such a brutal crime, an 
obviously professional job, in which the robbers had not only executed 
two ordinary workingmen but afterward, during the escape, had 
sprayed gunshots at witnesses peeking out from factory windows along 
the route. At the same time, although not unanimously convinced of 
their guilt, Pinkertons, federal agents, and state and local police be­
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lieved in general that "Godless atheists" and radicals made especially 
satisfying suspects, and what were they doing with loaded revolvers? 
But at the time of the arrests, the issue for the prosecution was how 
to turn suspicion into guilt, especially since the nearlyfifty eyewitnesses 
to the murders, although on the whole agreed that Italians were in­
volved, were otherwise hopelessly divided about nearly everything they 
had seen. The biggest problem was that while Nicola Saccos unremark­
able face might be made to fit some descriptions, it was hard to fix the 
unforgettable Bart Vanzetti, with his piercing eyes, hawk nose, and 
dramatic swooping mustache. The ingenious solution arranged by Dis­
trict Attorney Frederick Katzmann was to try Vanzetti that June for an 
aborted holdup in nearby East Bridgewater, the previous Christmas 
Eve, also by a gang in a car. Sacco had punched his factory time card 
that day, but a handful of the many witnesses, changing their inquest 
testimony, identified Vanzetti as one of the bandits—one of them knew 
he was an immigrant "by the way he ran." A lackadaisical defense relied 
wholly on the apparently solid alibi that Vanzetti had spent the day 
delivering eels, a traditional treat, to his usual Italian Catholic custom­
ers in North Plymouth. The all-Yankee jury (Vanzetti s attorneys had 
challenged no one) did not buy the stories of a dozen foreigners, and 
the defendant had next to face a murder trial with a record for at­
tempted murder and robbery of a shoe company payroll. 
That trial opened on May 31, 1921, Katzmann for the prosecution, 
before Judge Webster Thayer, who had already presided over Vanzetti s 
conviction. The defense, supported by modest contributions from 
friends, neighbors, and anarchists, was led by Fred Moore, a flamboyant 
Californian with a reputation as a radicals' lawyer, who soon alienated 
local opinion with his long hair, casual courtroom clothing, and above 
all interviews denouncing American capitalist justice. Confused and 
contradictory eyewitnesses for the prosecution were matched by alibi 
witnesses for the defense who had some trouble remembering just what 
they were doing on a particular day more than a year earlier. Jurors, 
resentful at being sequestered, had a hard time with the ballistics testi­
mony, "a wilderness of lands and grooves." Two for the prosecution 
claimed that the bullet that killed Berardelli was "consistent with" one 
fired from Saccos Colt .32, while two for the defense denied it. The 
defendants testified on their own behalf, and with the judges permis­
sion were questioned extensively about their politics, their dodging of 
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the draft during the recent war, and their atheist religious views. Judge 
Thayer, who freely gave out interviews criticizing the defense, had told 
reporters, "You wait 'til I give my charge to the jury—I'll show 'em." 
He delivered on July 14, summing up the case for the prosecution, in 
a speech heavily flavored with references to God and Country, and in a 
matter of hours Sacco and Vanzetti were convicted of murder in the 
first degree. 
To that moment this one case had commanded little national atten­
tion, given the crowded American criminal calendar. But Fred Moore's 
tactics were more successful at making martyrs of his clients than free­
ing them, and within months there were bombs and demonstrations 
outside U.S. embassies from Rome to Montevideo. And as Moore was 
replaced with William Thompson, American supporters began to rally 
also, civil libertarians and radicals joined by a few conservatives like 
Thompson himself, who simply believed that two innocent men had 
not gotten a fair trial. Thompson filed a motion for retrial on the 
grounds that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence; five 
supplementary motions were added over the next two years, mostly 
based on the impeachment of prosecution witnesses. Another one was 
based on an affidavit from former state police captain William Proctor, 
who had testified about Sacco s gun for the prosecution and had since 
changed his mind. All of these motions, under Massachusetts law, had to 
go though Judge Thayer. He denied them en masse on October 1,1924. 
One month later Celestino Madeiros was arrested for killing an el­
derly cashier in a bank holdup and locked up next to Nick Sacco in the 
Dedham jail. Young Madeiros was a member of the well-known Mo­
relli Gang, which many law enforcement officers thought had done the 
job in South Braintree as well. The next year, after his own murder trial, 
he confessed to it, in a statement marked both by apparently inside 
knowledge and elementary mistakes about the case. Defense investiga­
tors meanwhile crisscrossed the country, interviewing witnesses and pri­
soners, filing dozens of affidavits involving changes of testimony, alibis, 
and confessions, all of them countered by the state. After the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 1926 turned down appeals from 
Thayer's denials, Thompson filed another motion based on the Ma­
deiros confession. Thayer quashed that as well; the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts upheld him, on the grounds that it had no 
power to review the facts of the case if there were no technical errors. 
 227 World War I to World War II
Four days later, on April 5, 1927, Judge Thayer condemned Sacco and 
Vanzetti to death. 
But the case was still not over. The antiforeign bias shown in the 
Dedham courtroom helped fan anti-American bias abroad, where the 
appeal of radicalism was far stronger than in the United States, and the 
electric chair, so very American, inspired a special horror. The Italian 
government had sent representatives from the first, and the death pen­
alty sparked not only huge demonstrations in Moscow and elsewhere 
but also formal protests from the Vatican, the French Chamber of 
Deputies, and the German Reichstag. Both men had won passionate 
partisans in this country as well, Sacco as a hardworking family man, 
Vanzetti for his powerful combination of humility and a peculiar elo­
quence in broken English. On the other side, all of this unprecedented 
support from abroad and from the left created a resentful backlash 
among more conservative citizens of Massachusetts, who felt their 
whole judicial system was being put on trial. Caught in the political 
crossfire, Governor Alvan T. Fuller was persuaded to appoint a special 
three-man commission, headed by Harvard University president Law­
rence Lowell, to advise him about clemency. 
In addition to reviewing existing evidence, the Lowell Commission 
brought in a new expert, Calvin Goddard, to do the ballistics all over 
again. As it happened, roughly between the time of the murders in 
1920 and the death sentence in 1927, three Americans, Charles A. 
Waite, Philippe Gravelle, and Goddard himself had in effect revolu­
tionized the still-controversial study of ballistics. The United States for 
the first time was moving into the forefront of a key forensic science, 
and one of special importance in this country. The majority of Ameri­
can murder cases by then involved guns, and although the guns them­
selves were often ditched, investigators almost always had bullets to 
work with, and usually shells. While the self-taught "experts" at the trial 
and afterward had peered through glasses and microscopes, taking notes 
and making pictures, Goddard now had a new invention, the compari­
son microscope, which allowed him—and others—to see two bullets 
and their unique markings simultaneously. Armed with this, he con-
cluded—and persuaded two previous defense experts—that the bullet 
that killed Alessandro Berardelli had been fired from the Colt .32 that 
Nicola Sacco, with fatal foolishness, was still allegedly carrying three 
weeks later. 
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The Lowell Commission was convinced, and Governor Fuller re­
fused clemency on August 3. But expert testimony is not always con­
vincing, especially in cases involving ideology or high emotion, and 
given the possibility of switching guns or bullets over the years—the 
prosecution, and indeed the defense, had not always played fair—the 
partisans were not persuaded. The month of August was filled with a 
hot blizzard of appeals and exceptions: to Thayer again, who turned 
down a motion charging himself with judicial bias; to the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts; to members of the federal circuit court 
and Supreme Court of the United States. All were denied, Justice Oli­
ver Wendell Holmes of the Supreme Court ruling that the federal ju­
diciary had no right to intervene in a state criminal case unless the 
proceedings there were "absolutely void," that is, in blatant violation of 
the Constitution. 
As the final gasp of organized anarchism in the United States, that 
month was also punctuated with bombings of the homes of jurors, legal 
officials, and churches. As the fatal day approached the city of Boston 
was filled with local, state, metropolitan, prison, and Cambridge po­
licemen, more uniformed force than at any time since the American 
Revolution. And on August 23, 1927, more than seven years after the 
murders, millions mourned as Sacco and Vanzetti were finally electro­
cuted, together with the nearly forgotten Celestino Madeiros, the only 
three condemned men in the history of Charlestown State Prison to 
refuse the final ministrations of a clergyman. 
But their deaths, even their funerals, the most spectacular in the his­
tory of the state, did not truly close the most technically and legally 
tangled case in American history. Francis Russell, its leading historian, 
after rerunning the Goddard tests again in 1961, came eventually to 
agree with Carlo Tresca, the dean of American anarchists, that Sacco 
was guilty but Vanzetti was not. But this emotionally unsatisfying (if 
quite possibly correct) conclusion only dramatizes the fact that the case 
left scars, doubts, and divisions that would not easily heal. 
Whether struck by the very differing stories of Al Capone, Bart Van­
zetti, or Richard Loeb, thoughtful Americans at the close of the 1920s 
had reason to worry about murderous violence and problems in the 
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justice system. President Herbert Hoover commissioned an unprece­
dented study of law enforcement in the United States, and the resulting 
Wickersham Commission report, issued in twelve volumes beginning 
in 1931, summed up the prevailing wisdom about crime and criminal­
ity, police, prosecution, prison, and parole. And the next year, reflecting 
many of the same concerns, Professor H. C. Brearly published the first 
scholarly study of the subject, Homicide in the United States. 
Brearly was interested less in the famous cases than in the ordinary 
ones that made up the "homicide rate." And he was concerned above 
all with four questions: Was this in fact "the most lawless of civilized 
nations"? Was the rate going up or down? What were the patterns of 
homicide? And how,finally, to explain both patterns and rates? 
He recognized that the available national statistics, based since 1906 
on the registration of death certificates, were seriously flawed. But the 
comparisons used to answer hisfirst question were bigger than any pos­
sible errors: the figures showed that during the 1920s the American 
homicide rate was 8.4 per 100,000, more than 10 times Japans 0.8, 
5 times the 1.6 for Ontario, nearly 17 times the 0.5 for England and 
Wales, and 47 times the Swiss 0.18. Only the provinces of southern 
Italy had higher rates than the overall U.S. average, but even there the 
22.0 for Sicily was topped by the 30.0 for the state of Florida. 
The statistical problem made it harder to judge direction, but while 
suspect, the same figures showed a ragged upward trend from 1906 to 
1929: from 5.0 to 8.5. The differing geographic patterns, however, like 
the gaps between rates in the United States and other nations, were big 
past all denying. Vermont had the lowest rate at 1.4, Florida the highest 
at 30.0; in general the South led all regions, followed by the Far West, 
the Midwest, andfinally New England and the northern plains. 
The most obvious change in the patterns of homicide was the in­
creased use of guns. During the mid-1920s, Brearly s figures showed, 
guns were responsible for 71 percent of all deaths, a few points higher 
in rural areas, lower in urban. An independent and more recent sam­
pling of 513 homicide indictments in Philadelphia for the years 1920, 
1926, and 1932 underlines the point: 64 percent of the nonaccidental 
victims died of gunshot wounds, a sharp rise from the 42 percent for 
sampled years earlier in the twentieth century and far greater than the 
25 percent for the whole of the nineteenth century. Shotguns and rifles 
in rural areas were economic tools for most and recreation for many; 
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the guns involved in city shootings were almost always revolvers, eco­
nomic tools only for robbers, but widely owned and sometimes carried 
by fearful people of all kinds. The surging urban prosperity of the pe­
riod made cheap pistols more affordable than ever, and the publicity 
given crime news added to the fear, as the issue of handgun control 
took on a new intensity, with several national organizations and state 
legislatures taking up the cause. 
African-American men and women were especially vulnerable to gun 
deaths, and across the country, as earlier in Philadelphia, accounted for 
proportionally more of them than any other group. This was still an era 
in which blacks were more likely to be murdered by whites than vice 
versa, and had more reason to be afraid downtown at night. For more 
than a century their own neighborhoods had been zoned, by the domi­
nant powers, as "red-light districts," and the nasty underside of the Jazz 
Age was that places like Harlem, Beale Street, and Storyville were full 
not only of music but also of prostitutes, gambling halls, illegal speak­
easies, and wired-up strangers looking for action. And for many resi­
dents, in the North as well as the South, the justice system was no ally, 
and instead of a beacon of help in time of danger a blue uniform was 
seen as a red flag. Police brutality was one of the major targets of the 
Wickersham Commission. And in an era when the Philadelphia de­
partment averaged about 7 killings a year, New York 22, and Chicago 
nearly 45, too many of the victims were black men. 
One result of the vicious circle of gun carrying was that every en­
counter in the black ghetto was potentially lethal; the weapons carried 
for protection against gangs and strangers turned too often against 
family and friends. The result was another vicious circle: while the 
African-American population in most cities was still a small minority, 
it was increasingly identified with the crime of murder. The black death 
rate from homicide, according to Brearly s figures, was between seven 
and eight times the white death rate during the middle of the 1920s, 
and while the largely rural South had the highest rates overall, both 
black and white rates were highest in small cities and heavily publicized 
in big ones like Chicago and New York. Still largely denied the regi­
menting experience of office and factory, which raised the suicide-
murder ratio among white immigrants, African-American newcomers 
encountered the city only as a place of marginal employment, full of 
unfamiliar tensions and troubles. Even among the relatively well-off 
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policyholders of the Metropolitan Insurance Company, Bready pointed 
out, homicide among young adult black males ranked third as cause of 
death, behind only tuberculosis and pneumonia, two diseases then es­
sentially incurable. 
Among whites, the most notorious major change during the 1920s 
was the number of gangland murders: the Illinois Crime Survey 
counted 130 of these in Chicago during the two years 1926-27, 
roughly 18 percent of all nonaccidental killings. And while this was an 
unusual sample, taken at the peak of Al Capone s campaign to establish 
a racketeering monopoly, other places from Los Angeles to Philadelphia 
reported the same kinds of deaths in lesser number. The common de­
nominators were the evident efficiency of the execution, the fact that if 
they did not simply speed away immediately the killers dumped the 
victim's body in a river, park, or empty lot, the lack of cooperative 
witnesses, and as a result of these a dismal record for successful prose­
cutions. Not one of the 130 Chicago cases cited above resulted in a 
conviction of any kind. In Philadelphia the number is hard to count; 
a number of killings that in court were said to involve self-defense or 
no apparent motive at all were rumored to be related to the activities of 
Mickey Duffy, the Lanzetti brothers, and other local mobsters. The one 
thing clear is that in a city where the police claimed to "solve" nearly 
95 percent of all killings, either through arresting or at least naming a 
fugitive suspect, about half of the twenty-five "unsolved" cases in the 
three sample years were identified as gangland killings. 
The other half of the unsolved killings were mostly the result of 
armed robberies, another category that shot up during the 1920s. These 
had earlier been rare crimes in the urban East. But by the 1920s head­
lines continually advertised the fact that automobiles had opened up 
exciting possibilities to up-to-date versions of the Jesse James gang, like 
those who held up the South Braintree payroll, while more modest lone 
gunmen stuck up grocery stores, gas stations, and late-night celebrants 
on city streets. Death was always a danger in armed robberies, unlike 
the muggings or drunk-rollings that had been routine earlier, but the 
exact figure for robbery murders is hard to count, and the indirect toll 
was even more important. 
It is relatively easy for a historian working from official or newspaper 
accounts to find reliable numbers for things like "race" or "weapon"; 
but "robbery" is one of the harder categories to define, and in dealing 
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with motives the historical record is full of flaws and holes. The Chi­
cago Crime Commission found that seventy-one people, exactly 10 
percent of the victims of nonaccidental killings during 1926-27, were 
victims of holdups. This is almost exactly the percentage for Philadel­
phia for the sample years, when both indictments and "unsolved" kill­
ings are added together. But a significant fraction of the fatal shootings 
by policemen also involved robbery suspects. On the other side, armed 
robbery was one of the things that helped to make this a dangerous 
time to be an officer of the law. Brearly noted that fully one in seven 
murder victims in the southern cities of Atlanta, Birmingham, Mem­
phis, and New Orleans during 1921-22 were policemen, and while 
the attempt to enforce Prohibition was said to have cost many deaths, 
armed robbers accounted for all of the four Philadelphia cops killed in 
the sample years and probably most of the twenty in Chicago during 
1926-27. 
The presence of guns, too, quick reactions and quick deaths, helps 
make it hard to pin down what really happened in the many cases in­
volving card games and crapshoots—was the victim cheating, or being 
robbed? Meanwhile the very threat of robbery meant that growing 
numbers of small businessmen kept revolvers within reach, especially 
those involved in illegal sidelines like the numbers racket or liquor sales. 
In Philadelphia during the sample years, save for a single chiropractor 
who strangled his mistress and a University of Pennsylvania student 
accused of shooting a visitor from Dartmouth, all members of the 
middle class indicted for nonaccidental homicide were grocers, saloon 
keepers, or the owner-managers of gas stations. Whether directly or 
indirectly, the victims in these cases died as the result of growing ner­
vousness about guns and cars, the vicious circle that was making the 
city seem a place in which people had reason to fear strangers at night. 
And at the same time there was reason to fear family as well; the last 
major category of homicide to show an increase during the 1920s was 
domestic. This is an easierfigure to calculate than those for robbery. In 
Chicago during 1926-27, 42 husbands and 13 wives were killed by 
their spouses, or 8 percent of the total. But the Chicago figures evi­
dently do not include common-law marriages; in Philadelphia the total 
number of domestic killings during the sample years was 55, the pro­
portion twice as great, at 16 percent. Bothfigures are bigger than those 
for earlier periods. 
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In terms of the history of marriage in general, the rise suggests both 
good news and bad. The good news is that the relations between urban 
husbands and wives were in some ways growing closer over time and 
that more members of the working class—as always the great majority 
of killers and victims—were entering long-term relationships. The bad 
news is that in the city marriage for many working people had always 
been an economically unstable relationship and that the underside of 
love and affection is possessiveness, jealousy, and tension. 
Both points are most strikingly illustrated by the situation of black 
Philadelphians. During the 1920s as earlier, most of the city's African-
American adults were married, and the great majority of children were 
born into legitimate two-parent families. But the strains on these fami­
lies were enormous. As always, the move from country to city meant a 
movement from a family unit in which shared work was essential to a 
family unit in which husbands and wives worked separately; among the 
poor one paycheck was not enough, and children were almost wholly 
consumers, with no earning power until they were twelve or so. For 
black men the problem was aggravated by the fact that while they were 
still excluded from industrial and office jobs, their wives were far more 
employable. For black women the problem was that the jobs, while 
available, were mostly in badly paid domestic service, the best of them 
as live-in maids—situations that left little room for successful marriage 
or children. 
This uneven situation led to a high rate of separation, divorce, and 
jealousy, and so to an even higher rate of domestic killings among Phil-
adelphia's blacks than others; in the sample years fully 30 percent of 
African-American murders involved husbands and wives. And beyond 
this high rate was as always a distinctive pattern of gender roles as well. 
Black women, historically, had rarely been held in by the narrow roles 
allowed to middle-class whites. And the fact that they went where the 
men went, did what the men did, and often held the high cards in the 
marital and sexual games played by men and women of all races meant 
that they were more likely than white women to play the kind of ag­
gressive roles that might lead to murderous assault. 
Across the country, of 161 women committed to prison for homi­
cide in 1926, some 124 were African American, just 35 white, and 2 of 
"other races." This suggests, however crudely, a huge imbalance in ac­
tual rates of nearly 30 :1  . In Philadelphia during the sample years it was 
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even bigger. Just 3 white women were indicted for nonaccidental kill­
ings, and another, Irene Etter, committed suicide in the spring of 1932 
after shooting her steelworker husband and Gwendolyn Shinn, a 
twenty-two-year-old boarder in their household. But 17 black women 
were indicted; with the black population about one-tenth the white, 
that is a ratio well over 40:1. 
These black women were involved in a range of incidents. Constance 
Thomas, who had put up most of the money for their West Philadel­
phia restaurant, shot and killed her abusive husband in 1926, and while 
there was clearly malice aforethought, a jury decided that she was pro­
voked, and she was sentenced to 9 to 18 years for second-degree mur­
der. Eva Coleman, in the same year, had an argument with her landlady 
over her child's noisy behavior, slashed the woman to death, and fled. 
As a dramatic example of the growing importance of ordinary homicide 
detection in police work, she was arrested twenty-two years later, in 
Chicago, under a new name, and returned to receive a suspended sen­
tence for manslaughter in 1948. Six women killed other women, 11 
killed men, mostly husbands, at home, during parties, in back yards 
and streets. Six used guns, 8 knives or other sharp weapons, 1 a lighted 
oil lamp, and 1 an iron bar. Very strikingly, 5 of the 11 who killed men 
did not use guns, or physical "equalizers," but knives, at close quarters, 
showing a kind of strength and confidence almost unknown among 
white women at any time. 
Almost as striking is the utter absence of indictments for infanticide 
in Philadelphia, among either black women or white, or among black 
women in Chicago during 1926-27. While infanticide accounted in 
England for nearly a third of all homicides and was important on the 
Continent, Brearly sfigures show that by the 1920s it had dropped un­
der 2 percent of U.S. homicide deaths. This reflects, not just the quea­
siness about prosecuting such cases that had been growing since the 
Puritan era in New England, but a real drop in their number. Living 
standards, women's wages, and hospital birthings continued to rise, and 
the 1920s marked an especially important turn in the nature of adop­
tion. While black communities, always sympathetic to the plight of 
single mothers, had a long tradition of informal adoption, white cou­
ples well into the twentieth century preferred to "foster" healthy boys 
already old enough to work. Only in the 1920s and 1930s did "senti­
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mental" adoption overtake this hard-headed economic approach. And 
as celebrities such as Babe Ruth, Al Jolson, and George Burns and 
Gracie Allen helped to publicize the adoption of infants, especially girls, 
some of the worst pressures on pregnant unwed mothers were eased. 
But whatever the specific patterns of homicide in the United States, 
Professor Brearly was interested above all in why there was so much of 
it. And his survey is a marvelous guide both to the questions and preju­
dices of contemporary laymen and to the answers provided sometimes 
by common sense and sometimes by sociological expertise. 
Were American murder rates so high, first, as the underside of our 
go-getting spirit, a by-product of the nation's wealth and power? Clearly 
not, Brearly pointed out; the impoverished South had the worst record 
of all sections, the rich Northeast the best. Was it the aftermath of war, 
the glorification of killing? Again not; compare the lower rates of Eu­
ropean nations far more affected than we. Was it the American media, 
the movies and the papers? This made more sense, and various experts 
were worried that the gunplay in Wild West silents created violent fan­
tasies in delinquent kids. But children themselves, when surveyed, did 
not identify with movie villains, remembering mostly that they all died 
or went to prison. The sensational papers made better targets, together 
with books and dime novels that glorified criminals like Jesse James. 
And although again there was little hard evidence to go on, at least one 
well-publicized killing had an apparent "copycat" effect. 
One of the few individual cases described in Brearly's study was that 
of Edward Hickman, a young man who in 1927 kidnapped, ransomed, 
murdered, and mutilated a little girl named Marion Parker in Los An­
geles. Sex murders were still not routine events in that day—there were 
only three reported in the sample years for Philadelphia, two in Chi­
cago during 1926-27—and the heavy coverage of Hickman's crime 
seems to have inspired at least four imitators; the New York City super­
intendent of schools felt the need to warn teachers about letting pupils 
go home in the company of adults not their parents. 
Continuing with his list of possibilities, Brearly dismissed the popu­
lar idea that foreign immigrants pushed up homicide rates; with the 
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possible exception of the Italians, no group was as violent as natives of 
the South and West. (It may be added that despite the publicity sur­
rounding Al Capone, Prohibition era gangsters were often ethnically 
Jewish, Irish, Polish, or white Anglo-Saxon Protestant.) Nor was the 
mixing, the continual contact and sometimes friction among ethnic 
groups and cultures, responsible; no place was more polyglot than New 
York City, and New York in his day had lower homicide rates than the 
nation at large. 
The equally popular idea that the American school system encour­
aged criminal behavior by neglecting the teaching of values in favor of 
an emphasis on secular success and competition was harder to test. But 
Brearly did note that murderers in general had little schooling of any 
kind and that the best schools were in the West, the worst in the South, 
while the East had the lowest homicide rates of all. 
Prohibition was no answer either: American homicide rates were 
high before the Eighteenth Amendment was passed. Neither was the 
simple fact—compare Canada and Australia—that we were a new na­
tion, with a long frontier tradition. 
But above all, Brearly was at pains to disprove the theories of the late 
nineteenth century, the age of Social Darwinism, Robert Dugdale, and 
Cesare Lombroso. The idea that criminals were born and not made, 
that an inherited "stigma of degeneracy" distinguished them physically, 
mentally, and morally from other citizens, was no longer tenable. It 
would be hard, on this basis, to explain why the citizens of Wyoming 
were three times as murderous as those of neighboring Idaho. Careful 
tests of the "IQs" of convicts compared favorably with those of draftees 
during World War I. And although murderers seemed to score lower 
than others, wardens reported that they also tended to be model prison­
ers, by no means "moral degenerates." 
Himself a white South Carolinian, Brearly followed his attack on 
hereditarian dogma by abandoning racist explanations as well. As the 
result of recent studies, he and others were coming to believe that the 
undeniably high incidence of murder and manslaughter among African 
Americans was simply the result of poverty, discrimination, poor edu­
cation, and a history of abuses by the police and justice systems. And 
although more information was needed, it was at least possible that if 
researchers could control for all these environmental factors "approxi­
mately equal homicide rates might be found for the two races." 
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What underlay all of Brearly s conclusions was that as sociology and 
criminology moved toward the middle of the twentieth century they 
were returning to the explanations discovered during the era of roman­
tic reform, a century earlier. While neither he nor the experts surveyed 
for the Wickersham Commission's 1931 Report on the Causes of Crime 
were as optimistic as these distant ancestors about the ease of setting 
things straight, they agreed that crime in general and homicide in par­
ticular were best explained not by heredity but by environment, by 
history and culture. Murder was clearly related, as among blacks, to 
poverty and lack of education. Beyond that, the two most important 
contributors to high rates of homicide were rooted respectively in the 
family and personality and in the legal or justice system. 
Entering the 1920s, Brearly was appalled by the fact there was 1 di­
vorce in this country for about 8 marriages, compared to 1 in 96 in 
Great Britain and 1 in 161 in Canada. Experts found that family in­
stability was clearly related to juvenile delinquency. And with respect 
specifically to murder, they believed that such instability contributed to 
the most common type of homicidal personality. 
There were a number of personality types, described in now out­
moded psychological jargon, that according to current theory seemed 
especially prone to homicidal behavior, beginning with such obviously 
twisted sadists as Leopold and Loeb. But in looking over the range of 
homicidal incidents, Brearly was struck above all by the senselessness of 
most of them, the brawls that seemed to erupt over little or nothing. 
These he thought were the result of a low "sociological age," a failure 
to mature, to move out of the infantile stage of ego into altruism. Some­
times, not wholly ruling out the influence of heredity, he believed that 
the failure might result from feeblemindedness or epilepsy. But more 
often it resulted from failures in upbringing, from being spoiled as a 
child or, without firm parental guidance, from learning antisocial be­
havior from a delinquent "gang." In either case individuals under stress 
expressed their personal weakness and lack of self-control through a 
kind of fatally infantile temper tantrum. 
Brearly offered no solution to the problems of family and child rais­
ing. But when he turned to the law and the justice system his policy 
prescriptions, although sometimes implicit, were entirely clear. The 
most obvious single explanation for high American murder rates was 
the legal availability of guns, above all concealed revolvers, and the fact 
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that carrying guns was associated with manliness especially in the South 
and West. This alone was nearly enough to account for our differences 
with other nations, he pointed out. But there were other issues as well. 
On the question of deterrence, Brearly, like most contemporary ex­
perts, was opposed to legal execution, if only on the less than passionate 
grounds that it was so rare (there were then about one hundred a year) 
that it was irrelevant to most cases. Far more important than severity 
was that punishment be both swift and certain. And here again the 
United States compared badly with continental Europe, where the ju­
dicial system, relying on trained experts, was briskly run by unelected 
and presumably dispassionate judges. 
There was no question that the American justice system was both lax 
and inefficient. While rates differed in every region, state, and county, 
the bottom line was that in a 1923 sample that included most of the 
country, the rate of imprisonment for homicide was 3.6 per 100,000, 
while the homicide rate itself (measured by the death certificates) was 
8.1, meaning that only about 44 percent of killings resulted in any se­
rious punishment at all. Some of this resulted from the weakness of 
police detection; the number of wholly unsolved crimes was smaller in 
European nations, where forces were centralized and enjoyed far more 
prestige than in the United States. (And where, it might be added, au­
tomobiles were still relatively rare, and guns rarer yet.) And if the police 
were a problem, the courts were a disgrace. 
The disgrace, Brearly believed, was rooted both in popular and in 
legal culture. Americans, historically, were tolerant of violence, and in 
all well-publicized cases an often irrational "sympathy for the slayer" 
attached even to such obviously guilty parties as William Gray and 
Ruth Snyder. But other citizens were always irrationally eager to avenge 
death, whatever the evidence against the accused, and very often mur­
der cases were decided before they began, through the contest between 
defense and prosecution over composition of the jury. Again there were 
two sides; American juries were "miniature mobs," their group passions 
easily aroused, while, on the other hand, the professor suggested, many 
reformers would reduce the number needed to convict from twelve to 
ten. The whole emphasis on contest subverted the search for real truth, 
or justice. Public confidence was badly shaken by the obvious fact that 
rich defendants with skillful lawyers fared far better than poor folks and 
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that the legal profession, "like primitive savages," worshiped ritualism 
and outdated precedents that allowed the guilty to escape or win new 
trials on the barest of technicalities. 
And if capital punishment was no deterrent—Brearly again turned 
to statistics, with noncapital Rhode Island having far lower homicide 
rates than capital South Carolina—the evasion of tough punishment 
sent the wrong message about the sanctity of life. As of the mid-1920s, 
the average murder or manslaughter sentence handed down in the 
United States was about twenty years for males, fifteen for females (far 
higher, it may be noted, than in any earlier time). But as the result of 
casual pardons and paroles (rarely granted by the kind of experts the 
professor favored), the men typically served only about five years, the 
women three, a kind of "lenient treatment" that helped to explain, he 
believed, why murder rates stayed high. 
But while Brearly s statistics were a useful rough guide to many aspects 
of American homicide, he was quite aware that the national registration 
figures he cited were deeply flawed. One of the problems with death 
certificates as a source of "murder rates" is simply that "homicide" is a 
not a medical but a legal term and that doctors tended to write "skull 
fracture" or "renal failure" without indicating how or why these had 
occurred. And with respect to the important issue of comparison across 
time, the apparent ragged rise from 5.0 per 100,000 in 1906 to 8.5 per 
100,000 in 1929 is an utter illusion. In fact, while there are no truly 
definitivefigures, the actual "murder rate" across the United States dur­
ing the early twentieth century almost certainly continued the long 
downward slide of the late nineteenth century, or at worst remained flat 
with a modest upward zig during the "Roaring Twenties." 
The death certificate "registration area," first, did not yet include all 
of the states. The system was pioneered among those with more ad­
vanced medical-bureaucratic procedures, above all in the less murder­
ous North and East, and gradually added others from the South and 
West. The apparent 1906-29 "rise" then mostly resulted from starting 
with states with low homicide rates and adding new ones with high 
rates. If the same places are compared across time, the rise disappears; 
of the 23 states included in the "registration area" in 1912, 1 showed no 
change by 1922, while with a neat symmetry, 11 rose and 11 dropped. 
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Many places in the very earliest years also classified automobile acci­
dents as "homicides," as police departments did, and the time in ques­
tion neatly spans the internal combustion revolution. Motorcars, a rich 
man's luxury in 1906, had become items of mass consumption by 1929. 
Traffic control was still primitive, and elderly pedestrians were more 
used to calculating the oncoming speed of horse-drawn milk wagons 
than of Studebakers, so that deaths from automobile accident were pro­
portionally far more common than now: in Philadelphia there were 
roughly three hundred a year, on average, by the 1920s. These were tech­
nically "homicides," of course, but not in the sense used either earlier 
or later, and the inclusion in any number of the arrests, indictments, or 
death certificates based on them pushed up the "murder rate" artificially. 
Some historical studies, then, uncritically using these misleading "of­
ficial" figures, have published graphs and charts showing wholly erro­
neous rises for the early decades of the century. But if the object is to 
find the "real" murder rate, it is quite clear it was dropping markedly 
outside, perhaps, of the big cities of the Northeast and Midwest. 
The western gunfighter, on either side of the law, was after all a figure 
of the past, with movies stars like Tom Mix taking the place of roman­
ticized real figures like Wyatt Earp. Labor violence continued into the 
1920s and 1930s, with brutal jockeying along picket lines and occa­
sional serious outbreaks, as around the Kentucky mines of "Bloody" 
Harlan County, or in the Memorial Day Massacre of 1937, in which 
pro-union men and women marching on a Republic Steel Plant in 
South Chicago were charged by police; none of the ten men killed in 
that one were armed, and six were shot in the back. But after the brief 
antiradical flare-up around World War I, there were no truly sustained 
episodes comparable to the Rocky Mountain "labor wars," or those that 
had everywhere dogged the International Workers of the World. 
Racism, too, while still intolerably high, accounted for fewer direct 
casualties than in earlier decades. Across the South, its leadership eager 
to be accepted into the modern world of the twentieth century, the day 
of literally murderous politicians like Pitchfork Ben Tillman was done. 
After the flare-up around World War I, race rioting, while it never really 
ended, subsided markedly. So did lynching; another partial victory in 
the long and never-ended battle against racial violence occurred follow­
ing an episode in 1931, in which nine young black men were accused 
of the capital crime of raping two white women in a boxcar passing 
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through Alabama. The "Scottsboro Boys" were tried in a court of law, 
not lynched; in a case that drew in the NAACP and national attention, 
the result of a series of appeals was that over the course of a decade four 
were freed, one fled to Michigan—which refused to extradite him— 
and the remaining four got prison instead of the chair. 
The Native Americans,finally, had been disarmed entirely, and those 
unable or unwilling to join the dominant culture were shut up on re­
servations. During the New Deal of the 1930s an end was made to the 
long and misguided attempt to destroy their tribal structure entirely. 
The reservation still remained a dismal place for most, and for those 
who ventured off to clash with white neighbors in nearby grazing areas 
or barrooms the dominant system of justice remained one-sided or in­
comprehensible. But at least the ancient cycle of interracial murder, 
massacre, and revenge was long dead. 
Why, then, all the publicity about the "lawless decade" of the 1920s? 
Simply that these faraway declines in murderous violence were of little 
concern to most middle-class readers and opinion makers. The census 
of 1920 had marked an enormous demographic milestone: over half 
the population of the United States now lived in "urban" areas—a cate­
gory that covered "suburban" developments as well. And there is no 
doubt that the kinds of homicide thatfilled the news directly concerned 
these people. Armed robberies and gangland slayings happened close to 
home. Al Capone, Nicola Sacco, and Bart Vanzetti were scary represen­
tatives of the new immigrationfilling the cities. The marked increase in 
urban black crime was helping push whites out into the suburbs. The 
most famous cases, as always, involved people from backgrounds much 
like their own: Hall and Mills, Gray and Snyder, Leopold and Loeb. 
Did the increase in gun crimes and robberies actually push up ur­
ban rates? Maybe. But the ongoing urban industrial revolution was still 
demanding the kind of rational regimented behavior that had been 
pushing them down since the 1870s. For all of its failures in other 
ways, national prohibition did work in cutting down much casual 
drinking among the working class, and with it casualfighting. The pub­
lic schools were reaching more kids for longer periods of time, teaching 
them, as always, to sit still, take turns, and mind their betters, helping 
to raise the suicide-murder ratio. And the ongoing power of this kind 
of socialization, together with its absence, may be shown through the 
still contrasting experiences of Philadelphia s Italians and blacks. 
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Among Italian immigrants and their descendants, as they were 
slowly absorbed into the urban industrial revolution, the rate of impris­
onment for murder and manslaughter (eliminating auto and other ac­
cidental homicides) fell by close to a factor of two and a half between 
1901 and 1926, from about 17 to 7. Among excluded African Ameri­
cans the same rate, starting at lower than the Italian at 10, climbed by 
more than a factor of one and a half, to 16. During the same period, 
the rest of the population, including the long-resident native WASPs, 
Germans, and Irish, even the newer Jews, Greeks, and Poles, bumped 
along at a rate that varied from a little over 1 per 100,000 at the begin­
ning to a little less than that at the end. 
Starting in 1931, in response to complaints voiced by scholars like 
Brearly and the Wickersham Commissions Report on Criminal Statis­
tics, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, now headed by J. Edgar 
Hoover, began to collect and publish an annual series, Uniform Crime 
Reports for the United States, based on the number of incidents reported 
to police departments across the country. And while these, too, espe­
cially in the early years, were flawed and incomplete, they provided a 
relatively trustworthy check on the differently gathered mortality statis­
tics, which finally covered the whole nation in 1933. And with various 
yearly zigs and zags, the direction of both indices from the early 1930s 
and for decades afterward was sharply and unmistakably down. 
Publication of the Uniform Crime Reports was only one symbol of the 
many ways in which the federal government was becoming more in­
volved in crimes like homicide, which had earlier been left almost en­
tirely to the states. Congress had begun the process by stretching federal 
law to involve prostitution, drugs, and most famously the sale of alco­
hol. But even as the Eighteenth Amendment was repealed, the federal 
judiciary and even more the executive branch began to expand their 
roles, a trend much dramatized during the 1930s. 
The federal government in fact had a number of weapons to use 
against crime. One of them was exercised following public outcry over 
the brazen St. Valentine's Day Massacre, when state and local authori­
ties seemed powerless to deal with Al Capone. It was finally agents of 
the U.S. Treasury who convicted Capone in 1931, not for these and 
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other murders, his real offense, but—just a year before Prohibition was 
ended—for evading federal income taxes on his illegal gains. 
At the same time, too, the U.S. Supreme Court began for the first 
time to move against local injustice in criminal cases. The legal key to 
the defense of the Scottsboro Boys, mentioned just above, was that the 
Court took on a role that it had earlier refused, notably in the case of 
Sacco and Vanzetti just five years before, in reviewing the record of a 
capital case tried in a state court and deciding on grounds of substance 
and not mere constitutional technicality that the trial had not been fair. 
In an extremely important ruling, the Court in 1932 held in Powell v. 
Alabama that the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which 
guaranteed that no state could "deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property without due process of law," meant that the Bill of Rights 
applied to the states as well as to the federal government. While the 
nine accused had been assigned attorneys just before the trial opened, 
the Court ruled that their defense had been so minimal that the defen­
dants, contrary to Article 6, had in effect been denied "the assistance of 
counsel" and so reversed their death sentences and ordered another 
trial. Three years later, in the same case, the right to intervene was 
broadened when the Court ruled that systematic exclusion of African 
Americans from the jury made the retrial unfair by definition. 
But while in practice the Supreme Court over the next two decades 
moved only hesitantly to expand its role, the Federal Bureau of Inves­
tigation, under the direction of J. Edgar Hoover, positively charged into 
new territory as new crimes caught the public imagination. 
The most notorious of these was the kidnap-murder of little 
Charles A. Lindbergh Jr., son of the first man to fly the Atlantic solo 
and the most internationally famous American of the era. The toddler, 
just twenty months old, was stolen out of his second-story bedroom in 
the little community of Hopewell, New Jersey, on the night of March 
1, 1932. Next day hordes of state and local police clumsily destroyed 
any clues to the kidnapper, notably the sole footprint found at the 
scene. Several ransom notes were, however, delivered to the family, and 
a frantic Lindbergh was determined to pay. But he was long unable to 
make contact, despite desperately running through a series of odd and 
sometimes criminal would-be intermediaries. On April 2, finally, Dr. 
John F. Condon, a retired school principal, passed $50,000 in marked 
bills to a mysterious stranger in a Bronx cemetery. The child was never 
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delivered; six weeks later his body was found in a shallow grave four 
miles from home. 
It was over two years later when, largely by accident, a German im­
migrant named Bruno Hauptmann was caught with some of the ran­
som money. There is little doubt that Hauptmann was the mysterious 
stranger in the cemetery, cashing in on the crime. But the great emo­
tional need at the time was to put full closure to the case, to the family's 
grief and the public s outrage, and he was tried for the actual murder. 
At the trial in Trenton, given the utter lack of eyewitness testimony of 
any kind, the sole link between the defendant and the actual killing was 
the rickety makeshift ladder used to reach the bedroom—Hauptmann 
was a professional carpenter by trade—which a wood expert testified 
had been made of materials taken from his attic. Discovery in later years 
of an FBI memo that called this testimony "fabricated" (with more 
apparent skill than the ladder itself) has cast some doubt on this; but at 
the time, in an apparent victory for "scientific" evidence, it was good 
enough for twelve men to send Hauptmann to the chair. 
More important in the long run was that given the state and local bun­
gling in New Jersey, the case inspired Congress to pass the "Lindbergh 
Law" in 1933, making kidnapping across state lines a federal offense. 
And the list of such offenses, with the FBI responsible for enforcement, 
was quickly expanded into other areas, notably bank robbery. 
Historical changes are always mirrored in cases of homicide. In Phil­
adelphia, as the prosperous 1920s turned into the Great Depression of 
the next decade, in the single year 1932 Wallace Mitchell, father of five, 
was fatally shot by a grocer as he stole a bottle of milk from a back door; 
a railroad guard killed Nathaniel Austin, a black teenager, as he tried to 
steal a bag of coal from a freight train; Joe Garnet, another black man, 
tired of being teased by his wife and others for being unemployed and 
living in a public shelter, turned on his tormenters and stabbed one of 
them to death. Jurors, sympathetic to all parties involved in these little 
tragedies, ruled all of them cases of involuntary manslaughter, with 
light or suspended penalties. But while incidents like these illustrated 
the strains of daily life among the poor, the attentions of press and 
public centered around more dramatic cases, and decreed in effect that 
murderous bank robbery was the characteristic Crime of the Era. 
During the early 1930s, with money hard to get, these robberies 
multiplied especially across the South and Midwest, seriously dividing 
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communities, as those who had had their mortgages foreclosed quietly 
cheered and those with life savings on deposit—in a day before federal 
insurance—were wiped out. As before, local lawmen were easily frus­
trated (sometimes bribed, or scared) by men with machine guns and 
getaway cars speeding quickly out of their jurisdictions. Taking stolen 
cars across state lines had been a federal offense since 1919, and in 
1934, eager to use Hoovers government "G-men" against gangsters of 
all kinds, Congress made it a federal crime to kill a federal officer, to 
transport stolen money or flee prosecution for major crimes across state 
lines, or to rob a national bank. 
Romance had attached to bank robbers since the days of Jesse James, 
and during the depression, with banks and bankers more unpopular 
than ever, the ancient free-floating David and Goliath and Robin Hood 
legends were easily attached to the latest crop. The most notorious was 
then John Dillinger, a sometime farmboy from the Indiana heartland 
whose athleticism and trickery made fools of pursuers all over the Mid­
west. By 1933 not only Dillinger himself but Baby Face Nelson, Pretty 
Boy Floyd, and Homer Van Meter, all loose associates, had become 
famous names as they killed lawmen and citizens, broke jails, and 
robbed banks from Ohio across to South Dakota. Eager to join the 
hunt, Melvin Purvis of the FBI's Chicago office got word in the spring 
of 1934 that members of the mob were relaxing at Little Bohemia 
Lodge, in Rhinelander, Wisconsin. Dozens of agents surrounded the 
place on the night of April 22, and while Dillinger and friends slipped 
off spent the dark hours destroying the fishing resort with gunfire and 
killing an innocent guest, while to compound the embarrassment one 
of the G-men was shot dead in the pursuit that followed. 
This fiasco proved a death warrant for Dillinger and the gang, as a 
furious Hoover offered a huge reward and issued an order to shoot to 
kill. A deal was finally made with an East Chicago prostitute who knew 
the leader's whereabouts. Betrayed by this Lady in Red, his date for a 
movie, John Herbert Dillinger (or was it really him?) was shot down 
outside the Biograph Theater on the night of July 27. The bureau called 
a triumphant press conference the next morning. And while romantics 
mourned the gangsters death—one old girlfriend joined a carnival to 
tell his story—Hoover's masterful publicity machine won the day. 
The other mobile tommy-gunners of the era were soon crushed in 
the same way. Bonnie Parker and Clyde Barrow had been blasted by a 
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posse, in rural Louisiana, a month before Dillinger, but "the feds" 
made the most spectacular hits. Homer Van Meter was gunned down 
in a Minneapolis alley that August. Bureau agents in October shot 
down Pretty Boy Floyd outside of East Liverpool, Ohio, far from the 
Oklahoma hill country where he was a local legend, and in Novem-
ber—at the cost of two more dead G-men—killed Baby Face Nelson 
in a machine-gun duel in rural Illinois. The bureau's deadly reputation 
was further enhanced the next year when they won another bloody 
shootout, outside of a Florida lake resort, with Ma Barker and Fred, the 
last of her bandit sons still alive and free. 
Over the rest of the decade, the director continued to label various 
gangsters "Public Enemy Number One" just before his G-men killed 
or captured them; Hollywood loved it, as gangster movies came to rival 
westerns. Hoover himself was flown in personally to arrest the kidnap­
per and murderer Alvin "Creepy" Karpis in 1936, and three years later 
handcuffed Louis "Lepke" Buchalter, head of Murder, Inc. Both men 
were delighted with that one. Buchalter s loosely organized killers did 
work on contract for various New York labor racketeers and gangsters; 
conviction on a federal drug charge gave him several years to try, vainly, 
to pull the old familiar strings and avoid trial and execution for murder 
in New York. And the surrender to Hoover, of course, arranged by the 
radio personality Walter Winchell to take place publicly, in busy down­
town Manhattan, was another public relations coup for the bureau. 
By then the FBI was working, despite some opposition, to remedy 
an old constitutional problem by creating a kind of voluntary pyramid 
of state and local law enforcement agencies, with itself at the top. Many 
local lawmen were resentful of the FBI's publicity machine, and Augus­
tus Vollmer, a notably innovative head of the International Association 
of Chiefs of Police, was in turn an obvious target of the director s jeal­
ousy. Vollmer, improving on early experiments by Cesare Lombroso, 
had by the 1920s helped devise a polygraph machine that might serve 
as a "lie detector" by measuring a subject's blood pressure, pulse, sweat, 
and respiration rate under questioning. But its results were not accepted 
as "expert" evidence in federal courts, or for many years in states out­
side of Vollmer s own California, in large part because of Hoovers op­
position. The director, too, since the early Red Scare days, had been the 
target of criticism from the political left for his growing paranoia about 
domestic radicalism and subversion, while civil libertarians complained 
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continually about the FBI's trigger-happiness and evasions of constitu­
tional rights. But there was no denying that once Hoover took charge 
in 1924 the bureau had earned a reputation as tough, efficient, and 
incorruptible. And the expansion of federal law gave its agents the right 
(when they were asked, and willing to accept the challenge) to enter a 
number of otherwise local cases, as of homicide, when kidnapping or 
the crossing of state lines was even suspected. 
The long move toward better crime detection, begun late in the 
nineteenth century, had been continuing at several levels. But at the 
bottom, the move toward eliminating the coroner system in favor of 
medical examiners was largely stalled, as politicians preferred to keep 
the coroners and simply hire forensic pathologists as needed. The need 
for Washington's leadership was clear. The International Association of 
Chiefs of Police had been urging a centralized system of fingerprint 
registration for decades when, in 1930, Congress authorized establish­
ment of the Division of Identification within the FBI to keep a file, 
always expanding, of all prints taken in the United States. Two years 
later the bureau opened a laboratory, in part inspired by the Chicago 
Police Department's embarrassing inability, after the St. Valentine's Day 
Massacre, to evaluate ballistic evidence. Beginning in 1932 the bureau's 
expertise was then offered free of charge to any local department that 
asked for it. This was an often slow process, and rarely used, but one 
that came to involve not only ballistics but also, in cooperation with 
university experts across the country, a truly impressive range of physi­
cal evidence from blood and hair to soil, dust, and metallic traces. 
The evolving pyramid was capped when in 1935 the Justice Depart­
ment opened the National Police Academy, in which local officers took 
a series of courses staffed by bureau agents. From the beginning its 
graduates, returning to head divisions and departments back home, 
formed an elite of loyal law enforcement officers, connected to each 
other through the bureau. By the 1940s, then, through initiatives for­
mal and informal, taken by the Congress, the Supreme Court, and the 
FBI, the United States had moved almost as far as the federal system 
would allow toward the kind of centralized national system of criminal 
justice that had long reigned across the Atlantic. 
In terms of crime in general and murder in particular, the decades 
following World War I were full of rapid changes. After a period of 
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unsettled violence at the very beginning, followed by the spectacular 
Roaring Twenties, the nation settled into the Great Depression with 
clearly falling rates of homicide and greatly improved ways of dealing 
with it. But as the 1930s turned into the 1940s, the European conti­
nent, once the symbol of superior civilization, loomed as a place of 
menace and fear. Beginning in 1939 Adolf Hitlers Nazi Germany con­
quered most of its neighbors and made an alliance with imperial Japan, 
which was mounting the same kind of aggression on the other side of 
the world. On December 7, 1941, Japanese planes unexpectedly 
bombed and strafed the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. This 
first foreign attack on American soil since the War of 1812 pulled us 
into the Second World War, blotting out most other issues, and it was 
not at all clear what might follow. 
World War II to the Vietnam War, 
1941-1963 
As it turned out, the outbreak of World War II marked a period 
of unrivaled prosperity that began during the fighting and continued 
for decades, a period marked by much progress and confidence on 
nearly every front except for fear of Russia abroad and subversion 
at home. 
The United States had moved out of the depression and into World 
War II with a government far more centralized than ever and its citizens 
far more united. War production, already begun on behalf of European 
allies, was a tonic for the economy and the blue-collar workforce. The 
need for labor created new factory and office opportunities for blacks 
and for women. After December 7, 1941, there was no need to whip 
the nation into hating distant enemies, given the universal anger stirred 
by the attack on Pearl Harbor. Nearly 11 million American men and 
women went into uniform; and while the 330,000 who died were only 
a fraction of the 50 million killed worldwide, it was clearly the United 
States that dominated the war, and then the world, as confirmed with 
the dropping of the atomic bomb and thefinal victory in August 1945. 
And this time the triumph was not wasted, as the mistakes of the World 
War I era were avoided and the economic and social gains of wartime 
held through the later 1940s and 1950s. 
The result was that in several areas, notably race relations North and 
South, urban living, and murder rates, this was a period of extraordi­
nary promise. 
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As often before, and for the same reasons, the murder rate, as carefully 
measured by the Bureau of Vital Statistics, dropped during wartime. 
And this time, despite a brief upward blip in 1946-47 as the servicemen 
came home, it kept dropping afterward, and none of the violent devel­
opments of the 1920s and 1930s were echoed in the 1940s and 1950s. 
Although relations with wartime Russian allies soon turned bitter, 
the resultant fear of communist subversion, or the Red Scare, involved 
neither bombs nor murderous vigilantes. Labor and capital, with 
booming prosperity to divide between them, kept their competition 
largely free of bloodshed, supervised by federal rules and agencies cre­
ated during the New Deal. Returning black men in uniform, some of 
them with new ideas about civil rights, were not greeted with a wave of 
race riots or lynchings. Those who had won places in factories were 
enlisted by national unions, which sometimes helped ease friction with 
white co-workers and neighbors while protecting their new jobs. 
The FBI was stronger than ever, basking in its role as protector 
against Russian spies and communist subversives, and the day of bank 
robbers wielding tommy guns seemed as dead as that of outlaws with 
six-shooters. Urban gangsters did not go away, and in some ways the 
business of vice, especially drugs and gambling, was run more efficiently 
than ever. But while there were some shootouts and casualties, the very 
purpose of "organized" crime—involving loose cooperative and terri­
torial arrangements among otherwise separate groups—was to cut 
down on the kind of murderous competition associated earlier with Al 
Capone s Chicago. The city of Las Vegas, which began to rise out of the 
Nevada desert during the early 1940s and soared through the 1950s, 
was one sign among many that a new generation was working toward 
quasi-respectable and "front" operations, relying less on triggermen 
and more on lawyers. 
Newspaper readers, as always, had murder to read about, and just 
after the war the widely publicized case of William Heirens sounded 
dim echoes of Leopold and Loeb for them to talk about. Heirens, from 
a rich suburban family, was a brilliant student who skipped the fresh­
man year when admitted to the University of Chicago. That June 1945 
he slashed a middle-aged woman to death when she discovered him 
burglarizing her North Side apartment, and in December he shot and 
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stabbed a young nurse under the same circumstances, writing, in lip­
stick, a note on her bedroom wall: "For Heaven's sake catch me before 
I kill more. I cannot control myself." Six months after he had killed and 
dismembered six-year-old Suzanne Degnan, in January 1946, he was 
finally captured while attempting another burglary. 
In an age fascinated by Sigmund Freud, and by the promise of sci­
entific advance, the Heirens case was red meat. During the war, al­
though American intelligence had failed to come up with a drug to use 
in breaking enemy agents, psychiatrists did discover that sodium pen­
tathol might unlock buried memories in shell shock victims, easing 
them into talking about matters that they had been suppressing. Billed 
as "truth serum," it offered the exciting possibility that criminal sus­
pects, too, might be made to talk, unable to lie to police. And in the 
summer of 1946, for the first time in a criminal case, it was used on 
William Heirens. 
The effect of injecting young Heirens with the drug was that he at 
first described the crimes, in detail, but as the work of someone else, 
evidently an alter ego he called "George Murman," whose surname 
amateur psychiatrists were able to translate as "Murderman." Later he 
offered a more coherent confession. As a boy, incapable of normal 
sexual relations, he had spent much time pasting Nazi pictures into a 
scrapbook, playing with guns, settingfires, and burglarizing houses. His 
gruesome obsession with the bodies of his three victims had given the 
papers much to hint at; and the issue of his sanity together with his age 
were mitigating factors that helped a judge and prosecutor to agree to 
sparing him death, after a guilty plea, in favor of three life sentences 
without parole. 
But while many clung to hope in the potential of truth serum, as the 
ultimate "scientific" aid to police work (and perhaps psychiatry), its 
apparent magic quickly faded under assault from two professions. Psy­
chiatrists found its effect on the mind to be wholly unreliable, as in 
the Heirens case, and the Illinois Supreme Court condemned its use 
without permission as a clear violation of the Fifth Amendment right 
against self-incrimination. The business of "lie detecting" was left, 
then, to the more familiar polygraph machine. This was still viewed 
with some skepticism, but beginning in 1947 its results were allowed as 
expert evidence in most states, provided both prosecution and defense 
stipulated in advance that they would use them. 
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But the big news in the postwar era was in any case not crime but 
communism, and the biggest capital case involved not homicide but 
espionage, the result of the shock administered by the Soviet Unions 
explosion of an atomic bomb in September 1949. In the context of the 
developing Cold War, the blast shattered not only the previous Ameri­
can monopoly on atomic weapons but American nerves and compla­
cency as well. The FBI then found that the wartime bomb project in 
Los Alamos, New Mexico, had been penetrated by foreign agents, ex­
plaining how and why the Russians had so quickly mastered the tech­
nology. The key scientific information had been passed, it turned out, 
by Klaus Fuchs, a British citizen and communist refugee from Nazi 
Germany who had joined the project in 1944. Fuchs was arrested in 
England in February 1950, and shortly offered a confession that led 
back to the United States. 
With much work and some luck the FBI was able within months to 
identify the go-between between the scientist and the Russians as a 
Philadelphia chemist named Harry Gold. Gold, like Fuchs, confessed 
to having worked to advance the ideals of Soviet communism, which 
had since the war disillusioned both of them. And he provided another 
name, David Greenglass, a former technician at Los Alamos who had 
supplied some of the nuts-and-bolts to make real bombs of Fuchs s 
theory. After first protesting ignorance Greenglass and his wife also con­
fessed to passing secrets, and they named as the head of the spy ring 
David's brother-in-law, sometime machine-shop partner and longtime 
mentor Julius Rosenberg. 
Harry Gold pleaded guilty. Julius Rosenberg, his wife, Ethel, his 
longtime friend, Morton Sobell, and David Greenglass were all indicted 
for espionage, together with a long-departed minor Russian "diplo­
mat." The trial opened in March 1951, at the very height of the war 
begun a year earlier when the United States had come to the aid of 
South Korea, invaded by the communist North. Greenglass pleaded 
guilty at the outset, so that the proceedings involved the Rosenbergs 
and Sobell only. No testimony implicated Sobell, who refused to take 
the stand, in the specific trade in atomic secrets. Most of the govern-
ment's case was built on Gold and Greenglass, plus other witnesses who 
testified to the defendants' communist views, their plans to flee to 
Mexico after Fuchs's arrest, and other acts deemed incriminating. With 
Sobell mute, virtually the only defense was the testimony of the Ro­
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senbergs themselves, who simply and stubbornly denied all involve­
ment in spying and insisted that Greenglass, who had fallen out with 
his brother-in-law, was maliciously lying. The verdict of guilty, on 
March 29, was no surprise. But the sentences were. Klaus Fuchs, in 
England, had already drawn the British maximum of 14 years; Harry 
Gold, 30. In this case Judge Irving R. Kaufman handed 30 years to 
Sobell, 15 to Greenglass, and on April 6, as courtroom observers gasped 
and even screamed, condemned not only Julius but also Ethel Rosen­
berg to death in the electric chair. 
Since the founding of the American Republic the number of crimes 
that earned capital punishment had been shrinking steadily, although 
an occasional scare or case suggested new ones, in some states, such as 
assault by a life-term prisoner, bombing, or kidnapping. As of 1951 
there were still a number for which no one had been executed in de-
cades—15 states had "carnal knowledge" on the books, 7 bombing, 
4 arson, 2 train wrecking. "Treason" against an individual state had 
resulted in no deaths since John Brown, in 1859, was hanged by the 
Commonwealth of Virginia. Only 6 of the many states that provided 
death for kidnapping had actually carried it out since 1930; for assault 
by a lifer, thefigure was 1 execution in the 5 states that made it a capital 
offense; for armed burglary, 2 of 4; robbery, 7 of 10; rape, 18 of 19. 
Only murder was in practice as well as in law a capital crime in the 
majority of states, all 44 of those that legalized the death penalty. But a 
federal capital case was largely new country, and while the Rosenberg 
trial itself had created little public outcry at the time—the Russians, 
firmly in control of Communist parties the world over, had no wish to 
publicize it—the sentences did. 
The protests in some ways echoed those inspired earlier by Sacco and 
Vanzetti, and only partly because all parties were highly conscious of 
that earlier case. Again the fact that much of the campaign that de­
nounced either the trial or the sentence was inspired by Soviet Russia 
did not account for protests from the Vatican, or among many non- or 
anticommunist citizens across the Western world. While neither Ro­
senberg had the charismatic eloquence of Bart Vanzetti, the very ordi­
nariness of their middle-class life and looks counted for them; while a 
strong case was made for their involvement in specific acts of espionage, 
it was hard to believe David Greenglass s unsupported allegations that 
they were spymasters on a grand scale. Ethel in particular had played at 
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most a helping role, as in typing notes, and the traditional aversion to 
executing women was compounded by the fact that the couple were 
evidently devoted parents to two small boys. 
Less of the uproar than with Sacco-Vanzetti centered on the Rosen-
bergs' possible innocence, more on the harshness of the sentence. Tried 
during the height of the McCarthy era, when accusations of commu­
nist sympathies often pointed to "New York Jewish intellectuals," the 
fact that the jury that convicted them included no Jews was a sore 
point, despite the ethnic backgrounds of both Judge Kaufman and the 
prosecutor, Irving Saypol (both surely chosen with this in mind), and 
the notable lack of sympathy from B'nai B'rith, the leading watchdog 
against anti-Semitism. 
Legal scholars had a stronger point. The two had been tried for con­
spiracy to commit espionage in wartime, but the war in question had 
been with Nazi Germany; despite mutual hostilities, the United States 
had not then or ever been at war with Soviet Russia, the nation to which 
the secrets were passed. And Judge Kaufman, in a sentencing speech 
rich in references to the evils of International Communism, gave his 
opinion that the Korean War was in part the result of the defendants' 
"treason." No American had in fact ever been executed for treason 
against the United States (John Brown had betrayed Virginia), a crime 
to which a special horror attaches, and that was not the offense with 
which the two were charged or convicted. But all judicial appeals on 
these legal grounds failed, and with the Cold War raging President 
Dwight Eisenhower refused to grant clemency on grounds of compas­
sion. Julius and then Ethel Rosenberg, still protesting innocence, were 
accordingly electrocuted at New York's Sing-Sing Prison on Friday, 
June 19, 1953, just before a late sundown announced arrival of the 
Jewish Sabbath. 
That the Rosenbergs pushed murder out of the headlines for a while 
was no surprise, partly because of the excitement surrounding the Cold 
War and partly because of the lack of excitement then surrounding 
homicide. 
Marvin Wolfgangs classic study, Patterns of Criminal Homicide, pub­
lished in 1957, was based on an analysis of all 625 cases reported to the 
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Philadelphia police between 1948 and 1952. Wolfgang, a criminolo­
gist, was able to follow the homicide unit as it did its daily work, and 
s6 to offer far more detail and accuracy than any historian working out 
of dusty and reluctant paper records. In retrospect the five years of his 
study covered the very height of the ongoing urban industrial revolu­
tion, and clearly showed its long-term effects, as the collective portrait 
Wolfgang drew from life (and death) was of a less threatening series of 
big city homicides than would have been possible at almost any time 
before or certainly since. 
Philadelphia, as in earlier eras, was as nearly representative as any 
other city. Based on the 588 cases that were labeled neither "excusable" 
nor "justifiable," its "criminal homicide" rate over those five years av­
eraged 5.7 per 100,000 annually, putting it almost exactly in the middle 
of some eighteen of the biggest reporting American cities. Those ahead 
of it were Miami, at 15.1, followed by Dallas, Washington, D.C., Kan­
sas City (Mo.), Baltimore, Chicago, Cincinnati, and Seattle. Trailing 
Philadelphia were, in order, Boston, Columbus, Los Angeles, New York, 
Pittsburgh, Akron, Buffalo, St. Paul, and finally Milwaukee, at 2.3. 
In most other respects, too, Wolfgang's findings fit those for other 
places. The national average of 5.4 over the same several years was just 
a shade lower than Philadelphia's, as improved education, population 
shifts, stronger local institutions, and cultural changes continued to 
pacify the countryside, pushing rural rates in many areas below those 
for the bigger cities. The largely agricultural South was, however, still 
in the lead, with the West no longer so wild as when Brearly had sur­
veyed it in the 1920s. 
Philadelphia was typical, too, in that after decades of advances the 
homicide squad was by then at the top of the police departments 
ladder of prestige, commanding the services not only of experienced 
detectives but also of specialists in handwriting, fingerprinting, photog­
raphy, and ballistics, among others. An expert forensic pathologist 
worked for the coroner, who in turn worked closely with the cops; the 
growing respect given police may be measured by the fact that in addi­
tion to the twenty-three mostly trolley and auto homicides that an in­
quest ruled "excusable," all but one of the fifteen killings by police were 
deemed "justifiable," the only ones that earned that label. Just one po­
liceman, as a result, went through the whole court process: after indict­
ment for involuntary manslaughter, a white motorcycle officer, 
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pleading self-defense, was acquitted of shooting down a black motorist 
for resisting arrest. 
In some broad ways the patterns of urban homicide followed familiar 
lines, some of them stretching back to the Middle Ages. Murder and 
manslaughter were committed mostly by men, 82 percent of cases, and 
especially young men. Wolfgang was able to specify closely that those 
between ages 20 and 24 had the highest rates, at 22.7 per 100,000, 
followed by ages 25 to 29 and 30 to 34; teenagers between 15 and 19 
were in fourth place, and those under 15 had nearly infinitesimal rates 
at 0.3. Roughly 90 to 95 percent of all offenders—he could not be 
more precise—were "in the low end of the occupational scale," work­
ing with hands or backs. And in this and other ways offenders and 
victims tended to resemble each other; 94 percent of all killings oc­
curred within racial lines, although in this era—for the first time— 
the twenty black-on-white homicides outnumbered the fourteen white-
on-black. The nearest exception to the rule of resemblance was sexual, 
if a little complicated: there were significantly more female victims— 
24 percent of the total—than offenders—18 percent—meaning that 
men killed women more than women killed men, but that both sexes 
killed mostly men, the women usually husbands and lovers. 
As always, the courts were more lenient with these and other women 
than with men, convicting them at a lower rate but above all of lesser 
degrees of homicide, carrying much lighter sentences. In domestic cases 
especially, juries tended to believe wives about provocation and the 
need for self-defense. There were an even 100 of these domestic cases, 
with a slight edge, as usual, to male murderers: 53 husbands were ac­
cused of killing wives, 47 wives of killing husbands. Some 10 men in 
effect convicted themselves by committing suicide, 1 ran away, 6 did 
not come to trial for various other reasons; of the 36 who did, all but 2 
were found guilty, or 94 percent. There were no suicidal wives in the 
group, no fugitives, and only 5 had not been tried when Wolfgang 
wrote; of the 42 who had, just 26 were convicted, or 62 percent. 
In a pattern continued from the late nineteenth century, the great 
majority of all suspects arrested were in fact convicted of some de­
gree of homicide: the Philadelphia figure was 66 percent, compared to 
63 percent for big cities generally. And the rank order of conviction 
rates, when classified by motive, followed even more ancient patterns. 
At the high end (leaving aside just 3 rape-murders, 1 of them unsolved), 
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jurors were most likely to convict offenders accused of robbery, 81 per­
cent, as a reflection of their own fears and moral views. At the other 
end, none of the eight defendants whom the police (as distinct from 
the defendant) reported had acted in self-defense was convicted of any­
thing at all. Those who took cold-blooded revenge were condemned at 
a rate only second to robbers, followed by those who killed in argu­
ments over money. Domestic killers ranked behind these others mostly 
because the wives were so often freed; the husbands, by themselves, 
were even more likely than robbers to be convicted. The biggest group 
by far, and as always, were those involved in fights for trivial reasons, 
pushes and shoves, angry words, insults to honor—and again, as al­
ways, they ranked at the bottom of the conviction scale, next to (and 
overlapping) those who killed in self-defense. 
The rate of reported murder and manslaughter among African 
Americans, as earlier in the century, was far higher than that for whites. 
By this time the hlack minority in the city, 18 percent of the whole 
population, accounted for a substantial majority of all of Philadelphia's 
homicide deaths, fully 73 percent. The racial difference in the city was 
bigger than that across the country not because its black population had 
notably high rates but because its white population had notably low 
ones, since urban whites in the North and West, especially in manufac­
turing cities, were far less violent than those in southern and often rural 
areas. But most important, the black-white gap in the city was no 
longer growing, as it had been between the Civil War and the 1920s. 
Although, as too often, the available measures are not strictly compa­
rable, black Philadelphians in the 1920s had been convicted of murder 
and manslaughter sixteen times as often as whites, while their homicide 
arrest rates in Wolfgangs study, at 24.6 per 100,000 annually, were just 
fourteen times the white 1.8. 
Much of this difference, as earlier, was related to gender roles, as the 
difference between black and white women soared well above those for 
the men. With infanticide by this time of negligible importance (the 
word does not even appear in Wolfgang's index), white women were 
very rarely involved in homicide of any kind, just sixteen of them in the 
five years studied. In this, too, the city's racial and sexual patterns mir­
rored those across the United States. 
Another continuing trend, also in line with developments across the 
country, was toward treating homicides less tolerantly, not only in terms 
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of conviction rates but also in terms of the seriousness of the offense for 
which killers were found guilty. Whatever the race of defendants, ver­
dicts were more likely than in earlier years to be murder in the first 
degree, at 20 percent; second-degree verdicts were returned in 29 per­
cent of cases, voluntary manslaughter in 36 percent, involuntary man­
slaughter in 15 percent. But at the same time, apparently and 
paradoxically registering the same insistence on the value of life, but in 
a different key, judges and juries were more reluctant than ever to use 
the supreme penalty: of the 77 first-degree verdicts, just 7 carried the 
recommendation of death, and during the period only 5 Philadelphians 
actually went to the chair at Rockview State Prison. 
But in historical perspective, what is most striking about homicide in 
Philadelphia is the way in which it represents the urban industrial revo­
lution at its height. The one way in which patterns in the city differed 
both from those earlier and from other places across the United States 
was the relatively low percentage of gun killings. Some 33 percent of 
victims in Philadelphia died of gunshot wounds, 55 percent in the na­
tion as a whole. While this was in part an urban-rural difference— 
countryfolk had always had more access to firearms—it also represents 
a drop from sampled years in the city itself, earlier in the century, and 
from the percentages that Brearly reported for the whole of the United 
States in the 1920s. One reason for fewer gun deaths was simply the 
decline in the Italian-born population, with the great slowing of Euro­
pean immigration. But even more important was the fact that all Phi­
ladelphians at midcentury—notably African Americans, who were no 
longer much threatened by roaming white gangs—felt safer than be­
fore, with less need to stash or carry firearms. 
Certainly the overall "murder rate" had dropped markedly, in both 
city and nation. During the mid-1920s Philadelphia's mortality statis-
tics—roughly comparable to those used by Wolfgang—had stood at 
9.3 per 100,000, compared to 5.7 in 1948-52. In the latter period the 
homicide squad was able to "clear" 91 percent of its cases by arresting 
a suspect. This was almost identical to the national rate of a little over 
90 percent, and it says as much about the nature of the cases as about 
police efficiency. Mid-twentieth-century patterns, as compared with 
those for the nineteenth century, or even the 1920s, showed a marked 
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drop in most of the kinds of cases that were hardest to solve: those 
with multiple defendants (as in riots or mini-riots), those involving 
strangers, those occurring on the streets. Of the hard-to-solve variety, 
only robbery murders were (apparently) up, although there were only 
forty-nine in the five years, many brought into the totals as a result 
of greatly improved detective work. In the overwhelming majority of 
cases, the police were able to make an arrest the day of the killing, some 
78 percent; and in 88 percent, within a week. 
The ease of arrest was in part the result of what may be called the 
"domestication" of homicide by the 1950s. The term is among other 
things quite literal: the home had become by far the most frequent site, 
with over half of all cases, only partly because homes by then were more 
attractive places to be in at night, with central heating often, radios 
usually, and even televisions sometimes. Given the move indoors, the 
time of year made less difference than in earlier periods, with only 
a slight favoring of the warm months. The victims, again in over half 
the cases, were close friends or family of the offenders, a pattern es­
pecially noted among African Americans, and most of the rest were 
acquaintances. 
"Domestication" does not imply a lack of violence; in general mur­
derous attacks tended in fact to grow wilder as the relationship between 
victim and killers grew closer, as the fury of betrayal, or years of anger, 
were reflected in the number of shots, blows, or cuts inflicted, often on 
an already lifeless body. What "domestication" means rather is that as 
homicide was more fully restricted to the home, and to a circle of family 
and friends, fewer strangers were in danger. These few, aside from those 
hit by robbers, tended to be attacked in streets or barrooms by roving 
groups of belligerent young white bachelors full of liquor, not as com­
mon as they used to be but still active. 
Victims as well as offenders, finally, tended to be people with prior 
police records, usually for violent crimes such as assault, and both had 
typically been drinking at the time of the fatal encounter. Sober, peace­
able folks, again, had little to fear. And even the aggressive fraction of 
the population that was at risk showed some real signs of settling down, 
had they been given a little more time to do it. Both killers and victims 
were typically young but not teenaged people, often married, used to 
the rhythms of workweek and weekend. In an era of full employment 
260 Chapter 7 
and busy factories, the period between Friday and Sunday accounted 
for two-thirds of all killings, Saturday alone for nearly one-third. Drop­
ping into a local bar, especially after work on payday, was a widespread 
habit among working people of all groups, and could sometimes lead 
to trouble. Those involved in criminal homicides, like tens of thou­
sands of other blacks and whites across the city, had a little time off, 
money to spend, and liquor in the blood; it was just this once that the 
anticipated pleasures of sex, a party, or a night on the town turned 
suddenly into a nightmare, forever changing their lives or ending them. 
The domesticated pattern of homicide emerging among urban black 
Americans was a small sign of a bigger social change. While the Cold 
War was the most important international development of the era, the 
most important at home was the narrowing of the great black-white 
divide that had plagued America since the seventeenth century. No pe­
riod since the Civil War showed greater promise. And for an under­
standing of that promise and what was happening to it, the story told 
by murder and murder rates, South and North, is less well known and 
in some ways more illuminating than the familiar narratives of growing 
acceptance, legal change, and civil rights. 
The assault on racial discrimination began during and even before 
the war, reaching full intensity just after it on a number of fronts. Well 
before 1954 and the famous Brown v. Board of Education decision, the 
U.S. Supreme Court, with the support of leading members of both 
major parties, had been picking away at the foundations of legal segre­
gation, and the Democrats had formally endorsed equal opportunity in 
housing and jobs. Building on the breakthroughs of the 1920s, serious 
writers as different as Ralph Ellison, Richard Wright, and, later, James 
Baldwin won the appreciation of their peers, while in the bigger arena 
of mass popular music the last unwritten taboo was broken when male 
crooners like Billy Eckstein and Nat "King" Cole joined Ella Fitzgerald 
and other black women in singing love songs to white teenagers over 
the radio. Hollywood, gingerly, began to deal with themes of racial in­
justice in movies like Pinky and Intruder in the Dust. And with much 
greater force Jackie Robinson with the Brooklyn Dodgers, Marion 
Motley with the Cleveland Browns, and Nat "Sweetwater" Clifton with 
 261 World War II to the Vietnam War
the New York Knicks swept away the absurdities of diehards who had 
claimed that African Americans lacked the cool physical courage to play 
team sports. City by city, as the 1950s advanced, college by college, 
team by team, white fans across the North and West found themselves 
rooting for black athletes. 
But the white Deep South was still unmoved, and what finally 
cracked it were not the rich and famous, not decrees from above, and 
not outsiders of any color, but rather the extraordinary courage of or­
dinary black southerners. The story of Rosa Parks and her refusal to 
move to the back of a Montgomery bus in the fall of 1955 is justly 
famous, and so are the stories of Martin Luther King Jr. and others who 
built a nonviolent movement out of thousands like her. But there is 
another story, too, best told through the bloody history of Mississippi, 
hardest of the hard-core states, which had historically lynched more 
blacks than any other. 
Throughout the twentieth century, African Americans who found 
Mississippi intolerable had simply moved north, above all taking the 
Illinois Central "freedom train" straight up to Chicago. In the 1940s 
this was the poorest state in the Union, and as cotton production 
mechanized unskilled jobs were harder to get than ever. With blacks 
segregated from whites in almost all matters public or social, con­
demned to inferior schooling, often hungry and sick, blocked off from 
politics, there was little apparent hope for either collective or individual 
advancement. But following World War II, more and more men and 
women who loved the state decided not to leave but to change it. Many 
of them had seen a different world, and a number of returning veterans 
like Charles and Medgar Evers of Decatur boldly registered to vote (al­
though they did not actually vote), and with G.I. benefits went on to 
college. 
For ten years after the war the state stayed calm, with African Ameri­
cans quietly organizing in many places under the banner of the 
NAACP. Lynchings were slowly fading away, and in 1952, for the first 
time ever, there were none recorded anywhere in the South. But when 
in May 1954 the Supreme Court kicked down the last legal prop to 
segregated schooling, many white Mississippians rallied desperately to 
save the old order. The weapons were familiar, and together with eco­
nomic pressure one of them was the policy of murderous intimidation 
that had worked so well three generations earlier. 
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A "death list" with the names of African-American organizers was 
published in several Delta newspapers in the spring of 1955. The Rev­
erend George Lee was on it; that May he was shot dead from a passing 
car while driving his Buick in Belzoni; a coroner's inquest ruled the 
death an accident, possibly from a heart attack, and labeled the metal 
fragments from a faceful of buckshot as, perhaps, "dental fillings." 
In August Lamar Smith, who had been registering voters, was shot 
dead on the courthouse lawn in Brookhaven. Later that same month, 
fourteen-year-old Emmett Till, back visiting from Chicago, was teased 
by some friends into acting up with Carolyn Bryant, a white woman in 
a Delta grocery store; that night her husband and his half-brother came 
for the boy at his great-uncle's cabin. Three days later Tills body was 
found in the Tallahatchie River. Roy Melton was shot dead at his gas 
station in September. In November Gus Courts, who had succeeded 
Reverend Lee as head of the Belzoni NAACP, was severely wounded by 
shotgun blasts from a car driving by his grocery store. 
Threats, bombings, killings, the foreclosure of mortgages, and the 
stoppage of credit had an immediate effect in driving many African 
Americans off the voting rolls and some of their leaders out of the 
South. Charles Evers, his several businesses wiped out, had to leave for 
Chicago to recoup. The name of Medgar Evers, now state director of 
the NAACP, was on the death list. But he stayed. So did Amzie Moore, 
Richard West, Bernice Robinson, Louie Redd, and Joyce Ladner, men 
and women from all over the state. Reverend Lee's widow, Rosebud, 
refused to take her name off the voting lists. 
It was growing clear during that summer of 1955 that things were 
changing in Mississippi, as the lynching of Emmett Till drew more 
national protest and attention than any in history. Given Mississippi's 
dependence on federal money and outside investment, Roy Bryant and 
J. H. Milam were actually arrested and tried for it within weeks, with 
Medgar Evers and other leaders active in seeking out witnesses. And 
while a white jury acquitted them in a little over an hour (the two later 
boasted of the killing in a story sold to Look magazine), observers noted 
that the courthouse was surrounded by angry black men, some of them 
carrying weapons. The teenager's death and its aftermath had not in­
timidated but energized local African Americans, especially the younger 
men and women of what Ladner has called "the Till Generation." 
The threats and house bombings and drive-by shootings continued 
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for several years, Medgar Evers was beaten, and some were killed, but 
there was far more noise than there were actual deaths. White men were 
no longer assassinating "uppity" blacks in broad daylight; they were 
speeding by anonymously, in cars without license plates, too fast and 
too far away to be sure to hit their targets, fearful of getting close. When 
James Meredith entered the University of Mississippi in September 
1962, an armed mob of two thousand surrounded, harassed, and some­
times shot at the handful of federal marshals assigned to protect him, 
but only under cover of night. In an atmosphere full of smoke, whiskey, 
and defiance, two bystanders were killed in the darkness. But Meredith 
stayed. Over the next few days firebombs were thrown at an activist 
doctor s medical clinic, and the homes of two NAACP branch presi­
dents. They stayed too. 
That same year Medgar Evers led the state NAACP into an alliance 
with the young people from SNCC, the Student Non-Violent Coor­
dinating Committee, and with members of CORE, the Congress of 
Racial Equality. SNCC and CORE, much like Martin Luther King Jr. s 
SCLC, or Southern Christian Leadership Conference, had been in­
volved in nonviolent protests across the South. The several groups had 
many differences, but they were united in their ability to risk pain and 
even death. As segregationist whites reacted to this new alliance, with 
its threat to register blacks across the state, the Evers home was fire­
bombed in May 1963. And finally, as his children woke to the sound 
of his car, returning from a brutally hot day's work at 12:30 in the 
morning of June 12, Medgar was shot dead, in the back, in his own 
driveway, by an assassin hidden in the weeds. 
The sniper left his Enfield in place, and the local police, no longer 
indifferent, sent a fingerprint and .30-caliber bullets to the FBI crime 
lab in Washington. This was the first step in collecting a train of evi­
dence that took three trials—the first two deadlocked—and thirty 
years, but eventually led to the murder conviction of segregationist By­
ron de la Beckwith in February 1993. But the most dramatic event of 
the day after the killing was the return of Charles Evers, who left several 
thriving legal and illegal businesses in Chicago to fly back home and 
join widow Myrlie in tending to his brother's body. When the national 
NAACP wondered "Who's going to take Medgar s place?" Charles cut 
off the question: "Don't look no further. I'm here." If there had been 
any doubt before, there was no longer: what had worked in the 1890s 
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was not working in the 1950s and 1960s. Murder as social policy 
was bankrupt; while out-migration continued as always, many African 
Americans were not only staying in the Deep South but coming down 
and back to it, and the movement would not be stopped. 
But in the meantime, up North and in the cities, things were more 
complicated. 
Among nostalgic older Americans, later in the century, the 1940s 
and 1950s would come to seem a kind of golden age of progress and 
prosperity. And while nostalgia is a drug that distorts perception as 
badly as any other, it is hard to deny that for two groups especially, 
urban Americans and above all African Americans, these were in fact 
the Good OF Days. The two groups in fact overlapped more than ever 
before. Decades of flight from Mississippi and the rural South, acceler­
ated in the war and postwar decades, had resulted in an epic trans­
formation, as the census of 1960 announced that for the first time 
in history proportionally more blacks than whites were living in cities, 
73 percent to 70 percent. 
The cities they lived in were more livable than ever, and the streets 
were safer; the trolleys ran on time, and the smoke was only the price 
of industrial progress. Zoos and movies and ball parks, concerts and 
museums, were increasingly open and affordable for men and women 
of all races, and just as the Dixieland revival helped move jazz out of 
the South Side further into the mainstream, the quirkier sound of be­
bop was a reminder that Harlem had not run out of ideas. People raised 
in the depression were heady with the money and the apparent security 
that came with jobs in Chevrolet, Westinghouse, and RCA factories. 
And for African Americans the world war had marked a truly revolu­
tionary watershed in employment. 
Before that time, fully 60 percent of black women in the money 
economy had found work only as domestics, at the bottom of the lad­
der of pay and prestige. Within two decades the percentage had fallen 
dramatically, to 36 percent, as jobs in government and business opened 
up. Among men, the proportion of white-collar and skilled jobs also 
climbed steadily, and in 1953, during the Korean War, the black un­
employment rate reached a historic all-time low of just 4.5 percent. The 
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most significant change of all was registered in the same 1960 census 
that showed blacks were proportionally more likely than whites to be 
living in cities: as a proportion of all those employed, by a margin of 25 
to 20 percent they were also more likely to be working in factories. 
Almost all of the indicators of social health went up in these decades: 
personal income and longevity, education and home ownership. The 
most important of those that went down was the murder rate, as mea­
sured by national mortality statistics among both blacks and whites. 
The white rate of 2.6 per 100,000 annually in 1950 dropped to 2.5 ten 
years later, and the black rate plunged even faster, from 28.0 to 23.1, 
so that by 1960 the combined national average, 4.7, was the lowest ever 
recorded for any census year. 
In the early 1930s Brearly had believed it possible that high rates of 
homicide among African Americans might be the result of nothing 
more complicated than poverty. But Marvin Wolfgang, by the 1950s, 
found racial differences persisting even among people of similar jobs 
and incomes, suggesting that there were important differences in what 
he called "norms of conduct," or learned cultural responses to poten­
tially aggressive situations. And while he did not speculate about the 
reasons for this, the falling black rates of the 1950s offer a strong clue, 
and in the context of the time a hopeful one. 
All culture is the product of history, the result of a given group's 
experience over time. The cultural "norms of conduct" specifically re­
sponsible for rises or falls in either suicidal or homicidal behavior are 
those that help direct aggressive impulses either inward or outward— 
or best, in utterly harmless directions. This is a quite specific, and small, 
segment of the range of any group s culture, having little directly to do 
with theology or music, attitudes toward children, aging, or death, ac­
complishment in cookery or art. And across the developed world, broad 
changes in the suicide-murder ratio had resulted from an equally spe­
cific although widely shared historical experience. That is, those directly 
involved in the urban industrial revolution—whether Protestant or 
Catholic, winners or losers in the world wars, citizens of democratic or 
authoritarian regimes—all experienced statistically falling rates of inter­
personal violence and (although harder to demonstrate) rising rates of 
suicide. 
From this global perspective, what was beginning to happen among 
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black Americans was simply what had long been happening among 
white Americans, together with Australians and Swedes, Germans and 
Englishmen, starting sometime in the nineteenth century and continu­
ing into the mid-twentieth century. And the promise was that with 
economic inclusion, at last, African Americans would follow the paths 
already taken by Irish and Italian Americans, whose own violent norms 
of conduct had been settled out in a generation or two by the behavioral 
and psychological demands of office and factory. 
But it would not be that easy; the same kinds of statistics that showed 
the promise also suggested a threat to it. Racial discrimination was de­
clining but not dead, and its long-term effects were still strong. Phila­
delphia, typical of older industrial cities, reached its peak size at over 
two million in the census of 1950; over the next ten years the fact that 
tens of thousands of blacks moved in helped inspire an even bigger 
number of whites to move out to the suburbs. In the same years the 
kinds of industrial jobs that African Americans had just begun to win 
began also to move out, even to dry up. Across the country, after hitting 
its historic low in 1953, the black unemployment rate began to rise, 
reaching double digits by the end of the decade. The highest percenta­
ges were those among young men in cities. And after a little lag the 
homicide rates reported by the FBI, which had pointed unevenly down 
since the Uniform Crime Reports were first published in 1931, began in 
1959 to climb ominously upward. 
Even less noticed at the time, meanwhile, and halfway across the 
globe, American "advisers" were beginning to filter in to help the little 
demi-nation of South Vietnam, abandoned by its onetime French co­
lonial masters, as its leaders tried to avoid absorption by its more vig­
orous twin in the communist North. 
During the years between 1941 and 1963, then, the United States had 
taken and held as high a position as any nation ever had in world affairs. 
The mixture of jealousy and admiration that older European democra­
cies had shown following World War I was shifted further toward grati­
tude following World War II. After having helped a second time to hold 
off German expansionism, the Americans turned, through a variety of 
political and economic initiatives, to holding off the Russians, in the 
process rebuilding the tattered world capitalist market. And at home, 
too, a new maturity was shown by a clear decline in the violent behavior 
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and racial divisions that had so long provided ammunition to foreign 
critics and thoughtful citizens both. 
In fact as the 1950s moved into the 1960s it seemed to optimists 
that the whole of the world was moving closer, not just in terms of 
buying Coca-Cola, radios, and blue jeans but also in terms of values, 
standards, and behavior. Regional differences wereflattening out in this 
country, and partly for the same reason it was expected, or at least 
hoped, that global differences would flatten in the same way; as the 
urban industrial revolution spread over the world, peoples everywhere 
should grow more prosperous, contented, and rational than ever before. 
Americans believed of course that the threat of Russian and Chinese 
communism must be contained, but especially following a 1962 cri­
sis over the installation of missiles in Cuba, the United States and the 
Soviet Union were communicating better than ever, both apparently 
committed to peaceful solution of their disputes. But then history 
took a new turn, in this country marked by unexpected events during 
1963-64. 
8 
The Sixties, 1963-1974 
In dramatic contrast to the optimistic progress of the late 1940s and 
1950s, the long decade that lasted from the fall of 1963 into the sum­
mer of 1974 was one of the most troubling in the whole of the Ameri­
can experience. Increasing involvement followed by retreat and defeat 
in the civil war in Vietnam, halfway across the globe, dominated Ameri­
can foreign policy. Reaction to that war back home had a heavy impact 
on domestic politics and attitudes as well. The economy, booming half­
way through the period, began in 1968 to slow in ways that suggested 
that the long postwar period of American dominance was eroding. But 
there is no single explanation for the nature and pace of change during 
the 1960s, as prosperous young members of the middle class flocked 
into an antiestablishment "counterculture" while urban African Ameri­
cans boiled over in riotous fury in the midst of successful drives for civil 
rights and political recognition. 
Certainly with respect to murder, as much else, the 1960s was an era 
that witnessed more rapid, worrisome, and sometimes paradoxical new 
developments than any earlier. As television replaced newsprint as the 
major source of information, new and heinous kinds of murder, includ­
ing assassinations and killings for ideological reasons far more complex 
than those of the Civil War era, were publicized more graphically than 
any before. The result was to lift questions involving the causes of 
criminal violence and the effectiveness of legal procedures out of schol­
arly journals and the several states into national politics and the public 
arena. And all of this was happening just as, in response to deep-seated 
268 
I 
The Sixties 269 
changes in the nature of the economy and work, the long downward 
international trend in homicide rates was strikingly reversed. 
Historians are used to using wars, or revolutions, to divide time into 
periods; but this key transitional era in American history was signaled 
instead with a single act of murder. At 12:30 Dallas time, on the after­
noon of November 22, 1963, while John F. Kennedy's motorcade 
passed below, a rifleman perched in the Texas Book Depository build­
ing squeezed off two rounds—or three?—and blew off the top of the 
president's head. That is a moment that older Americans will always 
remember, and it ushered in a decade of bloodshed, turbulence, and 
confusion that few of them were ready for and almost none of them 
understood. 
Just what happened during the five or six seconds it took to assassi­
nate the president of the United States, and why, has been subjected to 
more intensive investigation than any comparable act in our history. 
But the results only underline the stubborn human ineptitude that 
guarantees that much about murder remains mysterious. It took the 
presidential limousine just eight minutes to rush Kennedy to the near­
est emergency room, at Parkland Memorial Hospital. Dr. Malcolm 
Perry found him on his back, heart beating but all other vital signs at 
stop, and nervously performed a futile emergency tracheotomy that de­
stroyed the contours of a hole in the front of his throat. Having seen— 
and through the operation destroyed—that throat wound, he answered 
press queries half an hour later by saying Kennedy had been killed by a 
shot from in front. 
In the meantime, one Lee Harvey Oswald had been seenfleeing the 
Book Depository building, and his description was flashed to Dallas 
police. Stopped by Officer J. B. Tippitt at 1:15, Oswald shot Tippitt 
dead, ran to hide in a nearby theater, and was arrested within minutes 
of Perry's press conference. The world was told that the assassin had 
been found; he was then interrogated ineptly by a crammed roomful 
of city and county detectives, Texas Rangers, FBI, and Secret Service 
agents, none of whom would either surrender jurisdiction or remember 
to provide a stenographer. Late that evening he was arraigned for the 
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murder of Officer Tippitt, while the FBI worked to confirm his own­
ership of the rifle used to kill Kennedy. 
By that time, the president's body had been flown back East, where, 
beginning at 8:00 P.M. EST, a three-hour autopsy was performed at 
Bethesda Naval Hospital under the direction of the head pathologist, 
James Hume. Commander Hume, unfortunately, had no experience 
with either forensic pathology or gunshot wounds; he and his team only 
later learned that Dr. Perry's tracheotomy had obliterated an exit (en­
trance?) wound. But having seen the back of the president's head, un­
like Perry, they found that his skull had been pulverized by a shot from 
behind. They also traced a wound in the back that oddly had neither 
an apparent exit nor a bullet at its end; they later offered the theory that 
the bullet had somehow fallen out on its own, back in Dallas. And back 
in Dallas, three and a half hours after the autopsy, at 1:30 A.M. local 
time, Lee Harvey Oswald was arraigned in local court for murdering 
the president of the United States. 
All this time the nation and the world were in a collective state of 
shock, wondering what it was all about. Had the Russians been behind 
it, or Cuban dictator Fidel Castro? Would it mean war? Was it the 
notorious right-wing fringe centered in Dallas itself, enraged by Ken-
nedy's liberal politics? Worst of all—could it have been ordered by 
Lyndon Johnson, the vice president from Texas, now constitutionally 
president of the United States? 
Few knew anything about the clumsiness of the investigation thus 
far, and it was expected in any case that Oswald himself would provide 
the answers to these questions. To protect him from possible vigilantes, 
it was decided to transfer him from the city to the county jail; to accom­
modate the television cameras, the transfer was scheduled not quietly, 
for the wee dark hours, but for the camera-friendly light of midday. 
And amid all the publicity and confusion, Jack Ruby, owner of a night­
club strip joint, somehow slipped by (was guided through?) police 
security in the basement, and at 12:21 Sunday afternoon, with one 
.38-caliber bullet to the midsection, assassinated the assassin in front of 
millions of haggard viewers of NBC. An hour and a half later Oswald 
died, like Kennedy, at Parkland Memorial, and all hope of definite an­
swers died with him. 
Only a few facts about the mystery man were immediately apparent; 
a former marine, with vaguely Marxist sympathies, he had lived for a 
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time and married his wife, Marina, in the Soviet Union. Within the 
week, in the hope of quieting national unease, President Johnson ap­
pointed a distinguished bipartisan commission headed by Chief Justice 
Earl Warren to investigate the case. Ten months later the Warren Com­
mission reported the most comforting of conclusions: that Oswald was 
indeed the man, that he had acted alone, that there was no conspiracy 
of any sort. 
The commission told the nation what it wanted to hear. But the 
weight of the twenty-six volumes of reports and exhibits it used to back 
its conclusions was not enough to squash the original rumors about 
Russia, Cuba, the far right, and Lyndon Johnson; while Jack Ruby, with 
his sleazy underworld connections, had added "Organized Crime" to 
the list of possible suspects. Criticism began almost immediately, and 
new books and theories are still appearing, encouraged by the Warren 
Commission's often hasty methods, its lack of access to key autopsy and 
other information, its reliance on FBI and CIA employees who had 
their own reasons to conceal prior agency contacts with Oswald. 
And by the time the Warren Report was published, in September 
1964, America was sliding into the kind of mutual distrust that natu­
rally encourages conspiracy theories. Lyndon Johnson, the president 
created by Kennedys murder, was then running for reelection against 
Barry Goldwater, the most conservative Republican candidate in de­
cades, and the issues raised in that campaign were beginning to split the 
nation more sharply than at any time since the Civil War. 
Lyndon Johnson's bottomless sense of inferiority, following the charis­
matic Kennedy, helped shape his political course and American history. 
Kennedy had sent 16,000 "advisers" to the failing government of South 
Vietnam and flushed Russian missiles out of Cuba; Johnson deter­
mined to take an even harder line in faraway Indochina, and in the 
campaign summer of 1964 the president escalated American involve­
ment in the local civil war by bombing North Vietnam. At the same 
time, as a southerner he was highly sensitive to suspicion that he might 
weaken his predecessor's perceived commitment to racial progress and 
opened the year 1964 by announcing a "War on Poverty," followed by 
a strong Civil Rights Act. 
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Bombing North Vietnam did not immediately become a big politi­
cal issue; support for African Americans did. 
Attacks on voting restrictions and segregation in the South contin­
ued that year and afterward with general success. As the murder of 
Medgar Evers in the summer of 1963 had only strengthened the cause, 
so did the murders of James Chaney, Mickey Schwerner, and Andrew 
Goodman, three young SNCC activists, in the summer of 1964. These 
deaths in Philadelphia, Mississippi, not only outraged voters outside of 
the state but led to a major legal and institutional breakthrough in deal­
ing with such crimes, further strengthening the role of the federal gov­
ernment in dealing with cases of homicide. J. Edgar Hoover's FBI, long 
hesitant to get involved in such issues, was galvanized by the three kill­
ings, and the Justice Department decided to move on its own. Given 
the failure of the Neshoba County authorities to prosecute the crime as 
murder under state law, the department made it a federal case. Its 
weapon was a Reconstruction era statute that made it illegal for two or 
more persons to "conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate 
any citizen . .  . in the free exercise of any right [granted by] the Consti­
tution or laws of the United States." That December, based on evidence 
provided by FBI informants to a federal grand jury, nineteen men, 
Klansmen and law officers, were arrested for effectively depriving young 
Chaney, Schwerner, and Goodman of their civil rights simply by mur­
dering them. 
This legal tactic, upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1966, was 
used successfully later in the decade to prosecute several racially moti­
vated killings in southern jurisdictions where local prejudices made 
murder convictions impossible. But in the same 1964 summer that 
Chaney, Goodman, and Schwerner were assassinated, the term "white 
backlash" was coined to describe the beginnings of a paradoxical coun­
termovement up North. Segregationist Alabama governor George Wal­
lace, running against President Johnson, won over one-third of the vote 
in a handful of presidential primaries that spring, and beginning in July 
Barry Goldwater's campaign brought the issue of "crime in the streets" 
into national politics. And by 1967, the year when eight men were 
finally sentenced to terms of three to ten years for "conspiracy" in the 
Neshoba County murders, violence against southern blacks had deci­
sively given way as a political issue in favor of violence by urban blacks. 
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The background to this issue was simply that all through the 1940s 
and 1950s, as the accelerated African-American move into the cities 
helped inspire an even greater white exodus, the complexion of ur­
ban crime had changed. White Americans—even contemporary social 
scientists—were not then generally aware of the historical statistics that 
would show that black murder rates were dropping through most of the 
period and black-white differences were narrowing. But they were viv­
idly aware, and frightened, by the more obvious fact that as big cities 
turned blacker, so did big city homicides. 
Generations of experience with the southern justice system, and an 
untold number of big city confrontations, had taught many African 
Americans not to trust the police. At the same time white Americans 
were learning to count on police as never before. As their efficiency 
increased and civil service rules took hold, their actions were in prac­
tice rarely reviewed by prosecutors or judges, and all over the country, 
as in Philadelphia, coroners and medical examiners routinely labeled 
police homicides "justifiable" and so kept them away from grand or 
petit juries. 
As neither local politics nor police tactics changed as rapidly as the 
complexion of big cities, the longtime tensions between white cops 
and black civilians simmered ever more angrily, fueled by the televised 
sight of southern sheriffs beating and siccing dogs on peaceful demon­
strators led by Martin Luther King Jr. and by the evident fact that the 
Neshoba County sheriff and his chief deputy were deeply involved in 
the Chaney-Goodman-Schwerner murders. And then, just after the 
Republican National Convention, in July 1964, the fatal shooting of 
a young teenager by a New York policeman was shortly followed by 
another, after a protest march over those three murders in Mississippi 
turned into a violent clash with the cops. Suddenly Harlem erupted 
in riot. 
The widely televised outbreaks that spread that summer from New 
York to Rochester, St. Louis, Philadelphia, and many smaller cities 
helped redefine the term "race riot" for the third time. The one-sided 
nineteenth-century white invasions of black neighborhoods had been 
much like anti-Semitic European pogroms. By World War I they had 
become armed clashes between whites and blacks finally numerous 
enough to fight back. In the summer of 1964 they had evolved still 
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further, as sprawling ghettos erupted in self-destruction, with resi­
dents burning and looting their own neighborhood stores, often white 
owned. The fighting pitted local blacks against police and sometimes 
national guardsmen, modern successors to the old state militias. As the 
violence was almost wholly confined to the ghetto itself, with little 
physical danger to those outside it—most of the nine deaths that first 
summer were of rioters "justifiably" shot by the authorities—the white 
majority was reduced to the passive role of sitting on the sidelines, root­
ing for the cops and cursing at the tube. 
During that campaign season outrage at southern brutality still out­
weighed "white backlash," and admiration for the courage of Martin 
Luther King Jr. and the young activists to the south helped conquer the 
Republican appeal for more "law and order." Lyndon Johnson then 
easily beat Barry Goldwater that November. But the backlash had a real 
effect, as analysts noted that five Deep South states went Republican 
for the first time since just after the Civil War. And the issue of crime 
in the streets did not go away, and never has. 
Over the next four years Johnsons presidency went on to splinter the 
nation. His decision to try to please both ends of the political spectrum 
by expanding both the war in Vietnam and the War on Poverty satisfied 
no one. Resentment of American actions in Vietnam and fear of the 
draft contributed to a collegiate counterculture, greatly expanded drug 
use, and hostility to authority in all forms. The civil rights coalition 
blew up as young militants turned on old white allies in the name of 
"Black Power." Activist blacks themselves were pulled in several direc­
tions, followers of Martin Luther King Jr. s Christian pacifism compet­
ing with militant young black nationalists on one side and leftist Black 
Panthers on the other. And back of all the increasing anger and division 
were the mounting death tolls, not only in Southeast Asia but in the 
nation's cities as well. 
The Vietnam War, with its typically small actions and media censor­
ship, was not as telegenic as the urban riots, and as each "long hot 
summer" in the ghettos brought more of them the players all came to 
know the script, as sketched in the nightly news and special reports 
brought into their homes. Trouble almost always began as a conflict 
between police and local residents, maybe a "justifiable homicide" or 
even a minor arrest that sparked a fight and drew a crowd. The offi­
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cers were then surrounded, jeered, and stoned; windows were broken 
next; and if there was no effective resistance, the mood changed from 
angry to light-headed as the crowds got bigger and the looting be­
gan. At that point, if the local police could not quickly restore order, 
crowds surged through whole districts while buildings were torched, 
firebombs thrown, sometimes even snipers set up in windows to shoot 
at cops and firemen. When the national guard was sent in serious killing 
began. 
Nothing but the infamous New York City Draft Riots of 1863, with 
its 110 victims, approached the number of homicides in these out­
bursts. Dozens of cities were hit each year. Among the biggest, in Au­
gust 1965 some 34 died in a six-day riot in the Watts district of Los 
Angeles; in July 1967, 23 died in Newark, New Jersey. In Detroit the 
same month, where the national guard was joined by U.S. paratroopers, 
the total reached 43. The body count in Detroit included 33 blacks and 
10 whites (the latter total much bigger than usual). Rioters themselves 
killed no more than 2 or maybe 3 of these, including 1 white civilian 
hit by a shotgun blast; storekeepers shot 2, and 4 more were burned or 
electrocuted to death by fallen power lines. Most of the rest, including 
some women and children, were killed by police or the ill-prepared 
guardsmen, in an atmosphere of smoke, fear, anger, confusion, and 
much indiscriminate gunplay. The well-disciplined paratroopers, many 
of them black themselves, had, in contrast, an obvious calming effect; 
they knew what serious combat looked like, refused to panic, and shot 
down just one man. 
White viewers were enraged, and scared, by all of this. It was es­
pecially maddening, and to most incomprehensible, that these riots 
should erupt after two decades of racial progress, just as segregation was 
crumbling and a host of antipoverty programs were moving out of the 
Congress and into the cities. Divisions over the role of police were es­
pecially deep, as white voters in several cities promoted the political 
careers of tough cops while paramilitary organizations like the Black 
Panthers flourished in the ghettos, demanding home rule, denouncing 
blue-uniformed "armies of occupation," and telling the cameras that 
they were out to "off the pigs," meaning kill the cops. And immediately 
after the holocaust in Detroit the president appointed the National Ad­
visory Commission on Civil Disorders, headed by former Governor 
Otto Kerner of Illinois, to draw on the experience of social scientists, 
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policemen, community leaders, and politicians to find just what was 
happening and why. 
Two years later the Kerner Commission issued a report. Its first conclu­
sion, based on far firmer evidence than that of the Warren Commission 
three years earlier, was that as in most historical riots there was no con­
spiracy behind these, no "outside agitators," although once they had 
broken out on their own, various groups and movements had tried to 
use or interpret them to their advantage. Other findings were not so 
reassuring. It was no more possible to blame the outbreaks on rootless 
drifters than on outside agitators or plotting by the Panthers; most of 
the participants were quite typical local people, the most active of them 
long-settled young men from the neighborhood, with jobs, if anything 
a little better educated than most of their peers. The report concluded 
that the anger was real and deep-seated, the product of years of denial 
and discrimination. 
Much of the Kerner Report fit with what historians were finding 
about the historic pattern of riots in France, England, and the United 
States over the previous two centuries. Popular protest does not break 
out in times of real despair; the truly desperate have neither the hope 
nor the energy for it. Instead protest riots—even revolutions—tend to 
follow periods of progress, when expectations outrun the pace of change 
and frustrations boil over into action, in Western societies usually di­
rected not at persons but at property, or such symbolic targets as police 
stations. The most disturbing prediction to follow from this was that 
despite all the improvements in race relations, the split between inner 
cities and the surrounding suburbs was creating two nations out of one, 
and if the trend continued more violence was inevitable. 
In fact, by the time the Kerner Report came out in 1969, the worst of 
the rioting was over, less the result of official tactics than, quite literally, 
burnout. Almost no riots occurred twice in the same city, as disillu­
sioned ghetto residents woke the morning after to find their neighbor­
hoods in smoky ruins, with no place to buy bread or milk and little to 
show for the excitement. The report itself sold two million copies; its 
moderate explanations for the events of the mid-1960s still make some 
sense, and many city governments did move to try to heal relations with 
a growing black electorate. But television was a far more powerful me­
dium than print, and at the national level another legacy of urban vio­
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lence was millions of white voters seething at the sight of activists 
shouting "Burn, Baby, Burn!" into the cameras and riflemen in battle 
fatigues holding press conferences to talk about Black Power. If Kerner's 
explanation for urban violence made sense, his call for massive new 
domestic spending on antipoverty and social programs was hopelessly 
ill-timed, doomed both by the need to finance the war in Vietnam and 
by political backlash. And then, just as the riots began to subside, in 
1968, murderous violence took yet another ugly turn. 
Martin Luther King Jr. had been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 
1964, just as his nonviolent tactics were beginning to win the battle 
against legal segregation in the South. But the very next year he set two 
much harder targets. One of them, inspired in part by the futile rage of 
the riots, was the extralegal segregation, discrimination, and above all 
poverty in big city ghettos. The other was the escalating war in Viet­
nam. Neither campaign was as widely popular or successful as his earlier 
assault on the segregated South. Death threats had always followed him 
almost everywhere. And on April 4, 1968, while visiting Memphis, 
Tennessee, in support of a garbage strike, chatting with supporters on 
the balcony of the Lorraine Motel, King was fatally shot, his spinal cord 
severed by a bullet from a rifle with a telescopic sight. 
African Americans again reverted, briefly, to rioting in protest of 
King's assassination. The apparent killer, who did not trouble to recover 
his belongings from a motel room just two hundred feet from King's, 
was shortly identified as one James Earl Ray. It was not at all clear why 
this longtime petty thief and robber, with no known political views, 
had chosen to assassinate the most internationally revered American of 
the day; but his name was put on the FBI's "Ten Most Wanted" list, 
and a search was mounted. 
Political leadership of the antiwar movement had by then passed to 
New York Senator Robert Kennedy. With the unpopular Lyndon John­
son having bowed out, the murdered John Kennedys younger brother 
and closest political confidante was seeking the Democratic nomination 
for president of the United States. Consciously reaching out to King's 
admirers, he was also seen as the one white politician who might heal 
the racial wounds of the era, both by supporting social programs and 
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by opposing a war whose American casualties—given student draft de­
ferments for collegians and a variety of dodges for the well connected— 
were disproportionately counted among the poor, ill-educated, and 
black. And then on the night of June 5, as the candidate celebrated 
victory in the crucial California primary, a young man named Sirhan 
Bishara Sirhan worked his way through the crowd in the Los Angeles 
Ambassador Hotel, raised a .22 pistol, and shot him point blank in the 
head; Kennedy died twenty-five hours later. 
Not yet recovered from the assassination of Martin Luther King, the 
nation was stunned again. Just two days after Kennedy's death James 
Earl Ray was captured in England, on his way to Brussels—raising 
questions about how and why a provincial hard luck loner with no 
apparent source of funds had become an international traveler, eluding 
a manhunt by escaping to Canada on a false passport, moving on to 
London, to Portugal, then back again to London. Sirhan Sirhan was 
meanwhile insisting that he had killed Kennedy, with no outside help, 
as a blow for the liberation of his native Palestine from Israeli rule. 
The possibilities were bewildering. King and the two Kennedys had 
been assassinated, clearly, for ideological reasons—but what reasons, 
from what political direction? Sirhan's confession made little sense; the 
senator from New York was indeed a supporter of Israel, but so were 
virtually all American politicians, and the matter was scarcely an issue 
in his primary campaign. Just what (or who) was behind Oswald had 
died with him, and Ray avoided the kind of explanation that a trial 
might produce by abruptly pleading guilty, in March 1969, without 
implicating anyone else. Once in prison, to keep the pot boiling, he 
repudiated his confession, insisting that he was in fact innocent, hinting 
at possibilities he had never revealed, and continuing vainly to ask for a 
new trial. 
And these three were only the most famous assassinations of the era, 
as over the next several years the number of broadly "political" or ter­
rorist murders multiplied in frightening fashion. Middle-class white 
Americans by this time were long familiar with southern killings of civil 
rights activists, and occasionally they read about events from what 
seemed faraway arenas, such as the bitter rivalries within the dimly un­
derstood Black Muslim sect that led, in February 1965, to the assassi­
nation of the charismatic leader Malcolm X, shot down as he addressed 
a crowd in a Harlem theater. But during the late 1960s and early 1970s 
The Sixties 279 
lives were taken by and among policemen, privileged young people, 
movie stars, and often random victims of a kaleidoscopic variety of 
ideological rages that burned far closer to home. 
The civil rights coalition had all but collapsed before King's murder, 
and in the resulting confusion about ends and means young black ac­
tivists founded a number of organizations, some promoting movement 
back to Africa, some self-government within the boundaries of the 
United States, still others a leftist world revolution in cooperation with 
white radicals. What all of them shared was a taste for paramilitary 
uniforms, violent rhetoric, and guns. During the mid- to late sixties, 
nothing beat the kind of publicity that came from confrontations with 
policemen, and when members of a Cleveland group called the Black 
Nationalists of New Libya killed three of them in a shootout on July 23, 
1968, the incident inspired three days of rioting. But the most famous 
and, to policemen, notorious organization was the Black Panthers. 
The Panthers were born in several different cities during 1966. 
Their ideas and activities varied with time and place; some groups set 
up ghetto soup kitchens and educational programs, others pulled off 
armed robberies and burglaries, while their official ideologies moved 
irregularly back and forth between nationalist and leftist. But the most 
visible Panthers were headquartered in Oakland, California, where in 
effect they patrolled the city's patrol cars, heavily armed, following the 
cops everywhere through the ghetto and monitoring arrests for signs of 
racist abuse. State laws allowed the public display of loaded weapons— 
and when the police tried to tighten California's gun control legislation, 
the Panthers provided great photo-opportunities by prowling the halls 
of Sacramento in protest, draped with bandoliers and automatic rifles. 
It was the Oakland Panthers who identified the cops with "pigs," a 
nickname that spread as fast as television, and in October 1967 the 
local leader, Huey Newton, was severely wounded and arrested fol­
lowing a stop and shootout that resulted in the death of Officer James 
Frey. But as the cry "Off the Pigs" reverberated through the ghetto 
riots of that summer, it also served as the death knell for the Panthers 
themselves, who officially organized as a revolutionary political party 
in 1968. 
Governments had far more resources and firepower than the thinly 
manned Panther organization. Hoovers FBI was inclined during the 
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1960s to see "domestic subversion," communist influence, and possible 
revolution in a number of small and otherwise isolated groups. More 
important in targeting the Panthers was the bureau s less official role as 
capstone of the nations law enforcement establishment and ally of local 
police; and if the "off" talk was mostly wind, it was an ill-wind, a threat 
with enough substance so that the cops would not tolerate it. Nothing 
was easier than for the FBI to infiltrate the organization, and others 
like it, using the threat of criminal charges to recruit African-American 
informers. 
Black radical groups, all of them new and continually changing their 
policies and people, full of big egos and clashing ambitions, were eas­
ily subverted through rumors of betrayal true and false. In January 
1969 Bunchy Carter and Jon Huggins, two University of California-
Los Angeles student members of the Black Panther party, were gunned 
to death inside of Campbell Hall, on the Los Angeles campus, by mem­
bers of the African nationalist US organization, perhaps on the basis 
of misinformation supplied by the FBI. On December 4 of that year 
the Chicago police dealt more directly with Panther Fred Hampton, 
deputy director of the national organization, by illegally raiding his 
apartment at 4:30 in the morning, guided by a planted agent, and 
shooting its several inhabitants, killing Hampton and Mark Clark in 
their beds. And as in a spirit of rampant suspicion Panthers across the 
country turned on, sometimes tortured, and executed each other, two 
groups of them, in New Haven and New York, were arrested and begin­
ning in 1970 tried for "conspiracy to murder" suspected informers. As 
further evidence of the growing national split, the New Yorkers were 
freed, given a jury's suspicion of FBI tactics and informants, while sev­
eral in New Haven were convicted. 
Meanwhile "pig" had also become part of the white radical vocabulary. 
As the war in Vietnam spread, collegiate antiwar protests increasingly 
spilled over into riots and occasional firebombings, with rocks and 
bottles thrown at squads of "pigs" called in to quell them. Many young 
people, repelled first by the governments involvement in Vietnam, 
then by all of the manners and mores of their parents' generation, 
dreamed vaguely of social revolution and spread the epithet beyond the 
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police and other "fascist" agents of government to the whole class of 
"bourgeois" from which virtually all of them had come. And it was the 
word "pig" that provided some of the especial horror, and key links, to 
the most notorious murders of the decade. 
On Sunday morning, August 10, 1969, Winifred Chapman re­
ported for her job as housekeeper at an isolated Beverly Hills estate 
rented to the movie director Roman Polanski, looked briefly about, and 
ran screaming to a neighbor. The police, quickly summoned, found five 
bodies in and around the house, beginning in the driveway with Steven 
Parent, a local teenager, shot dead in his car. The coffee heiress Abby 
Folger and her lover, Wojichiech Frykowski, were found in bloody 
heaps on the lawn. She had been stabbed so often that the police 
thought her white gown was actually red; he had been shot, beaten, and 
slashed repeatedly. Jay Sebring, an internationally famous hairdresser, 
was found in the living room, a rope around his neck thrown over a 
rafter; at the other end was the actress Sharon Tate, Polanski s wife, eight 
months pregnant. Sebring had been shot, and both, like all but Parent, 
savagely and repeatedly stabbed after as well as before death. The single 
word "Pig" was written in Tate s blood on the living room door. 
The next day two more bodies were found in another mansion in 
the Los Feliz district of Los Angeles; Rosemary La Bianca had been 
stabbed forty-one times, her husband, Leno, a supermarket executive, 
twelve, not counting fourteen puncture wounds from a serving fork. 
The killers had then calmly eaten a meal and apparently played with 
the family's dogs. The word "War" was scored on La Bianca s abdomen, 
"Death to Pigs," "Rise," and "Healter Skelter" [sic] daubed in blood on 
the walls. At the time one young detective remembered that the bloody 
words "Political Piggy" had been found ten days earlier, in another 
jurisdiction, at the scene of the murder of a young music teacher, Gary 
Hinman. But no one in charge thought to make the connection; it was 
the rich and famous who were terrified, as Frank Sinatra went into 
hiding, Mia Farrow was afraid to go to her friend Sharon Tate s funeral, 
and one sporting goods store in Beverly Hills sold two hundred shot­
guns in two days. 
But it was the Hinman murder that broke the case that fall, despite 
investigative delays and slipups resulting from the several different 
agencies handling the killings. A young man named Bobby Beausoleil 
was found driving the dead musicians car on August 6; his prints 
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matched a set found at the crime scene, and he was arrested on suspi­
cion of murder. Two months later, in mid-October, Inyo County sher-
iff's officers raided a remote ranch in Death Valley, where they rounded 
up twenty-four members of a "hippie" cult known as the Manson 
Family on a variety of charges from arson to grand theft. Two teenage 
girls living on the ranch then approached the officers asking for protec­
tion, and one of them said that a fellow "family" member, Susan Atkins, 
had helped Beausoleil kill Hinman. Atkins was duly arrested; while in 
detention the next month she gleefully told two prostitute jailmates that 
she was one of the party that had killed Sharon Tate and her guests. 
The story that emerged over the next few weeks was especially chill­
ing to those ordinary middle-aged Americans who followed it through 
the media. Beginning in the late 1960s tens and maybe hundreds of 
thousands of middle-class youngsters had been dropping out of school, 
experimenting with drugs, and leaving home in rebellion against their 
parents while talking socially radical talk. California was a favorite des­
tination, a place where many floated at least briefly into communes, as 
substitute for their abandoned families, and a number inevitably drifted 
into prostitution, theft, and other minor crimes just to keep alive. 
Charles Manson was clearly different, a thirty-five-year-old son of a 
prostitute and lifelong petty crook who had discovered, in the middle 
sixties, a remarkable gift for enticing young people, especially teenage 
girls, into his own extended "family." But the young people themselves 
were as ordinary as Manson was not, stray dropouts who seemed ach­
ingly familiar to parents across the country, unusual only in the way 
they had become entrapped in the "family" and in murder. 
No one was ever fully able to explain the Charles Manson phenome­
non, but for the two years between his arrest and trial his picture was 
everywhere, as people tried to understand the secret of his charisma 
from his physical appearance. Short and slight, he would be easy to 
overlook in a crowd. Hair and beard consciously modeled after those of 
conventional pictures of Jesus Christ were not unusual in that day, but 
there was clearly something truly extraordinary, and scary, about his 
eyes. It was a combination of those eyes, drugs, and sex that appar­
ently allowed Manson to mesmerize his LSD-addled "family"—Susan 
Atkins thought he was both God and Satan—with a philosophy of 
revolution built partly on the Book of Revelation and partly on the 
notion of a coming race war, with Manson picking up coded messages 
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in songs from the pop group the Beatles. Whatever he ordered (and his 
commands were often bizarre), there were followers to do it without 
question. 
Bobby Beausoleil, it turned out, had been ordered to kill his friend 
Gary Hinman—who was tortured over two days, Manson cutting off 
an ear—for some $20,000 he was mistakenly supposed to keep in his 
house. Manson then ordered the murders of whoever lived in Polanski's 
isolated Beverly Hills estate—Sharon Tate and her friends were wholly 
unknown to the "family"—simply to make a kind of statement, or 
perhaps get Beausoleil, then in jail, off the hook. It was "Helter Skelter" 
time, he told his followers, a lyric phrase from the Beatles current White 
Album hit. Four of them took the assignment. Young Parent, a casual 
visitor, was killed when he surprised them inside the gates; then while 
Linda Kasabian stood guard, the others, in a drugged frenzy, tied up 
and slaughtered Tate and her guests, Atkins and Patricia Krenwinkle 
acting as sadistically as big Tex Watson. The next night these four, plus 
Manson himself and two others, did much the same to the La Biancas; 
people equally unknown to them, and for equally vague reasons. 
These were a series of killings then unique in the annals of American 
homicide, with an accordingly unique fascination. And while the 
"family" were scarcely revolutionaries in any real sense—no one else 
could read the two harmless "Revolution" songs in the White Album 
the way that Manson did—they had an odd appeal to another group of 
young people at least marginally less insane than they were. The surface 
or "lifestyle" radicalism of the hippies was different from the deeper 
criticisms of racism, imperialism, and class oppression preached by 
more thoroughgoing radicals. While there was some overlap between 
the two kinds of protest and protesters, their aims and means were quite 
different—Manson himself was virulently racist—and they normally 
had little use for each other. For many of those seriously interested in 
political change, hard drugs and defiantly flamboyant clothing were 
seen as frivolous as, to hippies, all-night meetings were square. But for 
a small group on the radical extreme—known as the Weathermen, a 
title taken from a Bob Dylan lyric—the sheer mindlessness of the Man­
son murders made a shivery sense of its own. 
In late December 1969, just as the Manson Family was being arraigned 
for the murders, the Weathermen, by then a tiny splinter off the student 
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New Left, convened in Flint, Michigan. It was a deeply discouraging 
time for the left. President Richard Nixon had taken office earlier that 
year, defeating Democrat Hubert Humphrey in part by winning the 
"law and order" vote from segregationist Alabama governor George 
Wallace and in part by promising to win rather than end the war in 
Vietnam. Many Weathermen, their earlier hopes of radical reform 
nearly buried in defeat, greeted each other with three upraised fingers, 
signs of the serving fork stuck in Leno La Bianca's belly. "Dig it," one 
young woman exulted. "First they killed those pigs, then they ate din­
ner in the same room with them, then they even shoved a fork into a 
victim's stomach. Wild!" At the convention Sharon Tate became, in 
death, an unlikely villain, a symbol of privilege, her shredded fetus dis­
missed as one less white American imperialist-to-be. And with Fred 
Hampton assassinated that very month, the Panthers in disarray, the 
urban riots sputtering out in failure and bombings in North Vietnam 
intensified, several in attendance decided that Flint would be their last 
public appearance. They vowed instead to go underground and to re­
vive an old anarchist tradition, virtually dead since the era of Sacco and 
Vanzetti, by carrying on a terrorist bombing war against "the System." 
Five of them were heard from, loudly, later that winter. Early in 
March 1970, Cathy Wilkerson, a recent honors graduate of elite 
Swarthmore College, moved with Kathy Boudin, Bryn Mawr '66, and 
several others into her father s elegant and temporarily empty Green­
wich Village townhouse. On the morning of the 6th the block was 
shaken as the building exploded. Wilkerson, wearing only blue jeans, 
was seen running off down West 11th Street, together with a wholly 
naked Boudin, and disappeared for years. Back at the townhouse they 
had left three friends. Ted Gold, a Columbia graduate, was not found 
until that night, crushed under the rafters. It took a week to identify 
the fragments of Diana Oughton, of Bryn Mawr and the Peace Corps, 
from the print on a severed little finger. Ted Robbins, a Kenyon College 
dropout, was wholly obliterated; in the absence of physical remains his 
presence at the scene was deduced, later, from messages left by compan­
ions. Under the rule of felony murder, both Boudin and Wilkerson, as 
involved in the illegal bomb-making project, were legally liable for all 
three deaths. 
A few months later the years of less extreme collegiate unrest reached 
its own bloody climax on two widely separated campuses. Early in May, 
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in protest against President Richard Nixon's bombing of hostile supply 
lines in the neutral nation of Cambodia, students at Ohio's Kent State 
University engaged in a series of demonstrations climaxed by the burn­
ing of the campus ROTC building. Governor Rhodes called in the na­
tional guard, which on Monday morning, the third, lobbed tear gas at 
rock throwers, moved forward and then back, and ordered a crowd of 
hundreds to disperse, a group including many peaceable onlookers or 
passersby. And then at 12:35 P.M. several nervous guardsmen, without 
warning or orders, fired sixty-one shots into the crowd. They told in­
vestigators later that they had felt threatened. Of the thirteen casualties, 
a presidential commission later found that only two were hit from in 
front. Of the four students killed, the closest, Jeffrey Miller, who had at 
one point been harassing the troops, was 85 yards away; Allison Krause, 
at 110 yards, may have thrown rocks; the other two, 130 yards distant 
when hit by fatal fire, were William Schroeder, himself an ROTC can­
didate, and Sandra Scheuer, on her way to music class. 
Episodically, over the next ten days, partly in protest against these 
events up North, partly against the war, partly against racial discrimi­
nation, students at Mississippi's all-black Jackson State College engaged 
in another series of confrontations, with school authorities, passing 
white motorists, and police. The night of May 13 they threatened the 
ROTC building. The next night, units of the national guard, the state 
highway patrol, and city police faced a group of 75 to 200 jeering stu­
dents behind a chain-link fence in front of Alexander Hall; without 
warning or orders, as at Kent State, the officers fired more than one 
hundred fifty rounds into the crowd. Several later claimed they had 
been shot at. An investigating commission could not confirm this: po­
lice radio tapes, full of references to "nigger gals" and other victims, 
said nothing about sniping. But among the many casualties were Phillip 
Gibbs, a married junior, and James Earl Green, a high school student, 
both killed instantly. 
Grand juries were called but indicted no one for the homicides at 
either Kent State or Jackson State, which simply added to the political 
polarization of the nation. And during the early 1970s Americans kept 
killing each other for ideological reasons. On September 9, 1971, New 
York State s Attica Prison was taken over by mostly black inmates, hold­
ing hostages and demanding prison reform, the demands to be negoti­
ated by, among others, Minister Louis Farrakhan of the Black Muslims. 
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Four days later, after two hostages were injured, the place was stormed 
by state police and prison guards, killing ten hostages and twenty-nine 
inmates. Later that fall someone blew up the Army Mathematics Re­
search Center at the University of Wisconsin, killing a graduate student 
inside the building. A handful of Black Panthers reacted to the effective 
death of the organized party by going underground as the Black Libera­
tion Army, abandoning all other avenues of reform in favor of the stark 
simplicity of killing cops. In New York, between the spring of 1971 and 
winter of 1972, the group claimed credit for killing four of them, in 
black and white pairs, to underline the point that the issue was not the 
color of the policemen's skins but of their uniforms. This desperate pro­
gram, combined with a radical rationale for bank robbery, appealed at 
the same time to the surviving remnants of the Weathermen; Kathy 
Boudin belonged to the same circle as Joanne Chesimard, or Assata 
Shakur, who was arrested in a fatal shootout with the New Jersey state 
police in 1973. 
And then the reading public was in effect blindsided from another 
angle entirely, as the grievances of Native Americans, forgotten for gen­
erations, were dramatized in a violent confrontation with federal agents 
at the historically resonant site of Wounded Knee, South Dakota. 
As had been true of most conflicts between Native Americans and white 
governments since the seventeenth century, it was an act of murder that 
sparked the train that led to the armed takeover of the little hamlet at 
Wounded Knee. But as equally true, there was more to the conflict than 
that. 
Official U.S. policy toward the Indians had changed over the genera­
tions, the original aim of assimilation abandoned during the 1930s, 
then resumed in the 1950s. By the end of the 1960s some 300,000 of 
the 800,000 surviving Native Americans had moved off the reservation 
into the cities, many of them badly prepared for the "mainstream" they 
were encouraged to join. When the American Indian Movement (AIM) 
was formally organized in 1968, inspired in part by the current demand 
for Black Power, its founders played on old issues and new ones. The 
old ones were the corruption and indifference of the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs (BIA), its use of cooperative native stooges to run tribal govern­
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ments, its continued subversion of land rights. The new ones involved 
the plight of Indian people in the cities. Several native groups made 
headlines in the late 1960s with demonstrations such as the occupa­
tion of Alcatraz Island, in San Francisco Bay, when it was abandoned 
by the government. But it was hard to crack the indifference of most 
inhabitants of the reservations, sunk in poverty and desperation, with 
unemployment over 50 percent in many western states, alcoholism and 
suicide rampant, and a homicide rate twice the national average. 
And then Russell Means, a Sioux from Cleveland and one of the 
founders of AIM, was told about Raymond Yellow Thunder. Yellow 
Thunder, a middle-aged Oglala Sioux farmworker, was found dead in 
a panel truck, outside of Gordon, Nebraska, late in February 1972. The 
local authorities first claimed he had died of exposure, but his sisters 
saw evidence of mutilation on the body, and an autopsy found evidence 
of "foul play." The story later pieced together was that Yellow Thunder 
had stepped drunkenly out of a local bar and was picked up for sport 
by a group of whites in a car, locked for a time in a trunk, beaten and 
burned with cigarettes, and at one time forced to dance, naked from 
the waist down, for the amusement of a crowd at the American Legion 
Hall. It was after this ordeal, missing for a week, that the victim turned 
up dead. And when under insistent family pressure Leslie and Melvin 
Hare, two influential young heirs to a ranching fortune, were finally 
arrested for the crime, they were charged with no more than second-
degree manslaughter and released without bail. The sisters then turned 
to AIM. 
For Means "it was a turning point," requiring wholly new tactics. 
Placards and protests were not enough: "We could not allow Indian 
people to be murdered." And he proceeded to organize a caravan of 
Sioux from the Pine Ridge and Rosebud reservations, overfive hundred 
men and women in a hundred cars, to descend on little Gordon, waving 
American flags upside down in the traditional symbol of distress. The 
demonstrators occupied the town for three full days, terrifying the in­
habitants. And when the Hares were jailed, a cop suspended, and the 
town fathers promised to end all discrimination against Indians, AIM s 
reputation soared not only locally but across the country. 
The occupation of a whole town was a truly novel tactic, and Means, 
with a genius for publicity, over the next several months organized a 
number of well-televised demonstrations in Washington and elsewhere. 
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At the same time the visceral, and traditional, murder issue struck a 
special nerve among Indians across the country. Among the notable 
deaths were those of the activist Richard Oaks, ambushed in a Califor­
nia park, Philip Celay, a "justifiable homicide" shot in the back by a 
deputy sheriff in Arizona, and the "excusable homicide" of the highly 
honored special forces veteran Leroy Shenandoah, an Onandaga iron­
worker beaten and shot by Philadelphia police in a case of tragically 
mistaken identity. 
But for Russell Means the ancestral homelands were in South Da­
kota, and it was there that just a year after the Yellow Thunder murder 
he was again called to intervene in a homicide case, this one the killing 
of Wesley Bad Heart Bull, shot dead in a gas station lot in the town of 
Buffalo Gap. Again the white killer was charged only with second-
degree manslaughter, again released, this time on minimal bail, and 
again AIM organized a demonstration, on February 6, 1973, this time 
at the courthouse in Custer, a name with special resonance in Indian 
history. But backing up state police and national guardsmen by this 
time was the FBI, as Director J. Edgar Hoover was convinced that AIM 
was subversive, communist, potentially revolutionary; and the protest 
was broken up. At that point, frustrated not only by the opposition of 
local, state, and federal agencies but also by the corruption and brutality 
of native BIA police, under control of the tribal leader—a man then 
threatened with impeachment—Means turned not outside but inside 
the Pine Ridge Reservation. On the evening of February 27, he and 
two hundred armed supporters took the highly symbolic step of mov­
ing into the little hamlet of Wounded Knee, site of the killing of Sitting 
Bull during the last massacre of Sioux by the U.S. Cavalry in the winter 
of 1890. 
AIM then occupied the Church of the Sacred Heart (with the sup­
port of the resident priest) and the local trading post (without support 
from the traders), together with the local museum and post office. 
Means and his group demanded a U.S. Senate investigation both of the 
current management of the BIA and of historic treaty violations going 
back to 1868. The group was soon blockaded by BIA police, U.S. mar­
shals, and FBI agents, but during the early days allies managed to slip 
in and help build and supply defensive bunkers as the confrontation 
escalated. Shots were fired on March 9, and, except for occasional cease­
fires for negotiations, the two sides continued to shoot at each other for 
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several weeks. Some federal agents were wounded, one seriously, but 
AIM was badly outgunned, and on April 27, the killings of two sup­
porters, Frank Clearwater and Buddy Lamont, helped to force a fragile 
truce on May 4. 
The event helped to further polarize national opinion. Conservatives 
across the country rallied behind the FBI, for so long the symbol of 
hard-line, incorruptible law enforcement, while liberals and civil liber­
tarians denounced it. Accounts of the siege varied enormously, but one 
thing was clear: American citizens, acting on the basis of deeply held 
beliefs, were exchanging deadlyfire with a small army of federal agents, 
in a confrontation that lasted for several weeks. The nation, as yet, had 
never seen anything like it. 
Throughout all the murderous turmoil of the 1960s and early 1970s, 
meanwhile, the U.S. Supreme Court continued its long drive to clarify 
the rights of criminal defendants, which toward the end of the period 
resulted in the effective suspension of the death penalty for any offense, 
with powerful political repercussions. 
The Powell cast, which in 1932 had demanded a new trial for the 
Scottsboro rape defendants, was one key landmark in the movement, 
begun in the nineteenth century, that allowed federal courts to oversee 
the operation of the criminal systems of the several states. The concept 
that the Bill of Rights applied to state proceedings was a powerful legal 
lever, and under the regime of Chief Justice Earl Warren, beginning in 
the late 1940s, the Court did not hesitate to use it. While Warren and 
his colleagues rarely moved past precedents set either in the federal 
courts or in the more historically liberal states, such as California or 
Massachusetts, what it did in effect was to insist on a single, national, 
and high set of standards for criminal proceedings across the whole of 
the country. 
And so, in Mapp v. Ohio (1961), the court ruled on the basis of the 
Fourth Amendment that evidence found by police without proper 
search warrants could not be used in a criminal trial. In Gideon v. Wain­
wright (1963), it held that the Seventh Amendment guaranteed that 
any defendant in a felony trial had the right to a lawyer at state expense. 
On the basis of the Fifth Amendments right against self-incrimination, 
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Griffin v. California (1965) forbade state judges and prosecutors from 
implying guilt, in addressing jurors, as a result of a defendants decision 
not to testify in court. The next year Miranda v. Arizona (1966) de­
manded on the basis of both the Seventh and Fifth Amendments that 
people arrested in a criminal case had to be informed of their right to a 
lawyer and to remain silent. 
Another set of rulings dealt with the rights of convicted prisoners, 
based on the Eighth Amendment s prohibition of "cruel and unusual 
punishment." The early-nineteenth-century hopes that prisons might 
be places of reform and rehabilitation had depended, in part, on the 
absolute authority of wardens to impose their own benign intentions 
on the wicked wills of the inmates. These early hopes were long gone, 
and by the 1960s many prisons had become places abandoned by the 
authorities to the better organized inmates, especially racial gangs or 
groups like Hell's Angels or the Black Muslims. Attorneys for prisoners 
then sought no more than to make incarceration less brutal, insisting 
that even murderers condemned for life—for whom "rehabilitation" 
was irrevelant anyway—retained some basic legal rights. The federal 
courts agreed, notably in Talley v. Stephens (1965) and Holt v. Sarver 
(1970), both cases from Arkansas. The first held that arbitrary whip­
pings must end, the second that the state s whole corrupt, trusty-run, 
and often brutal penal system was unconstitutional and must be dras­
tically reformed. 
All of these general rulings in favor of the rights of criminal defen­
dants and prisoners were spiced by decisions in individual cases, includ­
ing one that reversed the most notorious murder trial of the 1950s. On 
July 4, 1954, Dr. Sam Shepard told police he had been knocked out 
after struggling manfully with a "bushy-haired" intruder into his sub­
urban Cleveland home (bushy hair apparently a standard feature among 
such strangers), before awakening to find his pregnant wife, Marilyn, 
dead in their bedroom, bludgeoned some thirty-five times with a blunt 
instrument. Neither police nor jury believed him, given no apparent 
physical evidence for the existence of any outsider. But in 1966 the 
Court granted a new trial on the grounds that sensationally biased press 
coverage had made it impossible to impanel an impartial jury, and 
Shepard s celebrated defense lawyer, F. Lee Bailey, found a forensic ex­
pert on retrial to testify that some blood samples found in the house 
belonged to neither occupant. The doctor was set free. 
An early version of the electric chair, billed as a humane alternative to hanging, 
1890s. Credit: The Bettmann Archive. 
Bartolomeo Vanzetti and Nicola Sacco in court, Dedham, Massachusetts, 1923. 
Credit: UPI/Corbis-Bettmann. 
Nathan Leopold and Richard Loeb, flanking Clarence Darrow, at their sentenc­
ing, Chicago, June 13,1924. Credit: UPI/Corbis-Bettmann. 
Ruth Snyder, the first woman executed in the elec­
tric chair, New York, 1927. Credit: UPI/Corbis-
Bettmann. 
Victims of the St. Valentine's Day Massacre, Chicago, February 14, 1929. Credit: 
UPI/Corbis-Bettmann. 
Al Capone leaving the court in Chicago, shortly before his conviction on a federal 
tax charge, 1931. Credit: UPI/Corbis-Bettmann. 
William Heirens, a serial killer and 
the first suspect in a criminal case to 
be questioned under the influence of 
"truth serum," Chicago, 1946. 
Credit: UPI/Corbis-Bettmann. 
One of 10,000 national guardsmen standing ready during the Watts riots of Au­
gust 1965. Credit: UPI/Corbis-Bettmann. 
Richard Speck, convicted of murdering eight student nurses on the night of June 
13-14, 1966. Credit: UPI/Corbis-Bettmann. 
Charles Manson, leader of the group responsible for the Tate-La Bianca murders, 
Los Angeles, 1969. Credit: UPI/Corbis-Bettmann. 
American Indian Movement sentries on guard at Wounded Knee, South Dakota, 
March 3, 1973. Credit: UPI/Corbis-Bettmann. 
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In terms of the legal treatment of most homicide cases, none of the 
Warren Courts decisions had a truly dramatic effect, although some 
created real changes and others speeded up processes already under way. 
Most states, even Arkansas, had over the years been improving condi­
tions in their prisons with little direct federal prodding, simply because 
rising prosperity and living standards on the outside seeped inside their 
penitentiaries, as relatives and other voting visitors insisted on such ba­
sics as running water, ample food, and some time for rest and recrea­
tion. The right to a state-appointed lawyer guaranteed by Wainright was 
already well established everywhere in homicide cases. Griffins restric­
tion on prosecutors and judges had some impact in those states that did 
not already follow it, but it had been standard practice in all federal 
trials since 1893. And the kind of illegal search and seizure addressed 
in Mapp was rarely an issue in murder trials. 
Miranda, then, was the only one of these landmark rulings to have 
a widespread and routine effect in homicide investigations. Some cops 
grumbled at the time about the need to read an arrested person a short 
list of warnings about self-incrimination, and to respect any silence, but 
the legal issue was hardly novel: three generations earlier it was the lack 
of such a warning that had allowed Lizzie Borden s lawyer to keep her 
inquest testimony out of her trial. Miranda did have some effect in cases 
of crimes, such as arson, that were typically committed by professional 
or semiprofessional criminals, who had much experience with the sys­
tem and knew that police were forbidden to beat or otherwise force 
confessions out of them. But except for the relatively few who acted as 
hirelings of organized gangs, killers were and are overwhelmingly first-
time amateurs, and so their proceedings were much less affected, as 
detectives still found it possible to get them to talk without consulting 
lawyers. The usual game was rigged in favor of the police—smart, edu­
cated, and experienced in such cases—against the great majority of 
homicide defendants—never up on such charges before, ill-educated, 
jittery, hoping to get on the good side of the law. Interrogation rooms, 
strange and frightening places to murder suspects, were a detectives 
home turf, and as one "good cop" played on a suspects natural and 
often overwhelming desire to tell his side of the story, to lie, boast, 
justify, or confess, another "bad cop" played on his equally natural fear 
of authority. And so despite complaints, the number of confessions in 
homicide cases did not drop markedly after Miranda. 
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But if most of the Warren Court's decisions were reformist rather 
than revolutionary in effect, without much political impact, the same 
could not be said of its decisions concerning the death penalty. 
The background to the dramatic suspension of capital punishment in 
the United States was the long slow decline in the practice. During the 
1950s, in another move to make legal execution as humane as possible, 
many states had substituted death in a gas chamber for the electric 
chair. But neither was much used in the postwar era. The number of 
executions actually carried out sank to double digits as early as 1950 
and fell to just seven in 1965, one in 1966. And then, with the 1967 
gassing of two convicted murderers, a black man in California and a 
Puerto Rican in Colorado, the death penalty simply stopped operating 
all across the United States. No new humanitarian arguments were 
added to the old ones, and there was no big popular movement in favor 
of abolition. But for decades there had been an unevenly dropping per­
centage of Americans who favored capital punishment when asked by 
opinion pollers. And now on top of the long-standing general reluc­
tance to take life there was added a new set of legal and constitutional 
objections. 
One effect of the 1932 Powell decision was that the number of capital 
executions appealed all the way to the Supreme Court soared from a 
little over 3 percent in the 1930s to nearly 33 percent in the 1960s. The 
expense to the states involved was considerable, and so was the embar­
rassment of the trial or appellate courts whose judgments were over­
ridden. By the mid-1960s, the drive to overturn the death penalty 
altogether was being led by the Legal Defense Fund of the NAACP, 
whose key argument was that in practice it was disproportionately re­
served for racial minorities, especially blacks, who accounted for well 
over half of all who died at the hands of the state. The evidence was in 
fact overwhelming. Roughly 90 percent of all those executed for rape, 
over many decades, had been black. And among those accused of mur­
der, scholars carefully going over the evidence, case by case, holding 
constant all other factors such as the nature of the crime and the age 
and sex of victims, clearly confirmed that what had been true in Phila­
delphia beginning in the twentieth century and in the South through­
out its history applied as well to the United States as a whole: African 
Americans were far more likely than whites to be sentenced to death. 
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The evidence was certainly strong enough to convince the states of 
the need, in effect, to suspend all executions until the Supreme Court 
laid down firm guidelines. During 1968, in Witherspoon v. Illinois, the 
standard prosecution practice of excluding potential jurors from capital 
trials on the grounds that they opposed the death penalty was held un­
constitutional, under the Fourteenth Amendment, because it deprived 
a defendant of a jury "representative of the community"—just as ex­
cluding black jurors did. No state, then, could safely execute anyone 
convicted in such a trial. For four years capital punishment was sus­
pended while the key test cases worked their way up through the sys­
tem, with both prosecutors and defense lawyers metaphorically holding 
their breath. In 1972, finally, the California Supreme Court and then 
the U.S. Supreme Court issued two more historic rulings. 
In California, People v. Anderson held that gassing was "cruel and 
unusual punishment," simply because it was so rarely done, carried out 
in only a tiny percentage of potentially capital cases, and was thus un­
constitutional in that state. The federal ruling in Furman v. Georgia was 
less extreme but followed in part the same logic. It was a close 5 to 4 
vote, with the majority turning in five different opinions. Some of the 
winning justices held in effect that while the death penalty was not on 
its face unconstitutional (past executions were not invalid), it had in 
effect become unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment, just as 
California had ruled, because it was so seldom imposed. The others in 
effect ruled that death at the hands of the state resulted from something 
like a lottery, as no firm guidelines dictated why this crime, or criminal, 
deserved execution and that legally identical one did not. And while 
leaving the way open, in theory, for a new legislative approach, the 
Court followed the argument of the NAACP by quite clearly forbid­
ding execution at the discretion of (usually white) jurors, as being liable 
to arbitrary or prejudiced abuse. 
This reasoning was an ironic reversal of the nineteenth-century 
movement to soften mandatory executions in cases of first-degree mur­
der, rape, and other offenses by allowing judges and jurors some dis­
cretionary leeway in which to exercise the quality of mercy. But while 
scholars might puzzle over that point, the one that hit the fan was that 
it invalidated the capital sentences of all the 120 men then on death 
rows across the country, threw state law into confusion, and underlined 
the nations already powerful ideological polarization. 
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The timing was especially critical, and to many painful. All through the 
rising turbulence of the later 1960s the Supreme Court, as the Found­
ing Fathers had intended, had marched to its own drummer, ignoring 
the prevailing political climate by pursuing a line of legal reform begun 
in a quieter era. As the "law and order" issue grew more explosive every 
year, the justices calmly followed Talley with Miranda, Witherspoon 
with Holt. But 1968 marked a series of key turning points. That was 
the year when both Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King Jr. were 
assassinated, the year when Richard Nixon won the presidency in part 
by running against urban riot and "crime in the streets." It was also, 
with ironic timing, both the last year in which a bare majority of Ameri­
cans, when polled, still opposed the death penalty and the first year in 
history when no one officially suffered it. 
The issue of capital punishment had always provoked strong emo­
tions, and the late 1960s were especially aggravating to those who be­
lieved in it. One of the most frightening killers of the era was known as 
"the Boston Strangler," a man who in just a year and half, between 
1962 and 1964, raped, killed, and sometimes sadistically mutilated 
thirteen female victims. Women who lived alone anywhere in eastern 
Massachusetts were terrified by the Strangler, who broke into locked 
apartments and attacked victims ranging in age from eighty-five-year-
old Mary Mullen, who was found with a cord tied in a neat bow under 
her chin, to nineteen-year-old Mary Sullivan, left with a broom inserted 
in her vagina and a "Happy New Year!" card between her toes. Early in 
1965, F. Lee Bailey, attorney for a man once falsely accused of these 
crimes, identified an inmate in an institution for the criminally insane, 
one Albert De Salvo, as the real Strangler. The evidence was strong, but 
the authorities took no legal action, evidently embarrassed by the fact 
that they had arrested De Salvo twice during the early 1960s without 
connecting him to the murders. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts 
implicitly agreed with Bailey by transferring the alleged Strangler from 
Bridgewater State Hospital to Walpole State Prison, for what was in 
effect a life sentence; he had been sent to Bridgewater, hearing voices, 
after an arrest for nothing more than breaking and entering an apart­
ment. But the public was outraged, and a major political issue was 
made of the fact that De Salvo was never put on trial for his life. 
And then, the year after the Strangler revelations, a drifting petty 
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criminal named Richard Speck shocked the nation by calmly and one 
by one murdering eight student nurses from South Chicago Commu­
nity Hospital, raping one of them, during a single hot July night in 
1966. Speck was widely considered a kind of monster, a notion en­
couraged by a brief return to Cesare Lombroso's Darwinian theory 
that criminals are physically different, biologically born and not made. 
During the excitement surrounding early exploration of genetic struc­
ture it was thought that carrying an extra Y, or male-determining, 
chromosome explained not only Speck's gaunt physique and deeply 
pockmarked face but his super-macho murderous behavior. Unlike 
De Salvo, he did not escape a murder trial or a death sentence, as pro­
nounced by a Cook County jury in June 1967. But the next year the 
Supreme Court's ruling in Witherspoon invalidated that decision, forc­
ing a resentencing to life in prison, which to many voters suggested 
somehow that he had gotten away with murder. 
And by this standard Speck was not alone. Both the King and Ken­
nedy families urged that their respective assassins not be sentenced to 
death, but much of the public felt cheated by their life sentences—in 
the case of Sirhan Sirhan, forced by the Anderson decision after he had 
been condemned to die in California. The same thing happened to 
Charles Manson, the apparent embodiment of sheer evil, and to all of 
his "family," together with brutal robbery murderers, cop killers, and 
child rapists across America. And as politicians accused the courts of 
coddling criminals and "tough cops" all over the country won office as 
big city mayors (a development inconceivable in the previous century), 
Richard Nixon worked throughout his first term to restructure the Su­
preme Court. He had barely squeaked to victory in 1968; the second 
time around, in 1972, the tested appeal of "law and order" helped him 
to reelection, just months after the Furman decision, by the biggest 
electoral margin ever won by a Republican candidate for president. 
The headlines, as always, dealt with the big ones; the assassinations 
and ideological killings, the hideous, sensational, or mass murders. But 
far more important numerically than these, again as always, were the 
"routine" homicides among acquaintances in bars, family members in 
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kitchens, robbery victims in streets and gas stations. These, too, were 
climbing sharply in the anxious decade 1963-1974. And the explana­
tions offered by contemporary sociological experts were no more help­
ful than those of contemporary politicians, liberal and conservative. 
Political conservatives tended to blame Democratic administrations, 
the Supreme Court, the decline in capital punishment, the "handcuff­
ing" of police by judicial decisions, the defiance of settled law by pro­
testers like Martin Luther King Jr., and various campus radicals. More 
privately, or with various code words, they also blamed blacks. Liberals, 
when not claiming that rising homicide rates were simply a figment of 
the FBI's imagination, blamed poverty and racism. Sociologists, heirs 
to an academic discipline that since its nineteenth-century beginnings 
had idealized small traditional communities, blamed urban growth, us­
ing a number of ugly words at the very top of the alphabet—"alien-
ation," "anonymity," and "anomie"—to describe the unhealthy mental 
state of city folks. But all of these attempts at understanding ignored 
both the hard statistics and the history of homicide in America. 
The "murder rate" had begun its rise in the late 1950s, under the 
conservative Eisenhower administration, and peaked in 1973 under 
Richard Nixon. It had never shown any correlation with rates of exe­
cution, rarely involved college students of any political persuasion, and 
was moving up among whites as well as blacks, Iowans as well as New 
Yorkers. The rise was recorded in death certificates as well as crimes 
reported to the FBI, and so were as "hard" as any criminal statistics 
could be. It kept moving up through a generally prosperous decade, 
when the number of blacks and whites counted under the official "pov­
erty" line was falling dramatically. And while during the 1960s metro­
politan rates did generally move up and past those for the countryside, 
this was a very recent development. To blame the rise in violence on 
the growth of cities was to ignore the fact that through most of Ameri­
can (and English) history cities were generally more peaceable than the 
countryside; that while various social ills (including crime) were offi­
cially counted better in urban jurisdictions than in rural ones, as late as 
the 1950s the "murder rate" in New York was lower than the national 
average, and that during the 1960s, as always, it was far higher in many 
small cities than in the big ones like Chicago and Los Angeles. 
All parties simply wanted to blame "crime in the streets" on their 
favorite villains. Being American and optimistic, all but the academic 
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sociologists also wanted to blame it on something they could "cure," or 
at least promise to cure, either through tougher cops and courts or 
through more antipoverty programs. And being American and paro­
chial, they remained largely ignorant of the fact that the rise in murder 
rates was at the same time afflicting a variety of nations with widely 
different political and justice systems, economies, and racial compo­
sitions. 
The first American colonies had been founded as part of the then-new 
worldwide international economy, and the United States had always 
been deeply involved in that economy, more deeply involved, and with 
wider implications, than most of its citizens recognized or understood. 
And at the most basic level rising violence in the United States was part 
of an international shift of great significance, nothing less than the re­
versal of the long decline in homicide rates and other indices of crimi­
nal behavior that had begun in the middle decades of the nineteenth 
century. 
The problems of records and definitions that make it hard to find 
comparable measurements over any long period within a single juris­
diction are multiplied many times over in any attempt to stretch com­
parisons not only over time but across space, as between nations. But 
careful studies by Ted Robert Gurr have shown movements in interna­
tional homicide rates, by far the most well measured and "trustworthy" 
of criminal statistics, that are far too long and steep to be denied. Gurr 
draws in part on my own more detailed work for the (mostly urban) 
United States over the same period, and despite some differences in 
timing and degree, the picture for the several Western countries is 
roughly the same. If drawn as a sketch it would look like a long dis­
tended U-curve, or perhaps a reverse J-curve, with high rates from the 
earliest available nineteenth-century statistics dropping to lows some­
where in the middle twentieth century, as in Marvin Wolfgang's Phila­
delphia, and then shooting up sharply in the 1960s. 
This giant U is of course pretty ragged, responding to a number of 
short-term phenomena in each locale, but even some of its zigs and 
bumps are common to many nations. In the middle of the twentieth 
century, the drop in recorded homicide rates during World War II and 
its rise immediately afterward echoes the experience not only of World 
War I but of the American Civil War, and (in England) it seems the 
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Napoleonic Wars as well. There are national variations, too: English 
homicides drop more steeply than American, on the left side of the U, 
as do Stockholm's convictions for murder and attempted murder. In 
Sydney the index for high court convictions for murder and assault 
plunged at the most dramatic rate, falling by a factor often between the 
1830s and the end of the nineteenth century. The bottom, too, was hit 
at somewhat different times in these places, and in various European 
nations. But the sketch still works, in its rough way, and the jump in 
the late 1950s and certainly the 1960s is unmistakable everywhere: in 
Stockholm, with no Vietnam War, virtually no blacks, little poverty, no 
liberal Democrats (or conservative Republicans), the rate of conviction 
for murder and attempted murder soared by 600 percent between 1950 
and 1970. 
There are many possible explanations for this international crime wave, 
or right-hand upturn in the U-curve, but the most fundamental is that 
it represents the decay of the conditions that caused the left-hand down­
turn in the first place. That is, just as the downturn represents the force 
of the urban industrial revolution in the mid- to later nineteenth cen­
tury, bottoming out in the mid-twentieth with the full maturing of that 
revolution, the upturn represents the move into what was already, in 
the 1960s, being called the "postindustrial era." 
Homicide in the modern world has been mostly an irrationally im­
pulsive crime, committed by young men, especially poor and aimless 
young men energized by frustration and anger. And in the 1960s two 
sides of the economy, both consumption and employment, combined 
to heighten frustration, release the curbs on irrationally impulsive be­
havior, and fill the streets with aimless young men. 
Frustration, even desperation, was never absent from the world of 
the nineteenth century, as people lived close to the edge of genuine 
hunger, and in hard times property crimes tended to go up as men and 
women had to beg or steal clothes, shoes, and bread. But the urban 
industrial revolution worked to curb impulsive behavior, as the hard 
discipline of mass schooling, backed up by cops and courts and moral 
lessons, reinforced the basic requirements of the new kinds of work 
itself. The regimen of routinized work and long hours through all sea­
sons of the year was made tolerable, even desirable, not only by more 
material abundance, the basic promise of more, here, and now in terms 
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of clothes, shoes, and bread, but also by such future possibilities as 
home ownership and family advancement. The moral lessons of self-
control and the private and governmental institutions of social control 
reinforced each other and the built-in demands of office and factory. At 
the very minimum the regularity of work and the demand for sobriety 
narrowed the opportunities for drinking and fighting to a few hours in 
the week. 
But by the 1960s the very abundance of the postindustrial econ­
omy was creating whole new layers of frustration. Modern marketing 
techniques, such as mass advertising and open shelves, virtually cried 
"Take!" to all comers, and property crimes soared even during times of 
prosperity. Television greatly magnified "relative deprivation," encour­
aging people who by earlier standards were well fed and clothed to com­
pare their own conditions, in great detail, to the lifestyles of the rich 
and famous, and so created demands for "More!" that were almost im­
possible to satisfy legitimately. And at the same time it grew harder for 
many to satisfy more basic needs through ordinary work. 
The new postindustrial economy required, and still requires, levels 
of schooling that the human species has never known before, more 
years of demanding that young people sit still, take turns, mind the 
teacher, and listen for the bell. For those who drop out after a few years 
of this, absorbing some of the discipline but few of the fine points, there 
had once been jobs in factories. But by the 1960s these manufacturing 
jobs, traditionally the best paid for those with few educational skills, 
were shrinking in number. And as competition stiffened for those in 
low-level white-color work, the prospects for good money and advance­
ment shrank there as well. 
Once there was a clearly apparent reward for putting up with the 
boredom and frustration of mass education, for obeying the cops, stay­
ing out of trouble, learning to curb the appetite for mind-altering 
drugs. But once the decay of the urban industrial revolution diluted 
these payoffs, the moral lessons came to seem irrelevant and the insti­
tutions of social control simply tyrannical. And at a level of prosperity 
high enough so that anyone could afford alcohol, with an expanding 
pharmacopoeia of other drugs widely available, without steady employ­
ment and with much time on their hands, a growing number of young 
men in the postindustrial age drifted into impulsively violent criminal 
behavior. 
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The story above is international in scope, but during the 1960s and 
early 1970s its American variation had some features of its own, as the 
result of the erosion of American economic dominance, the Vietnam 
War, the problem of race, and the unique character of cities in the 
United States. 
The year 1968, pivotal in many ways, witnessed a major crisis in the 
international money market. The resolution of that crisis both reflected 
and contributed to the fact that the U.S. dollar could no longer act as 
the basis of the world's currencies, as the result of chronic deficits in our 
international balance of payments. Some of this resulted from eco­
nomic developments beyond any American governments ability to 
control, but to try at the same time to fight a Vietnamese war in Indo­
china and a war on poverty at home greatly added to the strain. In any 
case the long postwar economic surge that had so lifted the prospects 
of urban working-class Americans, especially blacks, was coming to 
an end. 
Hidden under the prosperity of the era, the older manufacturing 
cities like Philadelphia continued, as they had since the late 1950s, to 
lose population and jobs. The good-paying factory jobs that lives and 
families could be built on were the ones that black men, in particular, 
had just begun to win in the postwar era; as "postwar" segued within a 
few years into "postindustrial," these men discovered that they had in 
effect been piped aboard a sinking ship, welcomed into the urban in­
dustrial age just as that age was fading out. At the same time there was 
a loss even in the less desirable, wholly unskilled jobs as messengers, 
elevator operators, and porters that had once been open to them. 
While many Americans, black and white, were able to move up and 
out of poverty during the 1960s, for many of them moving up meant 
moving out of the inner city. The majority of Americans, unlike Euro­
peans, had long felt uneasy about cities. Florence, Rome, Paris, and 
London were monuments to a nations history, outposts of high culture 
and civilization; Chicago and New York were dirty and sinful, full of 
strange, distasteful, sometimes scary people—in the nineteenth century 
foreign immigrants, by the late twentieth African Americans. And as 
the jobs moved out to the suburbs, so did the people with the jobs, 
black and white, abandoning the central core of the older cities to the 
unemployed and desperate. 
Vietnam was no help: for the first time in history, there was no drop 
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in the murder rate even at the height of a major war. Instead the fight­
ing simply drained federal dollars and attention away from the domestic 
economy and social issues. The fact that it was so deeply resented kept 
terms of duty short and morale low. By its late stages, after 1968, the 
Pentagon reported that about a third of all the troops in Indochina were 
abusing drugs, while refusal to obey direct orders, even the murder of 
unpopular officers—those who insisted on more fighting—had be­
come serious problems. And when finally rotated home, veterans hard­
ened to violence were greeted not with parades but indifference, even 
vilification, and the same tightening job market many of them had en­
listed to escape. 
Those who returned to the inner cities after 1969 found that the 
destruction of the Black Panthers had not brought peace but new trou­
bles. Some of the Panthers, those not suicidally attacking the police, 
had provided some sense of hope, some positive programs. In their ab­
sence purely local youth gangs swelled in importance, power, and ar­
rogance, representing no ideas but their own existence, robbing 
strangers, killing each other in turf wars. One result was the new record 
in homicides set in 1973. And not only the number but the patterns of 
these killings confirmed that the United States was pushing up the 
right-hand side of the historic U-curve in homicide rates, as shown, 
once again, by the Philadelphia story. 
Not all places moved at the same pace. In Houston, for example, 
never an industrial city, the coming of the space age in the shape of the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration only slowly changed 
the old southern attitudes toward homicide. For over a century Texas 
had put down in black and white what other places honored only as an 
"unwritten law": that a husband (not wife) who caught a spouse in the 
act of adultery had a right to murder the guilty party or parties. Carry­
ing concealed weapons into ordinary social situations was an old state 
tradition, and until the code was revised in 1974 the defense of private 
property, certainly the barest hint of personal self-defense, defined a 
killing as "justifiable." In that year lawmakers agreed that Texas had too 
long "provided private citizens with wide discretionary power to kill 
their fellow citizens legally and with impunity." As a result, one study 
of all Houston's killings in the year 1969 showed that, even before the 
stage when defense lawyers got to strut and fret in open court, police, 
prosecutors, or grand jurors routinely dismissed an absolute majority of 
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known killers without formal trials. Hearing, of course, from the sur­
vivors of these mostly barroom or family disputes rather than the losers, 
they based their decisions on the time-honored ground that, as the re­
sult of some combination of lowdown lyin', cheatin', braggin', stealin', 
or coldhearted double-dealin' in general, the victim had in fact deserved 
to die. (It is interesting that in this macho jurisdiction, perhaps because 
guns, as "equalizers," wiped out the physical difference between men 
and women, more wives killed husbands [15] than husbands killed 
wives [9]. None of them served any time as a result.) 
But Philadelphia, like most northern jurisdictions, was not and never 
had been as tolerant as Houston: during the late 1960s and early 1970s 
the problem in the City of Brotherly Love was not that homicide was 
often excused by the justice system but that it was beginning to run 
away from it. 
In 1972-74 another study of Philadelphia s Police Homicide Divi­
sion, asking the same questions as Marvin Wolfgang had a generation 
earlier, came up with dramatically different answers. The number of 
arrests for homicide among whites had climbed from just 1.8 per 
100,000 annually in the mid-twentieth century years to 2.8 at the verge 
of the century's last quarter, a gain of 56 percent. In part as the result 
of the explosion in gang activity, the number of black arrests meanwhile 
shot up from 24.6 per 100,000 at midcentury to 64.2 in the early 
1970s, a jump of 261 percent. The gap between black and white, then, 
which had been closing in the 1940s and 1950s, was again widening. 
Most significant, in a city now full of young African Americans with 
little work to do, as over a century earlier it had been full of young Irish, 
were the specific patterns of homicide. That is, the patterns of the early 
1970s, on the right-hand upside of the U-curve, in many ways more 
closely resembled those of the left-hand downside, way back in the 
nineteenth century, than they did those of just a generation earlier, or 
1948-52, at the bottom of the curve, the time that had marked the full 
maturity of the urban industrial revolution. 
As a result of the fact that one day looks much like the rest to the 
unemployed, during both 1972-74 and 1839-1901 the fraction of 
killings occurring on weekends was just one-half of the total, in con­
trast to the nearly two-thirds during the mid-twentieth-century years, 
when sobriety (and exhaustion) reigned during the workweek and 
the time for drinking and fighting peaked around payday. On both 
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sides of the U, in comparison with the mid-twentieth-century bottom, 
there were proportionally more killings of strangers, and in the streets, 
fewer at home; more deadly brawls involving many contestants, fewer 
one-on-one domestic fatalities; more robbery murders; proportionally 
fewer women arrested; more interracial murders, fewer involving fam­
ily, friends, or acquaintances. 
All of these changes after midcentury, too, were precisely of the kind 
that made homicides harder for police to solve. And as the national 
"murder rate" measured by mortality statistics more than doubled be­
tween the 1955 low of 4.5 and the 10.2 per 100,000 annually reached 
in 1974, the percentage of those that could not be "cleared by arrest" 
plunged in parallel, roughly doubling from less than 10 percent to 
about 20 percent. 
In January 1973 a ceasefire in Vietnam was followed by an exchange of 
prisoners; despite some diplomatic fudging it was clear that the United 
States had lost. By then even defeat was a relief, closing a decade of 
more rapid change and frightening domestic events than any since the 
Civil War. But while the events are over, we are still living with many 
of the changes they created, politically and socially. And in terms of 
homicide, we are still struggling, among other things, with the prob­
lems of the international postindustrial economy, as national murder 
rates are still nearly as high as those reached by the upside peak of the 
long-term international U-curve in murder rates. 
Murder in Contemporary America, 
1974 to the Present: 
A Historical Perspective 
In America, history has always moved too fast to be analyzed on the fly, 
and every generation has believed that its own experience is unique, that 
in the rush of change it has broken with tradition more decisively than 
any other. Sometimes even a professional historian is moved to agree: 
yes, it is at least partly true that this is a genuinely new time, without 
useful precedents in the past. There is no question that the patterns of 
homicide have changed over the last quarter of the twentieth century 
and that we approach the twenty-first in the midst of some unique 
developments, many of them troubling. But history is rarely tran­
scended outright, and the historian's basic credo is that it is impossible 
to know just where we are or to predict where we are headed without 
some knowledge of where we have come from. 
Ever since the 1960s the "crime issue" has been part of our national 
political discourse, and as murder heads the list of crimes most feared 
and publicized, the level and direction of the "murder rate" is a matter 
of continuing concern. But there is little agreement about what it 
means. In late December 1993 the chair of the U.S. Senate Judiciary 
Committee, charged with oversight of the several federal agencies de­
voted to fighting crime, announced that "the United States is the most 
dangerous country in the world. No country in the world has a higher 
per capita murder rate than the United States." A little more than two 
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years later the cover story of a national news magazine declared, "Fi­
nally, We Are Winning the War Against Crime." 
Both of these declarations were based on the latest statistical evi­
dence. The senator began his speech with the murder total from the 
FBI's Uniform Crime Reports for 1992; the magazine relied on an in­
terim report from the same source that showed a 15 percent drop for 
the first six months of 1995 (later cut back to 8 percent). Statistics like 
these stimulate scholarly commentary at regular intervals; the backyard 
arguments follow more often on dramatic events, the abduction and 
murder of little Polly Klaas, the O. J. Simpson trial, the latest drive-by 
shooting of innocent victims in Chicago or New York. But as experts 
and laypersons, liberals and conservatives, argue about whether or not 
there is a "crisis" in violent crime, and why, they share only a common 
refusal to look much beyond the immediate past. 
The simple fact is that in terms of both homicide and its treatment 
in law, the continuities are even more impressive than the changes. 
Murder itself stretches back into prehistory, and the death penalty al­
most as far; the outlines of the modern criminal process go back to the 
Middle Ages, and so do many enduring patterns of criminal homicide. 
While other patterns, punishments, and procedures have come and 
gone over the history of the American Republic, still more have moved 
along relatively predictable lines. 
Some acquaintance with the past is needed, then, if only to tell what 
is genuinely novel in our contemporary world from what is not. The 
list of debated issues is a long one, and this book has not even tried to 
deal with all of them. Its focus, much more modest, is limited to those 
that the specifically historical evidence may help to clarify. These clues 
from the past have no respect for political or ideological boundaries; 
readers will already have found that neither those labeled "liberal" nor 
those labeled "conservative" in contemporary debate can find consis­
tent comfort in the historical record. But if approached with an open 
mind, history may provide much useful perspective. At the least it may 
help to steer current debate away from the more obvious dead ends; at 
best, help scholars and voters to build their several arguments on 
stronger foundations. 
To now the book has concentrated on placing homicide firmly in the 
context of the wider history of America. The conclusion will deal briefly 
with several of the questions it promised to help solve way back in the 
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introduction. That is, what is the current "murder rate" and how does 
it compare with those in past times, and of other nations? What has 
changed since the early 1970s in the nature and levels of homicide? Last 
and hardest: What does history suggest about the usual explanations for 
murderous behavior, from the family, police, and courts on to the 
economy, guns, and the cultures of region and nation? 
I 
The single question most often asked of a historian of criminal violence 
is, How do murder rates today compare with those in past times? 
Readers by this time will understand that there is no simple answer; the 
historical equivalent of Murphy's Law is that people in past times did 
not record the kind of information we would now most like to have. 
But there is some firm comparative information about the present and 
recent past. And after that it is at least possible to provide a series of 
respectably educated guesses, growing shakier as we move in effect 
backward through this book, out of the twentieth century into the 
nineteenth, eighteenth, and seventeenth, returning finally to medieval 
England in the fourteenth and thirteenth centuries. 
If the question is confined to this last quarter of the twentieth century, 
the answer is simple: not much has changed. In 1974 the murder rate 
was 10.3 deaths from homicide per 100,000 residents of the United 
States, as recorded in the official U.S. statistics of mortality. Since then 
it has zigged and zagged along a line averaging something over 9.0, 
between a high of 10.7 in 1980 and a low of 8.3 in 1985, turning down 
some in the mid-1990s. If this represents a crisis—and in ways not 
measured by mere statistics, this may be argued—it is not because of 
any sharp rise in the numbers. 
These numbers are high by historic standards, but not dramatically 
so. And the ups and downs among them, while not negligible, are in 
perspective not great either. According to the same standardized set of 
national mortality statistics, the murder rate for the late 1920s and early 
1930s was close to what it has been in this past generation, reaching 9.7 
in 1933, the first year in which the mortality statistics covered the 
whole of the United States. From that apparent earlier peak the rate 
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then dropped fairly steadily and quite sharply to lows in the late 1940s 
and 1950s. In some years it dropped under 5.0—the figure for 1955 
was 4.5, or less than half those averaged in either the 1990s or the late 
1920s. The accompanying chart shows that while the figures for the 
forty-odd years between the onset of the Great Depression and the end 
of the Vietnam War make a fairly neat U-curve (with the usual upward 
blip just after World War II), those from 1974 to the present simply 
oscillate up and down around an essentially flat line trailing off the 
right-hand peak of the U. 
Before the 1930s, the comparative question gets progressively harder 
to answer as the figures get less reliable. The national mortality statis­
tics, as explained in chapter 6, were first compiled just after 1900; on 
paper the murder rate rose fairly steeply between then and the late 
1920s. But given the problems in the way the statistics were compiled, 
it is quite certain that if they had been properly, uniformly, and com­
pletely collected they would have shown comparatively little change be­
tween the beginnings and the 1920s. This means in effect that a graph 
for essentially the whole of the twentieth century would show a long, 
wavering but basically flat line trailing to the left of the 1932-74 U-
curve which would match that shown in the chart, on the right. 
Before 1900 there are no national figures at all. And for the whole pe­
riod stretching back from then into the 1830s, there is only one prov­
able conclusion and one firm guess. 
A variety of records from several places, notably homicide indict­
ments from the city of Philadelphia, as described in chapters 4 and 5, 
fit with other nonstatistical evidence to show that in the major indus­
trializing cities of the United States, as in the rest of the developing 
world, the general trend of the murder rate was down for most of the 
nineteenth century, certainly from the turbulent and riotous decades 
just before the Civil War. 
That is the trend that may be taken as proven; the firm guess is that 
across the country as a whole, during the same period, the murder rate 
was considerably higher outside big cities than inside. As late as the 
1920s the official mortality figures show that the New York City rate 
was lower than the national average. If trustworthy figures for the whole 
nation were available from the 1830s into the early twentieth century, 
12 
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U.S. Death Rate from Criminal 
10 Homicide per 100,000 Population, 
1 1933-1994 
Each bar represents a two-year average 
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the rural-urban difference would in all probability be the same or even 
bigger, given the levels of murderous violence especially in the rural 
South and parts of the West. 
But the "actual"figures for either the downward urban trend or the 
rural-urban difference—figures that would correspond to the modern 
statistics of mortality—simply do not exist. The records that are avail­
able present enormous problems to historians. A potpourri of arrests, 
indictments, imprisonments, and executions, with a few runs of coro­
ners' reports, they are not easily comparable to each other, they rarely 
span many years or decades in any given township, county, city, or state, 
and the standards used in all of the thousands of such jurisdictions 
across the United States differ in ways impossible to measure. Above all 
they undercount, to some unknown degree, the number of killings ac­
tually committed. 
Modern mortality figures come quite close to the "actual" number 
of homicides committed in the real world, and so the "dark figure" for 
those that are never officially counted is nowadays quite low. But that 
dark figure is by definition higher, often far higher, when the count is 
based on anything other than number of victims found by the authori­
ties. Many killings do not result in indictments, indictments do not 
always lead to convictions, and only a fraction of convictions lead to 
executions. And given the relatively primitive police and detective sys­
tems of the nineteenth century and above all the sometimes selective 
interest of coroners in pursuing cases of homicide, it is impossible to 
compare the numbers for the late twentieth century with those for ear­
lier times with any certainty. 
In big nineteenth-century cities, the authorities often bungled and 
even covered up when faced with the murdered bodies of poor people 
or transients, and this is one of the factors that make all the reported 
statistics suspect. But the biggest wild card in counting urban homi­
cides is infanticide, a crime that from medieval times into the twentieth 
century was sometimes pursued vigorously but more often ignored. 
The killing of newborns was always easy, almost always impossible to 
detect. In mid-nineteenth-century Philadelphia "dead infants" were of­
ten found in gutters and privies several times a week. And given these 
sad routine discoveries, the generally high level of infant mortality, and 
the many ambiguous "causes of death" reported by desperately poor 
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women and families, the dark figure for infanticide was surely far higher 
than the official one. 
And while the unrecorded murder of newborns is historically a major 
block to an accurate count, it is greatly overshadowed by the unre­
corded murders of nonwhites across much of the country. While the 
Civil War was legally followed by Emancipation, of a sort, the African-
American population of the southern states was only slowly and ir­
regularly brought into the formal systems that counted and seriously 
prosecuted white-on-black or even black-on-black killings. And it was 
not until the 1930s, with the Supreme Courts intervention in the 
Scottsboro case, that the federal government even began to pressure 
the several states into bringing black citizens into their legal systems on 
the same basis as whites. 
In cases of homicide the legal status of Native Americans was also 
confused, at least into the 1880s, when the last of them were herded 
into reservations and subjected to white jurisdiction. Until then the line 
between interracial murder and warfare was always ambiguous and 
troublesome. Meanwhile, killings among and between Indians, who 
were in law supposed to be in some sense subject to the United States, 
were rarely subject to official action by either tribal or white authority. 
So what was the "real" murder rate for the period? In the cities, even 
at its height in the antebellum decades, the murder rate was probably 
not as high as it is now, at least among teenagers and adults. If the 
number of infanticides were actually counted it might well be higher, 
even much higher. And outside of the cities, these were decades of mur­
derous interracial and intraracial violence not only in the South but in 
the West, where it involved not only the mutual hostilities of whites 
and Indians but massacres of Chinese and Mexicans. When these are 
added not simply to the routine drunken brawls among family, friends, 
and barroom acquaintances but to the toll taken by urban riots and in 
mining camps, by vigilantes and gunfighters, by strikers and strike­
breakers, it is evident that whatever the numbers they were surely higher 
than those of recent decades. 
For the years between the American Revolution and the 1830s, as al­
ways, homicide varied enormously among regions. Very few hard num­
bers are available, except for executions, which were dropping sharply, 
but there are other strong clues in the record. The Native Americans, 
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still a real threat, often killed and were killed. But the cities were quieter 
than they would be in the violent 1840s and 1850s. In settled com­
munities generally, within an increasingly nonviolent middle class, and 
even along the frontiers, homicide among white citizens was not con­
sidered a major problem—except in the South. There the relations 
among whites were increasingly infected by the often murderous vio­
lence essential to wringing work out of unwilling blacks, and homicide 
was widely tolerated, even celebrated, so long as it could be justified, 
often with much stretching, as "honorable" self-defense. 
For the colonial period, the racial and regional divisions among the 
inhabitants of the several American colonies were even sharper than 
they would be later, and the paradoxes greater. Warfare was a way of 
life for American colonials, much of it sparked by acts of murder be­
tween Indians and whites. Middle- and upper-class heads of household 
raised their children and treated servants and spouses with far more 
routine brutality than they would in the nineteenth and twentieth cen­
turies. Racial slavery, still new to both Africans and Europeans, was an 
even harsher institution than it would later become. Much of the white 
population was made up of indentured servants, even convicts, trans­
ported from England. But partly because of their rarity, the number of 
trials and executions for capital offenses of all kinds may be traced in 
many colonies with some care, and it is quite clear that in settled com­
munities along the Atlantic Coast the white-on-white murder rate was 
very low, by the standards either of later times or of the imperial En­
gland that ruled them all. 
And finally, to complete the sense of paradox, and to underline the 
point that history does not move in straight or simple lines, there is 
the evidence from medieval England. The records for some counties 
during much of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries are more de­
tailed than for any other sizable British jurisdiction until the eigh­
teenth century, or American until the nineteenth. Coroners' rolls and 
court proceedings do omit some kinds of homicide, from infanti­
cides to the murderous behavior of the rich and powerful and their 
outlaw proteges. But even without these, they show that in a nation that 
lacked most of the usual "causes" experts assign to modern murder, 
neighbors killed neighbors and robbers killed victims at rates roughly 
312 Chapter 9 
twenty times those of modern Britain and up to double those that 
trouble us in the contemporary United States. 
But the numbers across time do not fully answer our concerns about 
murder, and Americans have also worried, historically, about our image 
abroad and our record relative to other nations. In declaring in 1993 
that "no country in the world is as dangerous as the United States," the 
chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee was of course defining "dan­
ger" narrowly. Not since 1865 has a war been fought on American 
ground. He was evidently discounting also the undeclared but mon­
strous ethnic hostilities then wracking Bosnia and Rwanda, the mur­
derous rebellions afflicting much of the Southern Hemisphere, the 
state-sponsored killings and acts of terrorism authorized in many other 
places. This has never of course been "the most dangerous country in 
the world." But by the narrower definition, does it have "the highest 
per capita murder rate" ? 
This is not hard to test; for some decades the United Nations has 
been recording deaths from homicide. And while the counts from some 
member states are even less trustworthy than those for this country ear­
lier in the century, some real comparison is possible. And the answer to 
the senator s second proposition is again no. 
While the United States has averaged 9 to 10 homicides per 100,000 
over the past quarter century, the World Health Organization (WHO) 
reports that a number of other nations, mostly in South America and 
Africa, have had rates double and even triple ours; so has Russia, since 
the early 1990s, during its hard climb out of communism. Some of 
these foreign rates would probably be higher if counted more strictly, 
the reporting states having often clumsy recording techniques, great 
sensitivity about their international reputations, or both. (The WH O 
figures include police and military killings of civilians, in addition to 
ordinary murders and manslaughters. Syria, whose sponsorship of ter­
rorism abroad is matched only by its record of repression at home, was 
reported to have averaged 0.05 homicides per 100,000 people during 
1979-81 , a figure perhaps credible to believers in the Tooth Fairy.) 
But however exaggerated, the senators concern about relative mur­
der rates in the United States is neither new, unique, nor ill founded. 
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The meaningful comparison is not with those of unstable and impov­
erished nations across the globe but with those of other economically 
advanced societies with trustworthy records. And here the contrast is 
undeniable. Japanese murder rates have averaged well under 1.0 a year, 
while German, French, and English have all hovered somewhere close 
to that figure. Our near neighbor Canada has sometimes broken 2.0, 
and Italy has pushed past 2.5, but no developed nation in recent years 
has averaged as high as 3.0, in contrast to our own 9.0 to 10. 
In short, while American murder rates have remained essentially flat 
during this last quarter of the twentieth century, they are still high. 
Certainly they are far higher than those of the other nations that oth­
erwise most resemble us. But the statistics alone tell only part of the 
story: whatever the numbers, the nature of homicide in America has 
been changing since the early 1970s, and some of those changes reflect 
important social developments. 
That homicide rates have stayed relatively flat over the last quarter of 
the twentieth century is not surprising: murder has always reflected its 
historical context, and by the traditional measures this has seemed a 
relatively flat period in American history generally. A series of small 
military engagements, no big wars; economic good news and bad, with­
out surging prosperity or major depression; national elections occasion­
ally pushing government from the moderate right to the center left, 
checks and balances preventing dramatic movement. But just as under­
neath the larger surface much has happened, the numbers alone do not 
tell the full story about murder, and there are legitimate reasons to 
worry. 
The statute of limitations never runs out on homicide, and some old 
memories never fully fade. On August 23, 1977, the fiftieth anniversary 
of their executions, Governor Michael Dukakis of Massachusetts de­
clared "Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti Memorial Day"; the 
state legislature twice turned down attempts at posthumous vindication 
during the following decade. Cathy Wilkerson of the Weathermen, last 
seen fleeing her Manhattan townhouse in 1969, turned herself in dur­
ing the summer of 1980; her companion Kathy Boudin was arrested 
the next year as part of a team of armed robbers. In the spring of 1996 
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alone, Richard Thomas, once a Black Panther, was arrested in Chicago 
for the execution of rookie Philadelphia patrolman Frank Von Colin 
back in 1970; Dr. Samuel Shepard's son, Sam Jr., worked to clear his 
fathers name by identifying a new suspect in the 1954 murder of his 
mother; and the United Methodist church formally apologized to the 
Cheyenne and Arapahoe for the Reverend J. M. Chivington's leadership 
of the Sand Creek Massacre of 1863. 
Through all these years, too, people have killed each other for all of 
the old reasons, money and honor, the numbers on bits of bone, paper, 
and plastic, hot glances and cold dinners, the differences between 
Jeanne and Joanne. But at the same time a number of unique and 
frightening kinds of homicide have occurred since 1974. And while 
some have been truly isolated events, or simply dramatized old issues in 
new form, others have pointed in genuinely new and scary directions. 
The most notorious of isolated murders were the work of the so-called 
Unabomber, object between 1978 and 1996 of the biggest FBI man­
hunt in history. The bureau finally accused Theodore Kaczinski, a bril­
liant mathematician turned hermit in the woods of Montana, of mailing 
explosive devices over the years to targets from university professors to 
airline executives, selected nearly at random for their apparent involve­
ment in what he considered the high-tech destruction of the planet. 
Three victims were killed in this cold-blooded fashion, several badly 
maimed or injured. In the fall of 1995, the bomber blackmailed the 
New York Times and Washington Post into publishing his rationale, 
"Industrial Society and Its Future," a call for a revolutionary return to 
a simpler society.* This manifesto, an odd mixture of the sophisticated 
and the naive, was nearly as unique as a fingerprint; it was his younger 
*The author, then at work on this history of criminal homicide, discovered that a 
homicidal criminal was a reader of his work when contacted by reporters and 
federal agents in connection with this manifesto; in support of his argument that 
the industrial revolution demands regular, rational, sober behavior—to a degree 
he considers excessive—the bomber cited some of my earlier work, similar to that 
described in chapter 5. In the original note to the publishers, this serial killer 
worried that the quotations used might be so long as to violate copyright law(!), 
and so suggested an alternative, shorter, footnote, which was gratefully accepted. 
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brother s recognition of characteristic thoughts and phrases that led him 
to suspect Kaczinski's identity and turn him in, after a reported $50 
million and a million manhours of federal detective work. 
There are no real historical precedents for the Unabomber. The same 
may be said of the very different but equally extraordinary series of 
events that led the highest authorities of Philadelphia, on May 13, 
1985, to order the bombing of some of their own constituents from a 
borrowed state police helicopter. But these were rooted not in one 
man's twisted mind but in the long-standing and widespread racial ten­
sions that mark urban America everywhere. 
The homicidal confrontation in West Philadelphia had its origins in 
another, seven years earlier, between the city's police and a radical back-
to-nature group called MOVE. Like the Unabomber, the members of 
MOVE used sophisticated high-tech equipment—in their case loud­
speakers, ranting obscenities—to express their yearning for a simpler 
life. Unlike Theodore Kaczinski, they lived in a city neighborhood, 
where repeated threats and conflicts with nearby residents, cops, and 
health officials led in the fall of 1978 to a raid on the heavily armed 
MOVE house and the killing of a policeman. When the remaining cult 
members later moved to another place, much the same scenario was 
played out, but in a different and complicated political context. 
In Philadelphia, as in many other cities, it takes both black and white 
votes to win political office, a simple fact that guides much police work. 
The members of MOVE were black, as were their outraged neighbors. 
Frank Rizzo, the law-and-order mayor who had ordered the 1978 raid 
that killed Officer James Ramp, was white, sensitive to being tagged a 
racist. As former chief, his popularity with the police force was unshak­
able, and he was careful to mount an operation that put the safety of 
policemen second to that of the women and children of MOVE. But 
Wilson Goode, elected in 1983 as the city'sfirst African-American chief 
executive, had the opposite problem. The city's black community 
would forgive him almost anything, but he was afraid, politically, to 
risk the lives of mostly white cops. And so when after months of delay 
and mutual warnings an assault on 6221 Osage Avenue wasfinally or­
dered it was planned so as to minimize any danger to the attackers. The 
street was evacuated, the area turned into a war zone, and at long dis­
tancefirefighters hosed down the house and police fired an American 
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record of ten thousand rounds at it, their usual arsenal fortified by ma­
chine guns, tear gas, and an antitank weapon. When no one surren­
dered it was ordered finally that a homemade packet of explosives be 
dropped onto a fortified bunker on the roof. The packet detonated a 
gas tank, the place exploded in flames, and while the authorities and 
firemen looked on, taking no action, and hundreds of thousands 
watched on television, the blaze went out of control, incinerating eleven 
men, women, and children in the house and destroying an entire city 
block. 
No one was indicted for these homicides. Eleven years later, in the 
spring of 1996, the one surviving adult member of the house joined 
relatives of the dead in suing the city for personal injuries and civil 
damages. At the trial ex-mayor Goode denied all responsibility, and, 
playing on the long-standing tensions between blacks and police, de­
fended his absence from the scene with an improbable but frightening 
excuse: several rogue cops, he claimed, had been planning to assassinate 
him in the confusion. 
The Unabomber will find no like again; neither will the conflagration 
on Osage Avenue, although the problems it underscored are still with 
us. But a third kind of "unique" homicide is not a one-time event but 
a whole category, one that threatens to expand into the next century. 
The ideological turmoil of the 1960s and early 1970s has never really 
gone away, and in more recent decades there has been a steady toll taken 
in killings by a range of True Believers: vaguely Marxist or African na­
tionalist groups, supporters of Puerto Rican or of Native American in­
dependence, pro-life activists, racist hate groups, and religious cultists. 
Violent clashes between federal agents and armed militants have grown 
since the original 1973 siege and showdown at Wounded Knee, South 
Dakota. The 1993 confrontation with David Koresh s armed Christian 
cultists in their Waco, Texas, compound was a clear turning point, as 
after some clashes in February resulted in the death of four federal 
agents a misbegotten assault was ordered on April 19. The resulting 
firefight, explosions, and mass suicides killed some eighty people inside 
the compound, seventeen of them children, a disaster that led the FBI 
to reexamine the tactics, inherited from the G-man days of the 1930s, 
with which it approached hostage crises and other armed standoffs. But 
in terms of their implications for ordinary Americans, the most fright­
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ening murders in our recent history have been terrorist bombings: those 
of the World Trade Center in Manhattan in 1993, of the Alfred P. 
Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City just two years later. 
Terrorism in America is as old as John Brown. Defined as murder or 
other violence directed at noncombatants, designed to make an impact 
on a wider audience and on public policy, it is almost always a self-
defeating tactic, often degenerating into senseless acts of protest or 
revenge. The one major exception in this country was the white-on-
black terror of the post-Civil War South, where it had widespread 
popular support to begin with. Otherwise the historical record here has 
been thin. Dynamitings popularly associated with "red anarchism" date 
from the late nineteenth century. Right-wing segregationists took up 
terrorist bombing in the 1950s and 1960s, and the Weathermen re­
vived an old left tradition, dormant since the era of Sacco and Vanzetti, 
with their explosive campaign of the late 1960s and early 1970s. But 
for all the public fear of anarchists, they caused only a few deaths di­
rectly in this country: the casualties at Haymarket, in 1888, were mostly 
shot by panicky policemen. And however cold-blooded the Weather­
men, they were usually careful to destroy property rather than people. 
All of these actors, too, generally attacked specific targets clearly iden­
tified with "the enemy." Both the scale of the more recent bombings 
and their indiscriminate nature is something entirely new, as men, 
women, and children of all races and beliefs were massacred for pur­
poses of propaganda and protest. 
The towering World Trade Center in Lower Manhattan was at­
tacked, on February 6, 1993, through a car bomb in an underground 
garage; 8 people died and many more might have, as over a thousand 
were injured, and only heroic work by firemen, helicopter crews, and 
ordinary citizens saved others from the smoke andflames. On April 19, 
1995, the explosion of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Okla­
homa City showed the deadly potential in such incidents, as a truck 
bomb, parked on the street, set off a blast that killed 168 people, in­
cluding 19 children, most of them little ones attending a day care center 
for government employees. 
Sorrow is one natural result, as expressed by the flowers, notes, and 
teddy bears left to decorate the chain-link fence that long surrounded 
the Oklahoma City site. So are anger and fear. The technological ability 
to blow up big targets is widespread. The assassinations of the 1960s 
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had already shown that ideologues may strike from any direction, some­
times in ways not only impossible to predict but even to re-create after 
the fact. In the fall of 1995 ten Islamic fundamentalists, led by an Egyp­
tian, Sheikh Omar Adel Rahman, were convicted in federal court for 
the World Trade Center bombings. A year later two American anti­
government right-wingers, Timothy James McVeigh and Terry Lynn 
Nichols, also awaited trial on federal charges for the mass deaths in 
Oklahoma. 
And what is most frightening is that neither the foreign hatreds gen­
erated by the American government's support for Israel nor the domes­
tic hatreds inspired by its role in the lives of paranoid citizens begin to 
exhaust the list of the world s deadly grievances. As terrorism has spread 
worldwide since the early 1970s, characteristically insisting that there 
are no innocents, the open society of the United States is obviously 
vulnerable. The end of the old Cold War has made America the focus 
of angers and resentments across the globe just as domestic politics has 
taken on new and often irrational intensity. What we have seen so far 
may be only a harbinger of things to come; the alleged murderers in the 
Manhattan and Oklahoma City bombings have all denied involvement, 
pleading not guilty, and we have not yet in this country encountered 
the truly deadly suicide killers whose fanatical lack of self-concern 
makes them almost impossible to stop. 
Ideological killings are still too rare to have much impact on the annual 
statistics—something close to 25,000 homicides are reported each 
year—but they have a disproportionate power to worry us. The same is 
true of two other trends in murder: mass killings clearly and serial kill­
ings probably have been on the rise since the early 1970s. 
Mass killings are those that claim a number of victims in a single 
short span, committed by men—never women—whose motives are 
personal rather than political. They always make national headlines and 
so draw more attention than their number alone would deserve. But 
their unpredictability, and the generally random way in which they 
claim their victims, makes them scary in some of the same ways as ideo­
logical murders. The record set by Charles Whitman, who shot 16 
people from atop a tower at the University of Texas in 1966, has since 
been approached or beaten several times, notably by James Huberty, 
who killed 21 visitors to a San Diego McDonalds in 1984, and George 
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Hennard, whose toll was 22 at a coffee shop in Killeen, Texas, seven 
years later. Typically white and middle class, these killers often have 
the kind of obviously disturbed personality profiles that point more 
strongly to suicide than homicide. None of them escape, and many do 
not even try, as they either commit suicide, are shot down by police, or 
surrender passively. While psychologists have studied them in some de­
tail, the specific reasons for their brief homicidal outbursts generally die 
with them, and given their idiosyncratic personal histories it is hard in 
any case to place them as part of deeper social currents. But it is safe to 
predict that their numbers will grow, as the increased firepower of mod­
ern weapons makes it easier than in earlier times to claim multiple vic­
tims in a matter of minutes. 
Serial killers, defined as those who kill three or more people over 
thirty days or more, are also typically white and often middle class, but 
they are otherwise quite different from mass murderers, and even more 
frightening. There are more of them: hundreds have been interviewed 
since the 1970s. They are even harder to classify: usually but not exclu­
sively men, usually but not always loners, they kill for a bewildering 
variety of motives, including robbery, revenge, and the satisfaction of 
sadistic impulses. Some act out sexual fantasies of a sort guaranteed to 
draw media attention, not only rape but necrophilic mutilation of bod­
ies, even cannibalism, as in the case of Milwaukee's Jeffrey Dahmer, 
alleged killer of seventeen young men before his arrest in 1991. Those 
who are caught often lie, and with the cooperation of their proud 
captors greatly exaggerate the number of their victims. Many are not 
caught at all. Unlike mass murderers, while serial killers may be psy­
chotic they are also secretive, clever, often charmingly seductive; the 
modern archetype is Ted Bundy, who beginning in 1974 reputedly 
murdered eighteen young women across several states. And like Bundy, 
who was not arrested until 1979, they are able to escape detection at 
least for some time. 
The cleverness makes it impossible for a historian to say how many 
of them operated in the past. H. H. Holmes in the 1890s and the 
poisoner Belle Gunness in the early 1900s seem in their different ways 
to fit modern profiles exactly. But there are not many such historical 
exemplars. There is one purely material reason why serial murder is 
easier nowadays than it would have been in the past: many such killers 
(not all) use cars or trucks to abduct victims beforehand and/or trans­
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port bodies afterward—Alaska's Robert Hansen used a private plane— 
which would have been difficult before the 1920s. But this is clearly 
outweighed by the fact that the state of homicide detection in the nine­
teenth century made it hard to capture even one-time sex murderers, 
and with every generation back in time it would be easier for both 
missing people and killers to go unnoticed, especially if under the fed­
eral system they crossed state or even local lines. Social security cards, 
an aggressive FBI, and national fingerprint files are all essentially cre­
ations of the 1930s, and for any earlier time we have few clues. 
Still, the extant historical records simply do not smell of serial kill­
ings in any number. The leading experts are probably right to note that 
they have sharply increased since the middle 1970s, for reasons still 
unclear, and it is likely that the longer historic curve has been climbing 
as well. And while some of the apparent increase may result simply from 
better detective work and wider media coverage, our heightened recent 
fears seem firmly rooted in reality. 
The fearsome nature of ideological, mass, and serial killings is easy to 
understand. But the statistical trends in the other, more common kinds 
of murder and manslaughter are even more troubling, if less well 
understood. 
Some characteristics of American homicide have stayed as flat as the 
murder rate itself. From the early 1970s into the middle 1990s the 
percentage of killings committed with firearms has crept up only 
slightly, according to the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports, wavering be­
tween a little under and a little over two-thirds: roughly the same as in 
the 1920s, lower than the 1950s. Toward the bottom of the "means" 
list, poison has as always remained out of style everywhere but in the 
pages of mystery novels, rarely reaching over ten to twelve incidents a 
year. About three of four victims and nine of ten arrested for homicide 
have been men, figures again close to historic averages stretching back 
into the Middle Ages. 
The racial figures have held equally steady. With the black popula­
tion of the United States at roughly 12 percent, the number of black 
homicide victims has hovered close to half: 50 percent in 1974, 51 
percent in 1994. The number of African Americans arrested for homi­
cide has meanwhile remained several percentage points higher: 57 per­
cent in 1974, 56 percent in 1994. While much has rightly been made 
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of this racial disparity, black rates eight to ten times higher than white 
are again no novelty, dating from the earliest trustworthy national re­
cords in the 1920s and 1930s. And if homicide in recent years has been 
the leading cause of death among black male teenagers, in the 1920s 
company records showed that it trailed only pneumonia and tubercu­
losis, two long-forgotten threats, among the relatively elite group of 
black male adults who carried commercial life insurance. 
The FBI lives in a world more black and white than most of us, and 
its figures for other races have appeared only erratically. The cultural 
grouping "Hispanic" was listed for the first time in 1980, accounting 
for 16 percent of arrestees, a significant but not enormous overrepresen­
tation in terms of their percentage in the population; but after a few 
years the category was dropped. American Indians, occasionally listed, 
are overrepresented among victims both of homicide and of suicide, an 
unusual parlay and sad reflection of the continued misery of life on the 
reservation. All other racial groups are underrepresented. In any case, 
of over 22,000 murder victims in 1994, after "black" and "white" there 
were fewer than 500 "others" and less than 200 listed as "unknown." 
But if race, sex, and over the last quarter century overall rates have 
proved historically steady, there have been changes in other categories. 
Two of them are cause for real concern: type of crime and age of of­
fenders. The kind of "domesticated" urban homicide of the post-
World War II era had already receded by 1974, and the trends apparent 
then have continued strongly. 
Back in 1974 the South still strongly led all regions in homicides, 
with a rate of 13.3 per 100,000, the Northeast trailing with just 7.4. By 
1994 two long historic trends, population shifts and the nationalization 
of culture patterns, had closed this gap by about one-third, 11.0 to 7.0. 
A related but entirely opposite shift has meanwhile continued a trend, 
evident since the midcentury years, by raising metropolitan rates, his­
torically low, to a point where they are now over twice those in the 
countryside. The 1974 rate for metropolitan areas was 11.0; rural areas, 
8.0; and smaller cities, 6.0. In 1994 the metropolitan figure was 10.0; 
and those for both smaller cities and rural areas, 5.0. 
In terms of type, in 1974 a little over 12 percent of homicides in­
volved spouse killing spouse (counting common-law marriages). The 
sexes were fairly evenly divided at that time, wives only slightly more 
likely to be victims, 52 to 48 percent. With other relatives included, 
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family killings accounted for about 23 percent, or almost a quarter, of 
the national total. But by 1994 only 5 percent of killings were spousal, 
husbands committed 70 percent of them, and family killings altogether 
had fallen dramatically to 12 percent, almost half the earlier levels. The 
proportion of homicides among friends and acquaintances, too, had 
fallen: in 1976, the first time that figure was released, it was 54 percent; 
and by 1994 it had plunged to 35 percent. 
All of this continues developments begun earlier, following the low 
point in homicides in the midcentury years. And they all play on deep-
seated cultural values and fears. From the earliest records, in the Middle 
Ages, it has been clear that family killings and homicides among ac­
quaintances have not been thought as threatening as other kinds, al­
though men who kill women, including wives, have usually been 
punished harshly. Whatever the statistics show about domestic danger 
it is strangers—robbers, rapists, or other criminals—who truly scare 
us, and murder as mystery. Armed robbery has clearly been on the rise. 
So has interracial homicide, another frightening category. While the 
great majority of killings remain within racial bounds, as always, one 
long trend has reversed an older pattern; in 1994 proportionately twice 
as many white victims were killed by blacks, 12 percent of the total, 
than vice versa, at 6 percent. In the late twentieth century it is whites 
who fear blacks downtown at night, just as historically it was blacks who 
feared whites. 
All of us meanwhile fear the unknown, and during the 1990s one of 
the biggest categories in the FBI's list of motives and relationships has 
been just that: "Unknown." This is a category that did not even exist in 
1974; it now contains well over a quarter of all homicides: victims of 
robbery? revenge? thrill seekers? drug dealers? And its size reflects an­
other ominous trend: the fact that the percentage of killings "cleared by 
arrest" has been dropping steadily over the decades. Homicides among 
family, friends, and acquaintances have always been easy to solve ("slam 
dunks," in detective jargon), but part of the fear inspired by most other 
kinds is that they are not. The "clearance rate" in 1974 was 80 percent, 
a percentage already well down from the midcentury record of about 
90 percent in most big city departments. By 1994 it had fallen to 64 
percent. 
And on top of these longer historical trends there is a genuinely new 
one. We did not use to fear kids, but we do now. Well into the second 
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half of the twentieth century, killings by teenagers were relatively rare. 
In 1974 the number of homicide arrests among those under eighteen 
had climbed to a little less than 5 percent of the total; by 1994 the 
proportion had more than doubled, to 11 percent, and more and more 
early teens were involved. The importance of this fact is reinforced by 
another. Since murder is usually the work of young males, overall homi­
cide rates are at least in some part affected by the percentage of young 
males in the population. By historic standards the proportion of male 
teens between the early 1970s and mid-1990s was fairly low, but that 
demographic respite is coming to an end. There is an "age bulge" al­
ready here, small children now, who will come of age around the turn 
of the century. This simple fact threatens that even in the absence of 
anything else, the murder rate, flat so long, with even some signs of 
declining, may yet soar up again. 
In any case, after establishing rates and trends, it is necessary at last to 
begin the much harder job of explaining them, in this and the next 
several sections. The relevant questions are themselves historical: some 
of them have been asked for centuries, and H. C. Brearly raised most of 
them back in 1932, based on research done in the 1920s. The range 
of possibilities he covered then included the influence of the family and 
the media, the roles of police, courts, and the death penalty, the impact 
of poverty and guns, race and ethnicity, regional and national culture. 
All of these issues are complex, however easy they may seem to politi­
cians and pundits locked into simplistic ideological positions. The 
answers given here are often different from Brearly s, as conditions have 
changed and so has the state of our knowledge. They are also contro­
versial, and some of them are still uncertain. 
The uncertainty results from the fact that in terms of assigning causes 
murder is harder to "solve" than any other crime. With rare exceptions 
women do not rape, the rich do not rob gas stations, the poor do not 
sell phony stocks. But murder is done by people of every description, 
for an enormous range of reasons. And none of these reasons are 
"causes" in the strict sense. All that the historical evidence can offer are 
such statistical generalizations as that the young, the male, and the poor 
are more likely to be involved in homicide than the old, the female, and 
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the rich. But of course neither youth nor maleness nor poverty "cause" 
murder; this is an uncommon crime, and only a small minority of 
people in any category ever kill another human. 
Even in terms of broad statistical generalizations, the example of me­
dieval England, with which this book began, stands as warning to us 
all. Whatever "caused" the astonishingly high rates of the thirteenth 
and fourteenth centuries it was not guns or racial differences, not the 
pressures of city life, not capitalism or socialism, not lack of community 
or tradition or religious faith, not the absence of the death penalty, not 
in fact almost any of the usual suspects routinely trotted out in contem­
porary debate. 
But however hard the search, there are clues in the historical evi­
dence that do help explain rates and trends in homicide. It is easiest to 
begin toward the end, with what has been happening over the past 
quarter century. This was the subject of the previous section, and at 
least some of it is widely understood. 
Many of the minor ups and downs in recent murder rates are explain­
able, first, in terms of changes in the drug trade, which has unques­
tionably grown heavier. Back in 1974 the FBI estimated that felony 
murders associated with drug trafficking accounted for just 2 percent of 
the total; by 1994 the rate had quadrupled to 8 percent. The use of 
cocaine in any form is associated with violent and impulsive behavior, 
like alcohol and several "designer drugs" and unlike either marijuana 
or heroin; changes in personal drug use may push rates either up or 
down. In any case the trade in cocaine and some other drugs is more 
dangerous than the traffic in illegal alcohol during the Prohibition era 
of the 1920s. Bulky beer trucks back then delivered to saloons and 
stores, relatively big retail outlets, in a way that demanded territorial 
monopoly and thus cooperation; most competition was settled more 
quickly and peacefully than in the notorious Chicago of Al Capone. 
The marketing of expensive drugs in small packets, sold by individuals 
on street corners or indeed anywhere, is inherently more competitive, 
inviting continual turf wars and wrangling. The marketing problem is 
not insoluble, but it does mean that occasional dips in local murder 
rates may mix good news and bad: fewer homicides may simply mean 
that through superior organization a given drug gang is operating with 
little interference. 
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Many of these drug operations involve, use, or spin off gangs of kids. 
In 1994 the Uniform Crime Reports counted 1,157 "juvenile gang kill­
ings," a category that did not even exist until the late 1980s. This is 
a number more than ten times bigger than the 111 (adult) "gang­
land killings," and accounted for more than 5 percent of all homicides 
that year. 
The fact that drug and other killings are being done by ever younger 
teenagers suggests another look at two specific issues Brearly looked at 
nearly three generations ago: the influence of the media and of the 
family. History offers no direct clues to the impact of either of these, 
but it does help to put current problems in context. 
"Media" is our word; Brearly was concerned with newspapers and 
movies. The popular press was and is undeniably obsessed with sex and 
violence. But it always has been—here and in other less murderous 
nations—as a reflection of a popular appetite for the macabre that ex­
tends from the sale of bits of hangman's rope to the bizarre auction of 
goods belonging to Jeffrey Dahmer. The growth in literacy, and so in 
readership of crime novels, magazines, and sensational papers, has 
through most of its history coincided with falling homicide rates, mak­
ing it hard to establish a clear connection between violent publications 
and violent behavior. 
It is easier to make a case for the impact of modern movies and 
especially color television on the unsophisticated and semiliterate. The 
silent black-and-white westerns that alarmed some of Brearly's con­
temporaries seem today as harmless as Peter Rabbit when compared to 
either the content or the graphic immediacy of modern cartoons, dra­
mas, and full-length features. The study of moving images and their 
influence was then in its infancy; it is now an academic industry. Tele­
vision executives themselves, in accepting the so-called V-chip blocking 
device early in 1996, have conceded the overwhelming evidence that 
watching violence tends to beget violence, especially in children. And it 
would be hard today to duplicate the 1920s finding that what kids re­
member most is tfcat the bad guys always come to bad ends. 
Brearly s concern for the state of the American family is from this 
vantage even quainter. His major worry was the disruption created by 
divorce, which resulted in too many kids not "adequately trained for 
social responsibilities." Divorce at that time ended about one marriage 
in eight; he used neither the term nor the concept "unmarried moth­
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erhood." By the 1990s about one marriage in two was ending in di­
vorce, and nearly one out of three children were being born to single 
mothers; among big city blacks, the figure reached up to three out of 
four. And there are many recent studies of the effects of absent fathers. 
The economic impact is obvious, greatly increasing the chances that a 
child will grow up in poverty, but in terms of potential violence the 
psychological or "role modeling" effect may be even greater. With a 
full-time man in the home a boy learns something of the range of mas­
culine behavior, including compassion and tenderness; with no models 
but those on the street he is likely to see only the most violently macho 
end of the spectrum, and to act accordingly. 
But if the modest dips and surges in late twentieth-century murder rates 
may be explained largely in terms of such usual suspects as drugs and 
kids, the fact that the underlying line has stayed essentially flat since 
1974 requires a more fundamental explanation. The bad news that 
more Americans are being killed by strangers, criminals, and teenagers 
has been balanced by good news, in that lower percentages are being 
killed by family, friends, and acquaintances. 
The division is not quite that simple: within the family category, 
falling spousal murders are in part another kind of ironic and compli­
cated good news/bad news story. The women's movement over the past 
quarter century has finally awakened many Americans to the issue of 
domestic violence, the fact that historically more of us, especially mem­
bers of the middle class, have been killed or beaten by family than by 
strangers. Fears that the movement itself would create bolder and pos­
sibly more murderous women have not been borne out in the statistics: 
proportionally fewer wives are killing husbands than vice versa, as 
compared to earlier times. But just as the number of reported incidents 
of domestic assault has been rising, the number of domestic homicides 
has been falling; that is, Americans have been increasingly willing to call 
in the police in cases of abuse at a time when truly fatal cases of abuse 
have been declining. The fact that police take these calls more seriously 
than in earlier generations may help stop some situations from growing 
worse and turning lethal. Perhaps, too, the drop in spousal murders has 
something to do with the growing ease of divorce, as a relatively peace­
ful means of ending a painful relationship; or (less likely), we have been 
enjoying happier marriages. But a more easily measured reason why 
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fewer married people of either sex are killing each other is simply that 
fewer people are getting married in the first place, a trend marked es­
pecially among the young, the poor, and the African American, all 
groups that account for more than their share of homicides. 
Whatever its causes, the drop in spousal killings is an important part 
of the larger picture, which is that over the past several decades homi­
cide rates have been moving in two directions, with the majority of 
adult Americans committing fewer and fewer and a small minority 
committing more and more. 
It is important to note that this split is not racial. The black share of 
national homicides has not changed overall since the 1960s. But the 
African-American community is itself split, as its working and middle 
classes have moved ahead and a smaller "underclass" has dropped back. 
And the recent history of black America reflects what has been happen­
ing to all of us; we have been drifting apart, essentially along economic 
lines, in a way that follows a larger historical pattern. 
The upward surge in homicide rates that hit the United States begin­
ning in the 1960s was explained, in chapter 8, in terms of the decay of 
the urban industrial revolution, the transition to postindustrialism. For 
over a century that revolution and its dual effects on structural employ­
ment and social psychology had worked to push rates down. But after 
the postwar boom of the 1950s the progressive loss of relatively high-
paying factory jobs, especially in cities, pushed idle young people into 
the streets. The institutions of urban-industrial discipline and restraint, 
above all families, cops, and schools, seemed no longer relevant, as the 
promise of long-term reward went flat. In a world that stressed con­
sumption over production, the benefits of sober predictable behavior 
were outweighed by the drive for immediate gratification. The presence 
of large numbers of young men with drugs in their heads and time on 
their hands predictably boosted criminal activity of all kinds. And how­
ever flat the murder rate has been since 1974, essentially the same forces 
are still at work. 
After the initial, turbulent transition of the 1960s, the working ma­
jority has mostly adjusted to the relative loss of manufacturing in favor 
of office or service employment. During the last quarter of the twenti­
eth century the American economy has continued to generate jobs. But 
in the postindustrial service-and-computer economy the educational 
qualifications demanded for good ones have continually been pushed 
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up: once some high school education, then a diploma, then some col­
lege, now a degree. Most young Americans have been able to meet the 
new requirements by doing more time in school, learning to sit still, 
think ahead, and somehow cope with the sometimes dangerous im­
pulses natural to youth, or at least those that would derail them seri­
ously by leading to crime, pregnancy, or drug addiction. Statistically, 
people like these, ordinary working- and middle-class people, never got 
into much serious trouble anyway. Now, whatever their race or eth­
nicity, they get into even less; given the pressures of time, and of two 
jobs per family, even the old habit of dropping into a bar after work has 
fallen into decline.* 
But there is another, much smaller but nonetheless too big a group 
of Americans that has been left behind. While still the envy of the 
world, the American economy is not as robust as it was during the 
golden postwar era. As gains in productivity have slipped and the world 
has grown more competitive, growth rates have slowed. And the price 
has been paid above all by the undereducated. Once there were factory 
jobs, good lives, and hope for those who were able to learn the basic 
rules of regular behavior but balked at spending many frustrating years 
behind a desk. Now that those jobs are gone, the only alternative for 
too many is the low-paid service or burger-flipping sector. But there is 
prosperity enough for all to look at color television, inclusion enough 
for all to see, hear, and want to taste the delights of consumerism. And 
for those left behind, delayed gratification, impulse control, and ratio­
nal behavior seem to make little sense. Told to wait, they do not. Bom­
barded with thousands of versions of the quintessential advertising 
message—"Just Do It"—they obey. Told they should have, they reach 
out and get. 
One dramatic illustration of the resulting social psychology is the 
murderous Los Angeles riots of 1992. Like the urban riots of the 1960s, 
these were sparked by the police, in this case the widely televised vid-
*This, too, has a bad news side. After years of learning to repress impulsive ag­
gressiveness, holding it inward, more working- and middle-class Americans when 
pushed to the extreme are likely to take out their frustrations on themselves than 
on others. One result is that the U.S. suicide rate has been creeping upward all 
these years while, among the majority, the homicide rate has been creeping down, 
in accord with the theory of the suicide-murder ratio described in chapter 6. 
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eotape of a group of Los Angeles officers brutally beating a black mo­
torist, Rodney King, arrested after a high-speed chase in March 1991. 
Four of the policemen were charged with twelve counts of assault. 
When on April 29 of the following year the officers won acquittal on 
eleven of these counts, many residents of South Central Los Angeles 
took to the streets, following a script already prepared by a nervous 
media. And four days of clashes with police and other citizens left fifty-
four dead and over five thousand buildings damaged or destroyed. 
This explosion, the biggest since Detroit erupted twenty-six years 
earlier, was widely interpreted as a kind of revolt by the African-
American "underclass" against racism. But while it was clearly sparked 
by anger at racist behavior, the Los Angeles "race riot" of 1992, like 
many of its predecessors a generation earlier, quickly turned into a 
"commodities riot," the participants driven less by social rage than by 
the rage to possess. Social revolutionaries cannot reach city hall, the 
statehouse, or even the rich white suburbs if they must break into every 
liquor store and electronics outlet along the way. Even as Rodney King 
himself pleaded for an end to the shooting and looting, the racial com­
position of the riot suggested that black protest was not at its heart. A 
total of 5,438 people were arrested through May 4; some 2,764, or well 
over half of them, were Hispanic; 568 were white. 
The fact that there are large numbers of citizens who somehow share 
the American Dream but see no legitimate way of making it a reality in 
their own lives is a deeply disturbing social development. Their violence 
is far more dangerous to themselves and each other than to the domi­
nant majority. (The one area of family homicide that has been going 
up, after decades of decline, is infanticide, as always a measure of utter 
desperation.) People at the very bottom of the social ladder have neither 
the organization nor the desire to threaten revolution. The media, es­
pecially television, with its emphasis on visual crime news, tends to 
exaggerate the extent of murder, still a rare event, and largely confined 
within the circle of the most deprived. One result is to frighten the rest 
of us, helping to dictate where we live and even visit, undermining still-
healthy urban neighborhoods as working people leave for the suburbs, 
condemning the remainder to ever worse conditions. 
But increasingly murderous self-destruction among those left behind 
does sometimes spill over into other lives and places. And if present 
trends continue, with the postindustrial economy continuing to swell 
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the numbers of these jobless people, the rest of us may have to recognize 
that we are all in trouble together. 
Whatever the causes of high murder rates, many Americans, inspired 
by celebrated cases such as the O. J. Simpson "Trial of the Century," 
believe that one of them is failure in the justice system. Critics insist 
that the system is clumsy, full of loopholes that allow too many killers 
to escape arrest, too many of the arrested to avoid conviction, too many 
of the convicted to draw light sentences. These are not new complaints, 
but they have grown louder since the 1960s, as violent crime has be­
come a national issue. Solution is often cast in historical terms: politi­
cians and prosecutors promise a return to "the good old days" when 
justice was fair but tougher. A historians response is simply that there 
was never any such golden age, or none that we would want to return 
to, and that in fact as we approach the twenty-first century the justice 
system is working better than ever before. 
There is little question, first, that given current conditions the police 
are operating more efficiently, and fairly, than at any earlier time. The 
solution of ordinary homicide cases became a clear priority among po­
lice departments only during the first half of the twentieth century, and 
not until well into its second half did the murders of blacks and other 
marginal citizens get treated seriously all across the country, in part as a 
result of the growing political power of African Americans and their 
increased representation within local departments. Not all killings, still, 
are treated equally, but there is a kind of rough democracy at work in 
that detectives tend to give the highest priority to cases, such as the 
murders of children, that most outrage the voting public. It is true that 
there has been a growing drop in the proportion of cases "cleared by 
arrest" since the height reached in the 1950s. But as explained earlier, 
this is a reflection of the rising number of cases, such as murder by 
strangers, that are by their nature harder to clear. It is hard to deal with 
homicide in many city neighborhoods; the day of the spontaneous 
street posse is long over, and potential witnesses are often too terrified, 
or alienated, to talk. And although some of these problems are related 
to memories of racism and brutality, too often inflamed by fresh inci­
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dents in the 1990s, modern police are far more sensitive on both counts 
than their predecessors in the past. As one rough index, while the Chi­
cago department alone in the 1920s committed dozens of unprosecuted 
"justifiable homicides" each year, the annual number now, across this 
whole nation of over 250 million, is not much over 300. And in a 
revival of the practice of the previous century, policemen are again, 
however rarely, at least in some places subject to trial for manslaughter 
when they kill without compelling reason. 
The American federal system, whatever its other virtues, does still 
handicap much police work. Local, federal, and state agents often fail 
to cooperate, and while they stumble over and even fight with each 
other, such desperately poor places as Camden, New Jersey, where gang 
and drug killings have long been rampant, simply lack the tax base to 
support effective departments at all. But in the late twentieth century 
these traditional problems are not as severe as they once were. Com­
munications have greatly improved, making it harder for the likes of 
H. H. Holmes to slip unnoticed between jurisdictions. One result of 
making crime a national issue is that the federal government finds ways 
under both Democratic and Republican administrations to help fund 
local cops. And the policy of making the resources of the FBI available 
in high-profile cases has been continually expanded since its origins in 
the 1930s. 
The importance of this and other high-tech aids is easily exaggerated: 
most homicides are still solved by the same kind of patient questioning 
of suspects and witnesses as a century ago. Help from the FBI is often 
slow, as television viewers discovered in 1995 while waiting for the re­
sults of lab tests in the Simpson case. It is also too expensive to call on 
routinely. The bureau is not infallible, either: some of the million man-
hours spent on the Unabomber case were spent by experts who drew 
up a psychological profile showing that the killer was a meticulously 
neat man, hard to distinguish from his neighbors, in strong contrast to 
the real Ted Kaczynski, the unwashed, unbarbered, packrat-hermit fi­
nally arrested. But there is still no question that continued advances in 
such areas as forensic pathology, DNA testing, and the psychological 
profiling of serial and sex killers have lifted the potential in scientific 
detection up and past the once fanciful exploits of Sherlock Holmes. 
There is some advantage in federalism, too, in that each of the thou­
sands of local police departments across the country works differently, 
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and can experiment in what works best. Homicide is the major crime 
(except for assault) most often "solved," with rates of clearance by arrest 
far higher than for larceny, burglary, auto theft, robbery, or rape. But 
the notion that prevention, as distinct from solution, is actually police 
business is relatively new. The Uniform Crime Reports insisted for years 
that since homicide was mostly a spontaneous affair among family or 
acquaintances, it was "largely a societal problem beyond the control of 
the law enforcement community," which could hardly station cops in 
every bedroom and bar. But that disclaimer was dropped in the late 
1980s, as felony murders and killings by strangers increased. Since then 
several strategies directed at spousal abuse and street crime in general 
have succeeded, at least in the short run, in cutting local murder rates 
as well. These range from simply responding faster to "crime in prog­
ress" calls and a return to foot patrols and "community policing" to the 
highly publicized efforts by New York Police Commissioner William J. 
Bratton, in the mid-1990s, to target areas of high violence by computer 
and aggressively make arrests for everything from panhandling to pub­
lic drug use in order to make neighborhoods safer. 
Federal funds have sometimes helped these efforts. But the business 
of making politics out of crime has had negative effects as well. Schol­
arly research of several kinds, while having no immediate practical 
value, could eventually help police and others in preventing homicide 
through better understanding of the causes of violent behavior. But 
some of that research has been threatened because it offends political 
interest groups. 
One ongoing set of studies, sponsored by the Federal Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, has investigated the effect of gun own­
ership on homicide, suicide, and accident, viewing deaths from fire-
arms—the second leading cause of death among Americans between 
the ages of ten and twenty-four—as a problem in public health, in 
some places a kind of epidemic. Long under fire from the National Rifle 
Association in alliance with leading Republicans, these studies were cut 
back in the spring of 1996. 
Another line of research, with an old and largely discredited history 
stretching back to Cesare Lombroso, has attempted to discover whether 
individual differences in aggressive behavior have some basis in hu­
man biology. History aside, there seems some recent evidence that, for 
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example, low levels of the neurotransmitter serotin, which appear to 
trigger violence in young men, may be affected not only by a stressful 
environment but by heredity as well. Attempts during the 1990s to 
investigate a possible link between genetics and homicide have been 
discouraged by the hostile reaction of minority groups, although all 
research has centered on purely individual biology, and there has been 
no hint of any racial differences. 
But scholars are only rarely targets of political attack (or indeed atten­
tion), and most criticism of the justice system specifically exempts the 
cops. The usual targets of those who believe that we are too lenient, or 
"liberal," with killers are rather the courts. The specific complaints in­
clude jurors who let their biases interfere with the "duty" to convict, 
plea bargaining by prosecutors, and legal "technicalities." But in fact 
courts in the 1990s have been convicting and sentencing at historically 
high rates. And the issues in practice do not break clearly along "liberal" 
or "conservative" lines. 
Fury was one widespread reaction to the 1995 acquittal of O. J. 
Simpson for the murder of his wife, Nicole Brown Simpson, and her 
friend Ronald Goldman. Millions, having followed the trial on televi­
sion, were resentful of Simpson's expensive team of lawyers. They were 
even more dismayed by the ultimate action of the largely African-
American jury, which apparently ignored much expert testimony and 
freed a famous black man accused of killing two whites because of sus­
picion that the Los Angeles police, out of sheer racism, had somehow 
cooked the evidence. The case against Simpson was powerful. But his­
torically, juries of laypersons have often ignored complex technical evi­
dence when the prosecution cannot produce weapons or witnesses to 
the crime. The historical record, too, has been all too full of white juries 
biased in favor of white defendants accused of killing blacks, and even 
more of white-on-black killings that never came to trial at all. With the 
recent behavior of the Los Angeles Police Department laid on top of 
centuries of memory, it may be deplorable but it is hardly surprising 
that jurors were skeptical of police testimony and gave Simpson the 
benefit of a "reasonable doubt." 
Much public indignation, too, during the 1990s, was aroused by a 
number of publicized cases in which the issue was not race but gender, 
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as lawyers for wives accused or even convicted of killing their husbands 
successfully appealed to a "battered woman syndrome" to get their cli­
ents freed. In one of these, Florida Governor Lawton Chiles granted 
clemency to Lynn Kent, who shot her sleeping husband, Lamar, to 
death and then blamed it on a robber. The action was justified on the 
basis of psychological testimony that women systematically abused, as 
she was, are so fearfully traumatized that the normal bounds of "self­
defense" must be stretched to accommodate them. This tactic may 
seem objectionable on several grounds, and a number of feminist ob­
servers have complained that it stereotypes women as passive victims. 
But in fact the "syndrome" only gives a formal name to an ancient 
prejudice; juries, perhaps especially the all-male juries of history, have 
always been reluctant to convict women of killing husbands or lovers. 
In macho Houston, back in 1969, as Henry Lundsgaarde has shown, 
such women fared very well indeed; one of the rare penalties of any 
kind was three years probation for shooting a husband as he slept. 
The battered woman syndrome looks to laypersons something like 
the ancient plea of insanity. This has never been a popular defense in 
high-profile cases, but there is no evidence that it is more common now 
than in the past, when "temporary insanity" was often a way for jurors 
to free someone, often abused women, whose plight they found sym­
pathetic. During the late twentieth century many states, or state courts, 
have abandoned the strict M'Naghten rule in favor of the looser doc­
trine of "diminished capacity," in which an alleged criminal may escape 
formal punishment if "as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks 
substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct 
or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law." But whatever 
the rules, when cases get to jurors, or even bench trials by judges, the 
black letter law has historically been abandoned in favor of their own 
sense of who or what is or is not "crazy," or blameworthy. And while 
appeals courts in the past several decades have indeed found technical 
reasons for throwing out guilty verdicts, usually on the basis of consti­
tutional misconduct by police or prosecutors, the nineteenth century 
was the real golden age of "technicalities," when cases were routinely 
overturned on the basis, for example, of misspellings in handwritten 
indictments. 
The larger picture is that while in recent times, as always, there have 
been many cases in which apparently guilty defendants go free, the 
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overall conviction rate for homicide is higher than at almost any time 
in the past. Figures from the Justice Department indicate that in the 
1990s about half of all those indicted for homicide are found guilty as 
charged, another 20 percent or so convicted of lesser crimes—man-
slaughter, for example, in murder cases—for an overall conviction rate 
of about 70 percent. Only very rarely (as in the midcentury years) 
has that rate reached over 50 percent anywhere in America, or indeed 
in medieval England, except in those colonial jurisdictions that also 
hanged witches and Quakers or condemned African slaves to death 
by fire. 
The basic procedures in homicide cases—inquest, arrest, arraign­
ment, indictment, trial, and sentencing—have evolved slowly over cen­
turies. The trial is at its core, and certainly since the eighteenth century, 
when the accused were granted lawyers and then allowed to testify for 
themselves, the trial has been an adversarial contest. And by its nature 
this Anglo-American adversary system of justice ensures that a number 
of the accused will go free. Unlike European systems of justice, domi­
nated by judge and prosecution, in ours the parties are not even sup­
posed to be engaged in an impartial search for the truth. The 
revolutionary tradition reflected in the Bill of Rights is not to trust the 
state, that is, the prosecution, but to check it through vigorous opposi­
tion. And as in any series of real contests, victory may go either way. 
From the American beginnings, some of the ancient procedures have 
been modified: the jury of neighbors and acquaintances replaced with 
an impartial panel of strangers, public officers taking over the task of 
prosecution, state and federal constitutions adding protections for the 
accused. In recent decades and in many states some of the old practices 
and institutions have been further changed, even abolished. Thus medi­
cal examiners have been substituted for coroners, the grand jury, at­
tacked as irrelevant for over a century, abandoned in ordinary criminal 
proceedings. But the basic adversarial nature of the justice system is too 
deeply rooted to overturn. Change has always come slowly, conserva­
tively, and some places have found, for example, that the ancient grand 
jury, with the constitutional American power to grant immunity from 
prosecution to witnesses who would otherwise claim their Fifth 
Amendment right to remain silent, is still a powerful investigative tool. 
The law of unintended consequences, too, is often illustrated by efforts 
to change "the system." In homicide cases, virtually all of the states 
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during the 1990s have passed laws allowing violent juveniles, some as 
young as fourteen, to be tried as adults. The intent is to make their 
records public and to allow longer sentences. But one frequent effect 
has been that more of them have won acquittal, as defense attorneys 
have been changed from something like impartial guardians into one-
sided advocates. 
Prosecutors have been plea-bargaining homicides for well over a cen­
tury, in large part because they have not been able to predict what 
twelve citizens in a box will do once cases go to trial. Those citizens 
have always been the wild cards in the justice system. Even before the 
American Revolution, John Adams, in defending the British soldiers 
accused of the Boston Massacre, knew that choosing the right jurors, a 
key part of the adversary system, was important to his case. Juries have 
historically freed defendants, and still do, because of a mixture of both 
"liberal" and "conservative" views. They have been skeptical of the state 
and its agents, and are in any case supposed not to decide "innocence" 
but only failure to prove guilt. They have romanticized some kinds of 
crime, or killers, like the James brothers or even John Dillinger. Long 
before O. J. Simpson's "dream team" of defense lawyers was assembled, 
they have been swayed, perhaps too easily, by the eloquence, the legal 
knowledge, the outside experts provided by high-priced attorneys; the 
complaint that the rich are better defended than the poor goes back at 
least to the Age of Jacksonian Democracy. Above all jurors have put 
themselves in the shoes not of all but of some kinds of defendants. 
Juries have never delivered "absolute" justice but have represented, 
at their best and sometimes worst, the moral sense of their communi­
ties. Although often surprisingly fair-minded, historically, in many 
cases involving unpopular minorities some biases have been too strong 
to overcome, and they have tended to convict in times of social stress. 
Otherwise, although contemporary jurors are generally more diverse 
than those in times past, their prejudices have been quite stable over the 
centuries. Whatever the law may say they have found it hard, since the 
Middle Ages, to convict felonious accessories of actual murder: the kid 
who was there but did not pull the trigger at the convenience store 
holdup. They have tended to convict, whatever the evidence, the kinds 
of people accused of crimes they most hate or fear: robbery murder, 
killing strangers or women, abusing corpses. The Charles Mansons and 
Jeffrey Dahmers have never had an easy time in court. It is rather the 
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routine manslaughters, the result of sudden fights and quarrels, that 
have always earned the majority of the acquittals. Americans have gen­
erally been inclined to forgive fighters, or those who could arguably 
plead self-defense. And historically the highest acquittal rates have been 
registered in what we would now label "conservative" jurisdictions, 
places where gun ownership is most prized and the macho values most 
honored, whether the old slave states before the Civil War, South Caro­
lina in the 1920s, or Houston in the 1960s. 
But the biggest criminal issue of the late twentieth century has centered 
not on the conviction rate but on sentencing, above all capital punish­
ment. Here again the historical evidence provides perspective. 
Statistics for all fifty states are hard to compile. But as of 1982, just 
before a major national movement toward more prison construction 
and longer sentences, a study by the Justice Department figured that 
the time actually served by those convicted of murder averaged close to 
seven years. And as of 1987 the department indicated that 17 percent 
of those convicted of homicide in federal courts (a far smaller number 
than in the states) were given life in prison, while the rest earned sen­
tences averaging about sixteen years. These are historically high figures, 
very high. Do such sentences prevent homicide? No, yes, and maybe. 
No one has pretended for generations that prisons "reform" their 
inmates: in recent years attempts at rehabilitation have centered only 
on the young or the nonviolent. But in the starkest sense, yes, of course, 
impounding killers helps prevent future homicides; apart from the oc­
casional fellow inmate or guard, those in prison are in no position to 
kill anyone again. The longer they are in, too, the more they will 
emerge if not better at least older, and so less inclined to violent behav­
ior. A great upsurge in prison construction during the 1980s, which 
both encouraged and enabled longer sentences for a variety of crimes, 
seems also to have had some effect on murder rates—which might oth­
erwise have gone higher—for the same simple reason. While impris­
onment is expensive, and arguably wastes potentially productive lives as 
well as resources, locking up the most "at risk" criminals, such as those 
convicted of robbery or aggravated assault, means they are not out men­
acing neighbors or strangers on the street. 
But it is not so clear that the threat of prison "deters" those still on 
the outside. While the justice system nets more criminals than ever 
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before, the pool refills, it seems, immediately. And those who fill it are 
increasingly younger, poorer, and more alienated from the social main­
stream than ever. With less and less to lose, they seem less and less 
sensitive to the consequences of their actions, either to their victims or 
themselves. 
If not prison, perhaps death? This is an old issue. The actual process 
of capital punishment, and the publicity surrounding it, is much the 
same as it has been for many years; the addition of lethal injection to 
the list of methods has not much changed the ancient death house ritu­
als, although a heightened modern sense of delicacy has in many juris­
dictions added the application of a diaper sometime between last meal 
and final prayer. But some of the arguments in favor of the death pen­
alty have shifted, and so has the legal context. 
The U.S. Supreme Court, after having effectively suspended the use 
of capital punishment from 1966 through its Furman v. Georgia deci­
sion in 1972, as described in chapter 8, allowed in 1976 in Gregg v. 
Georgia that a new death penalty law might meet the objections it had 
raised just four years earlier. Ordinary homicides would not call for 
execution. But if there were particular "aggravating circumstances," 
spelled out in advance by law, judge or jury might decide on death. 
Many states followed Georgia, some insisting that after conviction a 
special hearing must be held to decide the penalty. Most of the "aggra­
vating circumstances" listed in state laws are the ones that have long 
earned the severest punishment: killing an officer of the law was de­
clared a crime not subject to benefit of clergy way back in Tudor En­
gland, and murder for profit, after lying in wait, or through using 
poison has always been thought especially heinous. More modern con­
cerns are reflected in the listing of race-hate crimes in some states. 
A year after Gregg, the court in Coker v. Georgia struck rape from 
the list of capital crimes; however terrible the offense, execution was 
held to be a "grossly disproportionate" punishment. But otherwise the 
movement has been in the other direction. McCleskey v. Georgia in 
1987 determined that the pattern of executions in that state was not 
so racially discriminatory as to invalidate Warren McCleskey s sentence 
for killing a policeman during a robbery. And Stanford v. Kentucky, in 
1989, affirmed that death was not too cruel and unusual a punishment 
for murder committed when the killer was seventeen years old, signifi­
cantly younger than, for example, either Nathan Leopold or Richard 
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Loeb, the notorious killers spared the chair on account of their age back 
in 1924. 
In virtually every election year since the mid-1980s, too, the Con­
gress has passed some kind of "crime bill." All of them, after providing 
more money for state and local law enforcement, have expanded the 
category of "federal" offenses. Adding dozens to the list of federal 
crimes deserving death has not yet added to the number of actual exe­
cutions; all of these "new" measures, except for death for certain kinds 
of "drug kingpins" (still to be constitutionally tested), have involved 
actions, such as assassinating the president, that are already defined as 
first-degree murder in any case and in any state. Conservative partisans 
of traditional states' rights have not complained about this kind of cen­
tralization of power, the effect of which is to further expand the role of 
the FBI and of federal courts. But liberals have objected on grounds of 
principle. 
The key legal-political issue fought nationally between 1992 and 
1996 involved making execution quicker and easier by limiting the 
right of appeal. Justice is ideally swift as well as sure. And while it may 
be argued that it is now more fair, in that sense more sure, than ever in 
the past, as part of the price for that it is certainly slower, at almost 
every stage. Homicide trials, at the center of the process, take far more 
time, on average, than they once did: Lizzie Borden's "Trial of the Cen­
tury" took just two weeks, while O. J. Simpson's stretched out over 
what seemed interminable months. But what has most maddened sup­
porters of the death penalty is that since Gregg repeated appeals, 
through three tiers of state courts and three tiers of federal courts, have 
greatly lengthened the passage between sentence of death and its actual 
execution. In contrast to the Pennsylvania average, a century ago, of less 
than a year—thought by Robert Ralston, at least, to be too long at the 
time—the average by the mid-1990s had reached eight years: Warren 
McCleskey himself was electrocuted only in 1991, after sentencing in 
1978. No one is urging a return to the era before the Scottsboro case, 
in the 1930s, when substantive Supreme Court review was effectively 
established. But the 1996 edition of biennial crime bills, passed by a 
Republican Congress and signed by a Democratic president, set dead­
lines for both prisoners' appeals and judicial decisions, limited inmates 
to one federal appeal if there is no "clear and convincing" evidence of 
innocence, and limited the power of federal judges to overturn verdicts 
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unless they are an "unreasonable application of clearly established fed­
eral law." 
The arguments about capital punishment have changed little since 
the abolition of public hanging, but the emphasis has. On deterrence 
the opponents long had the historical and statistical arguments to 
themselves, although the basic one may be essentially circular: the fact 
that times, states, and nations with the death penalty usually have 
higher murder rates than those without may simply reflect that these 
are the places that have most felt the need for drastic measures. In more 
recent years proponents have fought back with their own statistical 
studies, but on the whole the "amis" still have the best of it. In any case 
deterrence, although it figures in some political debate, is not now the 
key issue either in popular polls or among opposing theologians or phi­
losophers. Neither is revenge, although if not the key argument this 
may be the key emotion behind it. The case for death instead now turns 
on life. 
This is an age when Americans fear death and prize life more than in 
earlier times, perhaps because of a declining faith in life hereafter; mod­
ern military policy is often dictated by anxiety over how the public will 
react to the televised sight of a single body bag. And now that execution 
is reserved entirely for murder, both sides can insist that theirs is the 
one that most respects the value of human life, whether of killer or of 
victim. It is not an easy argument, and does not divide along neat lines: 
while most of the Roman Catholic hierarchy, for example, opposes the 
death penalty as a logical extension of its opposition to both abortion 
and euthanasia, there is no evidence that the laity follows the leadership, 
and some eminent Catholic philosophers have taken conscientious po­
sitions on the other side. 
The history suggests that we are still following a trend, now over two 
centuries old, in which the percentage of condemned killers actually 
executed has generally if raggedly declined. But except for the period 
1966-77 it has not quite receded to the vanishing point. Polls suggest 
wide support for the death penalty, well over 70 percent in the 1990s, 
higher among men than women, whites than blacks. But even among 
African Americans, a substantial minority, and in some years a majority, 
have favored it, despite their bitter memories. In a democratic nation, 
divided into fifty states, it is hard to imagine that execution will soon 
be abolished entirely. There are now several thousand prisoners on 
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death row, with only judicial appeals and executive clemency standing 
between them and chair or chamber, noose, needle, or firing squad. 
The first felon executed after Gregg was Gary Gilmore in 1977, shot to 
death in Utah for a robbery murder; since then there have been only a 
few each year. But while the majority has supported this, the actual 
business of state-sponsored homicide has always been thought a kind of 
necessary evil, traditionally as distasteful as the hangman. Even with 
new limitations on appeals it is hard to imagine a quantum leap in the 
number, a bloodbath involving all or even most of those currently un­
der condemnation. 
No historian doubts, nor should any reader of this book, that many 
innocent men and women have died at the hands of the state over the 
past several centuries. While trials on average may now be more fairly 
conducted than in the past, no one should believe that current proce­
dures have been so perfected that these miscarriages will not happen 
again. And however refined after Gregg, the system cannot be made 
entirely free of the arbitrary quality that allows one killer to live while 
it executes another for a nearly identical crime. But these are moral 
issues, beyond the reach of historical evidence. The majority of Ameri­
cans clearly have an emotional need to insist on final closure to some 
kinds of murder. And so the society as a whole will continue each year 
to choose a few men, rarely women, to help draw moral boundaries, to 
show in the most solemn fashion that some kinds of murderers are 
counted as beyond the circle of respect for life because of the ways in 
which they have taken other lives. All that the history can suggest is that 
the number of these dismal exemplars has not been and will not be very 
large, and that their examples have not had and will not have much 
effect on the murder rate either way. 
The final issue here is the search to understand why the American mur­
der rate is and so long has been the highest in the developed world. 
Discussion will begin with two of the more popular suspects, poverty 
and guns, and move on to culture, the heritage of frontier and slavery. 
Although the romantic reformers of the early nineteenth century were 
the first to use social statistics to establish that the poor are more likely 
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to commit homicide than the rich, this was hardly the first time that 
the connection was noticed. H. C. Brearly, on the other hand, writing 
in the 1920s, began his exploration of the causes of homicide in 
America by arguing against the then-popular notion that excessive rates 
were somehow the result of evils brought by our excessive riches; his 
clincher was that the South was both the poorest and the most murder­
ous section of the country. The historical evidence overwhelmingly sup­
ports both Brearly and the romantics; poverty is statistically associated 
with homicidal behavior. At the same time the evidence does not suggest 
that poverty per se is the cause of that behavior. Nor is it an explanation 
either for why American murder rates are higher than those of other 
nations, or why rates in some past times have been higher than at others. 
Absolute poverty, the threat of hunger and cold, is of course not the 
issue. In the past, as in medieval England, some murders may have been 
committed out of sheer immediate want, and in the nineteenth century 
strikers and strikebreakers, among others, fought and killed directly 
over jobs and livelihoods. But these directly economic issues are not 
now common. The United States remains the richest of nations. Adult 
murder rates in contemporary Philadelphia are higher now than they 
were a century ago, when the population as a whole was far poorer. 
Married men (and women) with families to support feel the bite of 
deprivation far more keenly than vigorous young men with no respon­
sibilities, but their rates have always been much lower. And while the 
long nineteenth- to twentieth-century drop in murder rates coincided 
with generally rising standards of living, the great upsurge during the 
1960s occurred during a time of matchless prosperity, when millions 
were being lifted up and over the official "poverty line." 
But if poverty is no simple answer, the historical evidence does point 
to related causes for statistical rises and falls in the murder rate. One of 
them has run through the last half of this book: changes in the structure 
of employment. There is no clear historical evidence that consistently 
connects homicide rates after the Middle Ages with changes in short-
term economic cycles. Sometimes, as in the 1960s and possibly the 
1920s, prosperity and violence have risen together, and there is at least 
a suspicion that during the previous century good times allowed poor 
people to buy more alcohol, and so to be in places and do things that 
were likely to get them into murderous trouble. But if not the short­
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term cycle, then longer and deeper changes are related to levels of homi­
cide. A good job is more than a source of income; it is a way of life, 
profoundly shaping personal routines and expectations. The relatively 
steady and highly paid work offered by the urban industrial revolution, 
together with all of the institutions, behaviors, and hopes associated 
with it were as important as anything in our history in driving rates 
down, just as the transition out of that revolution pushed them up. 
And if not absolute want, then "relative deprivation," as explained in 
this and earlier chapters, is a convincing explanation for much of the 
upsurge in criminal violence in the late twentieth century. Most Ver­
monters in the 1820s enjoyed fewer material comforts than contem­
porary residents of South Central Los Angeles. But they were not 
continually reminded, in living color, about the lifestyles of the rich 
and famous, they coped with deprivation in dignity, and they did not 
watch the majority of their fellow citizens move ahead of them along 
routes they despaired of following. There is, then, a sense in which 
Brearly s contemporaries were right to suspect some sort of connection 
between American riches and American violence. The gap between rich 
and poor is higher in the United States than in any other developed 
nation, and has been growing since the early 1970s. And while wealth 
in itself is even less a "cause" of homicide than poverty is, when the two 
are bound up close together they do create tensions, temptations, and 
frustrations that help push up murder rates. 
The American gun culture is a much better explanation for our level of 
homicide than poverty is, but it is still not good enough by itself. 
The arguments between supporters of gun control and the National 
Rifle Association (NRA) are tired now, run off by the numbers. The 
slogans Guns Kill People and Guns Don't Kill People: People Do are 
equally correct, and equally half-true. Murder rates are central to the 
debate: one side points to England and Wales, where private ownership 
of guns, especially handguns, is very rare and homicide almost equally 
so; the other counters with Switzerland, Israel, and New Zealand, 
where ownership is common and homicide almost as rare as in En­
gland. Neither side resorts to the historical evidence, although both 
might score points if they used it selectively. That evidence supports the 
fans of firearms, to a point, in that widespread use of guns did not by 
344 Chapter 9 
itself push up murder rates in our earliest history. But after that point 
new weapons did prove more dangerous than those traditionally used 
when the Constitution was drawn up. 
The gun culture in America is as old as the first British settlements. 
Settlers everywhere found muskets useful in hunting game, protecting 
property, and making war; so, soon, did the Native Americans. Every 
government except Quaker Pennsylvania at least theoretically required 
that able-bodied free men should own them, as members of the militia. 
While in practice many could not afford or use them, large numbers 
could and did; colonial history is full not only of war but of riot, rout, 
tumult, and insurrection among armed rebels. And yet ordinary homi­
cides among white colonists remained relatively uncommon, more so 
than among their English contemporaries, and there is no evidence that 
many were committed with the cumbersome muskets of the day. 
These low rates continued through the American Revolution and 
early national periods. Whatever was happening out on the frontiers or 
down on the plantations, it appears in fact that it was not until the 
1840s and 1850s that the American homicide rates in more settled 
areas, such as New York City, began to soar above those in comparable 
English places. 
The timing is no accident, and if history up to the antebellum de­
cades supports the National Rifle Association, the proponents of gun 
control can make a stronger case out of what happened after. Small 
concealable handguns were first mass-produced in the 1840s and 
1850s. It was these, not rifles, military pistols, or sporting weapons, that 
scared middle-class Americans, suggesting that as mobs and immigrants 
used them they must too, for protection. Among ordinary city dwellers, 
at the same time, hidden revolvers began to make any routine encoun­
ter as potentially deadly as it has been since; the man who carried one 
into the saloon or on the street was like a booby trap, liable to explode 
without warning when tripped or bumped. And so it was these "con­
cealed" weapons that were first subject to state regulation and city 
ordinance. 
If the widespread use offirearms has been deeply entrenched in our 
law and culture, gun control also has a long American history. The 
targets were those weapons thought most likely to be used for robbery 
or murder, above all handguns. Beginning in the mid-nineteenth cen­
tury, state and local legislation in many places required permits, forbade 
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sales to minors and aliens. New York State's Sullivan Law of 1911 tight­
ened the permit procedures and made it a felony to carry a concealable 
weapon in any village, town, or city, provisions widely copied else­
where. The apparent "crime wave" of the 1920s inspired the American 
Bar Association to call for the outright outlawry of pistols not designed 
for official government use. Even the sportsmen's United States Re­
volver Association, during the same period, called for a uniform fire­
arms act, which would require a minimum forty-eight-hour waiting 
period for a permit, with police screening out criminals, aliens, alco­
holics, drug addicts, minors, and others thought dangerous as owners. 
Several states at that time adopted variations on this model, and also 
outlawed tommy guns and sawed-off shotguns, the scary new weapons 
made popular by contemporary gangsters. But while local legislation 
had earlier been opposed only by a few small arms makers and hardware 
stores, the scent of absolute prohibition and federal action heated up 
the debate. The National Rifle Association, formed back in 1871, was 
greatly expanded during the 1920s, and lobbying Congress became one 
of its major activities. The mails were effectively closed to pistol sales in 
1927, but the Federal Firearms Act of 1938 did no more than charge a 
token $ 1 fee to manufacturers and dealers in interstate commerce, who 
were supposed to keep records and make sure they were not in viola­
tion of state permit laws. Thirty years later, during another crime wave, 
the Gun Control Act of 1968, signed only months after the Kennedy 
and King assassinations, raised the permit fees to dealers, tightened the 
requirements for interstate sales, and closed most access to imported 
heavy weapons. 
The arguments have grown hotter with time, which has brought on 
one side a great growth in NRA membership and on the other the loss, 
in an increasingly urban nation, of the old tradition of keeping some 
kind of a musket over the mantle. The constitutional argument has 
been a standoff; each side has its own interpretation of the Second 
Amendment, whether the "right to bear arms" was or was not meant 
to cover only those who served in the militia, with only the kinds of 
weapons appropriate to individual citizen-soldiers. But otherwise the 
issues, the arguments, and the politics have all shifted. As recently as 
1968 the House of Representatives was divided mostly along geo­
graphic lines, with the Northeast and urban areas generally standing for 
greater control, rural congressmen from the South and West opposed. 
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Since then the whole matter has been made ideological, pitting liberals 
and moderates against conservatives. The public, when polled, has long 
supported control, but the passion and the money have been on the 
other side, and the battles have gone both ways. 
Ten years after an attempt on the life of President Ronald Reagan, 
by an obviously deranged assassin who severely wounded his press sec­
retary, James Brady, the so-called Brady Bill of 1993 required at the 
national level the five-day waiting period and background check for 
handgun permits that several states had long adopted. Beginning in the 
late 1980s a number of mass murders, together with the increasing fire­
power of juvenile gangs and drug dealers, suggested the measures in­
cluded in the crime bill of 1994: outright abolition of assault rifles and 
other high-tech machines, a general tightening of dealers' licenses and 
penalties, and abolition of sales to youngsters without parental consent. 
But these and other control measures are themselves under continuous 
assault. 
The argument for control has changed very little: widespread own­
ership of guns raises the murder rate, and in the home suicide and ac­
cident rates as well. But the argument against control has progressed. 
Originally the NRA mostly stressed the sporting use of firearms. In the 
1990s, when the issue began to center on armor-piercing bullets and 
assault rifles, it has sometimes taken the extreme position that these 
killing machines may be needed to protect citizens against agents of 
their own government. But since the 1920s the basic arguments have 
been two: one is that gun control does not work, that only honest citi­
zens and not criminals will abide by curbs on sales. The other, related 
to this, is that gun ownership actually discourages crime by making 
criminals hesitant to rob, burglarize, or assault people who may have 
their own defensive weapons. All of these propositions may be sub­
jected to the test of historical experience, which complicates matters by 
showing some support for both sides. 
The NRA is right to point out that state and local curbs on sales have 
always been evaded, that determined criminals have been able to get 
whatever they wanted. Given the historic failure of other kinds of pro­
hibition, there is surely little chance that another layer of bureaucratic 
regulation, especially in a nation as deeply divided as this one, will keep 
lethal gadgets out of the hands of drug dealers or other professionals. 
There is evidence, too, for the second point that fear of guns in the 
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home holds down the burglary rate, for example, which is lower here 
than in contemporary Great Britain. This is an argument with wide 
popular appeal. The tradition of "justifiable homicide" in this country 
is an old one, as citizens as well as law officers may legally kill felons in 
the course of committing crimes such as robbery, rape, or assault. It is 
quite true that in places like nineteenth-century Bodie, California, 
where virtually all male citizens went armed, the incidence of robbery 
and burglary was virtually nil. In the late teens and 1920s, long after 
the frontier and vigilantism had passed away, Brearly estimated, after 
surveying big cities like Washington, Detroit, and Chicago, that the 
number of legally "justified homicides" accounted for over 25 percent 
of the totals recorded. And it is this heritage that over half the states 
have recently drawn on, beginning with Florida in 1987, in reversing 
the legislative trend of three generations by making it easier instead of 
harder to carry handguns hidden on the person. 
But the case of mining towns like Bodie cuts two ways: when every 
man carried a gun, not many got robbed, but many got killed. While 
gun control legislation offers no safety from murder committed by cal­
culating professionals, the great majority of homicides have always re­
sulted from near-accidents, sudden flares of temper. Despite the revival 
of legal gun-toting, according to the Uniform Crime Reports "justifiable 
homicide" by private citizens is now relatively rare, numbering in the 
1990s not much more than three hundred killings a year. While this is 
a substantial figure, roughly equal to the number committed by law 
enforcement officers, it is by the standards of Brearly s day quite low, 
accounting for not much over 1 percent of all homicides. Most of them, 
too, are committed by home owners with weapons legal under any 
imaginable form of registration. What most gun control proposals 
might curb is not these but the number of arguments in barrooms and 
traffic jams that have too often turned suddenly fatal, simply because 
what would otherwise be no more than a drunken shoving match has 
been irrevocably transformed by a handgun in easy reach. 
If the advocates of control have no clear answer to the problems of 
enforcement and of professional criminals, they are right on several 
other points. The high number of gunshot accidents resulting from 
stashed weapons in the home, many of them fatal to young children, is 
unique to this country. The growing number of early teenagers with 
ever-heavier firepower at their fingertips is surely appalling: the ease of 
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killing simply by pulling a trigger, instead of, say, stomping or biting an 
opponent to death, surely reinforces that psychological failure to un­
derstand the real nature of death by violence that is encouraged by 
graphic pictures on television. And there can be no question that the 
American ratio of roughly one gun in circulation for every resident is 
now and has been at least since the mid-nineteenth century a major 
contributor to our notoriously high homicide rates. That widespread 
ownership in Israel, New Zealand, and Switzerland does not lead to 
similar results is explainable in part by the fact that, however big by 
British standards, the proportion of households with guns in those 
countries is still not as big as ours and is carefully limited to the kinds 
of weapons and people that serve in their citizen armies. 
Still, there is more to all this than weapons alone. The American love 
of guns is only part of the explanation for our murder rates: even with 
all firearms deaths subtracted from the annual totals, we still kill each 
other at roughly three times the rate of most Western nations. A num­
ber of these killings, with or without guns, result from deep psycho­
logical problems in the killers, some of them from greed, a few from 
other carefully calculated motives. But even with these, too, subtracted, 
we remain a shamefully murderous nation. What must finally and most 
fundamentally be explained, then, is what it is in our habits, values, and 
attitudes that makes otherwise quite ordinary Americans more likely to 
kill people than most other folks are. 
Habits, values, and attitudes are components of culture, and culture is 
the product of history. Americans are a diverse people, with a shared 
national history but a number of separate histories as well. These sepa­
rate histories have been very important in shaping homicide rates: for 
complex historical reasons Irish and Italian immigrants brought violent 
traditions with them, Jews and Scandinavians did not. And while our 
shared history has in the long run been even more important, we have 
shared it unevenly. Two of the most famous and notorious of American 
experiences, both of them involving racial conflict, are the frontier and 
slavery. Our several peoples have of course been affected differently by 
these two, respectively the most famous and the most notorious aspects 
of our history, and the differences have been reflected in many ways, 
including regional differences in our murder rates. But in the end all of 
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us, from Mayflower descendants to Vietnamese refugees, have been af­
fected by both. 
The western frontier has long been a favorite suspect among those 
trying to explain violence in America, in part because we are proud 
of this part of our heritage, and may be willing to admit that there 
is a bloody price to pay for those more admirable values and tradi­
tions our national mythology has associated with the rugged Indian 
fighters, family farmers, miners, and cowboys who populate our his­
torical imagination. But among professional historians it is a cliche 
that a frontier experience, as in Canada, need not necessarily leave 
a violent heritage. And while from the viewpoint of the dominant 
population all of the continent from Maine to California was once 
frontier, murder rates have varied enormously across this great stretch, 
and there is little correlation between how far a given state is removed 
from the excitements of first settlement and its homicide rates: North 
Dakota and Utah are far less murderous than North Carolina and 
Georgia; and Texas was a sovereign nation half a century before Okla­
homa was opened to white residents, and has long been a more violent 
place. 
While there is something to the "frontier thesis," it has, then, little 
to do with recency of settlement. The experience of fighting hostile 
Native Americans is more important, but it is not critical either; al­
though it has left permanent scars among surviving Indians, its impact 
on later generations of whites has been relatively minor. Minnesota, 
ancestral homeland of the formidable Sioux and site of the biggest In­
dian massacre in our history, has never been known for its violence; nor 
has South Dakota, scene of the last encampments of George Armstrong 
Custer, Red Cloud, and Sitting Bull. 
More important than when a given frontier was settled or how much 
fighting it witnessed is the nature of its settlement. In some areas set­
tlement proceeded in orderly, even communal fashion, as in tradition­
ally peaceful New England and the upper Midwest; in others the 
outskirts of settlement pushed out past the reach of government. In the 
wilder jurisdictions, where a lone man on his place with a gun often 
defied the law and made his own, a tradition of prickly armed individu­
alism was born and then honored across the generations, built into the 
legal institutions and values of each state. Ranchers and miners were 
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more likely than farmers to go armed and get into fights, and modern 
Arizona and Colorado still have higher murder rates than Iowa or 
Nebraska. 
But ultimately the most crucial aspect of a lawless frontier heritage was 
not direct but indirect: that is, its contribution to the origins of African 
slavery. It was on the fringes of the Chesapeake, early in the seventeenth 
century, that isolated tobacco planters, with no effective opposition 
from government, illegally transformed the institution of indentured 
servitude into hereditary black slavery. Slavery later rooted elsewhere, 
too, and left a legacy of racism and tension even after its elimination, in 
the North, by the revolutionary generation. But it was only in the 
South that it dominated the economies and social systems of whole 
colonies, later states. And the most casual glance at the map of murder 
across modern America will show that, as from the beginnings, the 
highest rates are those in the South, followed by western places largely 
settled, often via Texas, by ranchers and other migrants from the 
Confederacy. 
The explanation for the connections among slavery, race, and vio­
lence have run throughout this book. An economic system built on the 
continuous exercise of physical force lasted until the Civil War; after 
that war a social system built on the subordination of blacks to whites 
required continual murder, terrorism, and lynching. Until Emancipa­
tion the criminal justice systems of the southern colonies and states 
were built around the maintenance of slavery, with slave owners essen­
tially allowed to make and enforce law as they saw fit, backed by armed 
civilians on patrol. Other issues, such as interpersonal violence, were 
neglected. After the war, the traditions of minimal official law enforce­
ment and racially biased justice continued. The effect in both periods 
was to tolerate and so to encourage murderous behavior, even to 
"honor" it. 
Observers of homicide in any era, including this historian, have 
always commented on the apparently irrational "causes" of many fa­
tal encounters, unable to decode at a distance the pattern of looks, 
words, and body language that escalated into fighting and then man­
slaughter. But they always made a kind of sense to the killer, and often 
the victim as well. Both were typically young men who shared the 
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same code of values, in which to tolerate any kind of "dishonor" with­
out fighting was to lose the reputation for manhood. These were 
the values of the bachelor subculture of young and often insecure 
males, whether on the frontiers of late-eighteenth-century Virginia or 
the saloons of mid-nineteenth-century Philadelphia. They are still fa­
miliar on the streets of Los Angeles, Brooklyn, and Chicago. But ob­
servers and historians have always found them especially powerful in 
the South. 
What distinguished the southern code of honor was less its depth 
than its width. In other places, an evolving sense of middle-class re­
spectability, often sealed by marriage, led young men as they grew older 
and got steady jobs to abandon physical responses to frustration or in­
sult. In some a sense of personal dignity was deeply engrained by paren­
tal or religious training, beyond the reach of sticks and stones as well as 
words, preventing overreaction to assault from outside the confident 
inner self. But in the South the daily need to assert personal dominance, 
first of all over slaves, demanded that even the most successful live by 
the code and handle their own affairs without calling on the law. Given 
the examples set by men such as President Andrew Jackson and Senator 
Ben Tillman, and the historically low rate of conviction for homicide 
resulting from any kind of quarrel, the need to maintain one's honor 
with fists, feet, and guns was effectively institutionalized at all levels of 
southern society. 
Black men, and women, made up one of those levels. This book has 
offered many explanations why homicide among African Americans has 
long remained at eight to ten times the level among whites. But one of 
them, at bedrock, has been the southern heritage. Violence directed at 
whites was punished savagely, violence directed at blacks, by either race, 
was not. Since the law was no help, disputes must be settled directly, 
often physically. And with little else to protect, the need to maintain 
personal respect, even personal safety, through fighting at the slightest 
provocation became for many the kind of cultural trait it was among 
the white elite. 
The anthropologist Elijah Anderson, analyzing the urban "Code of 
the Streets" as of 1993, described a set of values and violent responses 
that are in part specific to the most desperate of poor inner-city blacks. 
"The frustrations of persistent poverty shorten the fuse"—and so 
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adults beat kids, who remember. Drugs and drug dealers make neigh­
borhoods dangerous. Teenage status rests in part on owning, protect-
ing—often seizing—fashionable shoes, jewelry, jackets. But "the heart 
of the code is the issue of respect, loosely defined as being . . . granted 
the deference one deserves." In practice this means that members of 
this deeply alienated minority must always be ready to counter the most 
trivial insult by fighting for their reputations or honor, a set of values 
that any antebellum southern aristocrat would easily recognize. 
All of us, in fact, can recognize it: the "code of the streets" is simply 
an exaggerated version of the code of the schoolyard, of the codes of 
young men of many races, creeds, and backgrounds, of the free men of 
medieval villages, Irish immigrants to midcentury America, bachelor 
workingmen in late-century Philadelphia. It was and is not universally 
followed among any of these, including traditional southerners and 
inner-city African Americans. But there is some of it in most men, and 
it makes us ambivalent about homicide. Southerners, black and white, 
can on average trace their ancestry in this country longer than any but 
the original natives, and in good ways and bad they have stamped them­
selves forcefully onto its culture. Americans condemn the kinds of mur­
derers that all peoples do, Richard Speck and Albert De Salvo. But 
having long ago abandoned the old medieval insistence on the "duty to 
retreat" from potentially dangerous situations, we find it hard to draw 
the line between those who manfully stand up for their rights and out­
right bullies, even cold-blooded killers, and so we make heroes out of 
Billy the Kid, Stagolee, even Al Capone. Most of us find ways of out­
growing or transcending this set of values before it pushes us into seri­
ous trouble. But wherever it exists it is a recipe for continual and 
potentially fatal confrontation, as the effort to maintain dominance too 
often results in losing control. 
We misread much about murder, its threat and its origins. In perspec­
tive we have been spared more of the worst horrors of homicide than 
any major nation in the world, last visited by war on our own soil nearly 
a century and a half ago. But it is still true that murder is a social prob­
lem by definition, that every incident leaves scars on the families of both 
killers and victims, whose number over the last quarter of the twentieth 
century has reached into the millions. Historically the settled middle 
class has only at rare times worried about murder, mostly a matter for 
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other folks. But this is one of those times: even as homicides by ordi­
nary adults are falling in number, the most troubling kinds have been 
rising, from ideological bombings and serial killings to the more com­
mon murders by strangers, criminals, and deeply alienated teenagers. 
Our reputation for routine daily violence has been well earned. This 
book has surely shown that the history of homicide is a reflection of 
history in general. And there is no easy cure for it. Recent changes in 
the justice system have had only minor effects. Any measures designed 
to push up the rate at which accused killers are convicted in court— 
as low, comparatively, as our murder rates are high—would upset 
centuries of tradition, and win little support among either liberals or 
conservatives. And the three major reasons for both high American 
murder rates and low convictions are deeply embedded in our historical 
experience. 
We have been a part of the wider economic world since our 
seventeenth-century origins, and no country has fully solved the inter­
national problems brought by the decay of the urban industrial revo­
lution; while over the past quarter century the United States has gen­
erated more new jobs than most others in the West, it has also tolerated 
a bigger gap between rich and poor. Our love of guns, as old as our 
origins, is not going to go away. It was in part born of, and long nur­
tured by, the nearly two centuries of racial warfare that followed Euro­
pean invasion of long-established native peoples. But high murder rates 
in the United States result above all from the enslavement of Africans, 
another bloody legacy of the seventeenth century. Slavery and the re­
sulting racial hostilities have encouraged violent confrontation not only 
in direct and obvious ways but also in others not so easily recognized. 
We cannot fully escape it, whatever our personal ancestry, wherever we 
come from or live. Its heritage still lives in habits, values, attitudes, 
and even institutions that have made Americans historically more likely 
than other developed peoples to tolerate and even admire the kind of 
belligerence that leads to violence. It is our version of original sin, and 
the continual round of killings on the streets, across kitchen tables, in 
bedrooms, barrooms, playgrounds, and offices is only part of the price 
that we pay for it. 

Select Bibliography 
The works below do not include all consulted for this project. The list 
omits references to many well-known episodes or periods, including the 
most recent, and citations for familiar or easily found quotations. While 
including only single sources for all but the most controversial cases or 
issues, it attempts to suggest books of possible interest to general readers 
as well as to cite more specialized studies actually quoted or used di­
rectly in the text. 
Several books have been helpful across the whole of this one, or at 
least a number of chapters. They range from Lawrence M. Friedman's 
lively yet scholarly legal history, Crime and Punishment in American 
History (New York, 1993), to Jay Robert Nash's often inaccurate, sen­
sationalized, yet indispensably comprehensive BLoodletters and Badmen: 
A Narrative Encyclopedia of American Criminals from the Pilgrims to the 
Present (New York, 1995), from which several individual cases have 
been taken. Two older books by Negley J. Teeters contain lists of exe­
cutions, useful statistics, and anecdotes: Scaffold and Chair: A History of 
Their Use in Pennsylvania, 1682—1962 (Philadelphia, 1963) and Hang 
by the Neck: The Legal Use of Scaffold and Noose, Gibbet, Stake, and 
Firing Squad from Colonial Times to the Present (Springfield, 111., 1967). 
Neither is as scholarly as William J. Bowers, Legal Homicide: Death as 
Punishment in America, 1864-1982 (Boston, 1984), which not only 
summarizes legal arguments but also lists all official executions across 
several generations, state by state, with crime, method, and race of 
those executed. David R. Johnson, American Law Enforcement: A His­
tory (St. Louis, 1981), succinctly covers several centuries of experience 
at all levels of government. 
Modern homicide statistics, since 1933, have been drawn from U.S. 
Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime 
Reports for the United States (Washington, D.C., 1995), and earlier edi­
tions, and U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United 
States (Washington, D.C., 1995) and earlier editions. 
355 
356 Select Bibliography 
The differences between American and English law and their effects 
in practice are described in Richard Maxwell Brown, No Duty to Re­
treat: Violence and Values in American History and Society (New York, 
1991). The southern concept of honor is well introduced by Edward 
Ayers in Vengeance and Justice: Crime and Punishment in the 19th­
century American South (New York, 1984); what it has meant to Edge-
field County, South Carolina, and its sons and daughters over two full 
centuries is compellingly described in Fox Butterfield s All Gods Chil­
dren: The Bosket Family and the American Tradition of Violence (New 
York, 1995). The consequences of the opposing concept of dignity (one 
we know much less about) are suggested by Randolph Roth, "Why 
Northern New Englanders Seldom Commit Murder," a paper delivered 
at the meeting of the Society of Historians of the Early American Repub­
lic, July 1987. The tensions between slaves and whites and their legal 
ramifications from the beginnings through the Civil War are sensitively 
and carefully documented in Philip Schwarz, Twice Condemned: Slaves 
and the Criminal Laws of Virginia, 1705-1865 (Baton Rouge, 1988). 
Lee Kennett and James Laverne Anderson, in The Gun in America: 
The Origins of a National Dilemma (Westport, Conn., 1975), cover not 
only the history of the gun culture but also efforts to control it. Homicide 
in general is the subject of Lt. Col. Dave Grossman's On Killing: The Psy­
chological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society (Boston, 1995). 
Among several useful collections are Roger Lane and John J. Turner 
Jr., eds., Riot, Rout, and Tumult: Readings in American Social and Politi­
cal Violence (Westport, Conn., 1978), and Ted Robert Gurr, ed., Vio­
lence in America, vol. 1, The History of Crime (Newbury Park, 1989). 
The former includes Richard Maxwell Brown's survey, "The Ameri­
can Vigilante Tradition." The latter contains important articles on 
long-term trends in murderous behavior: Ted Robert Gurr, "Historical 
Trends in Homicide: Europe and the United States," and Roger Lane, 
"On the Social Meaning of Homicide Trends in America." Two other 
relevant books by Lane begin in the previous century and move into 
the twentieth: Violent Death in the City: Suicide, Accident, and Murder 
in Nineteenth-Century Philadelphia (Cambridge, 1979), and Roots of 
Violence in Black Philadelphia: 1860-1900 (Cambridge, 1986). 
These are not in general cited further, below, under individual chapters, 
unless they are sources of direct quotation or sustained argument. The 
Select Bibliography 357 
books and other works found especially useful for individual chapters 
include those cited below. 
Chapter I 
James Buchanan Given, Society and Homicide in Thirteenth-Century 
England (Palo Alto, 1977), and especially Barbara A. Hanawalt, Crime 
and Conflict in English Communities 1300-1348 (Cambridge, 1979), 
are indispensable, and for early modern England so are the several es­
says collected in J. S. Cockburn, ed., Crime in England, 1550—1800 
(Princeton, 1977). J. S. Cockburn and Thomas A. Green, eds., Twelve 
Good Men and True: The Criminal Trial Jury in England, 1200—1800 
(Princeton, 1988), deals with the whole of the period covered. J. M. 
Kaye, "The Early History of Murder and Manslaughter," pt. 1, Law 
Quarterly Review 83 (July 1967): 365-95, and pt. 2, Law Quarterly 
Review'84 (October 1967): 569-601, explains some of the legal issues 
in careful detail. 
Chapter 2 
John Rolfe quotation in Lyon Gardiner Tyler, Narratives of Early Vir­
ginia, 1606-1625 (New York, 1907), "Letter of John Rolfe, 1614," 
239-44, quotation on pp. 240—41; quotations on law enforcement 
from Oscar Handlin, The Americans (Boston, 1963), 133; the encoun­
ter between West Africans and colonial Americans is well described in 
John W. Blassingame, The Slave Community: Plantation Life in the Ante­
bellum South, rev. ed. (New York, 1979), chaps. 1 and 2; the author­
ity on homicide for the early years is Bradley Chapin, Criminal Jus­
tice in Colonial America, 1606-1660 (Athens, Ga., 1983), quotation 
on p. 13. 
Yasuhide Kawashima, Puritan Justice and the Indian: White Mans 
Law in Massachusetts (Middletown, Conn., 1986), is a good account 
of legal misunderstandings; King Philips War in David Horowitz, The 
Indian Wars and Americas First Frontier, 1607-1776 (New York, 
1978). 
Moral crimes in Robert Oakes, "Things Fearful to Name: Sodomy 
and Buggery in Seventeenth-Century New England," Journal of So­
cial History 12, no. 2 (Winter 1978): 268-81, Hackett quotation on 
358 Select Bibliography 
p. 274; Puritan justice generally in Daniel A. Cohen, Pillars of Salt, 
Monuments of Grace: New England Crime Literature and the Origins of 
American Popular Culture, 1674-1860 (New York, 1993); infanticide 
and other capital trials in Peter C. Hoffer and N. E. H. Hull, Murdering 
Mothers: Infanticide in England and New England, 1558-1803 (New 
York, 1993). 
The immense literature on the Salem witchcraft trials is neatly sum­
marized in "The Visible and Invisible Worlds of Salem," chap. 2 of 
James West Davidson and Mark H. Lytle, After the Fact: The Art of 
Historical Detection (New York, 1981); New York justice generally in 
Julius T. Goebel and T. Raymond Naughton, Law Enforcement in Co­
lonial New York: A Study in Criminal Procedure, 1664—1776 {New 
York, 1944), quotation on p. 669. 
North Carolina in Donna Spindel and Stuart W. Thomas Jr., "Crime 
and Society in North Carolina, 1663-1748," Journal ofSouthern His­
tory 49, no. 2 (May 1983): 223-44; quotations on proceedings against 
whites in slave cases in Arthur P. Scott, Criminal Law in Colonial Vir­
ginia (New York, 1930), 202, 203; arson trials of New York City blacks 
most conveniently in Winthrop D. Jordan, White over Black: American 
Attitudes Towards the Negro, 1550-1812 (Williamsburg, 1968). 
Chapter 3 
Colonial Mobs in Pauline Maier, "Popular Uprisings and Civil Author­
ity in Eighteenth-Century America," in Lane and Turner, Riot, Rout, 
and Tumult; North Carolina Regulators in Brown, "American Vigilante 
Tradition"; South Carolina Regulators in Paul David Nelson, William 
Tryon and the Course ofEmpire: A Life in British Imperial Service (Cha­
pel Hill, 1990); Boston Massacre in John Ferling, John Adams: A Life 
(Knoxville, 1992). The Cherokee in John Phip Reid, A Law ofBlood: 
The Primitive Law of the Cherokee Nation (Princeton, 1970), and Wil­
liam C. McLoughlin, Cherokee Renascence in the New Republic (Prince­
ton, 1986), quotation on p. 50. 
Richmond statistics in Robert M. Saunders, "Crime and Punish­
ment in Early National America: Richmond, Virginia, 1784-1820," 
Virginia Magazine ofHistory and Biography 2%6, no. 1 (1978): 33-44; 
Jason Fairbanks in Cohen, Pillars ofSalt, quotation on p. 25. 
Dueling in William Oliver Stevens, Pistols at Ten Paces: The Story 
 359 Select Bibliography
of the Code of Honor in America (Boston, 1940); Nat Turner in Ste­
phen B. Oates, The Fires of Jubilee: Nat Turners Fierce Rebellion (New 
York, 1978); quotations on southern character in Ayers, Vengeance and 
Justice, 11-12; Lewis brothers in Boynton Merrill, Jeffersons Nephews: 
A Frontier Tragedy (Princeton, 1976); South Carolina justice in Mi­
chael Hindus, Prison and Plantation: Crime, Justice, and Authority in 
Massachusetts and South Carolina, 1767-1878 (Chapel Hill, 1980), 
quotation on p. 130. 
Chapter 4 
Jewett and Bickford cases in David Ray Papke, Framing the Criminal: 
Crime, Cultural Work, and the Loss of Critical Perspective, 1830-1900 
(North Haven, Conn., 1987), and Cohen, Pillars of Salt; Choate quo­
tation in Cohen, Pillars of Salt, 227. 
New economy and reform in Roger Lane, "Urbanization and Crimi­
nal Violence in the 19th Century: Massachusetts as a Test Case," in 
Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, eds., The History of Violence 
in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives (Washington, D.C., 
1969); factory quote in Michael B. Katz, "The Abolition of Beverly 
High School," in Gary B. Nash and Cynthia J. Shelton, eds., The Pri­
vate Side of American History, vol. 1, 4th ed. (San Diego, 1975), 3 8 9  ­
404, quotation on p. 401; attack on capital punishment in David Brion 
Davis, From Homicide to Slavery: Studies in American Culture (New 
York, 1986), chap. 1, and Louis P. Mazur, Rites of Execution: Capital 
Punishment and the Transformation of American Culture, 1776-1865 
(New York, 1989). 
First police in Roger Lane, Policing the City: Boston, 1822-1885 
(Cambridge, 1967); New York mobs in Paul Gilje, The Road to Mob­
ocracy: Popular Disorder in New York City, 1763-1834 (Chapel Hill, 
1987), quotation on p. 137. 
Early police in James F. Richardson, Urban Police in the United States 
(Port Washington, N. Y., 1974), and David Johnson, Policing the Urban 
Underworld: The Impact of Crime on the Development of the American 
Police, 1800-1887 (Philadelphia, 1972); rioting in Paul Gilje, Rioting 
in America (Bloomington, 1996); quotation in J. Thomas Sharf, History 
of Baltimore City and County (Baltimore, 1881), 2:787. Philadelphia 
homicides in materials collected for Lane, Violent Death; new domestic 
360 Select Bibliography 
ideals in Carol Z. Stearns and Peter N. Stearns, Anger: The Struggle for 
Emotional Control in America s History (Chicago, 1986); "bachelor sub­
culture" in Elliot Gorn, The Manly Art: Bareknuckle Prize Fighting in 
America (Ithaca, 1986); New York coroners in Eric Monkkonen, "Di­
verging Homicide Rates: England and the United States, 1850—1875," 
in Gurr, Violence in Amerca, 1 :80-101; Prentiss Bishop quoted in 
Brown, No Duty to Retreat, 8; Marion County in David Bodenhamer, 
"Law and Disorder on the Early Frontier: Marion County, Indiana, 
1823-1850," Western Historical Quarterly 16, no. 3 (1979): 323-36; 
vigilantes in Brown, "American Vigilante Tradition"; Joseph Smith 
in Dallin Oaks and Marvin S. Hill, Carthage Conspiracy: The Trial of 
the Accused Assassins of Joseph Smith (Urbana, 1975). Governor Ham­
mond quotation in Stanley Elkins, Slavery: A Problem in American In­
stitutional and Intellectual Life (Chicago, 1976), 219; slave justice and 
homicide trials in Eugene Genovese, Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the 
Slaves Made (New York, 1974), bk. 1, pt 2. 
John Brown in Stephen Oates, To Purge This Land with Blood: A 
Biography of John Brown (New York, 1970), quotations on pp. 133, 
147. Civil War noncombatants in Grossman, On Killing; New York 
Draft Riots in Adrian Cook, The Armies of the Streets: The New York 
City Draft Riots of 1863 (Lexington, Ky, 1974), quotation on pp. 198­
99; Civil War slave conspiracy in Winthrop D. Jordan, Tumult and 
Silence at Second Creek: An Inquiry into a Civil War Slave Conspiracy 
(Baton Rouge, 1993). While Otto Eisenschiml's theory of a wider con­
spiracy to kill Lincoln is dubious, In the Shadow of Lincoln s Death (New 
York, 1940) does have a good account of the trial of Mary Surratt and 
others. 
Chapter 5 
New Orleans race riot in Dennis C. Rousey, Policing the Southern City: 
New Orleans, 1805-1889 (Baton Rouge, 1996); Kernan in Ayers, Ven­
geance and Justice, 266-67; Horace V. Redfield, Homicide, North and 
South: Being a Comparative View of Crime Against the Person in Several 
Parts of the United States (Philadelphia, 1880), quotation on p. 10, sta­
tistics on pp. 12-13; hill country in William Lynwood Montell, Kill­
ings: Folk Justice in the Upper South (Lexington, Ky, 1986); Stagolee 
 361 Select Bibliography
quotation in Lawrence W. Levine, Black Culture and Black Conscious­
ness: Afro-American Folk Thought from Slavery to Freedom (New York, 
1977), 418; Edgefield County, Tillman in Butterfield, All God's Chil­
dren, chaps. 3 - 4  ; quotations from rape victim, bishop, in Roger Lane, 
William Dorseys Philadelphia and Ours: On the Past and Future of the 
Black City in America (New York, 1991), 43, 51; geography of lynching 
in W. Fitzhugh Brundage, Lynching in the New South: Georgia and Vir­
ginia, 1880-1930 (Urbana, 1993). 
Of many histories of Mollies, the one most relied on here is Wayne G. 
Broehl Jr., The Mollie Maguires (Cambridge, 1964); labor violence gen­
erally in Philip Taft and Philip Ross, "American Labor Violence: Its 
Cause, Character, and Outcome," in Lane and Turner, Riot, Rout, and 
Tumult, 218 -51  ; Garfield in Charles Rosenberg, The Trial of the Assas­
sin Guiteau: Psychiatry and Law in the Gilded Age (Chicago, 1968); 
Haymarket in Paul Avrich, The Haymarket Tragedy (Princeton, 1984), 
district attorney quoted on p. 139; Homestead in Paul Krause, The 
Battle for Homestead, 1880-1892: Politics, Culture, and Steel, (Pitts­
burgh, 1992). 
Minnesota massacre, Native Americans, in Robert M. Utley, The In­
dian Frontier of the American West, 1846-1890 (Albuquerque, 1984), 
Sheridan quote on p. 165; western gunfighters in Frank Richard Pras­
sell, The Western Peace Officer: A Legacy of Law and Order (Norman, 
1972); Cole Younger quote in Nash, Bloodletters and Badmen, 334; 
Bodie, California, in Roger D. McGrath, "Violence and Lawlessness on 
the Western Frontier," in Gurr, Violence in America, 122-46, quota­
tion on p. 124; Rock Springs in W. Eugene Hollon, Frontier Violence: 
Another Look (New York, 1974), quotation on p. 100; vigilante statis­
tics in Brown, "American Vigilante Tradition." 
Western Federation of Miners and IWW in Melvin Dubosky, We 
Shall Be All: A History of the Industrial Workers of the World (Urbana, 
1988). 
Urban violence, suicide-homicide ratio, Philadelphia stories in Lane, 
Violent Death, Roots of Violence, "Social Meaning of Homicide Trends"; 
professional law enforcement in Susan C. Towne, "The Historical Ori­
gins of Bench Trial for Serious Crime," American Journal of Legal 
History 26, no. 2 (1982): 123-59; Mudgett in Harold Schecter, De­
praved: The Shocking History of America s First Serial Killer (New York, 
362 Select Bibliography 
1994); Oakland in Lawrence Friedman and Robert V. Percival, The 
Roots of Justice: Crime and Punishment in Alameda County, California, 
1970-1910 (Chapel Hill, 1981). 
National executions in Bowers, Legal Homicide, and graph in Gurr, 
"Historical Trends," 36; Judge Gordon quotation in Lane, William 
Dorsey s Philadelphia and Ours, 131. 
Forensic medicine and detective work in Jurgen Thorwald, The Cen­
tury of the Detective (New York, 1964), and Julie Johnson-McGrath, 
"Speaking for the Dead: Forensic Pathologists and Criminal Justice 
in the United States," Science, Technology, and Human Values 20, 
no. 4 (Autumn 1995): 438-59; Philadelphia detectives in Howard O. 
Sprogle, The Philadelphia Police, Past and Present (Philadelphia, 1887), 
quotation on p. 298. 
Of innumerable Borden books, most persuasive still is Edward 
Radin, Lizzie Borden: The Untold Story (New York, 1961). 
Chapter 6 
World War I hysteria in H. C. Petersen and Gilbert C. Fite, Opponents 
of War, 1917-1918(M2idison, 1957), 203-7 ; Race riots in Elliot Rud-
wick, Race Riot at East St. Louis, July 2, 1917 (Carbondale, 111., 1964). 
Capone in John Kobler, Capone: The Life and World of Al Capone 
(Greenwich, Conn., 1971), Moran quote on p. 235. Possible KKK in­
volvement in Hall-Mills in William M. Kunstler, The Minister and the 
Choir Singer: The Hall-Mills Murder Case (New York, 1964); Ruth 
Snyder quote in Nash, Bloodletters and Badmen, 281; Leopold-Loeb in 
Arthur Weinberg, ed., Attorney for the Damned: Clarence Darrow in the 
Courtroom (Chicago, 1989), 16-89, quotations on pp. 18, 35, 88; 
Frances Russell, Tragedy in Dedham, 2d ed. (New York, 1971), is the 
most readable as well as evenhanded account of the Sacco-Vanzetti case, 
but see the indignant response of Herbert B. Ehrmann, The Case That 
Will Not Die: Commonwealth v. Sacco and Vanzetti (New York, 1969). 
Homicide statistics 1900-1920s in H. C. Brearly, Homicide in the 
United States (Chapel Hill, 1932), and for an expert modern assessment 
see Douglas Lee Eckberg, "Estimates of Early Twentieth-Century U.S. 
Homicide Rates: An Econometric Forecasting Approach," Demography 
32, no. 1 (February 1995): 1-16. Philadelphia published and unpub­
Select Bibliography 363 
lished materials from Lane, "Social Meaning of Homicide"; 1895 rob­
bery in Lane, Roots of Violence, 104. 
FBI story in Don Whitehead s laudatory The FBI Story: A Report to 
the People (New York, 1956), but see Sanford J. Ungar's more critical 
FBI (Boston, 1975). 
Chapter 7 
Heirens in Lucy Freeman, Before I Kill Again (New York, 1955). 
Account of the Rosenbergs is taken mostly from Ronald Radosh and 
Joyce Milton, The Rosenberg File: A Search for the Truth (New York, 
1983), but see Walter and Miriam Schneir, Invitation to an Inquest 
(Baltimore, 1983). 
Philadelphia in Marvin E. Wolfgang, Patterns in Criminal Homicide 
(Philadelphia, 1958). 
Mississippi in Charles M. Payne, I've Got the Light of Freedom: The 
Organizing Tradition and the Mississippi Freedom Struggle (Berkeley, 
1995), and Maryanne Vollers, Ghosts of Mississippi: The Murder of Med-
gar Evers, the Trials of Byron de la Beckwith, and the Haunting of the 
New South (Boston, 1995). 
International patterns in Gurr, "Historical Trends in Homicide." 
Chapter 8 
On Kennedy assassination, minute-by-minute account in William R. 
Manchester, The Death of a President, November 20-November 23, 
1963 (New York, 1967); among saner near-contemporary critiques of 
Warren Commission, see Brian Jay Epstein, Inquest: The Warren Com­
mission and the Establishment of Truth (New York, 1966), and Josiah 
Thompson, Six Seconds in Dallas: A Micro-Study of the Kennedy Assas­
sination (New York, 1967). 
Chaney, Goodman, and Schwerner in William Bradford Huie, Three 
Lives for Mississippi (New York, 1965). 
Riots in The Kerner Report: The 1968 Report of the National Advisory 
Commission on Civil Disorders (Washington, D.C., 1968). 
King and Robert Kennedy assassinations in Janet M. Knight, ed., 
Three Assassinations: The Deaths of John and Robert Kennedy and Martin 
364 Select Bibliography 
Luther King (New York, 1971). Black radicals in August Meier and 
Elliot Rudwick, eds., Black Protest in the Sixties (Chicago, 1970); white 
radicals in Kirkpatrick Sale, SDS (New York, 1973), Allen Matusow, 
The Unraveling of America: A History of Liberalism in the 1960s (New 
York, 1984), and Edward P. Morgan, The Sixties Experience: Hard Les­
sons About Modern America (Philadelphia, 1991). 
Manson in Vincent Bugliosi (with Curt Gentry), Helter Skelter: The 
True Story of the Manson Murders (New York, 1974). 
Weatherman quotation in Sale, SDS, 628; Boudin and Wilkerson in 
John Castellucci, The Big Dance: The Untold Story of Weatherman Kathy 
Boudin and the Terrorist Family that Committed the Brinks Robbery 
Murders (New York, 1986). 
Two views of AIM in Russell Means (with Marvin J. Wolf), Where 
White Men Fear to Tread: The Autobiography of Russell Means (New 
York, 1995), and Stanley David Lyman, Wounded Knee: A Personal Ac­
count (Lincoln, Neb., 1991); Means quotation in Ward Churchill and 
Jim Vander Wall, Agents of Repression: The FBI's Secret War Against 
the Black Panther Party and the American Indian Movement (Boston, 
1988), 122. 
Kent State and Jackson State in William A. Gordon, The Fourth 
of May: Killing and Coverup at Kent State (Buffalo, 1990), and Report 
of the Presidents Commission on Campus Unrest (Washington, D.C., 
1970). 
Capital punishment in Bowers, Legal Homicide. 
International and American murder rates in FBI's Uniform Crime 
Reports, Gurr, "Historical Trends in Homicide," and Lane, "Social 
Meaning of Homicide"; Houston conviction rates in Henry P. Lunds­
gaarde, Murder in Space City: A Cultural Analysis of Houston Homicide 
Patterns (New York, 1977), an insightful study of all killings committed 
in 1969; quotation in Brown, No Duty to Retreat, 26; Philadelphia 
1972-74 in Lane, Violent Death, 137-39. 
Chapter 9 
Quotations from Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr., "Combating Violence in 
America," speech delivered to Wilmington, Delaware, Rotary Club, 
December 16, 1993, printed in Vital Speeches of the Day, March 15, 
1994; Time January 15, 1996. Some problems in tracing big city homi­
Select Bibliography 365 
cides in Eric Monkkonen, "New York City Homicides: A Research 
Note," Social Science History 19, no. 2 (Summer 1995): 201-14 . 
International homicide statistics in World Health Organization, 
World Health Statistics Annual(Geneva, 1995), and earlier editions. 
MOVE in Charles W. Bowser, Let the Bunker Burn: The Final Battle 
with MOVE (Philadelphia, 1989). 
All modern homicide statistics from Uniform Crime Reports; Brearly 
in Homicide in the United States. 
Modern big city homicides and detective work in David Simon's 
highly readable Homicide: A Year on the Killing Streets (New York, 
1991); FBI in John Douglas and Mark Olshanker, Mind Hunter: Inside 
the FBI's Elite Serial Crime Unit (New York, 1995); state imprison­
ments in Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prison Ad­
missions and Releases, 1982 (Washington, D.C., 1985); recent history 
of issues in capital punishment in all articles of Journal of Social Issues 
50, no. 2 (Summer 1994), devoted entirely to "The Death Penalty in 
the United States." 
Early history of gun control in Kennett and Anderson, The Gun in 
America. 
State-by-state distribution of homicides in Statistical Abstract of the 
United States, 1995; Elijah Anderson, "The Code of the Streets," Atlan­
tic Monthly'273, no. 5 (May 1994): 80-94 , quotation on p. 82. 

Index 
Abdel Rahman, Omar, 318 
Abilene, Kans., 171 
abjuring the realm, 13 
abolitionism, 87, 110, 137 
abortion, 119-21,340 
accessories to crime, 26, 336 
accidents, 185, 240, 347 
Adams, John, 71, 336 
Adams, Katherine, 203 
Adams County, Miss., 143-44 
adoption, 234-3 5 
adultery, 49, 56, 150 
adults, juveniles tried as, 336 
adversary system of justice, 335 
African Americans (blacks): adoption 
among, 234; in antebellum homi­
cide cases, 116-19; as armed, 
117; black belt, 154; black codes, 
147; Black Liberation Army, 286; 
Black Muslims, 278, 285; Black 
Panthers, 274, 275, 279-80 , 284, 
286, 301; "Black Power," 274; 
black-white murders, 136, 197­
98, 230, 256, 322; blamed for ris­
ing murder rate in Sixties, 296; 
Brearly on causes of violence 
among, 236; chain gangs, 149 — 
51; citizenship rights revoked, 
116; Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
271; Civil Rights Movement, 
260-65, 272, 279; after Civil 
War, 183; in Civil War, 141; class 
split in, 327; code of the streets, 
352; in contemporary murders, 
320-21 ; conviction rate compared 
to whites, 198-99, 257; death 
penalty compared to whites, 199, 
292; death penalty support by, 
340; educational attainments, 
187; Farrakhan, 285; in gangs, 
117, 302; gun death vulnerability, 
230-31 ; Harlem Renaissance, 
218; homicide as leading cause of 
death of young males, 321; "hunt­
ing the nigs," 118, 183; Irish hos­
tility toward, 105-6; Jackson 
State riot, 285; justice system dis­
trusted by, 150, 230; King, 261, 
273, 274, 277, 278; leaving the 
South for northern cities, 217, 
218, 264-66 , 273; lynchings in 
the South, 151-56, 240; Mal­
colm X, 278; marriage rate falling 
among, 327; miscegenation, 110; 
MOVE incident, 315-16; mur­
der identified with, 230; murder 
rate after World War II, 257, 265 ­
66; murder rate in 1960s and 
1970s, 302; murder rate increas­
ing in early twentieth century, 
242; neighborhoods made red-
light districts, 230; in New York 
City Draft Riots, 141-42; norms 
of conduct differing in, 266; in 
Philadelphia, 116, 198; police dis­
trusted by, 273; in police forces, 
330; as professionals, 187; radical 
groups of the Sixties, 279-80 ; 
rape of white women, 152, 198; 
restrictions on freed people, 6 4  ­
65; returning World War II veter­
ans, 250; Scottsboro Boys, 241, 
367 
368 
African Americans (blacks) {continued) 
243, 289; segregation, 155, 272;

on Simpson jury, 333-344; in 
South after Civil War, 147-56; 
southern code of honor in, 3 5 1  ­
52; special legal status in colonial 
America, 52; Stagolee, 149; as 
strikebreakers, 161; the underclass, 
327; as unrecorded in murder sta­
tistics, 310; vagrancy laws directed 
at, 147; violence against before 
Civil War, 110, 116, 137; violence

increasing among after Civil War, 
187-88; voting restricted in the 
South, 154-55; white-black mur­
ders, 148, 197-98, 230, 256,

322; white police and black 
civilians, 273; women murderers 
compared to whites, 233-34,

257; in World War I, 217. See also

race riots; racial tension; slaves 
age of reason, 24

aggravating circumstances, 338

Akron, Ohio, 255

Alabama: cotton, 88; death penalty 
reform, 101; Montgomery bus 
boycott, 261; Powell v. Alabama, 
243, 289, 292; vigilantism, 132

Alaska, 320

Alcatraz Island takeover, 287

alcohol consumption: going to the 
bar after work declining, 328; 
lager beer, 108; late nineteenth-
century decrease, 184; in post-
World War II murders, 259; Pro­
gressive Era liquor laws, 213; 
temperance movement, 97, 101,

182, 184. See also Prohibition

Alexander II, Czar, 162

Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building, 
317

Allen, George, 205

American Indian Movement (AIM), 
286-89

Index 
American Indians. See Native 
Americans 
American Legion, 216

American Prison Congress, 210

American Revolution, 67-74; Bos­
ton Massacre, 7 0 - 7 1  , 104, 336;

Boston Tea Party, 70; causes of, 
68, 70; colonials demanding their

rights as Englishmen, 70 -71  , 72; 
conduct of, 71—72; Declaration 
of Independence, 67, 72, 74; mob

action and riots preceding, 6 8  ­
70; a new nation resulting from, 
72, 77; unequal effects of, 67

anarchist movement, 162-64, 224,

228,284,317 
Ancient Order of Hibernians, 158,

160

Anderson, Elijah, 351

Anderson, Jacob, 118

Apache, 166, 168, 169, 176

appeals: after Civil War, 195-96; 
limiting right of, 339-40; Powell 
decision affecting, 292

Arapahoe, 166

Archer, Samuel, 199

Arizona: Cochise County massacre, 
177; death penalty abolished, 197; 
death penalty reinstated, 223; 
Miranda v. Arizona, 290, 291,

294; O.K. Corral, 177; Tucson 
massacre, 169; violence in, 350

Arkansas: Holt v. Sarver, 290, 294;

prison conditions, 290, 291; Tal­

ley v. Stephens, 290, 294; white-

black murders after Civil War, 
148

armed robbery, 189, 231, 322

armor-piercing bullets, 346

Armstrong, William, 120

Arnold, Benedict, 71

arraignment, 57, 114

arsenic, 202

assassinations, political: Garfield, 
369 Index 
162; John Kennedy, 269-71 ; 
Robert Kennedy, 278; King, 277; 
Lincoln, 144-45; McKinley, 165; 
Reagan attempt, 346

assault rifles, 346

Atchison, David, 137

Atkins, Susan, 282, 283

atomic bomb secrets, 252

Attica Prison riot, 285-8 6

Attucks, Crispus, 70

Atzerodt, George, 145

automobile accidents, 240

Baca, Elfego, 176

bachelor subculture, 122, 127, 183,

351

Bacon, Nathaniel, 43

Bacon's Rebellion, 43

Bad Heart Bull, Wesley, 288

bail, 78

Bailey, R Lee, 290, 294

ballistics, forensic, 202, 210, 225,

227

Baltimore: mob violence in ante­
bellum period, 103, 111; murder

rate after World War II, 255; Rail­

road Strike of 1877, 156

banditry, 173-77

bank robbery, 244-46, 286

Barber, Allen, 118

Barker, Fred, 246

Barker, Ma, 246

Barnett, Harry, 203

Barnett, Ida Wells, 153, 155

Barrow, Clyde, 245-46

bastard child, concealing death of, 
29,44,49-50,5 6

Beausoleil, Bobby, 281-82, 283

Beccaria, Cesare, 79

beer, lager, 108

benefit of clergy: abolition in early 
republic, 79, 80; in antebellum

South, 136; in colonial America, 
57-58; denied for killing law 
officer, 338; in early modern En­
gland, 27, 31; in medieval En­

gland, 11, 25; for slaves, 58, 63;

for women, 58

Bennett, James Gordon, 94

Bentham, Jeremy, 79

Berardelli, Alessandro, 224

Berkman, Alexander, 165

Bertillon system, 200

Bevan, Catherine, 55

Bickford, Maria A., 94-9 6

Bill of Rights, 78, 195, 243, 289­

92, 335

Billy the Kid, 175-76, 177

Bishop, John Prentiss, 129

black belt, 154

black codes, 147

Blackfoot, 166

Black Hawk War, 130

Black Liberation Army, 286

Black Muslims, 278, 285

Black Nationalists of New Libya, 
279

Black Panthers, 274, 275, 279-80,

284, 286, 301

"Black Power," 274

blacks. See African Americans 
Bodie, Calif., 171-72,347 
Bonfield, John, 163

Bonner, Sarah, 122

Bonney, William "Billy the Kid," 
175-76, 177

Booth, John Wilkes, 144-45

Borah, William, 180

Borden, Abby and Andrew, 2 - 3  , 
205-9

Borden, Emma, 205, 206

Borden, Lizzie, 2 - 3  , 6, 205-9 , 291,

339

Boston: abolitionist mob action in, 
137; Bickford murder, 94-96; 
Boston Massacre, 70-71  , 104,

336; Boston Strangler, 294; Bos­
ton Tea Party, 70; detective bureau 
370 Index 
Boston {continued) Burns, Anthony, 137 
established, 112; diversity of, 58; Burr, Aaron, 85 
domestic violence in 1840s, 126; Burton, Mary, 65 
first regular police patrol, 107; 
mob violence in antebellum pe- Cain and Abel, 1 
riod, 103, 106; murder rate after California: Bodie, 171-72, 347; 
World War II, 255; Times, 93 Griffin v. California, 290, 291; as 
Boston, Goodwife, 48 hippie destination, 282; People v. 
Boston Massacre, 70 -71  , 104, 336 Anderson, 293, 295; San Diego, 
Boston Strangler, 294 mass murder, 319; vigilantism 
Boston Tea Party, 70 during gold rush, 133. See also Los 
Botkin, Cordelia, 202, 203 Angeles; Oakland; San Francisco 
Boudin, Kathy, 284, 286, 313 Calvinism, 101 
Bowen, Dr., 205 Camden,NJ., 331 
boxing, 127-28, 183 Capie, John, 129 
Bradshaw, Sir William, 18 capital crimes: in antebellum South, 
Brady Bill of 1993, 346 136; in colonial America, 55 — 56; 
Bratton, William J., 332 increase in early modern England, 
Brearly, H. C  : analysis of U.S. 55-56 ; in post-World War II 
homicide, 235-39, 323; on black America, 253; rape as, 56, 223, 
death rate from homicide, 230, 253, 338; robbery as, 56, 80, 223, 
231; on the family, 237, 325; 253; treason, 24, 28, 55, 79, 253, 
Homicide in the United States, 229; 254 
on infanticide, 234; on justifiable capital punishment. See death 
homicide, 347; on killings of po- penalty 
lice officers, 232; on the media, Capone, Alphonse, 220, 231, 236, 
235, 325; on poverty and murder, 242 
342 Carnegie Steel Mill, 164-65 
Bridgeman, Laura, 101 Carr, Thomas, 118 
Britton, James, 49 Carter, Bunchy, 280 
Brown, D. Paul, 116, 120 Case of the Minister and the Choir 
Brown, John, 137-39, 173, 253, Singer, 221 
254 Casey, James, 135 
Brown, Richard Maxwell, 132-33, Cassidy, Butch, 177 
177 castration, legal, 88 
Brown, William Hill, 82 Catholicism. See Roman Catholicism 
Bryant, Carolyn, 262 Caverly,JohnR., 223, 224 
Bryant, Roy, 262 Centers for Disease Control study of 
Buchalter, Louis "Lepke," 246 firearms deaths, 332 
Buffalo, N.Y., 255 Centralia, Wash., 216 
buggery, 49 Ceylay, Philip, 288 
Bundy, Ted, 319 chain gangs, 149-51 
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), 286- Chaney, James, 272, 273 
87, 288 Chapin, Bradley, 54 
burglary, 347 Chapman, Winifred, 281 
Index 371 
Charleston, S.C., race riots, 148, 217 103-7; murder rates after World 
Chauncey, Henry, 120 War II, 255; police forces appear-
Cherokee, 75-77 , 130, 169 ing in, 97, 102-7; urban and rural 
Chesimard, Joanne, 286 murder rates compared, 307, 309, 
Chestnut, Mary, 144 321; volunteer fire companies, 
Cheyenne, 166, 167 104, 106, 127, 142, 159, 182. See 
Chicago: black men as murder vic- also Boston; Chicago; industrial 
tims in, 230; black migration to, revolution; London; Los Angeles; 
261; Capone gang, 220; Dillinger New York City; Philadelphia; po-
killing, 245; gangland killings in lice forces; and other cities by name 
1920s, 219, 231; Hampton and Civil Rights Act of 1964, 271 
Clark killing, 280; Haymarket Civil Rights Movement, 260-65 , 
bombing, 162-64, 317; Heirans 272, 279 
case, 250—51; Holmes case, 192, Civil War, 140-44; blacks during, 
193; killings by police in 1920s, 143-44; black troops in, 141; 
331; Leopold and Loeb case, 222 - causes of, 143; conduct of, 140­
24; McCormick strike, 162; mur- 41; end of, 144; Fort Pillow Mas-
der rate after World War II, 255; sacre, 141, 148; high kill rate of, 
police in uniform, 182; police offi- 140; murder rates during, 143; 
cers killed in 1920s, 232; race riot New York City Draft Riots, 141 ­
of 1919, 217-18 ; Railroad Strike 43; Quantrill, 140-41 , 173 
of 1877, 156; St. Valentine's Day Clark, Mark, 280 
Massacre, 220, 242; Speck case, class: in antebellum Philadelphia 
295; spousal murders in 1920s, murders, 125; in dealing with pos­
232; Tribune, 222 sible homicides, 203; in New York 
child, concealing death of bastard, City Draft Riots, 141; underclass, 
29,44,49-50,5  6 327. See also middle class; poverty; 
Chiles, Lawton, 334 rich, the; working class 
Chinese: in mining country, 171, clearance rate, 322, 330, 332 
172; in Philadelphia, 189-90; Clearwater, Frank, 289 
tongs, 172, 189-90 Cleveland: Black Nationalists of New 
Chinese Exclusion Laws, 172 Libya, 279; Shepard case, 290, 
Chisum, John, 176 314 
Chivington, J. M., 167, 169, 314 Coal and Iron Police, 158 
Choate, Rufus, 95-9  6 cocaine, 324 
Cincinnati, 255 Cochise County, Ariz., 177 
circumstantial evidence, 201 "Code of the Streets, The" (Ander­
cities: African Americans moving to son), 351 
northern, 217, 218, 264-66 , 273; codes of honor: in antebellum vio­
in antebellum period, 93, 102- lence, 127; and code of the streets, 
11; between Civil War and World 352; in culture of American vio-
War I, 146, 183, 184; factories lence, 351-52; and dueling, 86; 
moving into, 108; gangs in, 104; lynching as affront to honor, 155; 
job and population losses in, 300; in mining country, 171; and mur-
mob riots in antebellum period, der, 186; in South, 143, 150, 154 
372 
Cohen, Daniel, 83 
Coker v. Georgia, 338 
Cold War, 252, 260 
Coleman, Eva, 234 
Coleman, Sarah, 122, 129 
Collinswood, Mo., 216 
Colorado: Labor War of 1903-4, 
179; Sand Creek Massacre, 167, 
314; violence in, 350 
Colt, Samuel, 109 
Columbus, Ohio, 255 
Comanche, 166 
common law, 10 
communism: Cold War, 252, 260; 
FBI on influence of, 280, 288; 
post-World War II fear of, 267; 
and Rosenberg case, 252; in Rus­
sian Revolution, 216 
community policing, 332 
concealed weapons, 109, 301, 344­
45, 347 
Condon, John R, 243 
conflict resolution, in medieval En­
gland, 18-19 
Connecticut: New Haven, 38, 280; 
Simsbury prison, 80 
Constitution: Bill of Rights, 78, 195, 
243, 289-92, 335; Eighteenth 
Amendment, 215, 218, 242; Fifth 
Amendment, 251, 289-90; Four­
teenth Amendment, 243, 293; 
Fourth Amendment, 289; Second 
Amendment, 346; Seventh 
Amendment, 289, 290; slavery 
compromise, 87 
consumerism, 329 
consumption versus production, 327 
conviction rates: in antebellum pe­
riod, 115, 121-22; of blacks 
compared to whites, 198-99, 
257; for black-white murders in 
antebellum South, 136; in colo­
nial America, 45, 59-60; in con­
temporary America, 335; in early 
modern England, 31; in early 
Index 
twentieth century, 195; for gang­
land murders, 231; and jury bias, 
336-37; in medieval England, 25; 
after World War II, 256-57 
convict lease system, 149-51 
copycat effect, 235 
Cora, Charles, 135 
Corey, Giles, 51, 55 
Cornish, Harry, 203 
Cornish's wife, case of, 48, 49 
coroners: in antebellum America, 
112, 114; after Civil War, 194, 
204, 211; in colonial America, 54; 
medical examiners replacing, 201, 
210, 335; in medieval England, 
12,20 
cotton, 88, 92, 154,261 
counterculture, 268, 274 
counties: in colonial America, 5 3  ­
54; English, 12 
court. &"f trials 
Courts, Gus, 262 
cowboys, 170-71 
Cramer, George, 212 
crime, organized, 219, 250, 271 
crime bills, 339 
"crime in the streets," 272, 294, 296 
crime literature: in antebellum pe­
riod, 93-96; detective stories, 93, 
202; execution sermons, 50, 82, 
93; gallows literature, 82; murder 
novels in early republic, 82-8  3 
crime news, 221 
crimes, capital. See capital crimes 
criminal behavior, explanations of, 3, 
79, 100, 190-91,295,333 
criminal homicide. See murder 
criminal justice system: as adversar­
ial, 335; on antebellum frontier, 
131-32; black distrust of, 150, 
230; in colonial America, 34, 5 2  ­
60, 66; contemporary functioning 
of, 330-32; criticisms of contem­
porary, 333-42; as lax and ineffi­
cient between the world wars, 
373 Index 
238-39; medical examiners, 201, 
210, 336; in medieval England, 
10-12, 22; in mining country, 
179; in New England colonies, 
46; and Roman Catholic Church 
in medieval England, 11; slavery's 
influence on southern, 350-51  ; 
in Virginia Colony, 39, 41 - 4 2  . 
See also coroners; criminal proce­
dure; magistrates; public prosecu­
tors; sheriffs; vigilantes 
criminal procedure: in antebellum 
period, 95, 112—16; arraignment, 
57, 114; circumstantial evidence, 
201; after Civil War, 193-97; in 
contemporary America, 335-42 ; 
defendants' rights, 289—92; em­
phasis on contest in U.S., 238; 
laws of evidence, 79; for medieval 
English murders, 12—14; miscar­
riages of justice, 83, 144-45, 341; 
pardons, 196, 197, 239; reform in 
early republic, 78—80. See also^ ap­
peals; grand juries; indictment; in­
quest juries; legal counsel; plea 
bargaining; sentences; trials 
criminal types, 190, 200, 236, 295 
criminology, 3, 237 
Crosby, Sarah, 118 
Cross, Aaron, 118 
Crow Dog, 169 
cruel and unusual punishment: brutal 
prisons as, 290; in colonial America, 
55; death penalty as, 339; gassing as, 
293; hanging as, 98; in reforms of 
early republic, 79, 80, 88 
cultural factors in American violence, 
348-52 
cultural norms of conduct, 265 
Custer, George Armstrong, 168 
Czolgosz, Leon, 165 
Dahmer, Jeffrey, 319, 325, 336 
Daily News (New York) ,221 
Dallas, 255, 269-7 0 
Daltons, the, 173 
Daly, John, 113 
Dandy, John, 44-4  5 
Darrow, Clarence, 180, 181, 222, 
223, 224 
Davis, Jefferson, 123, 141, 145 
death certificate registration, 209, 
229, 239 
death penalty (capital punishment): 
abolition movement, 96—97, 9 9  ­
102, 197; in antebellum period, 
129; arbitrariness in, 341; of 
blacks compared to whites, 199, 
292; in colonial America, 55-56 ; 
in contemporary America, 338 — 
41; as cruel and unusual punish­
ment, 338; decline in late nine­
teenth century, 197; as deterrent, 
99, 100-101,238,239,340; 
as discretionary, 197; in early 
modern England, 28; execution 
sermons, 50, 82, 93; gallows lit­
erature, 82; innocent people 
executed, 341; as intentional 
homicide, 1; and Leopold and 
Loeb case, 222-24; lethal injec­
tion, 338; limiting in early repub­
lic, 79-80 ; in medieval England, 
23-25 ; in New England colonies, 
48, 49, 50-51  ; popular support 
for, 102, 340; reform of, 102; 
resumption of executions, 341; 
revenge as motive for, 340; Rosen­
berg execution, 254; in Salem 
witchcraft trials, 51; for slaves in 
colonial Virginia, 63; suspension 
of, 292-95 ; as theater, 50; time 
between trial and execution, 196­
97, 339-40; in Virginia Colony, 
40; in Virginia during early repub­
lic, 89; after World War II, 258. 
See also capital crimes; electric 
chair; hanging 
Declaration of Independence, 67, 
72,74 
374 
defendants' rights, 289-92

Degnan, Suzanne, 251

degrees of guilt: in antebellum pe­
riod, 114; in early modern En­
gland, 27; in early republic, 80. 
See alsofirst degree murder; man­
slaughter; second degree murder 
Delta, Mississippi, 262

Dempsey, Eddie, 117

Depression, Great, 244-46, 248

Deringer, Henry, 109

De Salvo, Albert, 294

detectives, 112,204,211 
detective stories, 93, 202

detective work: Bertillon system, 
200; fingerprinting, 200, 212; fo­

rensic ballistics, 202, 210, 225,

227; forensic medicine, 201-2,

210 - 1 1  , 331; lie detector, 246,

251; origins of scientific, 200­

202; in Progressive Era, 209-13; 
psychological profiling, 331; as 
public responsibility, 203; rogues' 
gallery of photographs, 200, 210;

sodium pentathol, 251

deterrence: death penalty as deter­
rent, 99, 100-101,238,239, 
340; threat of prison as deterrent, 
337-38

Detroit: Purple Gang, 220; race riots 
of 1967, 275

Diamond, Jack "Legs," 220

Dickens, Charles, 100

dignity, 85-86, 186

Dillinger, John, 245

diminished capacity doctrine, 334

discipline as object of schooling, 98,

182, 184-85

district attorneys, in antebellum pe­
riod, 114

divorce, 237, 325-26

Dix, Dorothea, 101

Dodge City, Kans., 171

Dodson, Sam, 198

domestic violence: in antebellum 
Index 
period, 126; in contemporary 
America, 326-27; in medieval 
England, 17. See also family 
members 
double jeopardy, 78

Dowell, Ann, 121

Doyle, Arthur Conan, 202

Draft Riots in New York City, 
141-43

drug kingpins, 339

drug trade, 324-25, 352

DuBois.W. E. B., 217

dueling: formal, 84-87, 123, 143,

150, 155; judicial, 13

due process, 243

Duffy, Mickey, 231

Dugdale, Robert, 190-91, 236

Dunning, Elizabeth, 202, 203

Dyer, Mary, 49

Earp, Virgil, 177

Earp,Wyatt, 177,240 
East, the: armed robbery in late nine­
teenth century, 189; between Civil 
War and World War I, 146; eco­

nomic change in antebellum pe­
riod, 97; on gun control, 345; 
murder rate as relatively low, 235,

321; nonviolent ideals in, 124. See 
also New England; New Jersey; 
New York State; Pennsylvania 
East St. Louis, 111., race riot, 217

Edgefield County, S.C., 151

education. See public school system 
Edward I of England, 18

Edward II of England, 18

Eighteenth Amendment, 215, 218,

242

Eisenhower, Dwight, 254

electric chair: national conversion to, 
199-200; in New York, 199; in 
Pennsylvania, 199; Snyder as first 
woman to die in, 222

Eliot, Samuel, 106

Elkin, John, 38

144 
Index 375 
Emancipation Proclamation, 141, Engle, George, 164 
Enlightenment, 72, 79, 82, 87, 88, 
Emerson, Ralph Waldo, 139 99, 122 
Emos, Carson, 129 Epps, Face, 198 
England, 9-3 2 ethnic groups: in antebellum urban 
—early modern, 26-32 ; capital violence, 104-7; as cause of high 
crimes multiplied in, 55-56 ; con- U.S. murder rate, 236; changing 
trol over American colonies, 52— nature after Civil War, 183; His­
53; conviction rates, 31; death panics, 321, 329; increasing diver-
penalty in, 28, 31; degrees of guilt sity after Civil War, 161; Jews, 
for murder, 27; families and mur- 183,219,236,242,254,348; 
der in, 29; firearms in, 31, 41; in- Mexicans, 171, 176; sporting 
fanticide in, 29; magistrates, 53; competition after Civil War, 183. 
murder rate in, 28-30 ; Protestant Seetf/w African Americans; Chi-
Reformation, 27, 28; as unsettled, nese; Germans; Irish; Italians; 
27-28; witchcraft trials, 30, 31 Scots-Irish; whites 
—medieval, 9—26; abjuring the Etter, Irene, 234 
realm, 13; causes of murder in, Everett, Wesley, 216 
15-21; conflict resolution in, 1 8 - Evers, Charles, 261, 262, 263 
19; conservative outlook of, 15; Evers, Medgar, 261, 262, 263, 272 
conviction rates, 25; counties, 12; execution. See death penalty 
criminal justice as state business execution sermons, 50, 82, 93 
in, 10-12, 22; on death penalty, expert testimony, 201, 207, 228, 
23-25; domestic violence in, 333 
17; economic conditions in, 20; 
family and murder in, 16-17; in- Fairbanks, Jason, 83-8 4 
fanticide in, 22-23  ; judicial duels, Fales, Elizabeth, 83-8 4 
13; king's approver, 13; Magna Fall, Albert B., 176 
Carta, 11, 71; on manslaughter, Fall River, Mass., Borden murder 
25-26; on mitigating circum- case, 2 - 3  , 6, 205-9 , 291,339 
stances, 24; murder case proce- family instability, 237, 325-2 6 
dure, 12-14; murder rate, 14 - family members: abetting in medi-
15,311-12; neighbors and murder eval England, 26; in antebellum 
in, 19; privacy as rare in, 20; pub- urban murders, 126; battered 
lic and private blurred in, 19-20; woman syndrome in husband kill-
records in, 10; robbery murder in, ings, 334; in early modern English 
16, 20-21  ; social attitudes toward murders, 29; in medieval English 
murder, 21-26 ; trials in, 21-22 ; murders, 16-17; in post-World 
as violent society, 17-18 ; weapons War II murders, 256, 257, 259; 
at hand in, 18 spousal murders in contemporary 
—modern: murder rate, 14, 229 America, 321-22 , 326-27 ; spou-
—nineteenth century: death certifi- sal murders in 1920s, 232-3 4 
cate registration, 209; scientific Farrakhan, Louis, 285 
detective work, 200 fathers, absent, 326 
—See also London Faurot, Joseph A., 212 
376 
Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI): and AIM, 288-89; Black 
Panthers targeted by, 279-80; and 
Dillinger, 245; establishment of, 
209; expanded role for, 243-47 ; 
growing power of, 215; local po­
lice assisted by, 331; in Philadel­
phia, Miss., murders, 272; in Red 
Scare of 1919, 216; in Rosenberg 
case, 252; and Sacco and Vanzetti 
case, 224; Uniform Crime Reports 
for the United States, 242, 266, 
305, 320, 325, 332, 347; after 
World War II, 250, 266 
federal government: Bureau of In­
dian Affairs, 286-87, 288; cen­
tralization during World War II, 
249; in civil rights murders, 272; 
clashes with armed militants, 316; 
crime bills, 339; defendants' rights 
clarified by, 289-92; expanding 
law enforcement role, 242-43 ; 
federal offenses increasing, 339; 
law enforcement role before 
World War I, 209; local police as­
sisted by, 331-32; Palmer, 216; 
postal inspectors, 209; Secret Ser­
vice, 209; treaties with Native 
Americans, 75, 168; Warren 
Court, 289—92. See also Con­
stitution; Federal Bureau of 
Investigation 
females (women): abortions, 119— 
21, 340; in antebellum period, 
119-22; battered woman syn­
drome, 334; benefit of clergy plea, 
58; black rape of white, 152, 198; 
differential treatment of, 26, 56, 
256; killing their husbands in 
medieval England, 24; mass mur­
derers as never, 318; murders by 
blacks and whites compared, 2 3 3  ­
34, 257; poisonings by, 202; un­
wed mothers, 29, 49-50 , 3 2 5 ­
26; witchcraft accusations, 30, 31; 
Index 
women's movement, 326; after 
World War II, 256. See also infan­
ticide; rape 
feuds, 149 
Fifth Amendment, 251, 289-9 0 
Finch, Abraham, 38 
fingerprinting, 200, 212 
firearms (guns): accidents with, 347; 
in antebellum period, 109, 111, 
117, 130; in armed robberies, 
231-32 ; armor-piercing bullets, 
346; assault rifles, 346; California 
law on display of, 279; Centers 
for Disease Control study of 
death from, 332; in colonial 
America, 41-42 , 59, 344; con­
cealed weapons, 109, 301, 344­
45, 347; in contemporary 
America, 320; as discouraging 
crime, 346—47; in duels, 86; in 
early modern England, 31, 41; in 
early twentieth-century murders, 
189; as explanation for high U.S. 
murder rates, 237-38 , 343-48; 
forensic ballistics, 202, 210, 225, 
227; in gambling murders, 232; 
gun control, 344-48 ; gunfights, 
171, 177, 240; handguns, 109, 
344-45 ; National Rifle Associa­
tion, 332, 344, 345, 346; in 
1920s murders, 229-30 ; in post-
World War II murders, 258; revol­
vers, 109, 117, 182; sawed-off 
shotguns, 175; Second Amend­
ment on, 78, 345; slaves not 
taught to use, 65; small arms, 
109 
Firearms Act of 1938, 345 
fire companies, 104, 106, 127, 142, 
159,182 
first degree murder: in antebellum 
period, 114; defined, 80; dueling 
as, 84; poisoning as, 202; vigi­
lante killings as, 132; after World 
War II, 258 
377 Index 
Fischer, Adolph, 164 
Fisher, Sidney George, 109 
Fisk,Jim, 191 
Florida: in colonial era, 61; con­
cealed weapons in, 347; in early 
republic, 75, 88; Miami murder 
rate in post-World War II era, 
255; murder rate in early twenti­
eth century, 22 
Floyd, Pretty Boy, 245, 246 
Folger,Abby, 281 
Forbush, Ella, 198 
Ford, Bob, 175 
forensic ballistics, 202, 210, 225, 
227 
forensic medicine, 210-11  , 331 
Forrest, Nathan Bedford, 141, 148 
Fort Pillow Massacre, 141, 148 
Fountain, Albert Jennings, 176 
Fourteenth Amendment, 243, 293 
Fourth Amendment, 289 
France, 201 
Franklin, Benjamin, 69, 77 
Franks, Bobby, 222-2 4 
French and Indian War, 68, 73 
Freud, Sigmund, 215, 251 
Frey, James, 279 
Frick, Henry Clay, 165 
frontier. See West, the 
Frykowski, Wojichiech, 281 
Fuchs, Klaus, 252, 253 
Fugitive Slave Law of 1850, 137 
Fuller, AlvanT., 227, 228 
Furman v. Georgia, 293, 295, 338 
gallows literature, 82 
gambling murders, 232 
gangland murders, 219, 231, 325 
gangs: in antebellum cities, 104; 
Chinese tongs, 172, 189-90; af­
ter Civil War, 182, 183; in drug 
trade, 324-25 ; elections con­
trolled by, 111; firearms use by, 
109; in New York City Draft 
Riots, 142; in 1960s and 1970s, 
302; during Prohibition, 219-20 ; 
putting down mob violence, 111 
Garfield, James A., 162 
Garnet, Joe, 244 
Garrett, Pat, 175 
Garrison, William Lloyd, 106 
Gary, Elbert, 163 
Georgia: Cherokee laws declared null 
and void, 77; code of honor in, 
86, 149; Cokerv. Georgia, 338; 
Furman v. Georgia, 293, 295, 338; 
Gregg v. Georgia, 338, 339; lynch­
ings in, 152, 154; McCleskey v. 
Georgia, 338; slavery in colonial, 
61; slaves "sold to Georgia," 63, 
66; as violent, 349 
Germanic tribes, 10, 23 
Germans: in antebellum urban mur­
ders, 125; anti-German hysteria in 
World War I, 216; immigration in 
1840s, 108; lager beer, 108; mur­
der rate in early twentieth century, 
242 
Geronimo, 168 
Geyer, Frank, 212 
Gibbs, Phillip, 285 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 289, 291 
Gilbert, Elizabeth, 118 
Gilje, Paul, 106 
Gilmore, Gary, 341 
Givens, James, 10, 16 
Glaser, Alexander, 189 
Goddard, Calvin, 227, 228 
Goerson, Albert, 191 
Gold, Harry, 252, 253 
Gold, Martin, 186 
Gold, Ted, 284 
Goldman, Ronald, 2 - 3  , 333 
Goldwater, Barry, 272, 274 
Goode, Wilson, 315, 316 
Goodman, Andrew, 272, 273 
Gordon, Nebr., 287 
Gordon, Peter, 198 
Gorras Blancas, 176 
Gothic literature, 82 
378 
Gouge, Henry, 44 
government, federal. Sre federal 
government 
Gowen, Frank, 158, 159, 160 
grand juries: abandoned in ordinary 
cases, 335; in antebellum period, 
114, 116; in colonial America, 53, 
54, 55; Constitutional guarantees 
for, 78; in medieval England, 12 
Grant, Ulysses S., 123, 145 
Gravelle, Philippe, 227 
Gray, Judd, 221 
Great Awakening, 87, 99, 101 
Great Britain: burglary rate, 347; di­
vorce rate, 237; family members 
in murder cases, 16; gun owner­
ship, 343. See also England 
Great Depression, 244-46, 248 
Green, James Earl, 285 
Greenglass, David, 252, 253 
Gregg v. Georgia, 338, 339 
Griffin v. California, 290, 291 
Grinnell, Julius, 163 
Guiteau, Charles, 162 
gun control, 345-48 
Gun Control Act of 1968, 345 
gunfights, 171, 177,240 
Gunness, Belle, 203, 319 
guns. See firearms 
Gurr, Ted Robert, 297 
Hackett, William, 49 
Hall, Edward Wheeler, 221 
Hall, Frances, 221 
Hamilton, Alexander, 85 
Hammond, James Henry, 136-37 
Hampton, Fred, 280, 284 
Hanawalt, Barbara, 10, 16, 23 
handguns, 109, 344-45 
hanging: in antebellum period, 118; 
as cruel and unusual punishment, 
98; in early modern England, 31; 
Kentucky reinstitutes, 223; last 
hanging in Pennsylvania, 199; in 
medieval England, 23-25 ; of 
Index 
Mollie Maguires, 160; in New En­
gland colonies, 48, 49, 50; opposi­
tion in antebellum period, 98-99; 
of Sioux warriors, 167; as theater, 
50. See also death penalty 
Hansen, Robert, 320 
Hare, Leslie and Melvin, 287 
Harlem Renaissance, 218 
Harper's Ferry raid, 138—39 
Harrison, William Henry, 77 
Harrison Act of 1914, 209 
Harvard College, 46 
Hauptmann, Bruno, 244 
Hayes, Rutherford B., 156, 165 
Haymarket bombing, 162-64, 317 
Haywood, Big Bill, 179, 180, 216, 
217 
Hedgepath, Marion, 192 
Heintzleman, Samuel, 113, 121 
Heirens, William, 250-51 
Hennard, George, 318-19 
Henry VIII of England, 28 
Herald (New York), 94, 96 
heredity, 236, 237, 295, 333 
Herold, David, 145 
Herrera, Juan Jose, 176 
Hickman, Edward, 235 
Hickok, Wild Bill, 173 
Higginson, Thomas Wentworth, 
137, 138 
Hill, Joe, 181 
Hindus, Michael, 90 
Hinman, Gary, 281-82, 283 
Hip Sing, 190 
Hispanics, 321,329 
Histon, Jane, 118 
Holliday, Doc, 177 
Hollinger, Catherine, 113 
Holmes, Dr. H. H., 191-93, 212, 
319 
Holmes, Oliver Wendell, 210, 228 
Holt, Joseph, 145 
Holt v. Sarver, 290, 294 
homeless people, 211-12 
Homestead Strike, 164-65 
379 Index 
homicide: justifiable homicide, 194, 
255, 273, 331, 347. See also inten­
tional homicide; manslaughter 
Homicide in the United States 
(Brearly), 229 
honor, codes of. See codes of honor 
honor killing, 84-87, 127, 143, 
150, 154, 171 
Hoover, Herbert, 229 
Hoover, J. Edgar, 216, 242, 243, 
246-47, 288 
Hopewell, N.J., 243 
House of Burgesses of Virginia, 40-4  1 
House of Morgan bombing, 217 
Houston, Sam, 123 
Houston, Tex., 217, 301-2 , 334, 
337 
Howard, John, 79 
Howe, Samuel Gridley, 101, 138 
Huberty, James, 318 
Huggins, Jon, 280 
Hugo, Victor, 100 
Hume, James, 270 
Humphrey, Hubert, 284 
Idaho: Coeur d'Alene strike, 178; 
murder rate compared to Wyo­
ming, 236; Steunenberg murder, 
179-80 
ideological murder, 138, 268, 318 
Illinois: Black Hawk War, 130; East 
St. Louis race riot, 217; Lincoln-
Shields duel, 123; Mormon settle­
ment in Nauvoo, 134; Smiths 
lynching, 134; vigilantism in, 131, 
132; Witherspoon v. Illinois, 293, 
294, 295. See also Chicago 
immigration: anti-immigrant party, 
110; as cause of high U.S. murder 
rate, 235-36, 348; Chinese Ex­
clusion Laws, 172; after Civil War, 
183; in 1830s and 1840s, 108; 
immigrants in antebellum urban 
murders, 125; immigrants in the 
West, 171-73; after Napoleonic 
Wars, 104-5; "New Immigra­
tion" after Civil War, 161; in New 
York City Draft Riots, 141. See 
also ethnic groups 
impressment, 68 
imprisonment. See prisons 
incident reports, 212 
indentured servants, 42-43  , 47, 59, 
82, 104 
Indiana: antebellum Marion County, 
131; vigilantism in, 131 
Indians, American. See Native 
Americans 
indictment: in antebellum period, 
114, 115; in colonial America, 54, 
55; Constitutional guarantees for, 
78; fewer dropped after Civil War, 
194-95; in medieval England, 12, 
14, 15-16, 19; multiple indict­
ments, 19 
industrial revolution: discipline as 
element of, 241, 298; improved 
policing due to prosperity of, 211; 
murder rate and development of, 
182, 184, 258, 302; paid work cre­
ating way of life, 343; postindus­
trial era, 298,299, 300, 327 
Industrial Workers of the World 
(IWW; Wobblies), 179-81, 
216-17 
infanticide: in antebellum period, 
113, 115, 119, 121, 126; in colo­
nial America, 56, 60; concealing 
death of bastard child, 29, 44, 
49-50 , 56; contemporary increase 
in, 329; in early modern England, 
29; in early twentieth century, 
190; in medieval England, 22-23  ; 
murder rates confused by, 309­
10; by Native Americans, 75; in 
New England colonies, 49-50 , 
56; in 1920s, 234; after World 
War II, 257 
inquest juries: in antebellum period, 
112-13; after Civil War, 201; 
380 Index 
inquest juries {continued) Jackson State College, 285 
in colonial America, 54; dubious James, Frank, 173, 174-75, 177 
rulings in late nineteenth century, James, Gomer, 159 
204; in medieval England, 12 James, Jesse, 173, 174-75, 191, 
insanity defense: in colonial America, 235 
58; contemporary criticism of, Jaspar, Lewis, 118 
334; diminished capacity doctrine, Jazz Age, 218 
334; in Leopold and Loeb case, Jefferson, Thomas, 72, 74, 75, 77, 
223; in medieval England, 24; 87, 88, 89-9  0 
M'Naghten Rule, 99-100, 193, Jewett, Helen, 94, 96 
223, 334; temporary insanity, Jews, 183, 219, 236, 242, 254, 348 
113, 193,334 Johnson, Andrew, 145 
intentional homicide, 1. See also Johnson, Lyndon: declines to seek 
death penalty; murder; war reelection, 277; election of 1964, 
International Association of Chiefs of 272, 274; and Kennedy assassina-
Police, 210, 246 tion, 270, 271; protests against 
involuntary manslaughter, 114, 258 Vietnam policy of, 274; Vietnam 
Iowa: vigilantism in, 132, 133; vio- escalation, 271; War on Poverty, 
lence in, 350 271,274 
Irish: Ancient Order of Hibernians, Jones, Hannah, 118, 122 
158, 160; in antebellum urban Jones, Julia Ann, 122 
murders, 125; bachelorhood judicial duels, 13 
among, 127; in ethnic violence, Jungjow, 190 
104-6, 184; in gangs, 219, 236; juries. See grand juries; inquest juries; 
immigration in 1840s, 108; later trial juries 
ethnic groups compared with, justices. See magistrates 
183; in mining country, 171; in justice system. See criminal justice 
Mollie Maguires, 158-60; mur- system 
der rate in early twentieth century, justifiable homicide, 194, 255, 273, 
242; in New York City Draft Ri- 331,347 
ots, 141-42; in San Francisco in juvenile delinquency, 237 
1850s, 134-35; and Scots-Irish, juveniles tried as adults, 336 
105; violence decreasing in, 186­
87; violent traditions of, 183, 348 Kaczynski, Theodore, 314-15 , 331 
Iroquois Confederacy, 73, 74 Kansas: Abilene, 171; cattle drives, 
Israel, 343, 348 170; Civil War action in, 140-41; 
Italians: in gangs, 219; Sacco and death penalty abolished, 197; 
Vanzetti case, 224; violence de- Dodge City, 171; Kansas-Nebraska 
creasing in, 188, 236, 242; violent Act, 137; Lawrence, 138, 141, 
traditions of, 348 173; Potawatomi Massacre, 138; 
IWW (Industrial Workers of the as school for banditry, 173; slavery 
World), 179-81,216-1 7 conflict in, 137-38 
Kansas City, Mo., 255 
Jackson, Andrew, 77, 86-87 , 91, Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854, 137 
351 Karpis, Alvin "Creepy," 246 
381 Index 
Kasabian, Linda, 283 
Katzmann, Frederick, 225 
Kaufman, Irving R., 253, 254 
Kehoe, Blackjack, 159, 160 
Kemmler, William, 199 
Kennedy, John E, 269-7 1 
Kennedy, Robert, 277-7 8 
Kent, Lynn, 334 
Kent State University, 285 
Kentucky: codes of honor in, 149; 
hanging reinstituted by, 223; labor 
violence in, 240; Lewis murder 
case, 90; Livermore lynching, 151; 
murder rate after Civil War, 149; 
Stanford v. Kentucky, 338; vigilan­
tism in, 131 
Kernan, Thomas J., 150 
Kerner Commission, 275-7 6 
Kerrigan, Jimmy, 159 
kidnapping, 244, 253 
Killeen, Tex., mass murder, 319 
King, James P., 135 
King, Martin Luther, Jr., 261, 273, 
274, 277, 278 
King, Rodney, 329 
King Philips War, 46-4  7 
king's approver, 13 
Kiowa, 166 
Kipling, Rudyard, 70 
Koresh, David, 316 
Krause, Allison, 285 
Krenwinkle, Patricia, 283 
Krohn, William, 223 
KuKluxKlan, 148, 153,221 
La Bianca, Leno, 281, 283, 284 
La Bianca, Rosemary, 281, 283 
labor unions, 161 
labor violence, 157-65; Colorado 
Labor War of 1903-4, 179; Hay-
market bombing, 162-64, 317; 
Homestead Strike, 164-65; IWW, 
179-81, 216-17 ; MollieMa­
guires, 157-60; in 1920s and 
1930s, 240; Railroad Strike of 
1877, 156-57; western mining 
disputes, 178-81 
Lacassagne, Alexandre, 201-2 
Ladner, Joyce, 262 
Lambert, Henry, 104 
Lamont, Buddy, 289 
Lane, William, 198, 199 
Langdon, Frank, 159, 160 
Lanzetti brothers, 231 
Las Vegas, 250 
Latham, Mary, 49 
"law and order," 284, 294, 295 
law enforcement: federal role in, 209; 
postal inspectors, 209; Secret Ser­
vice, 209; in the West, 173, 174, 
177; Wickersham Commission 
on, 229, 230, 237, 242. See also 
criminal justice system; Federal 
Bureau of Investigation; Pinkerton 
Agency; police forces 
Lawless Decade of 1920s, 214, 219, 
220-21,24 1 
Lawlor, Muff, 159 
Lawrence, Kans., 138, 141, 173 
laws of evidence, reform of, 79 
lawyers: African Americans as, 187; 
Bailey, 290, 294; in colonial 
America, 54; criticisms of defense, 
333, 336; Darrow, 180, 181, 222, 
223, 224. See also legal counsel 
Lee, George, 262 
Lee, Robert E., 139, 144 
Lee, Rosebud, 262 
legal castration, 88 
legal counsel: in colonial America, 
57; Constitutional guarantees for, 
78, 95, 289; in Scottsboro Boys 
case, 243. See also lawyers • 
legal segregation, 155, 272 
legal technicalities, 333, 334 
Leisler, Jacob, 55 
Leopold, Nathan, 222-2 4 
lethal injection, 338 
Levine, Lawrence, 149 
Lewis, Lilburne and Isham, 90 
382 
lie detector, 246, 251 
Lighthouse Regulators, 76 
Lincoln, Abraham, 123, 132, 141, 
142, 144-45, 167 
Lincoln County, N.Mex., War, 176 
Lindbergh, Charles A., 243-4 4 
Lindbergh Law, 244 
Lingg, Louis, 164 
Lippard, George, 118 
liquor. See alcohol consumption 
literacy, 31,98, 155, 187 
literature, crime. See crime literature 
Little Bighorn, 168 
Little Bohemia Lodge, 245 
Litde Crow, 166-67 
Livermore, Ky., 151 
Livingston, Edward, 100 
Loeb, Richard, 222-2 4 
Lombroso, Cesare, 190, 200, 236, 
295, 332 
London: death certificate registry in, 
209; medieval murder rate, 15; 
police force in, 103, 107; popula­
tion, 10, 15 
Long View, Tex., 217 
Los Alamos project, 252 
Los Angeles: Black Panther murders, 
280; Hickman case, 235; Kennedy 
assassination, 278; murder rate 
after World War II, 255; riot of 
1992, 328-29; Simpson case, 
2 - 3  , 6, 331, 333, 339; Tate-La 
Bianca murders, 281-83 ; Times, 
180; Watts riot of 1965, 275 
Louisiana: cotton in, 88; Livingston's 
legal code for, 100; murder rate in 
1993, 5; New Orleans race riots 
after Civil War, 148; rival govern­
ments after Civil War, 148; white-
black murders after Civil War, 
148 
Lowell, Lawrence, 227-2 8 
Lundsgaarde, Henry, 334 
Lyman, Theodore, 106 
Lynch, Ellen, 128 
Index 
lynching: by antebellum vigilantes, 
133; of blacks during Civil War, 
143; causes of, 153-54; in colo­
nial South, 63; geography of 
southern, 154-55; of IWW mem­
bers, 181; of Joseph Smith, 133­
34; in South after Civil War, 
151 - 56; in South after World 
War II, 261; terrorist lynching, 
153; around World War I, 240 
Madden, Owney, 220 
Madeiros, Celestino, 226, 228 
Madison, James, 87 
magistrates (justices): in antebellum 
period, 112, 114, 132; in colonial 
America, 53-54 , 193; in En­
gland, 53 
Magna Carta, 11,71 
Maine: death penalty reform, 102; 
murder rate in 1993, 5 
Malcolm X, 278 
males (men): absent fathers, 326; in 
antebellum murders, 122; arming 
themselves in antebellum period, 
109, 111, 130; in contemporary 
murder, 321; differential treat­
ment of, 26, 56; killing their wives 
in medieval England, 24; mass 
murderers as, 318; in medieval 
English murders, 16; in post-
World War II murders, 256; pun­
ishing children and servants, 58. 
See also young males 
Mann, Horace, 98 
Mann Act of 1910, 209 
manslaughter: Boston Massacre as, 
71; in early modern England, 27; 
involuntary, 114, 258; in medieval 
England, 25-26 ; second degree 
murder compared with, 80; for 
slaves death, 88; voluntary, 114, 
258 
Manson, Charles, 282-83 , 295, 336 
Mappv. Ohio, 289, 291 
Index 
Marion County, Ind., 131 
marriage: bachelor subculture, 122, 
127, 183, 351; declining rate of, 
327; divorce, 237, 325-26 ; un­
wed mothers, 29, 49-50 , 325-2 6 
Martinsburg, W.Va., 156 
Maryland: Dandy murder of 1657, 
44-45; slavery in, 43; typical early 
colonial white-Indian murder case, 
38, 39. See also Baltimore 
Massachusetts: Borden murder case, 
2 - 3  , 6, 205-9 , 291, 339; medi­
cal examiners in, 201; public 
prosecutors in, 95; Sacco and Van­
zetti case, 224-28 , 253, 313; slav­
ery abolished in, 87. See also 
Boston; Massachusetts Colony 
Massachusetts Colony: capital cases 
in, 55; conviction rate in, 59; exe­
cutions in, 49; founding of, 33; 
infanticide indictments, 56; as 
model for New England, 45; Prot­
estantism in founding of, 45—46; 
religious dissent punished in, 49, 
53; Salem witchcraft trials, 51 — 
52; sex crimes in, 49—50; torture 
abolished in, 55 
mass murder, 318-1 9 
Mather, Increase, 51 
Matoonas, 47 
Mattocks, Peter, 118, 129 
McAllister, Elizabeth, 159 
McCaffrey, Paddy, 142 
McCleskey, Warren, 338, 339 
McCleskey v. Georgia, 338 
McCormick Harvester strike, 162 
McDonalds mass murder (San Di­
ego), 318 
McGrath, Roger, 171 
McKinley, William, 165 
McNamara, John and James, 180 
McParlan, James, 158, 159, 160, 
179, 180 
McVeigh, Timothy, 318 
Means, Russell, 287-8 8 
383 
media: influence on murder rate, 
235, 325; National Police Gazette, 
94, 95. See also crime literature; 
newspapers; television 
medical examiners, 201, 210, 335 
medical testimony, 201 
Melton, Roy, 262 
Memphis: King assassination, 277; 
race riots after Civil War, 148 
men. See males 
Meredith, James, 263 
Metacom (King Philip), 46-4  7 
Mexicans, 171, 176 
Miami, 255 
Michigan: death penalty abolished, 
102. See also Detroit 
middle class: attitude toward death, 
98; business owners in nonacci­
dental homicides, 232; mass 
murderers as, 319; murder rarely 
touching, 352-53 ; nonviolent 
ideal in antebellum period, 122 ­
23, 124; on Railroad Strike of 
1877, 156-57; rational, predict­
able behavior of, 97; serial killers 
as, 319 
Middle Colonies: as differing from 
other colonies, 34; founding of, 
52; Scots-Irish in, 58 
Midwest: bank robberies during De­
pression, 244; between Civil War 
and World War I, 146; criminal 
justice systems on the frontier, 
131; murder rate in early twenti­
eth century, 229; as traditionally 
peaceful, 349. See also individual 
states 
Milam,J. H.,262 
Miller, Jacob, 200 
Miller, Jeffrey, 285 
Mills, Eleanor, 221 
Milwaukee: Dahmer case, 319, 325; 
murder rate after World War II, 
255 
mining country, 171—72, 178 — 81 
384 
Minneapolis, Van Meter killing in, 
246

Minnesota: Northfield robbery, 
174-75; St. Paul murder rate after 
World War II, 255; Sioux, 166­

67, 349; Van Meter killing in

Minneapolis, 246

Mintzhouser, Henry Clay, 204

Miranda v. Arizona, 290, 291, 294

miscarriages of justice, 83, 144-45,

341

miscegenation, 110

Mississippi: Adams County plot, 
143-44; black-white murder con­
victions in antebellum, 136; Civil 
Rights Movement, 260-65; cot­
ton, 88, 261; death penalty re­

form, 101; Jackson State riot, 285; 
Philadelphia civil rights murders, 
272, 273; rival governments after

Civil War, 148; vigilantismin, 132

Missouri: anti-German killing in 
Collinswood, 216; Civil War ac­
tion in, 140-41; Kansas City 
murder rate after World War II,

255; Mormons in, 134; vigilan­
tism in, 132. See also St. Louis 
Mitchell, Wallace, 244

mitigating circumstances: age of rea­
son, 24; in medieval England, 24. 
See also insanity defense; self-
defense 
M'Naghten Rule, 99-100, 193,

223, 334

mob violence: abolitionist mobs, 
137; in antebellum cities, 103-7; 
in antebellum South, 136; after 
Civil War, 182; on frontier before 
the Revolution, 68-69 ; gangs 
putting down, 111; lynching as, 
151, 152-53; murder during,

115, 117; New York City Draft

Riots, 141-43; in Philadelphia in 
1840s, 110-11; vigilantism com­
pared with, 132. See also race riots 
Index 
MockKung, 190

Moderators, 133

Molineux, Raymond, 202-3

Mollie Maguires, 157-60

Monkkonen, Eric, 125

Montague, Peter, 64

Montgomery, Ala., bus boycott, 261

Moore, Amzie, 262

Moore, Fred, 225, 226

Moore, Henrietta, 118

Moran, George "Bugs," 220

Mormons, 131, 133-34, 199

Morris, James, 118

MOVE, 315-1 6

movies, 235, 325

Mudd, Samuel, 145

Mudgett, Herman Webster, 191 -

93,212 
Mullen, Mary, 294

murder (criminal homicide): accesso­
ries, 26, 336; in antebellum pe­

riod, 92—139; causes as difficult to 
assign, 323-24 ; between Civil 
War and World War I, 146-213;

clearance rate, 322, 330, 332; in

colonial America, 33-66 ; in con­
temporary America, 304-54; in 
crime literature, 93 - 96; daily 
variation in, 125; defined, 1; 
"domestication" of, after World 
War II, 259; drug trade and, 324­

25; in early modern England, 2 6  ­
32; in England, 9—32; gangland 
murders, 219, 231, 325; Ger­

manic tribal view of, 10; going 
back to prehistoric times, 1; honor 
killing, 84-87 , 127, 143, 150,

154, 171; ideological murder,

138, 268, 318; as impulsive crime,

113, 129, 298; Indian intraracial

murders brought under white law, 
169-70; as intentional homicide, 
1; irrational causes of, 350-51 ; as 
low police priority in late nine­
teenth century, 203; mass murder, 
Index 385 
318-19; in medieval England,  9 - 309-10 ; in early modern En­
26; murder-suicides, 115, 189, gland, 28—30; in early republic, 
256; mystery and romance asso- 81-82 , 310-11 ; in early twenti­
ciated with, 82-84 ; Native eth century, 229, 239; in England 
American view of, 36, 75—77; in today, 14; international compari-
New England colonies, 46, 4 8 - son of, 312-13 ; longer sentences 
50; petit treason, 24, 55, 79; poi- and, 337; in medieval England, 
sonings, 202—3, 320; problems of 14-15 , 311 — 12; in mining coun­
legal and social definition, 6; re- try, 171; peak in 1973,296,301; 
venge killings, 257; in riots, 115, rural and urban compared, 307, 
117; seasonal variation in, 125; 309; Sixties rise in, 295-97 , 302, 
sites of, 126; in the Sixties, 2 6 8  - 303; in South after Civil War, 
303; South as most murderous 149, 151; suicide-murder ratio, 
section of country, 149-51 , 235, 185-86; in United States as per­
255, 321,342, 350; statute of sistently high, 214-15 ; during 
limitations, 313; by strangers in Vietnam War, 300-301 ; during 
contemporary America, 322, 330, World War I, 215; between world 
332; across time and place, 4 - 7  ; wars, 214-15 , 229, 235-39; after 
unique forms of contemporary, World War II, 255, 258-59 , 265; 
314-20; what kinds of people during World War II, 250 
commit, 4; why as central ques- murder-suicides, 115, 189, 256 
tion of, 3-4  ; between World War Murdoch, Catherine, 117 
I and World War II, 214-48 ; Murrell Conspiracy, 132 
young males committing, 6, 298, Myrick, Andrew, 166, 167 
323. See also assassinations, poli­
tical; conviction rates; criminal National Advisory Commission on 
justice system; degrees of guilt; du- Civil Disorders, 275-7 6 
eling; infanticide; lynching; miti- National Police Gazette, 94, 95 
gating circumstances; murder National Rifle Association (NRA), 
rates; premeditation; punishment; 332, 343, 345, 346, 347 
robbery murder; serial killers Native American party, 110 
Murder, Inc., 246 Native Americans: agricultural labor 
murder novels, 82-8  3 refused by, 42; Alcatraz Island 
murder rates, 4—6; in antebellum pe- takeover, 287; American Indian 
riod, 92-93 , 111, 115, 310; aver- Movement, 286—89; after Ameri­
age from 1933 to 1994, 308; as can Revolution, 72-77 ; in ante-
based on death certificates, 239; bellum period, 130-31; Apache, 
Brearly's analysis of U.S., 235-39 ; 166, 168, 169, 176;Arapahoe, 
causes of high American, 341-52 ; 166; in Bacons Rebellion, 43; 
after Civil War, 181, 182, 183- Blackfoot, 166; Black Hawk War, 
84, 185, 186-88; during Civil 130; Bureau of Indian Affairs, 286­
War, 143; in colonial America, 87, 288; Cherokee, 75-77 , 130, 
45, 59, 311; in contemporary 169; Cheyenne, 166, 167; after 
America, 5, 14, 306-13 ; in cow Civil War, 165-73; Comanche, 
towns, 171; dark figures in, 5, 166; in contemporary American 
386 
Native Americans {continued) 
murder, 321; as dependent 
nations, 75, 169; as disarmed in 
early twentieth century, 241; dis­
unity among, 37; European dis­
eases decimating, 37, 46; fight­
ing with as cause of violence in 
America, 349; infanticide among, 
75; intraracial murders brought 
under white law, 169-70; Iro­
quois Confederacy, 73, 74; King 
Philips War, 46-47 ; Kiowa, 166; 
land ownership as conceived by, 
73; murder as family matter for, 
36, 75-77 ; in New England colo­
nies, 46-47 ; Pawnee, 166; Paxton 
Boys massacre of, 68-69 ; Pequot 
War, 39; plains Indians, 130-31, 
169; Pocahontas, 35-37 ; police 
forces, 76, 169; Powhatan, 35; 
praying Indians, 46, 69; and Prot­
estantism, 37, 46; reputation as 
treacherous, 38; on reservations, 
166, 241; Sioux, 166-67, 168, 
349; slave ownership by, 61; in 
Spanish Latin America, 35; strate­
gic and economic roles of, 39; Te­
cumseh, 75, 77; as unrecorded in 
murder statistics, 310; U.S. trea­
ties with, 75, 168; in Virginia 
Colony, 35-39 ; Virginia massacre 
of 1622, 37; war as conducted by, 
168; white-Indian murders, 3 8  ­
39, 46, 169; Wounded Knee siege, 
288-8 9 
Nauvoo, 111., 134 
Nebraska: Kansas-Nebraska Act, 
137; violence in, 350; Yellow 
Thunder murder in Gordon, 287 
neighbors, murder between in medi­
eval England, 19 
Nelson, Baby Face, 245, 246 
Nepaupuck, 38 
Nevada: hanging retained in, 199; 
organized crime in Las Vegas, 250 
Index 
Newark, N.J., riot of 1967, 275 
New England: dignity as conceived 
in, 85 — 86; murder rate in early 
twentieth century, 229; New 
Hampshire death penalty referen­
dum, 102; Rhode Island death 
penalty abolition, 102; Vermont 
murder rate in early twentieth cen­
tury, 229. See also individual states 
New England colonies, 34, 45-52; 
benefit of clergy plea, 58; capital 
punishment in, 48, 50-51  ; infan­
ticide in, 49-50 ; King Philips 
War, 46-47 ; murder in, 46, 4 8 ­
50; Native Americans in, 46-47; 
Pequot War, 39; royal control 
over, 52-53 ; severity of justice in, 
48; slavery in, 47; stability of, 4 7  ­
48, 58; as traditionally peaceful, 
349; trial juries in, 56; white-
Indian murders, 46. See also 
Massachusetts Colony 
New Hampshire, death penalty refer­
endum in, 102 
New Haven, Conn., 38, 280 
New Jersey: Black Liberation Army 
shootout, 286; Camden poverty 
and gangs, 331; Case of the Min­
ister and the Choir Singer, 221; 
Lindbergh kidnapping, 243-44; 
lynching in, 151; Newark riot of 
1967, 275 
New Mexico: Billy the Kid, 175-76; 
Lincoln County War, 176; Los 
Alamos project, 252 
New Orleans, La., race riots after 
Civil War, 148 
newspapers: Boston Times, 93; Chi­
cago Tribune, 222; crime news, 
221; Los Angeles Times, 180; New 
York Daily News, 221; New York 
Herald, 94, 96; New York Sun, 
94, 96; New York World, 221; 
penny papers, 93, 96, 112; Phila­
delphia Public Ledger, 121, 204 
387 Index 
Newton, Huey, 279 
New York City: black men as murder 
victims in, 230; Black Panther 
trial, 280; Bratton policing strat­
egy, 332; Daily News, 221; diver­
sity of, 58; Draft Riots of 1863, 
141-43; Election Riot of 1834, 
103, 105; ethnic violence in, 
105-6; gangs in, 104; Harlem 
Renaissance, 218; Herald, 94, 96; 
House of Morgan bombing, 217; 
immigrants in antebellum murders 
in, 125; Jewett murder, 94, 96; 
medical examiner in, 210; Mur­
der, Inc., 246; murder rate in, 
143, 236, 255, 296, 307; Norris's 
reforms, 210—11; police functions 
cut down, 212; police in uniform, 
182; Quinn case, 212; race riot of 
1834, 106; race riots of the Six­
ties, 273; religious revival in, 124; 
rival police forces in, 111; slave re­
volts in colonial, 65-66 ; Sun, 94, 
96; Weathermen explosion, 284; 
World, 221; World Trade Center 
bombing, 317, 318 
New York State: African Americans' 
rights revoked in, 116; Attica 
Prison riot, 285-86 ; Buffalo mur­
der rate after World War II, 255; 
death penalty vote, 102; early 
penitentiaries in, 80 -81  ; jury de­
liberation restrictions, 57; Leisler 
rebellion, 55; mob violence in, 
103; Sullivan Law of 1911, 345. 
See also New York City 
New Zealand, 343, 348 
Nichols, Terry Lynn, 318 
night watch, 12, 103, 148 
Nixon, Richard, 284, 285, 294, 295, 
296 
Nixon, William, 120, 124 
Norfolk, Va., race riots after Civil 
War, 148 
Norris, Charles, 210-1 1 
North, the: African Americans move 
to cities in, 217, 218, 264-66 , 
273; in Civil War, 140-44; be­
tween Civil War and World War I, 
146; dignity as conceived in, 86; 
economic change in antebellum 
period, 97; mob violence against 
blacks, 137; murder rate as rela­
tively low, 235, 321; nonviolent 
ideals in, 124; slavery abolished in, 
87; white backlash against blacks 
in, 272, 274. See also individual 
states 
North Carolina: colonial law on 
burying servants, 44; conviction 
rate in colonial, 60; feuds in, 
149; vigilantes before American 
Revolution, 69; as violent place, 
349 
North Dakota: death penalty abol­
ished, 197; murder rates in, 349 
Northfield, Minn., robbery, 174-75 
Oakland, Calif.: appeals process in, 
195-96; Black Panthers, 279 
Oaks, Richard, 288 
O'Donnell, Charles, 159 
Ohio: Akron, Cincinnati, and Co­
lumbus murder rates after World 
War II, 255; Kent State killings, 
285; Mapp v. Ohio, 289, 291. See 
also Cleveland 
O.K. Corral, 177 
Oklahoma, 349 
Oklahoma City bombing, 317 
Orangemen. See Scots-Irish 
Orchard, Harry, 179-80 
Oregon: death penalty abolished, 
197; death penalty reinstated, 223 
organized crime, 219, 250, 271 
original sin, 79, 101 
Oswald, Lee Harvey, 269, 270-71  , 
278 
Oughton, Diana, 284 
outlaws, 14, 21, 175 
388 
Paine, Lewis, 145 
Paine, Thomas, 72 
Palmer, A. Mitchell, 216 
pardons, 196, 197, 239 
Parent, Steven, 281,283 
Paris, Tex., 151 
Paris Commune, 157 
Parker, Bonnie, 245-4 6 
Parker, Marion, 235 
Parker, Theodore, 137, 138 
Parks, Rosa, 261 
Parmenter, Frederick, 224 
Parris, Samuel, 51 
Parsons, Albert, 163, 164 
pathology, 201-2 
Patterns of Criminal Homicide (Wolf­
gang), 254-60 
Pawnee, 166 
Paxton Boys uprising, 68-6 9 
Pearl Harbor, 248, 249 
penitentiary movement, 81, 97, 101 
Pennsylvania: African Americans' 
rights revoked in, 116; Bevan exe­
cution, 55; capital punishment 
limited in, 80; Coal and Iron Po­
lice, 158; conviction rate in colo­
nial, 60; death penalty vote, 102; 
early penitentiaries in, 80-81  ; 
electric chair adopted in, 199; exe­
cutions in early twentieth century, 
197; hanging made private in, 99, 
160; Homestead Strike, 164-65; 
last hanging in, 199; Mollie Ma­
guires, 157-60; Paxton Boys up­
rising, 68-69 ; public education 
established in, 98. See also Phila­
delphia; Pittsburgh 
penny papers, 93, 96, 112 
People v. Anderson, 293, 295 
Pequot War, 39 
Perry, Malcolm, 269, 270 
personality types, 237 
petit treason, 24, 55, 79 
Philadelphia, Miss., 272, 273 
Philadelphia, Pa.: African American 
Index 
population, 116, 198, 266; ante­
bellum killers and their victims in, 
124-30; automobile accidents in 
early twentieth century, 240; black 
men as murder victims in, 230; 
black women murderers, 233-34; 
box score approach to homicide 
cases, 212-13 ; Chinese in, 189— 
90; contemporary murder rate, 
342; courts-martial during Revo­
lution, 71; criminal justice system 
after Civil War, 193-97; Depres­
sion era crimes, 244; detective 
force, 204, 211; diversity of, 58; 
executions in early twentieth cen­
tury, 197-98; gangland killings, 
231; gun deaths in 1920s, 229; 
Heintzleman, 113, 121; homicide 
case procedure in antebellum pe­
riod, 112-16; infanticide in, 119, 
309; losing population and jobs, 
300; mob violence in antebellum 
period, 103; MOVE, 315-16; 
Mudgett case, 191-93, 212; mur­
der rate after Civil War, 185, 
187-88; murder rate during Civil 
War, 143; murder rate in 1960s 
and 1970s, 302; murder rate after 
World War II, 255; Paxton Boys 
march on, 69; police force orga­
nized, 110, 182; police officers 
killed in 1920s, 232; post-Civil 
War killers and their victims in, 
188-93; Public Ledger, 121, 204; 
race riots of the Sixties, 273; regis­
tration system, 209; Sowers case, 
120; spousal murders in 1920s, 
232; Van Colin murder, 314; 
Walnut Street Prison, 80; Wolf-
gang's post-World War II study, 
254-6 0 
Philadelphia Police, The: Past and 
Present, 204 
Pine Ridge Reservation, 288 
Pinkerton, Allan, 158, 159 
389 
31 
Index 
Pinkerton Agency: in Borden murder 
case, 207; Cassidy and Sundance 
Kid pursued by, 177; in Coeur 
d'Alene strike, 178; in Homestead 
Strike, 164-65; and James gang, 
174; in Mudgett case, 192, 212; 
and Sacco and Vanzetti case, 224; 
and Steunenberg murder, 179; 
strikebreakers protected by, 161; 
in western law enforcement, 174, 
175 
Pitezel, Benjamin, 192, 212 
Pittsburgh: executions in early twen­
tieth century, 197; murder rate af­
ter World War II, 255; Railroad 
Strike of 1877, 156 
plains Indians, 130-31 , 169 
plea bargaining: after Civil War, 194; 
in contemporary America, 336; 
criticism of, 333 
Pocahontas, 35—37 
Poe, Edgar Allan, 93, 120 
poisonings, 202—3, 320 
Polanski, Roman, 281, 283 
police brutality, 230, 328-29 , 330­
police forces: African Americans in, 
330; appearing in American cities, 
97, 102-7, 182; black distrust of, 
273; community policing, 332; 
confessions extracted by, 291; con­
frontations with black radicals, 
279; contemporary functioning 
of, 330—32; cooperation among, 
210; cutting down on functions 
of, 212; detectives, 112, 204, 211; 
federal assistance to, 331; first 
regular patrol in Boston, 107; 
growing respect for, 255-56 ; In­
dian police, 76, 169; International 
Association of Chiefs of Police, 
210, 246; killings by, 205, 2 5 5  ­
56, 273, 331; in London, 103, 
107; and Miranda rights, 291; 
murder as low priority for, 111 ­
12, 203-5  ; night watch, 12, 103, 
148; officers murdered in 1920s, 
232; in Philadelphia, 110; as 
"pigs" in Sixties, 275, 279, 280; 
rival forces in New York City, 111; 
status in late nineteenth century, 
205; uniforms, 107; weapons, 
109, 182; white police and black 
civilians, 273. See also detective 
work 
political assassinations. See assassina­
tions, political 
political clubs, 104 
poll taxes, 155 
polygraph, 246, 251 
poor, the. See poverty 
postal inspectors, 209 
postindustrial era, 298, 299, 300, 327 
Potawatomi Massacre, 138 
poverty: as cause of crime, 79, 190, 
237; as cause of high American 
murder rate, 342-43 ; in colonial 
freed people, 65; gap between rich 
and poor, 343; poor more violent 
than the rich in medieval England, 
18—19; relative deprivation, 342; 
rich doing better in court than the 
poor, 238, 336; in South after 
Civil War, 149; in urban ghettos, 
277; and violence, 326; War on 
Poverty, 271,274 
Powell v. Alabama, 243, 289, 292 
Power of Sympathy, The (Brown), 82 
Powhatan, 35 
Prager, Robert Paul, 216 
premeditation: in antebellum period, 
129; in early modern England, 27; 
of poisonings, 202 
Preston, Jonas, Jr., 197 
Preston, Thomas, 70, 71 
prisons: American Prison Congress, 
210; Attica Prison riot, 285-86; 
construction in 1980s, 337; as de­
terrent, 337-38 ; federal pressure 
to improve conditions, 290, 291; 
390 
prisons {continued) 
first penitentiaries in New York 
and Pennsylvania, 80-81  ; peni­
tentiary movement, 81, 97, 101; 
rehabilitation in, 290, 337; Sims­
bury, Conn., 80; Walnut Street 
Prison, 80 
prizefighting, 127-28, 183 
procedure, criminal. See criminal 
procedure 
Proctor, William, 226 
Progressive Era, 209, 211, 213, 218, 
223 
Prohibition, 218-20; in ante­
bellum period, 97; Capone gang, 
220; casual drinking cut down by, 
241; drug trade as more danger­
ous than, 324; Eighteenth 
Amendment establishment of, 
215, 218; and murder rate in 
U.S., 236; and organized crime, 
219; repeal of, 242 
Prosser, Gabriel, 88 
Protestantism: Calvinism, 101; con­
version of preliterate peoples to, 
37; and democracy, 53; in early 
modern England, 27, 28; in Mas­
sachusetts' founding, 45-4 6 
psychological profiling, 331 
Public Ledger (Philadelphia) ,121 , 
204 
public prosecutors: in antebellum pe­
riod, 95, 132; in colonial America, 
57; district attorneys, 114; increas­
ing role after Civil War, 193-94 
public school system: Catholic resis­
tance to, 108; criticisms of, 236; 
discipline as object of, 98, 182, 
184-85 
punishment: of children and ser­
vants, 58, 123; convict lease sys­
tem, 149-51; legal castration for 
rape, 88; pardons, 196, 197, 239; 
rational approach in early repub­
lic, 79. See also cruel and unusual 
Index 
punishment; death penalty; 
prisons; sentences 
Purple Gang, 220 
Purvis, Melvin, 245 
Quantrill, William Clarke, 140-41, 
173 
Quincy, Josiah, 106 
Quinn, Nellie, 212 
race riots: Jackson State riot, 285; 
Kerner Commission, 275-76; af­
ter King's assassination, 278; Los 
Angeles riot of 1992, 328-29; 
New York City Draft Riots as, 
142; in New York City in 1834, 
106; police attitude toward, 182; 
in Sixties, 273-77; in South after 
Civil War, 148; around World 
War I, 217-18 , 240 
racial tension: between African 
Americans and Irish, 105-6; in 
antebellum America, 110; in colo­
nial America, 34, 44; in early 
twentieth century, 240; in MOVE 
incident, 315—16; in New Mexico 
Territory, 176; in New York City 
Draft Riots, 141-42 
radicals: anarchist movement, 162— 
64, 224, 228, 284, 317; fear of af­
ter World War I, 216; Industrial 
Workers of the World, 179-81, 
216-17; lifestyle radicalism of 
the hippies, 283; Red Scare of 
1919, 216; Sacco and Vanzetti 
case, 224; Weathermen, 283-84, 
286, 317. See also communism; 
labor violence 
Railroad Strike of 1877, 156-57 
Raleigh, Sir Walter, 30 
Ralston, Robert, 196, 339 
rape: black rape of white women, 
152, 198; as capital crime, 253, 
338; executions for, 292; as hang­
ing offense, 56, 223; law not 
391 Index 
applying to slave women, 63; legal 
castration for, 88; by Native 
American warriors, 167, 168; of 
Native American women, 169; as 
rare in late nineteenth century, 
191 
Ray, James Earl, 277, 278 
Raymond, Henry, 117 
Reading Railroad, 158 
Reagan, Ronald, 346 
Reconstruction, 147, 156, 174 
Redd, Louie, 262 
Redding, Alexander, 118 
Redfield, Horace, 149 
Red Scare of 1919, 216 
reform movements: abolitionism, 87, 
110, 137; in antebellum period, 
97; after Civil War, 181 - 82; 
penitentiary movement, 81, 97, 
101; Progressive Era, 209, 211, 
213, 218, 223; self-restraint as 
goal of, 122; temperance move­
ment, 97, 101, 182, 184 
registration systems, 209, 239 
Regulators, 69, 131 
rehabilitation, 290, 337 
Reilly, James, 199 
revenge killings, 257 
revolvers, 109, 117, 182 
Reynolds, George, 118 
Rhode Island, death penalty abol­
ished in, 102 
rich, the: as doing better in court 
than the poor, 238, 336; gap be­
tween the poor and, 343; as less 
violent than the poor, 19; murders 
among getting attention, 191 
Richmond, Va., 81,86, 89 
rifling, 202 
rights of defendants, 289-9 2 
riots. See mob violence 
Rizzo, Frank, 315 
robbery: armed robbery, 189, 231, 
322; banditry after Civil War, 
173-77; bank robbery, 244-46 , 
286; capital punishment for, 56, 
80, 223, 253 
robbery murder: in antebellum pe­
riod, 117, 126, 128-29; in colo­
nial America, 59; Gary Gilmore, 
341; Joe Hill case, 181; jury bias 
against, 336; in late nineteenth 
century, 189; in medieval En­
gland, 16, 20 -21  ; in 1920s, 2 3 1 ­
32; Sacco and Vanzetti case, 224; 
after World War II, 259 
Robbins, Ted, 284 
Robinson, Bernice, 262 
Robinson, George D., 207 
Robinson, Richard, 94, 96 
Rock Springs, Wyo., 172-73 
Rogers, Mary, 93, 120 
rogues' gallery of photographs, 200, 
210 
Rolphe, Sir John, 36, 40 
Roman Catholicism: anti-Catholic 
violence in antebellum period, 
105, 110; converting preliterate 
peoples, 37; criminal justice for 
officials of, 11; death penalty op­
posed by hierarchy, 340; on in­
fanticide, 22; and Protestant 
Reformation, 27, 28; public edu­
cation resisted by, 108; seen as 
subversive, 158 
romantic movement, 82-84 , 93, 96, 
99, 100, 122 
Roosevelt, Theodore, 212 
Rosenberg, Julius and Ethel, 
252-5 4 
Rox,John, 113 
royal charters of American colonies, 52 
Ruby, Jack, 270, 271 
Runion, Barefoot, 76 
Russell, Francis, 228 
Russia, 312 
Sacco, Nicola, 224-28 , 253, 313 
St. Louis: race riots in the Sixties, 
273; Railroad Strike of 1877, 156 
392 
St. Paul, Minn., 255 
St. Valentine's Day Massacre, 220, 
242 
Salem witchcraft trials, 51-5 2 
Sanborn, Franklin, 139 
sanctuary, 13 
Sand Creek Massacre, 167, 314 
San Diego mass murder, 318 
San Francisco: Alcatraz Island take­
over, 287; vigilantism in, 133, 
134-35 
Santo Domingo slave revolt, 88 
Sassamonn, 46 
Scheuer, Sandra, 285 
school system, public. See public 
school system 
Schroeder, William, 285 
Schultz, Dutch, 220 
Schwartz, Philip, 63 
Schwerner, Mickey, 272, 273 
Schwimmer, Reinhardt E., 220 
Scots-Irish (Orangemen): brawling 
among, 86; Cherokee law of blood 
compared with, 76; in frontier 
violence before Revolution, 68; 
Irish immigrants and, 105, 110; in 
Middle and southern colonies, 58; 
and Mollie Maguires, 159 
Scottsboro Boys, 241, 243, 289 
Seattle: general strike, 216; post-
World War II murder rate, 255 
Sebring, Jay, 281 
second degree murder: in antebellum 
period, 114; defined, 80; after 
World War II, 258 
Second Great Awakening, 99, 101 
Secret Service, 209 
segregation, legal, 155, 272 
self-defense: in antebellum period, 
129-30; battered woman syn­
drome as, 334; jury bias in favor 
of, 337; in medieval England, 26; 
in post-World War II Philadel­
phia, 257; in South after Civil 
War, 150-51 
Index 
self-incrimination, 207, 251, 289­
90, 335 
self-restraint, 122, 299, 327, 328 
sentences: aggravating circumstances, 
338; move to longer, 337; in 
1920s, 239; in 1980s, 337. See 
also death penalty 
serial killers: Bundy, 319; in con­
temporary America, 319-20; 
Dahmer, 319, 325, 336; Mudgett, 
193 
serotonin, 333 
Seventh Amendment, 289, 290 
sex crimes: adultery, 49, 56, 150; 
buggery, 49; Hickman case, 235; 
in Massachusetts Colony, 49-50; 
as rare in late nineteenth century, 
191; serial killings as, 319; sod­
omy, 56, 80. See also rape 
sexual harassment, 120 
Shakur, Assata, 286 
Shappello, Harry, 195 
sharecropping, 154 
Shaw, Honora, 128 
Shenandoah, Leroy, 288 
Shepard, Sam, 290, 314 
Sheridan, Philip, 168 
sheriffs: in antebellum period, 132; 
district attorney succeeding, 114; 
in early modern England, 27; in 
early republic, 103; in medieval 
England, 12, 13; in the West, 173 
Sherlock Holmes, Adventures of 
(Doyle), 202 
Sherman, William Tecumseh, 168 
Shields, James, 123 
Shiffler, George, 110 
Shinn, Gwendolyn, 234 
Siddles, William, 117 
Simms, William Gilmore, 100 
Simpson, Nicole Brown, 2 - 3  , 333 
Simpson, O. J., 2 - 3  , 6, 331, 333, 
339 
Simsbury, Conn., prison, 80 
Sioux, 166-67, 168, 349 
393 Index 
Sirhan, Sirhan Bishara, 278, 295 
Sixties, the, 268-303; American In­
dian Movement, 286-89; Attica 
Prison riot, 285-86; Black Pan­
thers, 274, 275, 279-80, 284, 
286, 301; "Black Power," 274; 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 271; 
counterculture, 268, 274; Jackson 
State riot, 285; John Kennedy 
assassination, 269-71 ; Robert 
Kennedy assassination, 278; King 
assassination, 277; murder rate in­
crease, 295-97, 302, 303; 1968 
as pivotal year, 300; Tate-La 
Bianca murders, 281-83, 284; 
University of Wisconsin bombing, 
286; urban race riots, 273-77, 
278; War on Poverty, 271, 274; 
Weathermen, 283-84, 286, 317; 
Wounded Knee siege, 288-89. 
See also Johnson, Lyndon; Viet­
nam War 
Skupinski, Blaise and Mathias, 128 
Slaughter, John, 177 
slave codes, 62, 65, 87, 136 
slaves: abolitionism, 87, 110, 137; in 
antebellum period, 135-37; At-
tucks, 70; benefit of clergy plea, 
58, 63; as cause of Civil War, 143; 
as cause of violence in antebellum 
America, 33-34; as cause of vio­
lence in colonial America, 33— 
34; during Civil War, 143-44; in 
colonial America, 33-34, 65-66; 
conditions ameliorated, 87-88; 
in culture of American violence, 
350-51, 353; death penalty for, 
63-64; Emancipation Proc­
lamation, 141, 144; European 
trade in, 27; Fugitive Slave Law, 
137; indenture contrasted with, 
43; in Harpers Ferry raid, 138 — 
39; Kansas-Nebraska Act, 137; 
lynching of, 63; in Maryland, 
43; murder by, 64; in murder sta­
tistics, 6; Murrell Conspiracy, 
132; Native Americans in Latin 
America, 35; Native Americans 
owning, 61; in New England, 47; 
New York City revolts, 65-66; 
northern abolition, 87; revolts 
during early republic, 88-89; in 
Salem witchcraft trials, 51; Santo 
Domingo revolt, 88; slave codes, 
62,65,87, 136; "sold to Geor­
gia," 63, 66; southern arguments 
defending, 135-36; in southern 
colonies, 61 - 6 5  ; in South of the 
early republic, 87-91  ; special le­
gal status of, 52; Stono Revolt, 61; 
and tobacco, 42; Turner revolt, 
88-89, 136; in Virginia, 42, 4 3 ­
44; West African origins of, 44; 
whites murdered by, 64, 136; 
whites murdering, 62-63  , 136 
Smith, Daniel, 113 
Smith, George K., 157, 159 
Smith, Gerrit, 139 
Smith, John, 36 
Smith, Joseph, 133-34 
Smith, Lamar, 262 
Snyder, Albert, 221 
Snyder, Ruth, 221-22 
Sobell, Morton, 252, 253 
Social Darwinism, 190, 218, 236 
sociology, 237, 296 
sodium pentathol, 251 
sodomy, 56, 80 
Soohan, Christopher, 129 
South, the: abolition societies in, 87; 
African Americans leave for the 
North, 217, 218; antebellum pe­
riod defensiveness in, 135-37; 
banditry in, 174; bank robberies 
during Depression, 244; black 
belt, 154; black codes, 147; chain 
gangs, 149-50; Civil Rights 
Movement, 260-65, 272; in Civil 
War, 140-44; between Civil War 
and World War I, 146; code of 
394 Index 
South, the {continued) in, 58; slave codes, 62; slavery in, 
honor in, 86, 351 — 52; cotton in, 61-65 ; South Carolina, 61, 69. 
88, 92; guerrilla war of national See also Virginia Colony 
liberation after Civil War, 147; Sowers, Eliza, 120, 124 
gun carrying in, 238; on gun Speck, Richard, 295 
control, 345; homicide laws in Spies, August, 162 
antebellum period, 136; legal seg- Spotted Tail, 169 
regation, 155, 272; lynching in, Spring, Arthur, 128 
151-56, 240, 261; as most mur- Stagolee, 149 
derous section of country, 149— Stanford v. Kentucky, 338 
51,235,255,321,342,350; statute of limitations, 313 
murder rate after Civil War, 149, Stearns, George Luther, 139 
151; murder rate in early twenti- Steunenberg, Frank, 179-80 
eth century, 229; police officers Stevens, Henry and Willie, 221 
killed in 1920s, 232; race riots Stokes, Ned, 191 
after Civil War, 148; Reconstruc- Stono Revolt of 1739, 61 
tion in, 147, 156, 174; slave re- strikes, 161 
volts during early republic, 8 8  - Strong, George Templeton, 109 
89; slavery in culture of violence Stuyvesant, Marion, 198 
of, 350-51 ; slavery in the early re- suicide, 185, 319, 321, 328n 
public, 87-88 ; vagrancy laws, suicide-murder ratio (SMR), 185-86 
147; voting restrictions in, 154- Sullivan, Bridget, 205, 206, 208 
55. See also individual states Sullivan, Mary, 294 
South Braintree, Mass., 224 Sullivan Law of 1911 (New York), 
South Carolina: acquittal rates in, 345 
337; Charleston race riots, 148, Sara (New York), 94, 96 
217; Hammond, 136-37; murder Sundance Kid, 177 
rate after Civil War, 149, 151; ri- Surratt, Mary, 145 
val governments after Civil War, Switzerland, 343, 348 
148; secedes from Union, 139; Sydney Ducks, 133 
slave code, 136; slavery in colonial, Syria, 312 
61; slavery taxing legal system in, 
90; Stono Revolt of 1739, 61; Talley v. Stephens, 290, 294 
Tillman, 151, 152, 351; vigilantes Tate, Sharon, 281,283, 284 
before American Revolution, 69, technicalities, legal, 333, 334 
131 Tecumseh, 75, 77 
South Dakota: Bad Heart Bull mur- teenagers, 323, 353 
der, 288; death penalty abolished, television: bringing murder and vio­
197; violence in, 349; Wounded lence into public arena, 268; con-
Knee siege, 288-89 sumerism encouraged by, 328; 
southern colonies: as differing from exaggerating extent of murder, 
other colonies, 34; Georgia, 61, 329; relative deprivation magni­
63, 66; Maryland, 38, 39, 43, 4 4  - fied by, 299; urban riot coverage, 
45; murder in, 44-45 ; North 274; violence encouraged by, 276, 
Carolina, 44, 60, 69; Scots-Irish 325,348 
395 Index 
temperance movement, 97, 101, 
182, 184 
temporary insanity, 113, 193, 334 
Tennessee: code of honor in, 86, 
149; death penalty reform, 101; 
vigilantism in, 131; white-black 
murders after Civil War, 148. See 
also Memphis 
terrorism: in contemporary America, 
317-18; defined, 317; lynching 
as, 153; Potawatomi Massacre as, 
138; in the Sixties, 278, 284 
Texas: cattle drives, 170; concealed 
weapons allowed in, 301; cotton, 
92; Dallas, 255, 269-70 ; Hous­
ton, 217, 301-2 , 334, 337; 
Kennedy assassination, 269-71 ; 
Killeen mass murder, 319; on kill­
ing a wife's lover, 150, 301; Long 
View race riot, 217; lynching in, 
154; murder rate after Civil War, 
149; Paris lynching, 151; Uni­
versity of Texas sniper, 319; vigi­
lantism in, 132, 133; as violent 
place, 349; Waco conflagration, 
316 
Thaw, Harry K., 191 
Thayer, Webster, 225, 226, 228 
Thomas, Constance, 234 
Thomas, Richard, 314 
Thompson, William, 226 
Till, Emmett, 262 
Tillman, Pitchfork Ben, 151, 152, 351 
Times (Boston), 93 
Times (Los Angeles), 180 
Tippitt, J. B., 269, 270 
Tirell, Albert J., 94-96 , 112 
Tituba, 51 
tobacco, 40, 42 
Todd, Cuffee, 117 
Tombstone, Ariz., 177 
tongs (gangs), 172, 189-90 
Torrio, Johnny, 220 
torture: for black rape of white 
women, 152; elimination of, 55 
toxicology, 201,202-3 
Trail of Tears, 11 
transportation of convicts, 58-59 , 
82 
Travis, Joseph, 89 
treason, 24, 28, 55, 79, 253, 254 
Tresca, Carlo, 228 
trial juries: in antebellum period, 
114, 116, 129; biases of, 336-37; 
in colonial America, 56, 57; Con­
stitutional guarantees for, 78; in 
contemporary America, 335—36; 
decreasing role after Civil War, 
193; for Haymarket bombing, 
163; in medieval England, 21; 
as miniature mobs, 238; in New 
England colonies, 56; in Simpson 
trial, 333 
trials: as adversarial, 335; in ante­
bellum period, 116; of Lizzie 
Borden, 207-8 , 339; in colonial 
America, 57; Constitutional 
guarantees for, 78; court day in 
colonial America, 54; expert testi­
mony, 201, 207, 228, 333; of 
Hauptmann, 244; of juveniles as 
adults, 336; length of contempo­
rary, 339; medical testimony, 
201; in medieval England, 21-22 ; 
of the Rosenbergs, 252—53; of 
Sacco and Vanzetti, 225-26; of 
Simpson, 333, 339. See also trial 
juries 
Tribune (Chicago), 222 
truth serum, 251 
Tucson, Ariz., 169 
Tudors, 28 
Turner, Nat, 88-89 , 136 
Unabomber, 314-15 , 331 
underclass, 327 
Uniform Crime Reports for the United 
States, 242, 266, 305, 320, 325, 
332,347 
396 
unions, labor, 161 
United States 
—American Revolution. &•? Ameri­
can Revolution 
—antebellum period, 92-139; John 
Brown, 137-39; cities during, 93, 
102-11; criminal justice systems 
on frontier, 131-32; criminal 
procedure during, 95, 112-16; 
death penalty opposed in, 96-97 , 
99-102; economic change in, 97; 
ethnic violence in, 104-7; Kansas 
slavery dispute, 137-38; murder 
rate in, 92-93 , 111, 115,310; 
Native Americans during, 130— 
31; nonviolent ideals in, 122-24; 
public education established dur­
ing, 98; reform movements in, 97, 
101; religious revival in, 124; slav­
ery during, 135-37; vigilantism 
during, 131-35; women's prob­
lems during, 119-22 
—Civil War. See Civil War 
—between Civil War and World 
War I, 146-213; labor violence, 
157-65; lynching in the South, 
151 - 56; murder as low police 
priority, 203; murder rate, 181, 
182, 183-84, 185, 186-88; Pro­
gressive Era, 209, 211, 213, 218, 
223; Reconstruction, 147, 156, 
174; scientific detective work, 
200; the South, 146, 147-56; 
violence declining, 181-88; the 
West, 146, 165-81 
—colonial era, 33-66 ; benefit of 
clergy plea, 58; British influence 
in, 33; capital crimes in, 55-56; 
causes of violence in, 58-59 ; con­
viction rates in, 59-60; counties 
in, 53-54; court day, 54; criminal 
justice systems, 34, 52-60, 66; 
death penalty in, 55-56; democ­
racy in, 53; firearms in, 41-42 , 
59; French and Indian War, 68, 
Index 
73; grand juries in, 53, 54, 55; 
individualism in, 59; insanity plea, 
58; land holding in, 59, 73; legal 
counsel permitted in, 57; magis­
trates, 53-54 ; murder rate in, 45, 
59, 311; Native Americans' strate­
gic and economic roles, 39; public 
prosecutors, 57; royal charters, 52; 
slavery in, 60-66 ; three races in, 
33; transportation of convicts, 
58-59 ; trial juries in, 56, 57; trial 
procedure in, 57; typical early co­
lonial white-Indian murder cases, 
38-39 ; women and men treated 
differently in, 56. See also Middle 
Colonies; New England colonies; 
southern colonies 
-contemporary, 304-54; causes of 
murder in, 323-30, 341-52; 
criminal violence feared in, 6-7  ; 
family members in murder cases, 
16; guns in, 343-48 ; mass mur­
ders, 318-19; as most dangerous 
country in the world, 304-5 , 
312-13 ; murder rate, 5, 14, 306­
13; serial killers, 319-20; terror­
ism in, 317-18 ; various forms of 
homicide in, 314-2 0 
-early republic, 77 -91  ; criminal 
procedure reformed, 78-80 ; duel­
ing in, 84-87 ; murder associated 
with mystery in, 82-84 ; murder 
rate in, 81-82 , 310-311 ; slavery 
in, 87-9 1 
-Sixties, the. See Sixties, the 
-World War I, 214, 215-1 6 
-World War II, 248,249 
-between World War II and Viet­
nam, 250-67 ; Civil Rights Move­
ment, 260-65 , 272, 279; Cold 
War, 252, 260; murder rate in, 
255, 258-59 , 265; Rosenberg 
case, 252-5 4 
-between world wars, 216-48 ; 
Brearly s analysis of murder rates, 
397 Index 
235-39; gangland murders, 219, 
231; Great Depression, 244-46 , 
248; Jazz Age, 218; Lawless 
Decade of 1920s, 214, 219, 220 ­
21, 241; murder rate, 214-15 , 
229, 235-39; Red Scare of 1919, 
216. See also Prohibition 
—See also cities; class; Constitution; 
criminal justice system; East, the; 
federal government; firearms; 
immigration; media; murder; 
Native Americans; North, the; 
public school system; reform 
movements; slaves; South, the; 
violence; West, the 
University of Texas sniper, 319 
University of Wisconsin bombing, 
286 
unwed mothers, 29, 49-50 , 325-2 6 
urban industrial revolution. See in­
dustrial revolution 
Ury, John, 65 
Utah: Gilmore execution, 341; hang­
ing retained in, 199; violence in, 
349 
vagrancy laws, 147 
Van Colin, Frank, 314 
Van Meter, Homer, 245, 246 
Vanzetti, Bartolomeo, 224-28 , 253, 
313 
Vermont, murder rate in early twen­
tieth century, 229 
Vesey, Denmark, 88 
Vietnam War: Johnsons escalation 
of, 271; Kent State killings, 285; 
King's opposition to, 277; murder 
rate not dropping during, 300— 
301; protests against, 274, 280­
81; U.S. politics dominated by, 
268 
vigilantes: in antebellum period, 
131-35; after John Brown's raid, 
143; in colonial South, 69; IWW 
lynchings, 181; Native Americans 
killed by, 169; Regulators, 69, 
131; in South after Civil War, 
148; in the West, 177 
violence: against African Americans 
after Civil War, 187-88; against 
African Americans before Civil 
War, 110, 116, 137; causes in 
antebellum period, 126-28; 
causes in colonial America, 5 8  ­
59; cultural factors in American, 
348 — 53; feared in contemporary 
America, 6 -7  ; imprisonment and, 
337; international trend since 
mid-nineteenth century, 297­
300; in late nineteenth century, 
183, 184; medieval England as 
violent society, 17-18; nonviolent 
ideal in antebellum period, 122— 
24; prosperity and, 343; role mod­
eling and, 326; slavery as cause, 
33-34 , 110; suicide, 185,319, 
321, 328n; television encouraging, 
276, 325, 348; tolerance for in 
America, 238; in young males, 3, 
326. See also domestic violence; 
dueling; homicide; labor violence; 
mob violence; terrorism 
Virginia: capital exported, 88; capital 
punishment in early republic, 89; 
freeing slaves restricted, 88; Har-
per's Ferry raid, 138-39; lynching 
in, 152, 154; Norfolk race riots, 
148; Richmond, 81, 86, 89; slav­
ery ameliorated in, 88. See also 
Virginia Colony 
Virginia Colony, 34-45 ; Bacon's Re­
bellion, 43; benefit of clergy plea 
for slaves, 58; criminal justice sys­
tem, 39, 41-42 ; death penalty, 
40; founding of, 33; House of 
Burgesses, 40 -41  ; indentured ser­
vants, 42-43  ; land ownership, 41; 
massacre of 1622, 37; murder rate 
in, 45; Native Americans in, 3 5  ­
39; Pocahontas, 35-37 ; restric­
398 
Virginia Colony {continued) 
tions on freed people, 64; Rolphe, 
36, 40; slavery in, 42, 43-44 , 61, 
62-64 ; Smith, 36; tobacco farm­
ing, 40, 42; Virginia Company, 
34-35 , 40 
Vollmer, Augustus, 246 
voluntary manslaughter, 114, 258 
volunteer fire companies, 104, 106, 
127, 142, 159, 182 
Waco, Tex., 316 
Waite, Charles A., 227 
Walker, Mary, 117 
Wallace, George, 272, 284 
Walnut Street Prison, 80 
wanted notices, 210 
war: European and frontier com­
pared, 73-74 ; in European impe­
rialism, 27; hopes for abolition of, 
77-78 ; as intentional homicide, 1; 
Native American conduct of, 168; 
in West Africa, 44; World War I, 
214, 215-16; World War II, 248, 
249. See also American Revolution; 
Civil War; Vietnam War 
War on Poverty, 271, 274 
Warren Commission, 271 
Warren Court, 289-9 2 
Washington, George, 87 
Washington, D.C., 217, 255 
Washington State: Centralia con­
frontation between American Le­
gion and IWW, 216; death 
penalty abolished, 197; death pen­
alty reinstated, 223. See also Seattle 
Watson, Tex, 283 
Watts riot of 1965, 275 
weapons: in antebellum murders, 
129; armed robbery, 189, 231, 
322; concealed weapons, 109, 
301, 345, 347; in medieval En­
gland, 18. See also firearms 
Weathermen, 283-84, 286, 317 
Welch, Agnes, 189 
Index 
Wells, Ida, 153, 155 
West, Richard, 262 
West, the: banditry in, 173-77; be­
tween Civil War and World War I, 
146, 165-81 ; cowboys and cattle 
drives, 170-71 ; frontier thesis for 
American violence, 349; gun car­
rying in, 238; on gun control, 
345; gunfights, 171, 177,240; 
labor violence, 178—81; local law 
enforcement in, 173, 174, 177; 
mining country, 171-72, 178­
81; murder rate in early twentieth 
century, 229; Oklahoma, 349; 
plains Indians, 130-31 , 169; vigi­
lantism in, 177; violence declining 
after World War II, 255. See also 
individual states 
Western Federation of Miners 
(WFM), 178, 179 
West Virginia, Railroad Strike of 
1877, 156 
Wharton, Wesley, 189 
White, Roy Wilson, 198, 199 
White, Stanford, 191 
Whiteling, Sarah Jane, 202 
whites: backlash against civil rights, 
272, 274; black rapes of white 
women, 152, 198; black-white 
murders, 136, 197-98, 230, 322; 
conviction rate compared to 
blacks, 198-99, 257; death pen­
alty compared to blacks, 199, 292; 
in Los Angeles riot of 1992, 329; 
mass murderers as, 319; miscege­
nation, 110; move to the suburbs, 
266, 273; murder rate in 1960s 
and 1970s, 302; in Prohibition-era 
gangs, 236; serial killers as, 319; 
slaves murdered by, 62-63  , 136; 
slave murders of, 64, 136; white-
black murders, 148, 197-98, 
230, 322; white-Indian murders, 
38-39 , 46, 169; white police and 
black civilians, 273; women mur­
399 Index 
derers compared to blacks, 2 3 3  ­
34, 257. See also Germans; Irish;

Italians; Scots-Irish 
Whitman, Charles, 318

Whittier, John Greenleaf, 100

Wickersham Commission, 229, 230,

237, 242

Wilkerson, Cathy, 284, 313

Wilson, Woodrow, 215, 217

Winchell, Walter, 246

Wisconsin: death penalty abolished, 
102; Little Bohemia shoot-out, 
245; University of Wisconsin 
bombing, 286. See also Milwaukee 
Wise, Henry A., 139

Wister, Owen, 183

witchcraft, 30, 31, 49, 51-5 2

Witherspoon v. Illinois, 293, 294, 295

Wobblies (Industrial Workers of the 
World), 179-81,216-1 7

Wolfgang, Marvin, 254-60 , 265

women. See females 
Women's Christian Temperance 
Union, 184

women's movement, 326-2 7

Wood, Edward S., 208

Wood, James, 124

working class: in antebellum Phila­
delphia murders, 125; and decline 
of older manufacturing cities, 300; 
discipline as object of schooling 
for, 98, 182, 184-85; discipline

required in, 97; labor unions, 161; 
in 1830s and 1840s, 108-9; in 
late nineteenth century, 184; mar­
riage in, 233; nonviolent ideals in, 
124; prizefighting's popularity in, 
127-28; strikes, 161. See also la­
bor violence 
World (New York), 221

World Trade Center bombing, 317,

318

World War I, 214, 215-1 6

World War II, 248, 249

Wounded Knee siege, 288-8 9

Wyoming: murder rate compared 
with Idaho, 236; Rock Springs 
Chinatown violence, 172—73 
Yellow Thunder, Raymond, 287

Young, Brigham, 134

Younger, Cole, 173, 174

Younger, John, 173, 174

young males: in antebellum Philadel­
phia murders, 125, 126; bachelor

subculture, 122, 127, 183, 351;

causes of violence in antebellum, 
127-28; gangs formed by, 104; 
homicide as leading cause of death 
for black, 321; homicides com­
mitted by, 6, 298; in medieval En­
glish murders, 16; in mob riots in 
antebellum cities, 104; murder as 
crime of, 6, 298, 323; in post-

Civil War Philadelphia murders, 
188; in post-World War II mur­
ders, 256; role modeling for, 326; 
teenagers, 323, 353; violence in,

3, 326; in the West, 171. See also 
gangs 
Zephron, Samuel, 117, 128


The History of Crime and Criminal Justice Series 
David R. Johnson and Jeffrey S. Adler, Series Editors 
The series explores the history of crime and criminality, violence, crimi­
nal justice, and legal systems without restrictions as to chronological 
scope, geographical focus, or methodological approach. 
Murder in America: A History 
Roger Lane 
